

The term “geopolitics” became the characteristic expression of Britain’s fear of loss of its imperial world-domination. During the late Nineteenth Century, and first four, pre-nuclear decades of the Twentieth, Britain’s leading concern was to ensure the overwhelming supremacy of British maritime—and, therefore, also naval—power over any conceivable combination of nations outside the Empire itself. This meant, in practice, an included determination, not only to destroy the ongoing development of Eurasian continental railway “land bridges,” but to slow down, even reverse the rate of economic development on the continent of Eurasia, and, in the feared and hated United States. The notion of strategy based upon political geography of sea-power versus Eurasia “heartland,” emerged from this British—or, should one better say, “British”—imperial obsession.

In this setting, “geopolitics,” the old Roman imperial policy of “balance of power” which Britain had employed earlier, divide and conquer, assumed new dimensions.

The act of overthrowing the existing government of France, to bring a *revanchist* assortment of political degenerates to power, against cooperation-partner Germany, was the first step of the Prince of Wales, later King Edward VII, toward a war aimed at destroying the potential of an anti-London concert of power on the continent of Eurasia. To bring Germany’s leading continental partner, Witte’s Russia, into alliance with France and Britain, against Germany, was crucial for Edward VII and his lackeys. If the U.S.A. could be summoned to support Britain logistically, against Germany, rather than continuing the U.S. pre-1901 alliance with both Germany and Russia, then Britain and its continental dupes, France and Russia, could be summoned to war for the mutual destruction and enduring enmities of a “Great War.” The 1901 assassination of U.S. President William McKinley, to bring that wicked Anglophile spawn of the Confederacy, Theodore Roosevelt, to power, and the subsequent election, with crucial assistance from Theodore Roosevelt, of Ku Klux Klan buff Woodrow Wilson, ensured Britain the position to launch the 1914-1918 “Great War” with aid of an orchestrated Balkan War.

It is that same policy which London focusses against continental Eurasia today. That is the governing consideration behind Brzezinski’s disgusting opus.

Today, the possibility of moving directly from the unstoppable, presently ongoing doom of the present financial system, to economic recovery globally, demands international cooperation in a great seed-crystal program of infrastructure development. The only possibility for such a program of the needed scope, is a reconstruction program based upon what we have defined, more broadly, as the Eurasian “Land-Bridge” program, and, more narrowly, the “New Silk Road” program. These programs, engaging all continental Eurasia, Africa, and, across the Bering Strait, into all of the principal land-masses of the Americas, are indispensable for the human race as a whole, and, thus, also for the U.S.A.

A glance at the natural, as well as the political geography

of our global land-bridge-route map, shows immediately the strategic significance of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus for the world as a whole. Caspian oil as such, is a relatively trivial consideration by comparison.

Get to the heart of Brzezinski’s rant. What is the practical effect of his proposed scheme from the standpoint of the land-bridge route-map? It is World War I all over again! The words spring to the lips of any sane person: “That miserable clown, Brzezinski!”

The fact that a clown such as Brzezinski may be goofy, does not mean that insanity can not be dangerous.

Documentation


Brzezinski’s geostrategic scheme for Eurasia

The following are excerpts from Zbigniew Brzezinski’s “A Geostrategy for Eurasia,” published in Foreign Affairs, the journal of the New York Council on Foreign Relations (September-October 1997). The article was adapted from his new book, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books, 1997).

... Eurasia is the world’s axial supercontinent. A power that dominated Eurasia would exercise decisive influence over two of the world’s three most economically productive regions, Western Europe and East Asia. A glance at the map also suggests that a country dominant in Eurasia would almost automatically control the Middle East and Africa. With Eurasia now serving as the decisive geopolitical chessboard, it no longer suffices to fashion one policy for Europe and another for Asia. What happens with the distribution of power on the Eurasian landmass will be of decisive importance to America’s global primacy and historical legacy. . . .

In the western periphery of Eurasia, the key players will continue to be France and Germany, and America’s central goal should be to continue to expand the democratic European bridgehead. In the Far East, China is likely to be increasingly pivotal, and the United States will not have a Eurasian strategy unless a Sino-American political consensus is nurtured. In Eurasia’s center, the area between an enlarging Europe and a regionally rising China will remain a political black hole until Russia firmly redefines itself as a post-imperial state. Meanwhile, to the south of Russia, Central Asia threatens to become a caldron of ethnic conflicts and great-power rivalries. . . .

Failure to widen NATO, now that the commitment has been made, would shatter the concept of an expanding Europe and demoralize the Central Europeans. Worse, it could reig-



Brzezinski's insane geopolitical view of the world, as published in the *New York Council on Foreign Relations' journal*, Foreign Affairs.

nite dormant Russian political aspirations in Central Europe. Moreover, it is far from evident that the Russian political elite shares the European desire for a strong American political and military presence in Europe. Accordingly, while fostering a cooperative relationship with Russia is desirable, it is important for America to send a clear message about its global priorities. If a choice must be made between a larger Europe-Atlantic system and a better relationship with Russia, the former must rank higher.

Russia's historic task

... Russia's first priority should be to modernize itself rather than to engage in a futile effort to regain its status as a global power. Given the country's size and diversity, a decentralized political system and free-market economics would be most likely to unleash the creative potential of the Russian people and Russia's vast natural resources. A loosely confederated Russia—composed of a European Russia, a Siberian Republic, and a Far Eastern Republic—would also find it easier to cultivate closer economic relations with its neighbors. Each of the confederate entities would be able to tap its local creative potential, stifled for centuries by Moscow's heavy bureaucratic hand. In turn, a decentralized Russia would be less susceptible to imperial mobilization.

Russia is more likely to make a break with its imperial past if the newly independent post-Soviet states are vital and stable. Their vitality will temper any residual Russian imperial temptations. Political and economic support for the new states must be an integral part of a broader strategy for integrating Russia into a cooperative transcontinental system. . . .

China as the eastern anchor

... Although China is emerging as a regionally dominant power, it is not likely to become a global one for a long time. The conventional wisdom that China will be the next global power is breeding paranoia outside China while fostering megalomania in China. It is far from certain that China's explosive growth rates can be maintained for the next two

decades. . . .

A de facto sphere of Chinese regional influence is likely to be part of Eurasia's future. Such a sphere of influence should not be confused with a zone of exclusive political domination, like the Soviet Union had in Eastern Europe. It is more likely to be an area in which weaker states pay special deference to the interests, views, and anticipated reactions of the regionally dominant power. . . .

Greater China's geopolitical influence is not necessarily incompatible with America's strategic interest in a stable, pluralistic Eurasia. For example, China's growing interest in Central Asia constrains Russia's ability to achieve a political reintegration of the region under Moscow's control. In this connection and in regard to the Persian Gulf, China's growing energy needs means it has a common interest with America in maintaining free access to, and political stability in, the oil-producing regions. Similarly, China's support for Pakistan restrains India's ambitions to subordinate that country, while offsetting India's inclination to cooperate with Russia in regard to Afghanistan and Central Asia. . . .

The bottom line is that America and China need each other in Eurasia. Greater China should consider America a natural ally for historical as well as political reasons. . . .

Transcontinental security

In the long term, Eurasia's stability would be enhanced by the emergence, perhaps early in the next century, of a trans-Eurasian security system. Such a transcontinental security arrangement might involve an expanded NATO, linked by cooperative security agreements with Russia, China, and Japan. But to get there, Americans and Japanese must first set in motion a triangular political-security dialogue that engages China. . . . The emergence of such a transcontinental system could gradually relieve America of some of its burdens, while perpetuating beyond a generation its decisive role as Eurasia's arbitrator. Geostrategic success in that venture would be a fitting legacy to America's role as the first and only global superpower.