

ments Found—Paper.”

- May 22, Associated Press, “Khmer Rouge Was Plotting Comeback Via Peace Talks, Papers Show.”
- May 23, Huw Watkin, *South China Morning Post*, “Cambodia Prince ‘Plotted’ with Khmer Rouge.”
- May 25, Huw Watkin, *South China Morning Post*, “Cambodia: Papers Ravage Credibility of Ranariddh.”
- May 27, Agence France Presse, “Deposed Cambodian Prince Defends Negotiations with Khmer Rouge.”

At the postwar Nuremberg trials, the criterion for complicity in genocide was “knew, or should have known.” Once again, *EIR* must set the record straight.

### Gaining the legal ground

The notebooks record discussions at meetings led by Khmer Rouge leaders Ta Mok, Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan, and others. One entry, from June 1997, reports that “in the past few months, Ranariddh has run to us because Ranariddh

doesn’t have forces.” Explaining why the Khmer Rouge were joining in Ranariddh’s National United Front, one entry reads: “Ranariddh’s boat is sinking in the sea, but our boat is not. We have to help him, but the way we help is to offer him a stick, not a hand, not an embrace, not to let him cling to our boat, or we all die. We have to play a trick.”

Another official said: “The [National United] Front is not important. Signing to join the Front obtains us legitimacy. Once we are legitimate, the world will want to help.”

Readers who find it incredible that the Khmer Rouge could imagine gaining international legitimacy, must recall that between 1979, when the Vietnamese military provided backing for Cambodian nationalists (including Hun Sen) to end the Khmer Rouge terror, and 1993, when the United Nations sponsored elections, the deposed Khmer Rouge were *officially recognized at the UN, and by the Reagan and Bush administrations, as the legitimate government of Cambodia*, despite universal horror at the genocide they had carried out

## U.S. policy could lead to tragedy for Cambodia

Following the aborted coup attempt in Phnom Penh in July 1997, the United States imposed sanctions on the government of co-Prime Ministers Hun Sen and Ung Huot, which especially affected U.S. aid for preparations for general elections, now scheduled for July 26, and assistance in anti-narcotics efforts. Recently, Washington has said it will cut funding for the elections, from \$7 million to \$2.3 million, and that money will not go to the National Economic Commission, but will be funneled through privately run non-governmental organizations. Sens. John Kerry (D-Mass.) and John McCain (R-Ariz.) have largely subscribed to the view that the Phnom Penh government must be held to account for “free and fair” elections, while U.S. aid is denied the government, with little accountability demanded from the NGOs.

*EIR* is not alone in thinking that U.S. policy on Cambodia is seriously askew. Australia’s ambassador to Cambodia (1994-97), Tony Kevin, wrote a commentary on the situation, titled “U.S. Errs in Cambodia Policy,” which was published as the “5th Column” article in the May 21 *Far Eastern Economic Review* and posted to an Internet website. Ambassador Kevin does not consider either Hun Sen or Prince Ranariddh “angels” in the complex situation in Cambodia, but acknowledges that up until last July, Cambodia, largely through Hun Sen’s efforts, was making progress. Prince Ranariddh, he says, “listened to reckless advisers when he listened at all,” and did the most to

destroy his own political party, Funcinpec.

Ambassador Kevin appeals to the United States to reconsider its current approach as follows:

“While Cambodia remains at war with itself, rights violations on all sides will continue. But rather than condemn just one side, the U.S. should help bring about an end to the . . . warfare in which such rights violations occur. . . .

“America’s unrelenting demonization of Hun Sen, and its determination to treat Cambodia as a pariah state until he is ousted, is unworthy of a great nation. These policies are rooted in anger and guilt, and compounded by ignorance. Washington is angered by the failed return (as it sees it) on the \$2.2-billion international investment in the UN-sponsored election process in 1991-93. There is also guilt over the U.S. mass bombing of Cambodia during the Vietnam War, followed by active U.S. support from 1981 to 1991 of an insurgency in which the Khmer Rouge was the strongest force. Hun Sen has become the focus of these unresolved American feelings of anger and guilt—hated by both liberals and conservatives in Washington. . . .

“The result is bad policy. The U.S. aid boycott since mid-1997 has further damaged business confidence, economic growth and the growth of civil society—without any countervailing political benefits.

“Tensions will inevitably mount in the run-up to elections in July. There may be provocations, even high-profile political killings. If Washington were to continue to blame Hun Sen for whatever goes wrong, and accordingly pressures its partners within the ‘Friends of Cambodia’ group to withdraw their support for the election, this would be a tragedy. It would risk pushing Cambodia back to the worst days of the 1979-91 civil war and diplomatic isolation—to no good purpose.”