

leaders first heralded in the Jan. 14, 1997 London *Times*. This breed centers around Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, and included Eritrean military dictator Isaias Afwerki, Ethiopian dictator Meles Zenawi, Congolese dictator Laurent Kabila, and Rwandan dictator Paul Kagame. One of this coalition's major aims was to bring down the Sudan government; however, the coalition has fallen to pieces, as war has broken out between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and between Kabila's Congo on one side and Ugandan and Rwanda on the other. Rice's "peace efforts" have come to naught in both cases.

Rice's animosity toward Sudan is unyielding, as she has stated that "Sudan is the only state in sub-Saharan Africa that poses a direct threat to U.S. national security interests." In her current post, and before that, at the NSC Africa desk, she refused to meet with Sudanese Ambassador to the United States Mahdi Ibrahim Mohamed, despite the ongoing diplomatic relations between the two countries.

She has been nearly as extreme in her targetting of Nigeria. In a speech at the Brookings Institution on March 12, Rice enunciated her policy toward Nigeria: "Let me state clearly and unequivocally to you today that an electoral victory by any military candidate in the forthcoming Presidential elections would be unacceptable"—the first time that such a policy had been so stated by Washington. Her father, Emmet Rice, was a former adviser to the Central Bank of Nigeria.

To the extent that she has any expertise, it is in peacekeeping and military operations, and Rice has been involved in the details in formulating the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), which calls for the formation of regional armies that would deploy at the behest of supranational organizations, such as the UN Security Council, or the Organization of African Unity.

The poverty of her knowledge of Africa itself has shocked the African diplomatic corps in Washington. Further, is the common complaint, she doesn't want to learn. "Many of my colleagues on Africa have a degree of understanding and expertise that I can't pretend to have," she told the *Washington Post*; and, says the *Post*, in its adulatory March 30 profile of her, "While the top brass are enchanted, she has not captured the hearts and minds of the grunts" in the State Department. She is known for not entertaining any views contradictory to the policy that has been set for her to carry out, and for blocking the flow of information that might show that policy's weakness or failure.

She brooks no opposition, it is said, even from the U.S. President. When President Clinton, in South Africa, on March 27 had voiced his hopes for Gen. Sani Abacha's moving Nigeria toward democracy, the State Department was asked by a reporter if this did not contradict the policy stated by Rice on March 12, and which policy was correct. After first denying the President's statement, State Department spokesman James Foley stood by Rice's declaration, and stated that any other idea was "wildly hypothetical." "What Assistant Secretary Rice said stands," asserted Foley.

Roger Winter: boss of the warlords

On Sept. 17, Roger Winter, executive director of the U.S. Committee on Refugees, spoke at a conference of the U.S. Institute for Peace, and demanded full-scale backing from the U.S. government for a war "to bring down the Khartoum government" in Sudan, adding, "even though I know it will bring about a humanitarian catastrophe." He reassured the assembled African policymakers present, however, that U.S. troops would not be involved in the effort; this would be a proxy war using Ugandan and Eritrean troops against Sudan, with U.S. weapons and logistical and training support.

To aid this process, Winter is known to have lobbied for the placement of Susan Rice as the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.

By all accounts, Winter is a feared person among Africans and in Washington. Not only is he seen as the man behind Rice's appointment, but his underling at the Interaction Council, Julia Taft, is now the head of the U.S. State Department's Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration. Winter is head of the Interaction Council, an umbrella group for all the non-governmental organizations that deal with relief and other humanitarian matters, Winter is reputedly the political director of the entire operation. He and his sidekick John Prendergast, now ensconced at the National Security Council, have pushed for a policy of politicization of relief agencies, and away from their expected stance of neutrality in other people's conflicts.

Winter's own U.S. Committee on Refugees—75% funded by the U.S. government—never delivers aid to refugees, but is the intelligence nerve center for the entire relief apparatus, and coordinates the political "attitude" to be taken toward refugees. It is also clear from Winter's own public activities, and the most recent caper in which he has been caught, that the "political" direction of relief efforts also includes supplying military aid—that is, using "relief" efforts as the cover for partisan and deadly military support.

Winter's longstanding demands for war against Khartoum are a classic case of such partisan and deadly mis-use of "humanitarian concerns." In 1990, Winter published a paper "War and Famine in Sudan" which called for a complete realignment of U.S. policy in East Africa based on the winding down of the Cold War against the Soviet Union. "For many years," Winter wrote, "Sudan has been an important geostrategic partner of the United States. For more than 15 years, Ethiopia has been viewed by the United States as the destabilizing force in the region—with good reason. Frankly, however, given the overwhelmingly negative changes that have occurred in Sudan at the hands of the Bashir government,

there is no reason other than being caught in the Cold War rut to explain the U.S. pattern of tolerating Khartoum's actions during much of the last year and a half.

"In some ways, the pattern has been similar to our pre-August 1 pattern of cozying up to Iraq. When [Sudan President Omar al-] Bashir's coup overthrew [Sudan leader] Sadiq [al-Mahdi], U.S. aid began to shut down, but only because our law required it. The United States continued to support assistance to Sudan through multilateral institutions. Human rights conditions in Sudan deteriorated rapidly and massively, but U.S. criticism was muffled at best; the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs was absent. Operation Lifeline Sudan was manipulated into impotence, but the United States (and the UN, for that matter) was not aggressive about preserving Lifeline's effectiveness and humanitarian neutrality.

"Until Saddam.

"Finally, the United States appears to have fundamentally reconsidered its posture regarding Sudan, or, more specifically, a Bashir administration in Sudan."

Winter's complaints against Sudan have not changed; in fact, at the U.S. Institute for Peace conference, Winter's charges against Sudan all reverted back to 1991, even though the Sudanese government has changed major policies and made peace with large sections of the political leadership of southern Sudan, and also permitted Operation Lifeline relief agencies to continue to send food into southern Sudan, while bypassing Khartoum.

Winter argued for support by the U.S. government for John Garang's Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA). His sponsorship of Garang in Washington is legendary; whenever Garang comes to the United States, the itinerary is in Winter's control. Since 1990, Winter has argued for a U.S. policy of de facto recognition of Garang's SPLA as the government of southern Sudan. Winter called this a "people-friendly" policy toward Sudan.

It is noteworthy, however, that since Winter wrote his policy paper of 1990, the military situation in southern Sudan *has not changed*. What has changed, is the death toll of this war. More than 3 million southern Sudanese, most of them Christian, have fled southern Sudan for *Khartoum*, to escape the war. Hundreds of thousands were killed in the 1992 fratricidal war between the Garang and Machar wings of the SPLA, not only by military means, but mostly due to the terrible famine that ensued; today millions more are at risk of starvation. In his 1990 paper, Winter predicted military victory just around the corner: "In January 1990, the SPLA began to shell Juba, the so-called capital of the South, and captured Kajo Kaji, Kaya, and Yei town. . . . Virtually all Sudan army actions to regain the military initiative have failed."

But today, the SPLA is no closer to taking Juba than it ever was. In fact, it is not in shelling range of the "capital of the south." The towns of Yei, Torit, and others have changed hands numbers of times, each battle leaving hundreds dead,

and thousands displaced, uprooted, left with no means of subsistence.

It really cannot be expected that even if Winter were able to supply the SPLA, that it could achieve military victory, yet he and his cohorts continue a war against Sudan, a policy which, as Rep. Tony Hall accurately told Rice in Congressional hearings on July 29, "is a failure."

Why?

Roger Winter is also patron to two other warlords in the region: Ugandan dictator Yoweri Museveni and his underling, Rwandan Defense Minister and former head of Ugandan military intelligence, Paul Kagame.

His sponsorship of Museveni dates back to 1982—before the SPLA war against Sudan even began. In one of his first ventures as executive director of the U.S. Committee of Refugees, Winter traveled to Uganda, where he took up the cause of the Banyarwanda refugees—Tutsi Rwandans who had fled to Uganda in the early 1960s—against the government of Ugandan President Milton Obote. By 1983, Winter was regularly visiting Yoweri Museveni in the bush, as Museveni was leading his guerrilla war against the Obote government. Winter became an early publicist for Museveni, centered around charges that Obote was carrying out a campaign of mass murder in the Luwero Triangle—a campaign that many in central Uganda are coming to realize was carried out by Museveni himself.

Through Museveni, Winter became an early patron of Kagame and the Rwandan Patriotic Front, which was organized in Kampala, Uganda. In August 1988, Winter organized a conference of the Association of Banyarwandans in Diaspora in Washington, D.C., which brought together Rwandan Tutsis in exile to sponsor the efforts of the Rwandan Patriotic Front to come to power in Kigali. Two years later, the RPF, backed by Museveni along with troops of Uganda, invaded Rwanda in October 1990, launching the process that led to the genocide of 1994. In the 1994 RPF blitzkrieg of Rwanda, after the murder of Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana, Winter told Congress: "I had the great honor of travelling in Rwanda in April, in May, in June, and in July, as the war was occurring. I had the privilege of travelling with the Rwandan Patriotic Front as it gradually increased its control over Rwandan territory."

Hence, Winter is to be found among the earliest sponsors from the United States of the British warlords—Kagame, Garang, and Museveni—who have wreaked so much havoc in East Africa. Their policy has nothing to do with the populations they claim to represent, but the British Commonwealth designs—funneled by Winter through the United States—to break up the nation-states of East Africa with the use of mercenary armies that have agreed to function as the marcher-lords for a total looting of African raw materials and mineral wealth.

It is the myth of the "bogeyman" of Sudan and the alleged national security threat from Sudan that keeps Winter and these warlords in business.