

## Schiller and the Liberation Wars against Napoleon

by Helga Zepp-LaRouche

*The following is edited from the keynote by Helga Zepp-LaRouche to the second day of the Nov. 21-22 Schiller Institute conference, in Bad Schwalbach, Germany. Before launching into the subject of her address on Schiller and the Liberation Wars, Mrs. Zepp-LaRouche introduced a few video excerpts from her recent trip to China, which she described to the conference participants. A full report on the China Land-Bridge conference appears in our National Economy section. A summary of the Schiller Institute conference in Germany appears on p. 59.*

The subject of my speech today, is Schiller and the Liberation Wars, which I have chosen not so much because the Germans of that period of the Liberation Wars were much less stupid than the Germans today, even though that alone is a reason to go back to this period and enjoy being in Germany, mentally. But the present global situation, is such that one needs to go back to such better periods of one's own history, and try to find the lessons of what we need to do today. And especially when you look at this period, which you already heard a lot about yesterday during the panel on Lazare Carnot, it is very obvious that there are clear parallels between the Liberation War period, and the present situation.

And then, it becomes also very obvious that we cannot look at the present moment in history from the standpoint of normal politics, or diplomacy, or foreign relations, or any such thing. But, that, if you really want to understand what is happening right now, you have to think from the standpoint of war. And the purpose of my speech today — and I hope I succeed — is, I want to cause you to stop thinking like civilians. Because if you are thinking like a civilian, you will not be able to deal with the present dangers with which mankind is threatened.

You have to think like a military commander — and I really mean that — you have to think like a general, a superior commander, who has to win a war against an evil enemy.

Look at a couple of examples in the present situation. For example, remember when Gore put his big feet into his mouth at the APEC summit in Kuala Lumpur,



*Statue of Schiller (right) and Goethe in Weimar, Germany. Schiller, it could be said, “reached out of his grave” to defeat Napoleon—through the efforts of the Prussian military reformers trained in his way of thinking about grand strategy and the human mind.*

when he said something which was nothing other than his intention to topple the government of his host country. Now, was that diplomatic? Or was that an act of bellicose aggression?

If you reflect how the Monica Lewinsky affair was set up de facto as an effort to conduct a British parliamentarian-style coup against the institution of the American President, was that diplomacy? No. It is like an act of war, where a hostile force tries to take out the Supreme Commander of the opposing army.

If you consider how Clinton, in the middle of the British-led effort to lure the United States into another strike against Iraq, was fed disinformation about Iraq, including about the number of civilians who would die in the first strike—he was fed misinformation by Gore, by Defense Secretary Cohen, by head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Shelton. And only because Clinton, at a certain point, insisted that he must have an estimate of the number of people—civilians—dead in the first moment of war, that finally, I think it was Shelton, who said, “Okay, the first wave of killing would be 10,000 dead civilians.” And then Clinton called off the strike.

Now, is that normal diplomacy, that some elements in the *government* of the United States would try to lure the President into such an operation? No. These are characteristics of war.

### **The oligarchs’ war against the nation-state**

Now, what is the nature of this war? Well, to give it one short characterization, the war is the effort of the international

financial oligarchy to eliminate the sovereign nation-state as the only efficient defense of the people against the oligarchs’ excessive efforts at looting.

The weapons being used in this war, are partly the same as always—drugs, coups, assassinations, and so forth—but partly these weapons are also coming in new clothes, in new dogmas, in the form of new sacred cows, things which cannot be touched upon.

For example, one such sacred cow, is the dogma that, “There is no alternative to globalization.” Well, as I will demonstrate later, a similar dogma existed before the Liberation Wars, with the sentence “Napoleon is invincible.”

Another such dogma: “Nobody has a *Patentrezept*,” “Nobody has a solution to the problem.” “Nobody should interfere with the free market.” Or better, “Nobody should interfere with the free financial markets.”

If you look at the way the hedge funds, for example, are attacking countries, you can only find a comparison with war: It’s like heavy artillery bombarding a country, or better, like ICBMs. When the aggressive capital of these hedge funds is used to attack the national economies, indeed, they can destroy—as Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir said a while ago—they can destroy in weeks, what it took countries 40 years to build up. So, are they less damaging than ICBMs? No.

If one reviews the beginning of the so-called Asian crisis in February 1997, with the attack on the Thai baht, and all the attacks on the stock markets in Southeast Asia, and their respective currencies, there is no other description than that this is warfare by the international speculators against nations

and their people. There is no essential difference between bombing Iraq back into the Stone Age, like Schwarzkopf had announced in the Bush period, or if you take hedge funds, and you bomb the Indonesian economy back into the Stone Age, which is exactly what has happened.

Now, the only government which really seems to have recognized the implication of this war fully, seems to be the Chinese government, which at the beginning of August, put out the analysis that from now on, they would equate all matters of the economic security of their country, with the question of national security. Because with respect to the economy, the very existence of the country would be at stake, and the sovereignty of the country.

Now, if you say that economic matters are questions of national security, because the existence of your people is at stake, then you are starting to think like a military commander. And consequently, China, at the beginning of August, started the battle against the speculators in Hong Kong. Then, on the first of September, the Malaysian government, obviously in the general aura of inspiration coming from China, instituted capital and exchange controls, a perfectly legitimate move to defend their own country.

Then, coinciding with that, we had the Labor Day conference in the United States [see *EIR*, Sept. 18, pp. 44-50]. And, as all layers from the highest layers in Washington to local people acknowledged, it was our mobilization which turned the tide. And the fact that not only the November election, but the aggression against the office of the Presidency was turned around, was due to our mobilization.

### **The free-market economy is dead**

In the meantime, on Aug. 17, when the Kiriyenko government imposed the known measures, this not only signified the end of the so-called IMF reform policy in Russia, but it de facto also meant—and history later will acknowledge this—the end of the free-market economy. At that moment, *the free market economy was as dead as the socialist-communist economy was dead in '89*. And only later, in '92, was it clearly visible.

Now, on Sept. 14, President Clinton, obviously in a very important move, made a speech before the New York Council on Foreign Relations, demanding a new financial system. The fact that he made that speech before the Council on Foreign Relations was commented upon by a high-ranking person in the U.S. Congress, saying it may not have been the wisest thing to speak to that group of people, because they will only target him if he doesn't follow through with actions to realize this.

Then, unfortunately, Clinton did not carry through. On Sept. 23, with the near-total bankruptcy of the Long Term Capital Management hedge fund, the whole world financial system was at the moment of complete meltdown. Not Asia, but western Europe, the United States, directly. At that point, the G-7 made a gigantic effort to bail out 16 of the leading banks and hedge funds. And the G-7 regrouped to move

against President Clinton's intention to go for a new financial system, by pulling him into the direction of the Third Way, namely, to have a so-called global solution to the present situation, and not allow countries like Malaysia, India, Russia, to act independently to defend their own economies.

That decision—the so-called G-7 plan to save the world economy—was nothing but a gigantic effort to pump liquidity into the system, Weimar-style, to blow up the bubble, which will make the next round of collapse even more horrible, and coming with a vengeance.

In the meantime, the Primakov government came in, in Russia, and against incredible odds—the danger of horrendous food shortages, a harsh winter to come, with Russia being in a situation where the perception of Russian patriots is that Russia is completely in the hands of the mafia, of the United States. And when you have had to suffer the kinds of destruction Russia had to go through over the last seven years, you cannot expect ordinary people to differentiate between the U.S. administration and the Republican networks.

Because, unfortunately, Gore is meddling with Chernomyrdin. And Berezovsky controls the media, so that even the Primakov government has a very hard time in getting out its own policies throughout the whole country. And the situation is very, very difficult, because in the meantime, the result of the success of the “great reform policy” in Russia, is that 1.5% of all Russians possess 60% of all wealth in the country.

So, under these circumstances, the fact that the Primakov government came in to try to retake control, to establish measures to solve the hunger situation for the winter, is absolutely heroic. And one can only fully agree with Maslyukov, who just gave an interview to *Kommersant-daily*, a vicious paper which normally plays the same role as *Spiegel* or *Business Week*, that of targetting politicians and conducting warfare.

So, Maslyukov said, “If not us, then no one,” making the point that this Primakov government *must* succeed. It is the last chance to ensure the survival of the economy and the country as a whole. And indeed, in the nearly two months that the Primakov government has been in there, they have taken extremely tough, prompt measures. And, as Taras Muranivsky was telling us yesterday, there is a good chance that the problems of hunger and power supply for the winter, can be brought under control. Now, there is an understanding by every sane force in the world, that the Primakov government must be successful.

In the meantime, as I showed you with the videoclip, we were in China, at the conference for the Eurasian Land-Bridge. And I can assure you that, in the many discussions that we did have with the Chinese, but also with some of the Russians who happened to be there at the same time, we had an incredibly important input. . . .

### **The APEC conference**

[The APEC conference in Malaysia marked an] extremely important inflection point, because Mahathir had asked Jiang Zemin to give a speech on how to get out of the international

financial crisis. Primakov was going there instead of Yeltsin, and, also, he was representing the approach of going back to protectionist measures. So it is very clear that had Clinton gone to this APEC summit with the idea of the speech that he gave at the CFR meeting, a unique combination could have come together: Jiang Zemin, Primakov, Mahathir, Clinton. And it is very obvious that with these people, Gore and Albright, going there, making the most horrible interference inside, and rude — so that the condemnation of what Gore did was unanimous. Even the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* — they all agreed that you cannot do that, you just cannot go to a country and call for the subversion and the toppling of the government in this way.

So it is very, very clear that if Clinton had gone there, it would have changed the world. Because Clinton, with all his shortcomings, is a real human being. And he would have responded to the discussions, especially in this environment.

Now, Jiang Zemin gave a very important speech there. [See *EIR*, Nov. 27, p. 8.] He said in this speech, that globalization is presenting very serious challenges and risks, especially to the developing countries, which have to be concerned with how to ensure their economic security under these conditions. And he said that globalization is the same, or corresponds to the inequitable and irrational, old international economic order. And then he said something, which I said many times in speeches in the last 20 years; he said, “The ultimate solution to the problem, is to work for the establishment of a just and reasonable new world economic order, in the interests of the common development of all nations.” And he also demanded a new world financial order.

Now, Jiang Zemin will go this weekend to Moscow. He will be there from the 23rd to the 25th; then he will go to Japan. I expect, especially when he goes to Siberia, that he will make very important announcements. Then Primakov will go to India on Dec. 6. And it is very clear that a new dynamic is already shaping the world. It is the dynamic between China, Russia, Malaysia, India. And as Lyn [Lyndon LaRouche] was telling you yesterday, you know: Europe and the United States, if they don't change, they will soon become irrelevant. And I think that we are confronted with a situation where, either we are able to use this new emergence of the new constellation in the world to catalyze new forces into being in the United States to turn the situation around with Clinton, to get people who are not giving up European civilization and European culture; or else, we may be confronted with a situation where, in maybe 10 or 20 years from now, Europe may be just a little place nobody is really concerned with. And European culture may actually die. I think that that is quite possible.

### Schiller's republican model

The situation, as I've said, has many similarities to the situation in which Carnot found himself, and the German patriots at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

So, what was this situation? The hopes of the European

republicans to repeat the American Revolution, in Europe, through the beginning of the French Revolution, had been completely destroyed by that time, due to the British subversion of the French Revolution; that hope had been completely dismantled. The oligarchy was well-entrenched in all European courts. Germany was still divided into 300 little baronies of squabbling dukes and barons and princes.

Napoleon had just made himself Emperor, very clearly on the model of the Roman Empire. Napoleon, at that point, had an explicit plan to rule the world. He had detailed plans not only to conquer Russia, but to move on to occupy India, after that. So, it was the same kind of globalism which is really the modern form of the control of the financial oligarchy today, in terms of supranational institutions controlling backward regions. And Napoleon had no interest in nations being strong: He wanted Germany to be divided into all of these little provinces.

So, the issue that patriots of all countries — of France, of Germany, of other countries — were confronted with, was how to get rid of oligarchism.

Now, the towering mind of the whole period in Germany, who radiated with anti-oligarchical spirit, was Schiller. He, in all his writings — the beautiful poems, the tragedies, the historical writings, and aesthetical and other writings — defined the struggle against the tyranny of oligarchism. Now, as you know, Schiller grew up in Württemberg. And as a child, he had a very personal and direct impression of what oligarchism was. It was the Duke of Württemberg who really tortured his childhood by putting him in this Karl's Academy, which he really suffered tremendously from. He grew up by seeing firsthand the complete indifference with which, for example, the court would go out hunting, using dozens of horses, storming through the peasants' crops, destroying the whole year's harvest, without ever thinking of compensating them. He saw the complete moral degeneracy of the court life: the bad cultural tastes, the morbid social life. He saw the horrible example of the poet Schubart, who was put by the Duke of Württemberg, into a dungeon, just for criticizing the Duke, without a trial, sitting in a dark hole for more than 10 years.

So against that, Schiller, out of this very personal experience, put up the vision and the idea of republican freedom. And as you remember, in the beautiful “Ode to Joy,” there are such beautiful formulations like “*Männer Stolz vor Fürsten Thronen*,” “Manly pride before the thrones of kings,” the idea that each person had to be independent and proud and free, and that there was no such thing as nobility.

The beautiful image of a progressing state, where the government takes care of the well-being of the people, which he writes about in *Solon and Lycurgus*, contrasting the republican model of the state with the oligarchical model. The beautiful dialogue in *Don Carlos* between the Marquis of Posa and Philip II, in which the Marquis of Posa says, “Why are you not a king of a million kings? Why do you not allow all your citizens to be uplifted? Why do you have to rule over people who are miserable?”



*Gerhard David Scharnhorst was the German counterpart to France's Carnot. Like Carnot, he emphasized the training of civilian soldiers, and their officers, in scientific conceptions—rather than using the soldiers as cannon fodder, and having oligarchs as officers.*


Or the beautiful play *Wilhelm Tell*, where he denounces the despotism of Gessler.

So, you can actually take the entire work of Schiller, and you read all these beautiful poems, and dramas, and other writings; and you can actually see that it was these passionate conceptions, about how one can be both a patriot and also a citizen of the world, by opposing oligarchism.

Now, Schiller, as you know, became the most beloved Poet of Freedom in Germany. And when he wrote new plays—for example, when he wrote *The Virgin of Orléans*, after its first performance, people were so excited that they carried him around on their shoulders. People would hold their children up to look at him, because he moved the hearts of the people, and he was just the most important influence. Later, in the Liberation Wars, when the soldiers went into battle, they would take poems, and would cut out lines, and place them near their hearts, so that they would feel strength from his writings.

So, Schiller was in one sense *the* most important, because he gave the conceptions of what this fight was all about.

Then, another extremely important figure, obviously, was Scharnhorst, who in this same spirit, had the idea of training civilian soldiers, by taking away the command from the silly oligarchs; the idea that officers had to be trained on the highest level of science and military thinking; and not just some degenerate bums from the courts—princes and so forth—would be the officers, using the people as cannon fodder.



*Freiherr vom Stein, the main author of the Prussian reforms, and probably the best statesman Germany ever had.*

Then, obviously, Scharnhorst is the corresponding figure to Carnot in Germany.

Then, other figures you know, were vom Stein, the main author of the Prussian reforms—actually, in my view, the best statesman Germany ever had. And you can forget all these ridiculous governments of the postwar period. Alongside people like vom Stein and von Humboldt, they're like midgets; they're dwarves; they're not visible, at all.

When Napoleon, who had conquered large parts of Europe, attacked Russia in the beginning of 1812, what was the situation? Was this a war between France and Russia? No. The way to look at it (and, also referring to a question, which came up yesterday—what was the difference between Carnot and Napoleon?), the way to understand this period, is: It was a struggle between oligarchical institutions and republicans, who used—or tried to use—the follies of Napoleon, hoping that, out of the weaknesses of this despot, they could bring down oligarchism; and intervene in such a way, that the end result of this period would be a republican order.

### **Schiller and Ludwig von Wolzogen**

Now, I want to talk, in particular, about one person, who had more to do with the defeat of Napoleon than almost anybody else; I think that history has not sufficiently given him credit, and it's not surprising that the enemy is trying to hide, a little bit, the true development of such periods. This person is Ludwig von Wolzogen, who was the youngest child of Henrietta von Wolzogen, the courageous woman who helped Schiller, after he had to flee. She housed him in Bauerbach,

so that he could continue to write various of his plays.

Schiller had gone, together with the two older brothers—Wilhelm and August—of Ludwig von Wolzogen, to the Karl's Academy. So, Ludwig, the youngest brother, knew Schiller extremely well from this period. Also, he stayed in very close contact with Schiller, after 1792, when Schiller and his wife spent some time with him in Heilbronn. In 1794, when Wilhelm, the oldest of the Wolzogen brothers, married Caroline von Lengefeld, the von Wolzogens became the in-laws of Schiller, who was married to Charlotte von Lengefeld. Beyond being in-laws, they remained extremely close friends, until Schiller's death.

Ludwig von Wolzogen joined the court of the Count Hohenlohe, and there had the ability to use the very rich library of this Count, studying maps; but the influence which guided his studies was Schiller. Any time he visited him, Schiller would impress him very much, because Schiller was already very sick—Schiller had many different health problems—but he nevertheless worked with great effort, and produced incredibly creative works. So, Ludwig von Wolzogen was so inspired by that, that he would study more seriously military history, geography, and history in general. He spent a longer period with Schiller in 1798, and there, they studied together, especially the Thirty Years' War; which, as you know, Schiller wrote about not only in his historical writings, but he also used that study, then, to write the Wallenstein trilogy.

And, they especially discussed the idea of the circumstances of the death of Max Piccolomini: namely, what Schiller had to do in the drama to present that death, not in the typical image of war, where bullets are flying—but, he gave it the stylistic form of having Max Piccolomini die beneath the hooves of the horses from his own army, and created a much deeper impact in this way.

They also discussed the role of the outstanding commanders, like Wallenstein, and Gustav Adolf; and this, in the mind of Ludwig von Wolzogen, created the idea of the unique role of outstanding commanders for the outcome of the battle, and he used that later, in his thinking about Napoleon. He writes, in his memoirs, that these discussions gave his whole military thinking further inspiration. He was deeply impressed by Schiller's enormous creativity; and then, again, felt inspired to write his own military essays, some of which were improved stylistically by Schiller, and then were published. For example, one about the Battle of Turin and the Prince Eugene of Savoy, which gained him the membership of the military society which had been founded by Scharnhorst in Berlin.

Now in 1797, Ludwig became a second lieutenant, and moved into the quarters of General von Grävenitz, and he reports in his memoirs that he had much time to study there, because there was no military activity going on. And, he only felt disturbed, because every day this General Grävenitz would loudly recite Schiller's poems to his troops; he would do so with great emphasis, especially the "Lied an die Freunde"—the "Song to the Friends"—and so forth. So, you

can imagine what the environment was. And, when Ludwig would visit his brother Wilhelm in Weimar, people like Goethe, Wieland, Herder, and all the great people from the Weimar Classic, would be coming in and out.

So, that was the environment. It was the environment of the Weimar Classic, which formed the thinking of these Prussian reformers—of Wilhelm von Humboldt, of Wolzogen, of Scharnhorst, and others.

It was from that Schillerian standpoint, that von Wolzogen first met Napoleon personally, in 1805, when he came to Ludwigsburg, to manipulate the Duke of Württemberg to join the war against Austria. And, Napoleon was very skillful, by offering this Duke that he would become a king, that he would have a much larger country; so he succeeded. And Ludwig von Wolzogen was in a strange position, in that he was close to somebody whom he had to regard as his mortal enemy: He writes in his memoirs that he belonged to the few who had *always* seen Napoleon as *only* a despot, who would never bring fortune to the world, which was the propaganda spread by many of the Rheinbund [Confederation of the Rhine] princes.

In 1806, he met several times with Napoleon, alone, and one of his observations was that Napoleon was always carrying an armored vest, obviously fearing assassination attempts. He interrogated Ludwig von Wolzogen about the condition of the Württemberg army: Which generals had what capabilities? And, Wolzogen basically said, "Well, none. You should give them a French general, because they're all badly trained." In these discussions, Wolzogen found Napoleon intelligent, but that really strengthened his determination to fight against this person. He says, "I was his enemy, by birth and conviction."

Soon, he left the Duke of Württemberg; he wanted to go to the Prussian court, but this was not possible, because of the defeat of Jena and Auerstaedt in 1806. But, he decided to do everything in his power to defeat Napoleon.

## **Journey to St. Petersburg**

Therefore, what he did—since he couldn't go to Prussia at that point—he went to St. Petersburg, where he arrived in 1807. And there, he could stay in the house of General Major Pfuehl, who was not a great military genius, but he was, however, the major general closest to Tsar Alexander, who took lessons in military science from Pfuehl—and also, Wolzogen—so he got to know the Tsar very well, too. And, sometimes to know these people, and how they think, and so forth, is extremely important.

So, some time passed, with his studies of the Seven Years' War. Ludwig von Wolzogen was drawing battle plans of this war, and then, he wrote the very important memorandum about Napoleon and how to conduct war against him. This was the first scientific elaboration of the strategy that the Napoleonic army had to be lured into Russia; that Russia could only win through a system of retreat, encountered with the



*Napoleon Bonaparte. Ludwig von Wolzogen insisted, contrary to widely held belief, that Napoleon was not invincible; once one knew how his mind worked, one could work out a plan that would cause him to fail in his imperial ambitions.*

effect of space and time—space from the standpoint of expanse. This memorandum was later exactly the operation of the war by Pfuehl, Scharnhorst, Knesbeck, and others. What came together were several factors: the great talent of von Wolzogen to find solutions to theoretical problems—he was a mind capable of hypothetical thinking; his close knowledge of Schiller’s studies in space and time in the Thirty Years’ War, and how to use space and time as strategic power factors; and Schiller’s concept of resorting to ruses, to tricks, to out-flank the enemy, and, most of all, by Schiller’s ideas.

This memorandum about Napoleon, and how to conduct war against him, von Wolzogen wrote on Oct. 22, 1810, in St. Petersburg.

I’m now discussing this a little bit at length, because I want you to think along, in your own mind, about how this applies in the present situation. Because it is exactly that kind of thinking which you have to have, if we are to win this war.

Ludwig von Wolzogen starts by saying: “Napoleon will remain the conqueror as long as there is a spark of life within him. No state, no country, will be safe from him in all of

Europe. Even, all of Europe, with its 160 million inhabitants, will not be sufficient for his ambition. The hour will come, sooner or later, when the fight to prevail and for independence will be fought. Is it not wise to mobilize all forces to prepare this fight for life and death?” He immediately concluded that, despite the common view at that point that Napoleon was invincible, that he was *not* invincible, and that, once one had a key idea who he was, what his thinking was, one could map out a genial plan which would cause Napoleon to fail. He again used Schiller’s studies of Gustav Adolf’s fights against Wallenstein, and applied those considerations. He said, “The first step, therefore, has to be a cool, unprejudiced investigation of the strength of the enemy. If these are in sharp focus, the means to counter him are obvious.

“Napoleon’s greatest advantage is his talent. But, what is the decisive advantage which makes a genius so horrible in war, and gives the genial commander such great superiority? In no other art, is this advantage so decisive as in the art of war, and this is because nowhere else does the lightning speed of action, to accomplish the purpose necessary, exist in such a high degree. Everything in the art of the command of the army, is based on space and time, and he who thinks faster, naturally, can act faster; because, those who act without thinking, should never be in charge of the army.”

(Now, that would disqualify our present Defense Minister Scharping, right then and there.)

“Through the earlier thinking of the enemy, the series of combinations is changing, and so, whoever thinks more slowly, never arrives at a mature decision. This becomes especially obvious on the day of battle, when the time for thinking and calm reflection is nearly totally lacking, and where the talented strategist has a decisive superiority. In this moment, his actions are, in a way, determined by impulses: He does not conduct a painful series of conclusions to investigate the truth. The idea emerges suddenly in his soul, as Minerva jumped from the head of Jupiter, armored.”

Now, if you remember, this is exactly the formulation that Schiller uses in the *Aesthetical Letters*, that the idea—how the creative mind forms an adequate hypothesis—takes place suddenly: It’s not that you start in a moment of crisis to see, “Oh, what do I do now?” But you have studied before, you have accumulated the knowledge, and in the decisive moment, the new idea jumps out of your head. So, Wolzogen says: “It is this gift of nature, which lets the Alexanders, the Caesars, and the Fredericks, seek the battles and lets them be nearly certain of success, when they manage to engage their enemy.

“Neither in battle, neither in the cabinet, nor during marches” (“cabinet” meaning during normal government policy) “or operations, is this a priority so evident, that in the tumult of battle, seconds decide the fate of the people. Also, great results are only reached through victories, and one single battle is often sufficient to determine the expedition, and the fate of the nation.”

## How to defeat the Napoleons

Now, again, I want to apply that kind of thinking to the present world strategic situation, which is not one of diplomacy, or cabinet politics, or marches—not even “marches through the institutions”—but, it is a situation of war. To internalize how the financial oligarchy is thinking, and to think about ways to defeat them, how to defend the nation-state, is exactly *only* possible if you apply these lessons.

Ludwig writes in his memoirs, out of these observations: “The role of the superiority of the ideas of the commander, out of that follows a first rule: Never dare to wage a battle against Napoleon, unless you have a decisive advantage on your side. These decisive advantages consist of a large superiority of troops, which are sufficiently equipped with supplies, and which are in a good position. Their inner strength is advantageous, and a secure retreat in the case that victory cannot be achieved, must be there. Napoleon always appears with the greatest number of combatants, which can be supplied at a given moment. That makes it difficult to counter him with an even bigger number of combatants. That leads to the conception of confronting him with two armies, where the main army must be as strong as his—two armies, because it’s easier to supply them—and then, the second army has to be half of the strength of the main army. So that, without such a decisive superiority, one should not dare to engage him. And, that superiority has to be maintained throughout the whole campaign. Losses and subtractions from your own army have to be replaced all the time.

“Even that is not enough: One has to counter his art with science. And, this science consists of four elements: First, there has to be a well-chosen base of operations; second, there has to be an adequate direction of operational lines; third, the position of these has to be well chosen; and, fourth, the creation of fortified camps and fortresses, with capable commanders, must be selected.”

Ludwig then refers to the countless examples where well-defended fortresses gave the war the decisive direction.

Now, on the first point—the operational basis—he says, “This must be always bigger than that of the enemy, so that it cannot be encircled by him. And it must be in correspondence with the operational lines. The larger these are, the larger the base must be.

“The second rule in the battle against Napoleon, is to make the operational line as long as possible, which already follows out of the sentence ‘against the genial enemy, one wants to avoid the battle.’ That is, that against such an enemy, the defensive is preferred over the offensive.” But, we’re not talking about a passive defense, Wolzogen says, “but a defensive war based on motion. Therefore,” he says, “I regard, in this case, the operational lines more as lines of retreat, and demand that, in order to gain the necessary time for action, these lines should be as long as possible. This is all the more useful, because, given the nature of his supply system, he is unable to quickly give pursuit.” Because, you remember that,

the Napoleonic army was based on requisition, which is a nice word for looting the poor people who have the misfortune to be occupied by this army. So, they would just steal from the peasants, or the cities, wherever they were.

Wolzogen says this whole idea is not new, because one only has to study the history of the Thirty Years’ War to understand this principle. But, the difference, he says, is that “never before has a commander operated with such big armies, or so many theaters of war, and with such luck as Napoleon has”—again, always think about the present oligarchical system, when I’m saying these things.

“As obviously as this system has its advantages, so, it has its great weaknesses. There are countries in which this system cannot function, with only halfway sizable armies.” Ludwig says, “I have calculated that, if the population-density of a country is less than 800 citizens per square mile, then an army of 60,000, which is based on the requisition system, cannot be sustained, since the distance from which the food supplies have to be retrieved becomes too great. Second, with the requisition system, a large army can never remain together for long.” So, whoever studies Napoleon’s campaigns with any degree of attention, immediately realizes that one of his principles is, to mass the entire strength, carry out a big strike very quickly, and then divide up and separate the corps of the army, and then harvest the fruits of this great victory, as they basically fall into his lap.

Wolzogen says: “The unusual aspects of his marches disappear, and the admiration for the so-called superiority of Napoleon’s strategy, once one calculates them over the full duration of the entire campaign: In the beginning they are always conducted with seemingly supernatural speed (considering human strength), but then, there follow long intervals, and it is quite natural that excessive mobilizations of power are followed by relaxation. Once one recognizes this maxim of Napoleon, it is not difficult to find a countermeasure, especially with respect to long lines of retreat. One assumes the position, where one pretends, either to cover the land, or even to go farther ahead. In this position, one consumes all possible available food and fodder, and waits until the hostile army is at the point of concentrating for the attack. Then, suddenly, one moves back, three or four strong marches, moving closer to one’s own storage depots, which has the consequence for the enemy, that he has to divide up, while we can stay together, and consequently are in a position where we can strike one of his corps with full power.”

Thirdly, he goes into a long elaboration about the fortified positions along these operational lines, and then Ludwig demands that there should be an entirely elaborated theater of war, which means that the entire terrain of the theater of war is militarily studied and prepared. And, that a defensive system based on *motion* is designed; that, already, during peacetime, operations that will be necessary later, are prepared, so that the depots and arsenals are at the appropriate moment, in the right place where the future battle will take place. And, also,



that such factors as roads, rivers, canals, are considered from the standpoint of war.

Then, he demands that one has to have a General Staff who know the theater of war as intimately as their own apartments—like when you get up in the middle of the night, you find the bathroom without the light. You have to know the theater of war, as well as your own apartment, or like the farmer knows his field.

And, fourthly, that the necessary fortified camps and fortresses are at the appropriate points, which are, in a certain sense, the final stones in the whole system. These fortresses cannot be on the enemy's border, where they would be isolated outposts, in a very short period of time, but they have to be inside, or even, in the other direction, at the border of your defensible territory. Wolzogen says, "Their function is *not* to defend the territory. One has to totally abandon the idea to wish to defend territory or borders. Because, only through the annihilation of the hostile army, can one defend one's own country—whether 100 miles before our border, or 100 miles behind, or within its interior, it does not matter. The country is not secure before the hostile army is destroyed. There are fortresses only at the end-points of the envisioned operation lines, up to which the withdrawing army can pull back. Therefore, they have to be fortified camps, so that the army can be put up there, but this defense is essentially only to gain time, to force the enemy, through powerful diversions, to retreat. At that point, the second army has to come into place. And, the task of both armies is to successively retreat into previously selected positions; to hold up the enemy from fortified positions, which each time costs him lives and wears him down.

"Both armies, essentially, have to work in a division of labor, going for partisan strikes, and such an interlocking play of both armies will finally defeat even the genius of Napoleon. Because he will continuously be weakened and lose men, especially if this is done with skill and energy. His army will be weakened, so that, in the end, he lacks the means to realize his designs.

"In any case, his system is too extended, and it is becoming more so every day. To simultaneously rule, in such a despotic way, in Portugal, in Italy, on the Vistula, and other places, for which his forces are not adequate—especially since he never watches his means, and he always takes the next best ones, regardless of whether they will be destroyed for generations, or forever.

"The clever family farmer," says Wolzogen, "takes only as much out of his farm as he needs to produce fruits in the future. Napoleon not only takes the fruits, but he cuts down the tree, and does not even spare the roots."

So, therefore, this general system of ruin carries within it, the seed of its destruction, and will ruin it, in the end. The only question is: When is this point reached? Probably Napoleon thinks that it will be at the end of his life, or afterwards, but Wolzogen expresses hope that, if one engages him in that kind of protracted extension and prolonged system of attack

and retreat, that this can be brought about much earlier. And, he says, while this is happening, the armies that Napoleon does not command himself can be defeated; allies can be won over to abandon him; insurrections can break out. All of this is possible, because of the increasing hatred against his person, because, one should not forget that his rule only exists because of the belief in his invincibility; and it will break down, once that belief is gone.

Now, remember, "There is no alternative to globalization"; once the belief that this is true, is gone, globalization is finished.

So, Wolzogen says, "Two to three decisive defeats, and Napoleon's legions will flee beyond the Rhine. Germany will have a different shape, and France will tire of sacrificing its treasures and its sons to this despot." Then he concludes, and says, "These are roughly my thoughts, how the war against Napoleon must be fought."

Now, when he wrote this memorandum, it was first discussed between Tsar Alexander, Foreign Minister Count Rumyantsev, War Minister Count Arakcheyev, and General Pfuehl. It did not have immediate acceptance, because Rumyantsev didn't like this idea of war—he wanted to settle this whole problem through diplomacy. Arakcheyev, who was a typical Russian patriot, saw the very idea—to have the Russian army retreat and let Napoleon the conqueror come—he thought this was an insult to the national honor. But, the Tsar replaced him with General Barclay de Tolly, and ordered Ludwig von Wolzogen and General Pfuehl to travel to the western theater of the anticipated defensive war.

On June 29, 1811, Ludwig von Wolzogen started his reconnaissance trip, and wrote several memorandums on different parts of this theater. Later, his pupil, Count Eugen von Württemberg, wrote about his former teacher, that the basic principle of retreat with the final turning to the offensive was *the decisive change* in the history of Europe, and the precondition for the liberation of Germany from foreign chains.

Wolzogen became a member of the staff of Commander in Chief General Barclay, and, because he was a German, there were a lot of intrigues (Napoleon had already set up intrigues against him when he was still at the court of Württemberg, which he escaped, basically by leaving); now, he was even accused of high treason, and only through the intervention of vom Stein, did he escape the death penalty. So, to be a patriot under these conditions was not exactly a very easy thing.

### **Moscow: the turning point**

But then, when, on June 24, 1812, Napoleon crossed the Niemen River with the great army, without having declared war, von Wolzogen was completely vindicated, and a strategy of defensive war based on motion was implemented, because it was the only possible way to act. Immediately the Russian troops started to engage the Napoleonic forces in these kinds of battles that I described before. In August 1812, these battles

cost the French 20,000 dead and wounded. Then, in Smolensk, another major battle occurred, in which, again, thousands of people were wounded, already under very difficult conditions, lying in barracks, lacking food, medicine, and bandages. And many died who could have been saved if the supply had been there.

Napoleon at that point still had 150,000 men. And he demanded an immediate resupply of troops from the Rheinbundstaaten, and he ordered Paris to recruit 140,000 new men. So within one year, from France alone, 440,000 troops were recruited.

When Napoleon was only 56 miles outside of Moscow, he thought that he had—as you can see, this was not exactly a very happy march—he thought that he had at least two more months of decent weather, and that a decisive battle would eventually make him the ruler of Moscow. So, he did not really think much about the fact, that along the main road which this gigantic army was moving, there was plundering. Because those who arrived first, would just plunder; and then the people who arrived second and third, would often find nothing, and find burnt-out villages, which were burned down in anger by people not finding anything.

Then, on Sept. 7, there was a major battle, the battle of Borodino, in which there was horrible carnage on both sides. General Kutuzov reported it back to the Tsar in St. Petersburg as a victory, but it actually was not.

The Russian army was nearly halved. They lost in this one battle, 1,500 generals and staff officers, and 30,000 sergeants and soldiers were killed, wounded, or missing. How fiercely the Russians fought, one could see from the fact that the French could only capture 1,000 men. But the French also had tremendous losses: 12 generals and 10 lieutenant generals; 28,000 dead, wounded, and missing. Thousands remained without medical care and died. There was no means to transport them. Whoever could even crawl, sometimes on all fours, tried to follow the troops, or died on the way. Many were killed by angry villagers afterwards. The smell of death was breathtaking. The groaning of the wounded and dying was horrible. After days, one could see how those wounded men, who could not move, were eating the cadavers of dead horses.

So, 15,000 Russians retreated during the night. And the condition of the Russian army at that point was such that there was no possible idea of waging another battle before Moscow.

On Sept. 13, the retreating Russian army reached Moscow, and occupied the heights in front of the city, and set up fortifications. So at that point, the War Council deliberated on what to do. General Kutuzov decided to retreat beyond Moscow, and Count Rostopchin, the war governor of Moscow, advocated the destruction of Moscow, rather than leaving it in the hands of the enemy. So he ordered all inhabitants to leave Moscow within hours. More than 300,000 inhabitants of Moscow moved out, left the city, taking whatever belongings they could take, and less than 14,000 people remained, mainly foreigners or beggars and others.

Now, Governor Rostopchin ordered the firefighting equipment to be taken out of the city, preparing for things to come. At that point, General Miloradovich led the rearguard of the Russian army, with the order to hold up the French as long as possible. When Murat reached them as the vanguard of the French army, Miloradovich engaged them in long discussions, with the idea of gaining time. Murat suddenly became suspicious, and asked, “Is Moscow empty? Did the inhabitants leave?” In the meantime, only beggars, the sick, and many wounded remained in Moscow.

On Sept. 12 at 2:00 in the afternoon, Napoleon reached the hills in front of Moscow, and looked down. And, according to reports, he said, “Ah! Finally, there she is, the famous city!” It was high time. And then he studied the map of Moscow, and gave the orders for the positions the troops should take. But when he reached the Dragomilovsk Gate, he expected that a deputation from the city would come to greet him, and show him respect, because this had been his experience in all of Europe: Wherever he went, he was given the keys to the city, and the officials came bowing down, to show respect to the Emperor.

Not so here in Moscow. No human being appeared, and Napoleon waited for one hour, and then his temper boiled over, and he recognized what was going on. Then a French staff officer from the vanguard arrived, and reported the horrifying news that Moscow was completely empty. So, Napoleon moved in, and spent the first night in a private house. The next day, he moved into the Kremlin.

He had hoped that here in Moscow, he would find the limitless resources where his starved and exhausted troops could recover from this horrendous journey, and that he could enforce peace according to his conditions; that the troops would recover, the wounded could heal, and maybe in spring-time, he could make a new offensive, or even that Tsar Alexander would make peace immediately.

But that wish turned out to be a big illusion. Already in the first night, many places in the city started to burn. First a big bazaar, then a store, then a bank, then many houses. First, people thought that it was soldiers who were careless with their fires. But then it became obvious that there was a systematic plan behind it, especially since no firefighting equipment was to be found.

Soon the firestorms moved back and forth every time the wind changed. Napoleon stood for hours at the open window of the Kremlin and stared into the fire. His hopes for a secure, rich quarters for the winter were buried. The red sky over Moscow was visible from very far away, and filled the hearts of the Russian soldiers and peasants with feelings of hatred and vengeance against the French, whom they naturally saw as being responsible for Moscow being burned down.

In Moscow, there were incredible scenes: plundering, dying, murdering. Most destroyed, was the fodder for the horses, who suffered and wasted away to skeletons in a very short period of time. When Tsar Alexander got the news in St.

Petersburg, he was deeply shocked, both about the losses in the battle of Borodino, and the fire in Moscow. But it was especially Freiherr vom Stein, who strengthened his resolve to not make a peace agreement with Napoleon, but to continue the fight.

At that point, Rostopchin published an appeal to the Russian people, where he described the atrocities by the French, which infuriated the population to no end. And then everywhere, peasants and partisan groups attacked weak French outposts or transport units, or they would just shoot couriers out of their saddles.

The nervousness among the French troops grew by the day. In Moscow, the plunder continued. Wine and alcohol were found in large quantities, and it became impossible for the officers to prevent the troops from excesses in plundering.

### The Emperor's retreat

On Oct. 5, Napoleon sent an emissary to General Kutuzov to make peace offers. But Kutuzov only engaged him in negotiations to win time, knowing very well that the cold Russian winter would come. On Oct. 15, the first snow started to fall. On Oct. 17, Murat, whose troops stood as an avant-garde of the great army near Minkovo, was attacked by superior forces and defeated. And they lost 1,600 men and 40 cannon. This unexpected defeat demonstrated to Napoleon how vulnerable his position was. Napoleon at that point still had 100,000 troops left. But the cavalry had a severe lack of horses, and the artillery lacked supplies.

At that point, he started to study possible roads for the return. The northern one went through a very poor and thinly populated area. The middle one was the one by which the French army had come, along which the battles of Borodino and Smolensk had been fought, where everything was burned down and destroyed, and with the army needing to requisition supplies, it probably could not make it. And the third one was via Kaluga in the south, through a relatively rich area, which had not yet been touched by the war, and which, from the resupply standpoint, seemed to be the best. But this retreat route had to be opened up with a victorious battle against the Russians, who were blocking the road.

On Oct. 18, Napoleon decided that he could not stay in Moscow over the winter, and he began the retreat via the southern route. He put out the rumor that this would only be to engage the Russians in a battle, and then return to Moscow—but by that time, nobody believed him anymore.

So the forces which he moved out of Moscow—there were 4,000 cavalry without horses, so they stayed in Moscow; only 4,500 had good horses. There were 10,000 horsemen who could not be used for lack of horses. That represented a big weakness, especially since the Russians had an excellent and large cavalry. And now Napoleon had to pay the bill for having wrecked his cavalry through forced marches and reckless use in the battles of Smolensk and Borodino. Nevertheless, the army still carried 569 cannon, and 200 vehicles

of various kinds. The march out of Moscow did not exactly look like an army, but more like a crowd, because you had everybody who could walk or crawl, follow, because people who were either wounded, or civilians, or merchants, or foreigners, feared the revenge of the Russian people, if they stayed behind.

The mood among the Russian court and many of the officers, was completely depressed, because they doubted the salvation of their army. The Russian people were extremely upset. And General Pfuehl at that point did not dare to show himself in the streets, because he feared being lynched. But Ludwig von Wolzogen congratulated the Tsar for the now-inevitable defeat of the French. And vom Stein was the only other influence in the environment around the Tsar, who encouraged the continuation of this strategy.

Now, nobody wanted to stay in Moscow. Soldiers had looted the place, and they put their loot—all kinds of jewelry, furniture, and other things—on the horses, so the few horses left nearly collapsed under this burden. People would carry things which had no value for them, because they could not eat it, they could not warm themselves with it in the winter. But Napoleon at that time, already did not dare to forbid the soldiers to do that, because he felt that they might not listen to him, and might mutiny.

He also did not dare to take away the officers' nice carriages, which they had taken in Moscow. So the whole march was like an army, but also *lumpen*, merchants, looting people. So, not very flexible. Whenever this march reached a bridge or a curve in the road, there were incredible bottlenecks. There were 30,000 non-riders and civilians. Altogether, this group of people number 150,000 which moved into the desert of winter. One-third were non-riders; and in this inflexible way, it moved forward.

So Napoleon directly marched from Fominskoye, in order to reach Maloyaroslavets. But on Oct. 22, a heavy rain started, and the roads became washed out. At Maloyaroslavets, a Russian contingent under General Dokhturov engaged the French in a fierce battle of 18 hours. The Russians lost 8,000, the French 6,000. Kutuzov, for some reason, did not engage the French with all his forces, but moved back for three miles. But Napoleon didn't know that, and at the end of that day, he was sitting there in a desperate mood, because he did not know that he did not have to confront the entire strength of the Russian army.

The only way he thought he could bypass the Russians, was at Mozhaik, to reach the old road of the army on which they had come. Then the news arrived that Kutuzov had retreated three miles, and Napoleon at that point would only have had to run over the rearguard of General Miloradovich, and the road to Smolensk would have been open. But Napoleon stayed with his decision to go back to Mozhaik, and that decision proved to be the worst, because from that moment on, the retreat was becoming completely desperate. And from now on, without letup, they were chased until they were be-



into the passing carriages, but many were left behind, or tried to follow on their crutches. It came to absolutely disgusting scenes of murder and killing.

On Nov. 3, in Bezna, there was heavy fighting between the French rearguard and the Russian avant-garde. Four thousand French were killed, wounded, or captured. Then, from there on, the Russians remained closely on the heels of the French. The temperature sank to  $-12^{\circ}$  Celsius. On the night of Nov. 9, around one fire near a tent, 300 men were frozen overnight, because there were only tents in which to stay, because all the villages had been burned down.

When a half-frozen French, Italian, or German soldiers fell into the hands of regular Russian troops, they could be happy, because if the peasants got them, it was even worse, because they would rip off their clothes, and throw them into the cold, naked.

On Nov. 7, some Württemberg generals found a miserable little room to sleep in, and their soldiers gathered around a tent outside, around a fire. The next morning, one of these generals said, "I saw the most frightening thing of my life. All of our people are frozen to death."

When the army had left Moscow, it consisted of 110,000 men. And to these had been added 15,000 detached troops. Of these 125,000, some 50,000 were lost in four weeks; 30,000 had disappeared, and most lay dead in ice and snow, or were captured. What remained, did not look like troops, but more like vagabonds. When the army reached Smolensk, Napoleon spent five days in regrouping the army, and getting its strength back to 50,000, and departed on the 12th of November at Smolensk at  $-18^{\circ}$  Celsius.

Then, at the famous battle of Krasny, the French lost 20,000 prisoners of war, mostly displaced people, wounded, and 200 cannon. The dissolution of the great army had progressed so far, that thousands allowed themselves to be captured, just to save their lives.

Napoleon was lucky that General Kutuzov did not pursue him more forcefully, since he knew about the state of the dissolution of the army. But there were obviously complicat-

*It was not only the harsh Russian winter that defeated Napoleon's army—although this played a role in decimating the army which originally numbered one-half million—but rather the superior strategic conceptions of his adversaries.*

yond the Prussian borders. And they had to confront the horrible conditions of the harsh winter, and burnt-down villages and towns.

The army of one-half million, which had crossed the Niemen in June, was defeated through the strategy of defensive war based on motion. The burning down of villages, the destruction of all means of subsistence: that was what defeated Napoleon. And only the last 100,000 were killed by the winter. Napoleon tried to create the myth that it was the winter alone, but that was not the case at all.

The retreat was absolutely awful. In places like Mozhaisk, where they had to cross the dead bodies from 52 days earlier—dead bodies were lying everywhere. The same thing in Borodino: large numbers of corpses. And people reported that as far as the eye could see, there were dead men, dead horses, broken weapons. When they passed by the famous cloister of Kolotskoy, hordes of wounded and mutilated men tried to get

ing factors, like the dubious role of Austria, which left a vacuum, in which England could have moved on to the continent. So there were other considerations than strictly those of the battlefield.

Then, at the famous next crossing of the Berezina at Studenka, Napoleon again lost 30,000—dead, captured, and wounded. Nevertheless, the fact that the French could bring 40,000 men over the river, was a relative success, because Clausewitz's estimate was, never was it easier to force an army to capitulate than here. But, Napoleon still being arrogant in front of his marshals, told them, "You see, it's possible to escape even from right underneath the beard of the enemy." One decade after the crossing of the Berezina, a Prussian engineer passed by that location. And still, there were mountains of helmets, weapons, epaulettes, bullets, splinters, bones of human beings and horses.

When the individual refugees first reached Vilna, they told everyone about the horrible conditions at the crossing of the Berezina. People at first did not believe it, and these first people were arrested as liars. But soon there could be no doubt, as the remains of the army as *lumpen*, arrived in Vilna.

In Vilna, because of the large mass of people, there was a tremendous food shortage, with vicious fights. In hospitals, people died with frozen arms, legs just rotting away. And when the remains of this army left Vilna, and they reached the steep hill of Ponari, the roads were completely covered with ice, and the last poor, starved horses were unable to climb upward. So Murat and the marshals had to leave the carriages, and make their way sideways through the woods. The rest were lost. So, of 612,000 men which had started the Russian campaign in June, 500,000 remained in Russia.

### **The war moves west**

Now, under the influence of vom Stein, Tsar Alexander decided to pursue Napoleon westward. On Dec. 30, 1812, Clausewitz convinced General Jorck at Tauroggen that now was the ideal moment for Prussia to turn against Napoleon. And then the text of this famous convention was brought to King Friedrich Wilhelm III.

On Feb. 28, 1813, Russia and Prussia made the alliance of Kalisch. And on March 17, King Friedrich III wrote the appeal "To My People," which was not really what was in his heart, but he reluctantly followed the patriotic enthusiasm of the population.

But, one more time, Napoleon was able to recruit a more numerous army, and defeated Prussia in the battle of Gross-greschen, on May 2, 1813.

And here, Schiller played a role, because von Wolzogen reports in his memoirs, that on the eve of the battle of Gross-greschen, he studied the description by Schiller of the battle of Lutzen in the Thirty Years' War.

The allies were forced to retreat to Silesia. Then came the great fall offensive of 1813, and the decisive turnaround in the great battle of Leipzig, the people's battle of Leipzig

from Oct. 16-19. This not only meant the end of the Rheinbund, but in 1814, the allies continued the war into France. Napoleon was banned to Elba. And in 1815, while the Congress of Vienna negotiated, Napoleon returned one more time. He beat Blücher at Ligny on June 16, but finally was beaten by the two armies of Blücher and Wellington at Waterloo on June 18, 1815; and finally was banned for good to St. Helena. Now, that is exactly the fate I have in mind for the oligarchs today.

Obviously, the result was not a republican victory, because as you know, the Congress of Vienna was a big setback. Despite the fact that the Prussian reformers, who were represented by vom Stein and von Humboldt to negotiate a unified Germany based on a constitution, had the correct idea—that after all, Germany had won the war, and there could be the formation of a German nation-state—the oligarchies of the entire European courts conspired against that, and instead, the Holy Alliance began a tremendous period of restoration.

### **Republican principles in the New World**

But how did the war continue? Was it ended with this? No. It continued especially when Lincoln revived the spirit of the American Revolution. And there, it was especially the role of republican Germans—the so-called Latin farmers—who helped to bring Lincoln to power, and had a very decisive role also in the famous Emancipation Proclamation, which abandoned that which had been the flaw in the American Constitution, namely, that the American Constitution at the beginning only applied to white people.

And one can say proudly that many of the Germans who fled from the restoration of the Holy Alliance, then played a role in supporting Lincoln in this battle.


Then, it continued through the fight of republican networks in the United States, Germany, China, Japan, in transforming society into modern industrial states, thereby laying the basis to continue the struggle for the eventual final defeat of oligarchism.

### **The subjective factor in history**

So, what is the lesson of the comparison of the war against Napoleon, and the way to fight globalism today? Well, yes, one can look at a lot of things in this way. One has to wage similar battles, sometimes—a defensive war of retreat based on motion—choosing weak flanks, moving here and there.

But that is not the reason why I told you this story. Because it is the *subjective point* which is crucial. The reason why I presented to you the design of the Russian campaign, and then the actual implementation of it, is not because it is a scheme one can follow in an objective manner. It's not a prescription which should be followed battle by battle, in this way.

But the point is that it makes obvious that history, the success or failure of history, is shaped by people like Schiller, who inspire people to come up with new ideas, by people like



A scene from the battle of Leipzig in 1813, a turning point in the war against Napoleon.

Carnot, by people like von Wolzogen. And I can say in all modesty, that we are on the scene today, to fulfill exactly that function.

Because in all historical periods you need people who conceptualize how to conduct the war. And therefore, for this reason alone, we have to be put in a position of power. This is the reason why we are running a campaign, for Lyn to become Clinton's economic adviser, and knowing how these historical processes function, one can actually see and study. If you look at the role of Schiller, of von Wolzogen, the Humboldts, the Prussian reformers, all working together in a division of labor, actually only a handful of people, but being there at the right moment, having the right ideas, the right strategies, the right conceptions at the right moment.

Wilhelm von Humboldt, in the famous statement about the *Geistesgang* of Schiller, the mental development of Schiller, accounts how it is not only the written language, the written documents, which report what Schiller did. He says that is only a small part: But it is the thousands and thousands of discussions Schiller had with contemporaries, inspiring them, changing the way they were thinking about themselves, which shaped this period.

So, the idea of defeating Napoleon by drawing him into Russia, was the outcome—and one can actually say that Schiller, in a certain way reached out from the grave, and defeated Napoleon in this way. This was not so easy, because as I said, the resistance against this plan was enormous. And

it had to be done with forces who all had to go against their basic instincts and what they perceived as their interests, to follow and take guidance from a higher interest.

Now, this defines our role, and Lyn's role, in particular, today. Because who is qualified today, in this war to save human civilization? It's not because we say we are so great. But if you look at the horrible failure of all the leading governments of the West, one can say very clearly, that if you leave these governments to themselves, it means certain doom for our nations. Take the German government, for example, with their famous *Ausstieg aus der Atomenergie*, "Withdrawal from Nuclear Energy": It's not an exit from nuclear energy, it's an exit from civilization, that they represent.

Therefore, if you look at the defeat of Napoleon, one can actually see how that can be done, and that it takes this principle of motion and leadership, to defeat the enemy. So therefore, if you think like Schiller, the enemy can be defeated.

Ludwig von Wolzogen wrote in his memoirs, "Whatever system one may adopt, it always will be essential to know ahead of time what one wants to do, and then carry out this plan in a rigorous way. Nothing is more dangerous in war, than to lose time with debates"—or dialogues, as Clinton would say—"at a moment you should act."

So, I want you to think like a brilliant military strategist, and then the enemy can be defeated. Or even better, I want you to think like *both* poets and brilliant military strategists, because then humanity can win.