

BAC's 'Taiwan lobby' provokes crisis in Asia

by Mary Burdman

In the extremely delicate, and potentially critical, relations across the Taiwan Strait, the gravest danger is not posed by the immediate reactions of either Beijing or Taipei, but by the provocations of the Washington-headquartered troglodytes known as the "Taiwan lobby." This rich, powerful, and murky operation is not just some group united by its political positions on Taiwan. The Taiwan lobby is one face of the British-American-Commonwealth (BAC) establishment in the United States, whose anti-China frenzies date back to the McCarthy-era witch-hunts.

The Taiwan lobby apparatus brings together Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and buddy of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright; Rep. Benjamin Gilman (R-N.Y.), chair of the House International Relations Committee, and an interface with the Zionist lobby; operatives of U.S. billionaire-spook Richard Mellon Scaife's "Blue Team," such as Mark Lagon of the New York Council on Foreign Relations (see "LaRouche's Enemies Push for Taiwan War," *EIR*, March 10); and a group of U.S.-founded Taiwanese organizations committed to provoking tensions with China. The Taiwan lobby's tentacles reach into Japan, and include elements of the Iran-Contra networks of Central America.

BAC establishment figures provide conceptual input and direction for this apparatus. Typical is Sir Caspar Weinberger, Defense Secretary under President Ronald Reagan, who was knighted by Queen Elizabeth for his role in aiding and abetting Great Britain, in the 1982 Malvinas War of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher against Argentina. Weinberger is a leading "poison pen" of the Taiwan lobby.

No independent policy

One indication of the "made-in-Washington" nature of the problem, is pointed to by Taiwan strategists, reviewing the political history of the newly elected Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). They point out that Chen is a local political figure, with few international connections of his own. Unlike his predecessor, Lee Teng-hui, who was educated in Japan and the United States, and has many close ties to political figures in both countries, including the violently anti-Chinese Tokyo Governor (mayor) Shintaro Ishihara, Chen's political career has been focussed on internal Taiwan politics.

Therefore, these Taiwan strategists say, the key to the DPP's international policy, lies *outside* Taiwan. One leading

Taiwan political analyst told *EIR*, that a central agent provocateur is the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA), based in Washington. FAPA is part of a network which includes the DPP Mission in the United States, and it has branches all over the United States and a big operation in Japan, the colonial power in Taiwan during the first half of the 20th century. This is a "die-hard" Taiwan independence force, the analyst said.

Ironically, such "Taiwan independence" has a foreign foundation. The FAPA was founded in 1982 in Los Angeles, and is now a "worldwide, Washington-headquartered" operation. Associated with the DPP Mission in Washington, is the Center for Taiwan International Relations, which was established in Washington in 1988, and the journal *Taiwan Communiqué*, which is published just over the D.C. line in Chevy Chase, Maryland. Of this Taiwan lobby group, only the Taiwan Independence Party was actually established in Taiwan, in 1996, by a group of professors who were former supporters of the DPP. They split from the DPP, according to their own account, after its leaders Shih Ming-teh and Hsu Hsin-liang attempted to politically cooperate with the pro-reunification Taiwanese New Party in 1995, and later with the Kuomintang (KMT), then the ruling party.

If the Washington-based Taiwan lobby retains hegemony over DPP policy under President Chen, the stormy cross-strait relations provoked by Lee Teng-hui's trip to the United States in 1995, when Helms, Sen. Frank Murkowski (R-Ak.), and their ilk insisted on giving him an almost-official reception, are going to continue, the Taiwan analyst warned. While the DPP is at least discussing a compromise on its party platform position, which demands a referendum on declaring a "Republic of Taiwan," and is moving to open, from its side, economic and other links to the mainland, Chen is refusing to accept the "one-China principle," which has been the policy of both China, and the former KMT government which had ruled in Taiwan for 50 years. Chen is also rejecting the "one nation, two systems" program offered by China's President Jiang Zemin, which would grant Taiwan even its own independent military force.

The DPP policy makes it clear, why it is vulnerable to the war-mongering of the likes of Helms and Weinberger.

While proclaiming its peaceful intentions, the DPP policy is actually to *compromise* on the issue of national sovereignty, and to "play in the cracks" of the deep fissures in the current international situation. In a world facing financial catastrophe and many regional wars, this could be a dangerous course. Beijing is making it clear, that it cannot, and will not, tolerate this highly unstable situation for much longer.

The DPP's "White Paper on Foreign Policy in the 21st Century," published in November 1999, explains how it intends for Taiwan to exploit its position on the "fault lines" between the globalized world, and the nation-state. DPP chairman Lin I-hsiung elaborated, in a speech at the free trade-oriented American Enterprise Institute in Washington in December 1999.

“Taiwan’s relations with China must be put into a broader context of Taiwan’s strategic position in the world,” Lin said. “A new global order is in the process of formation . . . in which Taiwan must find an appropriate balancing middle way.” Taiwan’s “greatest challenge is to maneuver in a global system of big-power politics and grand contradictions . . . [such as] the conflicting trend of globalization and state nationalism. . . . The breaking down of sovereign boundaries in the context of cultural and economic integration has chartered new opportunities and enabled new vitality for Taiwan in the international civil society.” At the same time, “rising nationalism,” as in East Timor, Kosovo, Chechnya, and Taiwan itself, shows that “statehood” remains important.

Taiwan’s “full potential” has been “inhibited” by the dominance of its relations with China, Lin stated. Taiwan must put its “China relationship under a broader global context of Taiwan’s new international role.” This is “a cautious balance between the demands of globalization on the one side, and state security on another.”

Taiwan’s “new diplomacy” will embrace “international economic activities, conservation, human rights, and trade”—the very issues being used by the United States and Great Britain to launch wars against nations all over the globe. “The uniqueness of Taiwan’s economic advantages [such as its \$100 billion in foreign exchange reserves] complemented by democratization, have already provided a natural stage for Taiwan’s global participation,” Lin said. The DPP wants Taiwan, he said, to “take a stronger initiative to play a role in China’s democratization.”

Taiwan can solve the problem, that it has been too focused on its relations with China, because “the most salient feature of the current international system, is the increasing blurring of national borders and evolving concept of national sovereignty,” the White Paper states. Taipei must build its relations with the non-governmental organizations, rather than on ties with other nations, and must focus on the “lurking prominence of the international civil society,” which has, according to the DPP, “gone beyond the boundaries of purely military and political affairs, to emphasize economy, environmental protection, human rights, and trade.” Taiwan also has to “enhance” its economic interests “in the context of global markets.”

Yet, with all this talk of “civil society,” the DPP is firmly committed to extending military blocs in Asia, by establishing a “three-way security network among the U.S., Japan, and Taiwan.” Outside of the U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea, and military ties with the Philippines, there are no security alliances in all of Asia.

Schizophrenia

Such a wildly “split personality” approach is characteristic of the Taiwan lobby. While claiming to advocate democracy and independence, it promotes military confrontation. Typical is the blood-curdling article written in September

1999 by Weinberger, now chairman of *Forbes*, which is featured on the FAPA website. Weinberger lashed out at the Clinton administration, even attacking Albright for “selling out” Lee Teng-hui as Czechoslovakia was sold out to Hitler at Munich. Weinberger denounced what he called the “appeasement” of China by President Clinton, and even claimed that an “earlier” U.S. administration would have immediately “cashiered” Adm. Dennis Blair, Commander of the Pacific Command, for saying last year, that the United States should not defend Taiwan if it declared independence from China.

Weinberger distorted history right and left, denouncing Jimmy Carter for “abandoning” Taiwan (forgetting about the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué of President Richard Nixon), and arguing that the U.S.-China 1982 Communiqué (signed under President Reagan, who also made a six-day trip to China to sign agreements on nuclear energy cooperation) does not really mean what it says, i.e., that the United States would phase out sales of advanced weapons to Taiwan.

Weinberger belligerently proclaimed that the United States is “absolutely committed” to defending Taiwan, and ends his article with scenario-spinning about China attacking Taiwan “with impunity” while the United States has to resort to a useless UN resolution. All this—were it ever to happen—would constitute a “legacy of catastrophic proportions” for Clinton, Weinberger claimed.

WTO no alternative

Unfortunately, the growing role of Vice President Al Gore, as the expected Democratic Party nominee for this year’s Presidential elections, has cast a pall over Clinton’s commitment to develop a strategic relationship with China. The visit of Richard Holbrooke, U.S. Ambassador to the UN, to Beijing during the week of March 20, is a case in point.

Holbrooke was in Beijing not only to discuss Taiwan, but also the World Trade Organization (WTO). Clinton’s policy has now become focussed on getting China into the WTO. However, as Clinton’s presentation on the issue, on March 8 at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, makes clear, this will hardly benefit China—or the United States. The U.S.-China WTO Accession deal, Clinton emphasized, would open China’s markets to the United States, for such U.S. exports as “information technology” and U.S. “telecom/insurance/banking”—and it was China, not the United States, which made “significant, one-way market-opening concessions across virtually every economic sector.” Selling grain and other agricultural products to China will be “a boon” to hard-hit American farmers, Clinton claimed—but what of the consequences for China’s 900 million farmers, many of them still very poor?

Gore, who had earlier professed opposition to China’s accession to the WTO, in an effort to gain the support of U.S. labor unions, has now proclaimed that he will do his all to get the administration bill for permanent trade status for China, through the U.S. Congress.