

indication, American agencies know more than they are admitting about the death of the "People's Princess."

### The DOJ and the LeWinter fiasco

In April 1998, the FBI and CIA joined with the Austrian police in busting up a \$20 million extortion scheme against Al-Fayed. On April 24, 1998, Austrian police arrested a one-time CIA informant, Oswald LeWinter, at a Vienna hotel, as he attempted to extract \$20 million from John Macnamara, the security chief for Harrods, in return for bogus "CIA documents" that LeWinter and company claimed proved that MI6, on behalf of the royal family, had planned to assassinate Princess Diana and Dodi Fayed.

The arrests were the result of tight coordination among Al-Fayed, Macnamara, the U.S. Justice Department, the FBI, the CIA, and the Austrian authorities. At DOJ request, Al-Fayed had transferred \$25,000 to a New Mexico bank account, to finance LeWinter's travel to Vienna for the exchange. At least three other individuals, all American citizens, had been identified as co-conspirators with LeWinter in the scheme. One, Keith Fler, was a prominent Hollywood entertainment industry attorney whose credentials as a highly respected member of the California bar had initially been a key feature of the fraudulent documents scheme.

Sources close to the case have confirmed to *EIR* that Justice Department attorneys, including Lisa Prager of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, had vowed to pursue the entire network of would-be extortionists, and that the wire transfer of the \$25,000 alone constituted a serious felony that would be prosecuted to the hilt.

Things apparently changed dramatically, following the arrest of LeWinter in Vienna. His identity had been previously unknown, along with his former ties to the CIA. When that "complication" became apparent, according to sources close to the case, the DOJ suddenly lost all interest in prosecuting the U.S.-based co-conspirators, including Fler, and another purported ex-CIA stringer, Pat McMillan, who had accompanied LeWinter to Vienna.

*EIR* has been told that the LeWinter and McMillan links to U.S. agencies, while no longer active, could have provided an aperture for accessing the overall U.S. intelligence files on the Diana affair, and that this would have had devastating consequences for America's spy cousins at MI6 and GCHQ.

Al-Fayed intends to tenaciously pursue all of the unanswered questions and buried intelligence files. And, his efforts are hardly in vain. Recently, a British court allowed application for a judicial review of the Coroner's decision that Al-Fayed is not an "interested party," in the official Royal Coroners inquest into the death of Princess Diana. Buckingham Palace had argued that the official British government probes of the causes of death for Dodi Fayed and Princess Diana should be handled separately, and that Al-Fayed had no right to access the inquest of the Princess of Wales. That matter now will be reviewed by the Courts.

## Will the 'jihadis' topple Pakistan's Musharraf?

by Ramtanu Maitra

The recent visit by U.S. President Clinton to Islamabad, amidst unprecedented security arrangements, gave a glimpse of how precarious is the military regime of Gen. Pervez Musharraf. Under the circumstances, Pakistan's Chief Executive is in no position to meet Clinton's terse demands, which include stopping infiltration of the *jihad* terrorists into the Indian-held part of Kashmir and lowering tension along the Line of Control in Kashmir; preventing the growth of Islamic fundamentalism within Pakistan; halting aid to the Taliban in Afghanistan; and bringing back democracy (which Musharraf terminated in a bloodless coup on Oct. 12, 1999) in Pakistan.

When the American President left for Oman after his five-hour stopover in Islamabad, General Musharraf began a damage-control operation. He went to Southeast Asia seeking moral and financial support. Although he was well received in Malaysia and Indonesia, the two Muslim-majority nations in the region, Musharraf was reminded by both that their polite reception was not an endorsement of military rule. Like the United States, they would also like to see democracy restored in Pakistan. On Kashmir, both nations expressed neutrality.

### No room for maneuver

In Pakistan, attempts are being made to meet some of the U.S. demands. To begin with, Islamabad, for the first time, offered to hold bilateral talks with India at "any time, any place, and any level" to resolve the Kashmir dispute. New Delhi, now more belligerent than ever, rejected the offer outright, citing Pakistan's continuing anti-India propaganda and the support that Islamabad continues to lend to the *jihadis* in Kashmir. For emphasis, the Indians used a helicopter-gunship for the first time against the terrorists in the Indian-held part of Kashmir. India has also increased its defense budget by 28%, and is buying arms and ammunition by the shipload.

Islamabad has tried to open a back-channel to resume talks with New Delhi. It has not succeeded so far, but when it does, it can rest assured that the price that the Indians will ask for a settlement on Kashmir will be too high to pay. But, then, what possible solution over Kashmir can Musharraf dictate to the *jihadis*? Nothing but the entirety of Kashmir would satisfy them. And India will not hand over all of Kashmir to Pakistan, and Pakistan cannot militarily annex it. So, the only option left for Musharraf is to continue with the infiltration

operation, even if that antagonizes the United States and India. This will, of course, strengthen the *jihadis*.

Musharraf will back the *jihadis* because they, armed with the cash from narcotics from the poppy fields of Afghanistan, have people in important positions throughout the Pakistani establishment—in the Army, the bureaucracy, and the judiciary, among the landed aristocracy, academics, and religious leaders, and so on. Clinton's security was so elaborate, because the U.S. security personnel did not know who the Pakistani intelligence people really were. Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is heavily infiltrated by agents from many countries, including Britain's MI6 and the Israeli Mossad, and, according to former Pakistani Air Chief Ashgar Khan, the ISI pays almost everyone in Pakistan, to buy their loyalty. Terrorist organizations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba and the Harkatul Mujahideen are backed by the ISI and the Army, and they have no reason to listen to Musharraf or anyone in Islamabad who might like to dismantle them.

### **The Afghan pincer**

If things look grim in Kashmir for Musharraf, the Afghanistan issue may become even worse. In Kashmir, the U.S. interest is to see that the situation remains within bounds, that India and Pakistan do not come to an exchange of nuclear weapons. At the same time, the United States is rethinking its South Asia policy, and may add India into its strategic equation, and this means that Islamabad, from time to time, may feel the heat—diplomatic or financial, through the International Monetary Fund, for example—from Washington.

In Afghanistan, however, things are no different. There, too, Pakistan is badly isolated, and it is a more painful isolation, because all the countries in the region are Islamic nations that should have been Pakistan's friends. But by supporting the Taliban, even arming and fighting for them in Afghanistan, Islamabad has blundered, and quite soon will have to pay up.

Reports indicate that the anti-Taliban forces, under the banner of the Northern Alliance (NA), are being reorganized with the help of Iran. Tehran, by means of clever diplomacy and determined efforts, has re-engineered the alliance among the Haziras, Uzbeks, and Tajiks of Afghanistan. Support has been lent by Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, by allowing Iranian arms and supplies to go through their territories to reach the NA base in northern Afghanistan. Russian and Indian support for the NA is no secret, and this support is expected to grow in the coming months. Turkey has also started helping the NA, and the only friends in the adjoining areas that the Taliban have at this point are the Pakistanis.

### **Washington is active**

Washington is also active in Central Asia. CIA chief George Tenet was in Uzbekistan, and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright will be there in mid-April. FBI Director Louis Freeh, who is now setting up an FBI office in the U.S. Em-

bassy in New Delhi, will be in Pakistan and Kazakstan. In Kazakstan, too, an FBI office will be set up. Four Central Asian nations—Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakstan, and Kyrgyzstan—held a joint anti-terrorist military exercise focussing on how to deal with the Taliban and narcotics traffickers. Washington, by being present on the scene, has managed to rally the Central Asian nations against the Taliban. Pakistan's ISI Chief, Lt. Gen. Mahmud Ahmed, and two important ministers were in Washington the first week of April for talks with U.S. National Security Council officials, Attorney General Janet Reno, anti-narcotics coordinator Gen. Barry McCaffrey (ret.), and top anti-terrorism officials.

All signs indicate that as the snows of the Hindu Kush begin to melt in the coming weeks, the Northern Alliance will push southward. Troubles for the Taliban have already begun. From Kandahar jail, one of the top anti-Taliban commanders, Ismail Khan, a prize catch from Hazira, has escaped, allegedly with the help of a Talib, and is now in Iran. The powerful Governor from Kunduz, Mohammad Arif Khan, was gunned down in Peshawar, near Pakistan's border with Afghanistan, on April 4. A close Yemeni aide of Osama bin Laden, Ahmed Abdullah, who was travelling from Bangladesh to Afghanistan via Pakistan, was nabbed on April 1 with a bagful of cash along the Afghan-Pakistan border. All this happened within a week after President Clinton's visit to Pakistan.

Pakistan's Taliban problem, a creation of the period following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988, is the result of its obsession to control Afghanistan. But it is not unlike the Kashmir problem. In the case of Kashmir, India claims the whole of it, and so does Pakistan. They have fought three wars over it, and an uneasy Line of Control separates the two armies.

The Afghanistan-Pakistan border is demarcated by the infamous Durand Line, drawn by the British Raj, recognized by Pakistan and rejected by the Pushtoons who dominate the Taliban movement. On the Pakistan side live millions of Pushtoons who will be keen to join the Pushtoons of Afghanistan. If Pakistan goes against the Pushtoons of Afghanistan, Islamabad is certain that the Pushtoons will try to re-draw the Durand Line, and this time it will be the Indus River. Pakistani intelligence is aware of this and so is Pakistan's Army, 25% of whom are ethnic Pushtoon Pakistanis. So, for better or worse, Pakistan has no choice but to support the Pushtoons of Afghanistan to be the rulers of Afghanistan, and to oppose the Northern Alliance.

In other words, Islamabad is caught in a foreign policy straitjacket. Having focussed on opposing India and befriending those who oppose India, because of the Kashmir issue, and supporting the Pushtoons in Afghanistan because of fear of opening a Pandora's Box around the Durand Line and of the gun-toting Pushtoons, Islamabad's foreign policy remained stuck in the mud while the world changed. It is these failures that have made Islamabad today subservient to any force that continues to promote the old foreign policy.