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## Book Review

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# For Kissinger, Economic Crisis Demands War

by Mark Burdman

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### **Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century**

by Henry Kissinger

New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001

318 pages, hardbound, \$30

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For anyone who had doubts that high-level circles in the Anglo-American financial-political establishment are extremely nervous about the onrushing crash of the global economic system, and are calculating a war, most likely in the Middle East, as their means of holding onto power, at all costs, Henry Kissinger's newest book is proof.

Throughout his woeful career of more than five-plus decades, Kissinger has been obsessively committed to the strategy of "geopolitics." This is the arcane notion invented by Britain's Sir Halford Mackinder, at the turn of the 20th Century, the which made a significant contribution to starting the First World War. Kissinger has adapted, for contemporary use, "geopolitical" strategies, from the anti-American policies put forward at the 1815 Congress of Vienna, by Britain's Lord Castlereagh and Austria's Prince Metternich, as these policies are lauded in his doctoral thesis, *A World Restored*. Otherwise, his main source of "inspiration," has been the British Foreign Office, admiration for which Kissinger has often publicly expressed, in lectures and writings.

In *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?: Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century*, Kissinger perpetuates this obsession. "Geopolitical thinking" was downgraded during the Bill Clinton era, he claims, and is now being revived under George W. Bush. He avows that "geopolitics has not disappeared as an element of international politics," and he devises "geopolitical strategies" for Asia, Russia, and other parts of the world.

However, in this book, there is a very important new spectacle: the "master strategist" Kissinger in a state of panic, that the world economic system is careening out of control, and will reduce all his great designs, to rubble. He cannot contain

his dismay, that the crisis will lead certain countries, such as Brazil in South America and several in Asia, to overthrow the "rules of the game," rules that he and his Anglo-American financier and political buddies have been able to impose on the world for much of the post-World War II period.

In such a state of mind, Kissinger is apparently reaching for the one solution that he has always had in mind for times of big trouble: start a war, and institute an international regime of "crisis-management." The main focus for his bellicose intentions, as usual, is the explosive Middle East situation. His outrageous claim, that a solution modelled on the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia is impossible for the region, clearly points in this direction.

This matter would not be so important, were Kissinger speaking only for himself. His latest book reveals him to be a mediocre thinker, at best, who resorts to so many pomposities, lies, distortions, and cover-ups about his own nefarious activities, that a book could be written on that subject alone.

Nonetheless, his state of mind in writing it, is relevant for international financial, political, and strategic developments, as they are now unfolding. For Kissinger speaks for a network, extending into the current Bush Administration, and into senior Wall Street banking and finance layers. His entire career has never been "his own." From the outset, he was the protégé of the super-Anglophile Harvard Professor of Government, William Yandell Elliott, one of the chief figures in the so-called "Nashville Agrarian" movement of American backers of the ideas of the 1861-65 Southern Confederacy. He has always been at pains, as in his notorious May 10, 1982 address before the London Royal Institute of International Affairs ("Chatham House"), to stress his tutelage by the British Foreign Office.

So, when Kissinger speaks or writes, an Anglo-American "Committee" of some substantial influence, is expressing itself—leaving aside the question of whether the entire book has been ghost-written by a "Kissinger Committee" of his lackeys and underlings.

### **U.S. Downturn 'Could Wreak Havoc'**

Early on, Kissinger indicates his nervousness about the global economy, interrupting his hyperventilations about "globalization" and the ostensibly unchallengeable nature of American power, to warn that a "global economic crisis is the major threat to contemporary democracy." Then, "another significant financial crisis in Asia, or in the industrial democracies, would surely accelerate efforts by Asian countries to gain greater control over their economic and political destinies by the creation of an Asian counterpart to the existing regional systems. A hostile Asian bloc combining the most populous nations of the world, and vast resources with some of the most industrial peoples would be incompatible with the American national interest." He is nervous, that there will be growing support for the protectionist policies of Malaysia,

China, and India, all of whom weathered the storm of the “Asia crisis” better than those who were subjected to International Monetary Fund prescriptions.

It is hardly necessary to read between the lines, to understand that this is a “thumbs down,” from relevant Wall Street milieux, to the LaRouche policy package of a “New Bretton Woods,” combined with a Eurasian Land-Bridge reconstruction program.

He also frets, that a possible “hard landing” in the U.S.A., could overturn all his wishes, for a Free Trade Association of the Americas, and for an eventual Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Association (TAFTA), and bring about a Brazil-led resistance to free-trade designs.

The mood of panic hits its peak in Chapter Six, “The Politics of Globalization.” In the introduction, Kissinger had specified, that this chapter was written with advice from Felix Rohatyn, the wheeler-and-dealer of Lazard Frères banking house, and John Lipsky, a Wall Street prominent. In the chapter, he admonishes that “the very process that has produced greater wealth in more parts of the world than ever before, may also provide the mechanism for spreading an economic and social crisis around the world. Just as the American economy has been the world’s engine of growth, a major setback for the American economy would have grave consequences transcending the economic realm.”

Next, he makes a revealing assessment about the state of mind of those in positions of power and influence, faced with the unravelling economic-financial situation: “There are significant psychological obstacles in preparing for such a crisis. Those responsible for the economy . . . *find it psychologically easier to manage the consequences of a recession than to take controversial measures to avert it.* . . . I have nothing to contribute to the debate about the economic measures needed to avert or to mitigate a recession” (emphasis added).

Soon thereafter, Kissinger mentions the past years’ economic crises in Russia, Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, etc., and writes: “How many such roller-coaster rides can the international system withstand, without political and social debacle? What would happen if a U.S. recession were thrown into the equation. . . . When global growth depends so much on the performance of the American economy, a downturn of any length could *wreak havoc with the international financial and political systems.* . . . The dark cloud hanging over globalization is the threat of a global unraveling of the free market system under pressure, with all its attendant perils to democratic institutions. . . . The international financial system needs to reduce its volatility and learn to cushion the impact of crises more effectively” (emphasis added).

### **‘The Maxims of Westphalia Do Not Apply’**

In this context, Kissinger’s geopolitical obsessions signal that he and his friends are looking for a war.

This suspicion is aroused early on in the book, when he writes that “the Middle East conflicts are most analogous to those of 17th-Century Europe. . . . The maxims of Westphalian peace diplomacy do not apply in the Middle East.” What this refers to, is the 1648 treaty, which brought about an end to the 1618-48 Thirty Years War in Europe, a war which had caused vast devastation throughout much of the continent. The Treaty of Westphalia insisted on a new regime of international justice, centered around the recognition of the absolute sovereignty of the nation-state, ecumenical agreements between these states, and the rejection of revenge and retribution in policy calculations.

That he would so attack “the maxims of Westphalian peace diplomacy” for the Middle East can only be read as an attack on the policies of Lyndon and Helga LaRouche, the two figures who have repeatedly, and uniquely, insisted on “Westphalian” policies, as the only means of war-avoidance in that region. For the LaRouches, “Westphalian maxims” are the only way to create the preconditions, there, for a new era of economic cooperation, including water-development projects, and the like.

By axiomatically excluding the Treaty of Westphalia precedent from the Middle East context, and insisting on the “analogous” 17th-Century European Thirty Years War situation there, Kissinger is saying, in fact, that new wars are inevitable, and, in essence, desirable.

If one reviews his Chapter Five, dealing with the Middle East, what sticks out, is not only his obsessive dislike for the 1990s Clinton Administration peace diplomacy and “Oslo peace process,” but his yearning for his days of “shuttle diplomacy crisis-management,” when he was Richard Nixon’s National Security Advisor. While covering up his own central, manipulative role in the October 1973 “Yom Kippur War,” and in the ensuing “oil crisis,” his nostalgia for that conjuncture is crystal clear. The message, for the present moment, is also clear.

### **Britain Yesterday, America Today**

Although his perspective on Asia is not stated quite so crudely, there too, in the Kissingeresque worldview, war is on the horizon. He likens the situation in Asia, now, to that of 19th-Century Europe. There, according to this great strategist, the only thing that “worked,” was the “balance of power” doctrine of the British Empire. The United States, today, must apply “balance of power” policies to prevent “an unfriendly bloc” from developing in Asia, or in Eurasia more broadly. “America’s relationship to Asia is . . . comparable to that of Britain toward the continent of Europe for four centuries,” he writes. He quotes at length, from Churchill’s 1948 book, *The Gathering Storm*: “For 400 years, the foreign policy of England has been to oppose the strongest, most aggressive, most dominating Power on the Continent.” This covers the era,

inclusively, as Churchill stresses, of Lord Marlborough's conquests on the continent, in wars against France, and of the First World War.

It would be worth neither the time nor the space, to enumerate or detail the lies, distortions, and cover-ups in *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?* But one particularly egregious example deserves comment.

Kissinger, ever the influence-peddler, has felt the need to position himself, in the recent period, as a supporter of the Bush Administration's National Missile Defense (NMD) policy. He portrays himself here as a long-standing supporter of ballistic missile defense, and as a staunch opponent of the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) policy. What could be more absurd?!

This reviewer had the opportunity, soon after President Ronald Reagan's March 23, 1983 announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative, to speak to a very well-connected European strategist. This individual reported, that he had been at a dinner, with Kissinger, when the latter first was informed about Reagan's speech. He commented: "Henry nearly choked on his food, when he heard what Reagan had said! He was dismayed."

Beyond that anecdote, the simple fact is, that from that March 23, 1983 point onward, Kissinger became ever-more obsessed with destroying his chief adversary in the United States, the man who had architected what became the SDI policy, Lyndon LaRouche. Kissinger had already successfully demanded, during 1982, the extra-legal processes that eventually led to LaRouche's unlawful conviction and incarceration, in 1988-89. But in Spring 1983, he re-intruded himself into the Administration of a President who despised him, to combat the policy-influence of LaRouche.

The historical point, which is hardly a state secret, is that Kissinger was one of the architects of MAD. This grew, from his intimacy and collaboration with the leading circles of the Anglo-American-Soviet "Pugwash Conference" of Lord Bertrand Russell et al. This was the clear message of his 1950s book, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, written for the New York Council on Foreign Relations (the U.S. branch of Chatham House), under the tutelage of establishment big shot McGeorge Bundy, and ghost-written by one Gordon Dean. Though Kissinger is MAD, there is a dangerous method to his madness.

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## Sanctions on Iraq Aren't So 'Smart'

by Muriel Mirak-Weissbach

The decision on July 3, by the United States and British governments, to withdraw their resolution to the UN Security Council, calling for a new regime of "smart sanctions" against Iraq, demonstrates how much the world has changed since George W. Bush entered the White House. The move signalled a personal defeat both for Bush and his Secretary of State Colin Powell (who had vowed to change the sanctions regime, as a priority); furthermore, it announced a new reality in the Security Council: No longer can Washington and London assume that the usual arm-twisting will work, to win over the support of the Russian government in continuing the anti-Iraq policies.

It was, in fact, the Putin government's rejection of the "smart sanctions" resolution, which forced the United States and Britain to back off. Russia, which has been critical of the sanctions overall, shifted its position this time, to threaten an actual veto in the Security Council, a humiliation which Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair did not want to suffer.

Now, formally speaking, the *status quo ante* has been reinstated, in that the oil-for-food program, allowing Iraq to sell oil for purchases of food and other necessities, has been confirmed, for five months. In reality, the entire correlation of forces inside the Security Council has changed, as it is now Russia—not the U.S. and U.K.—that is determining policy toward Iraq.

### Smart Sanctions vs. Dumb Sanctions

The proposal for a new sanctions regime was submitted on May 22, on British and American initiative. It was dubbed "smart sanctions," allegedly because the resolution claimed to limit the effect of sanctions to the government and military, while alleviating the hardship for the civilian population. The resolution called for lifting restrictions on some civilian goods, while toughening controls on illegal imports of goods, illegal exports of oil, and also tightening enforcement of the arms embargo. This meant, that the UN expected Iraq's neighbors, Syria, Turkey, and Jordan, to "monitor" the flow of trade, i.e., that these countries should play the role of UN inspectors, which are no longer on the scene.

Iraqi officials were quick to note, after the resolution was presented, that if these were "smart sanctions," the previous measures must have been "dumb sanctions." They rejected the proposal, and immediately contacted the neighboring countries' governments, to make clear, that were they to sup-