

inclusively, as Churchill stresses, of Lord Marlborough's conquests on the continent, in wars against France, and of the First World War.

It would be worth neither the time nor the space, to enumerate or detail the lies, distortions, and cover-ups in *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?* But one particularly egregious example deserves comment.

Kissinger, ever the influence-peddler, has felt the need to position himself, in the recent period, as a supporter of the Bush Administration's National Missile Defense (NMD) policy. He portrays himself here as a long-standing supporter of ballistic missile defense, and as a staunch opponent of the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) policy. What could be more absurd?!

This reviewer had the opportunity, soon after President Ronald Reagan's March 23, 1983 announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative, to speak to a very well-connected European strategist. This individual reported, that he had been at a dinner, with Kissinger, when the latter first was informed about Reagan's speech. He commented: "Henry nearly choked on his food, when he heard what Reagan had said! He was dismayed."

Beyond that anecdote, the simple fact is, that from that March 23, 1983 point onward, Kissinger became ever-more obsessed with destroying his chief adversary in the United States, the man who had architected what became the SDI policy, Lyndon LaRouche. Kissinger had already successfully demanded, during 1982, the extra-legal processes that eventually led to LaRouche's unlawful conviction and incarceration, in 1988-89. But in Spring 1983, he re-intruded himself into the Administration of a President who despised him, to combat the policy-influence of LaRouche.

The historical point, which is hardly a state secret, is that Kissinger was one of the architects of MAD. This grew, from his intimacy and collaboration with the leading circles of the Anglo-American-Soviet "Pugwash Conference" of Lord Bertrand Russell et al. This was the clear message of his 1950s book, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, written for the New York Council on Foreign Relations (the U.S. branch of Chatham House), under the tutelage of establishment big shot McGeorge Bundy, and ghost-written by one Gordon Dean. Though Kissinger is MAD, there is a dangerous method to his madness.

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## Sanctions on Iraq Aren't So 'Smart'

by Muriel Mirak-Weissbach

The decision on July 3, by the United States and British governments, to withdraw their resolution to the UN Security Council, calling for a new regime of "smart sanctions" against Iraq, demonstrates how much the world has changed since George W. Bush entered the White House. The move signalled a personal defeat both for Bush and his Secretary of State Colin Powell (who had vowed to change the sanctions regime, as a priority); furthermore, it announced a new reality in the Security Council: No longer can Washington and London assume that the usual arm-twisting will work, to win over the support of the Russian government in continuing the anti-Iraq policies.

It was, in fact, the Putin government's rejection of the "smart sanctions" resolution, which forced the United States and Britain to back off. Russia, which has been critical of the sanctions overall, shifted its position this time, to threaten an actual veto in the Security Council, a humiliation which Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair did not want to suffer.

Now, formally speaking, the *status quo ante* has been reinstated, in that the oil-for-food program, allowing Iraq to sell oil for purchases of food and other necessities, has been confirmed, for five months. In reality, the entire correlation of forces inside the Security Council has changed, as it is now Russia—not the U.S. and U.K.—that is determining policy toward Iraq.

### Smart Sanctions vs. Dumb Sanctions

The proposal for a new sanctions regime was submitted on May 22, on British and American initiative. It was dubbed "smart sanctions," allegedly because the resolution claimed to limit the effect of sanctions to the government and military, while alleviating the hardship for the civilian population. The resolution called for lifting restrictions on some civilian goods, while toughening controls on illegal imports of goods, illegal exports of oil, and also tightening enforcement of the arms embargo. This meant, that the UN expected Iraq's neighbors, Syria, Turkey, and Jordan, to "monitor" the flow of trade, i.e., that these countries should play the role of UN inspectors, which are no longer on the scene.

Iraqi officials were quick to note, after the resolution was presented, that if these were "smart sanctions," the previous measures must have been "dumb sanctions." They rejected the proposal, and immediately contacted the neighboring countries' governments, to make clear, that were they to sup-

port the U.K.-U.S. proposal, Iraq would suspend all trade with them. Jordan, Syria, and Turkey stood up for their economic interests, and refused to back the plan.

Inside the Security Council, the U.S. and U.K. tried to ram the proposal through in eight working days, but when France, Russia, and China balked, they agreed to extend the oil-for-food program for one month, until July 3, to allow more time to apply pressure, especially to Russia. Iraq responded to that move, by stopping its supply of oil, arguing that the one-month extension was a violation of the program itself, which is defined in six-month intervals. When the month was up, China and France had agreed to the resolution, but Russia signalled its intention to veto, if necessary.

What had occurred in the interim, among other developments, was the summit meeting between George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin, during which the U.S. President reiterated his provocative positions regarding missile defense, abrogating the ABM Treaty, and massively expanding NATO eastwards. Putin made clear his principled rejection of these policies. The Russian President's first face-to-face confrontation with the intellectual lightweight Bush, must have impressed upon him, how important a firm stance by Moscow would be, in crucial policy questions, to maintain stability and prevent the Bush regime's provocative stance from endangering world peace. Iraq was to become the case in point.

When the Security Council decided to extend the oil-for-food program five months, the United States and Britain tried to insert a phrase, to the effect, that the Council in the meantime would continue to study the smart sanctions. This, Russia, also torpedoed; the only phrase allowed, was one referring to the need to improve the humanitarian program. In a statement issued by the Russian Foreign Ministry, the UN decision was characterized as a "wise compromise," and the ultimate solution to the Iraq problem was identified as a complete lifting of sanctions, in the context of Iraqi "cooperation with the international community in the field of disarmament." The day after the UN decision, the Russian parliament, the State Duma, voted 242-3 in support of a call to Putin, to use Russia's veto power to shoot down "any initiatives envisaging a tougher sanctions regime against Iraq," and to push for lifting the sanctions altogether.

No wonder, then, that when the "smart sanctions" plan was withdrawn, regional observers identified the Russian role as crucial. "I am happy about it," said economist and political commentator Fahed Fanek of Jordan, "because it clearly shows that the United States no longer imposes its will on the world, while Russia has proven that it is still a superpower."

## The Economic Dimension

One reason for Russia's intransigence on the Iraqi sanctions issue, is economic. Russia has huge interests in Iraq, which have been damaged by the ten-year sanctions, and is eager to return to trade normalcy. Iraq has \$10 billion outstanding in debts to Russia, from before the 1991 Gulf War;



*Russian President Vladimir Putin virtually pronounced the Iraq sanctions policy dead on July 18, calling it inappropriate and wrong, and announcing that Russia was negotiating resumption of full trade with Iraq.*

the two countries have signed a series of massive economic cooperation and trade deals, worth that figure, which can be implemented as soon as the sanctions are lifted. As Russian wire services reported on June 26, a group of Russian businessmen in the Committee on Cooperation with Iraq, met regarding the July 3 vote on sanctions, and issued a statement. It said that if the resolution passed, Russian companies would have to completely withdraw from Iraq, after having sustained some \$30 billion in losses already, over the ten-year sanctions period. The companies involved included big groups, such as LUKoil, Slavneft, StroitransGaz, and Saubneft.

The same must be said of Iraq's immediate neighbors, albeit the dimensions may be reduced. Jordan, whose economy has been shattered by the Gulf War and sanctions, has depended on trade with Iraq, especially oil imports, to survive. As one Jordanian diplomat told *EIR*, if the "smart sanctions" go through, it would be the end for Jordan. Prime Minister Ali Abu Ragheb told UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, in a letter prior to the vote, that if Jordan agreed to the new proposal, it "might very well threaten its social, economic, and political stability."

For Syria and Turkey, as well, trade with Iraq is crucial. The Turkish economy is going through a terminal crisis, and is financially virtually bankrupt, in part due to the after-effects of the Gulf War and sanctions, which cut the volume of trade by an order of magnitude.

Thus, the rejection by Iraq's neighbors of the U.S.-U.K. proposal. Iraqi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Najji al Hadithi expressed the government's satisfaction with the defeat of "smart sanctions," saying, "The American plot has collapsed. This collapse is a victory." And he added, "It's also a victory for the will of the countries which voiced their rejection of this deceitful project, such as Jordan, Syria, and Egypt."