

Fujimori government, no one, with the exception of Interior Minister Rospigliosi, is denying that Shining Path has returned, and with a vengeance. On Aug. 20, Rospigliosi, under pressure from the media, admitted that “for budgetary reasons,” the Paniagua transition government had closed down counterinsurgency bases in the country. The fall of the Fujimori government was also used to dismantle the entire national intelligence service.

On Aug. 7, the Lima press reported that the town of Pangoas, on the left bank of the Ene River, was once more in the public eye. This is the same region in which the Fujimori government had surrounded and captured “Comrade Feliciano,” the second-in-command of Shining Path after its “president,” Abimael Guzmán, was captured in 1992. In Pangoas, a column of more than 100 terrorists, armed with modern Israeli-made weapons and with anti-aircraft protection, decimated a national police patrol, killing four agents, and then disappeared into the jungle. Today, although the government denies it, there exist four main centers of subversion in the country: along the Apurimac River, along the Ene River, in the departments of Ayacucho, Junín, and Cuzco, and in the Upper Huallaga Valley in the departments of Huanuco, and Ucayali. Shining Path activities have been detected in Yurimaguas, Apurimac, San Martín, Amazonas, Cajamarca, Huncavelica, and Puno.

Shining Path has begun to make its presence felt in the slums of Lima as well, thanks to the fact that it has succeeded in rebuilding its nation-wide communications network, including with Shining Path members in prison, many of whom now have cellular phones and free contact with the outside. In mid-August, after eight years, Shining Path downed two high-tension electricity towers in Ayacucho department. There were also dynamite attacks in the same department, in the town of Puquio. According to a report by the Peace Council, an institute that studies the terrorist phenomenon in Peru, Shining Path has not only succeeded in reestablishing a central command on a national scale, but the theft and transport of explosives from various parts of the country has increased in recent months.

Peasants in the Peruvian interior, represented by legally constituted self-defense militias known as *ronderos*, which, together with the army, succeeded in defeating narco-terrorism during the 1990s, have travelled to Lima, demanding that President Toledo restore the budget for weapons and gasoline, which had previously supplied the civil defense patrols. Despite these appeals, however, the government not only continues to deny the resurgence of narco-terrorism, but has taken certain actions which will undoubtedly encourage the narco-terrorists. For example, on the pretext of indemnifying the relatives of those killed in the Barrios Altos and La Cantuta massacres, President Toledo called together the relatives of the disappeared terrorists and pledged to them that his government would raise monuments to honor Lima’s “fallen.”

Army War College in China-Bashing Orgy

by Michael O. Billington

Parameters, the monthly publication of the U.S. Army War College, published three separate articles in its August edition calling for the United States to adopt an imperial military policy, supposedly necessary to meet the threat of an aggressive war launched by China, either against Taiwan or over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.

Parameters generally serves as a sounding board for widely divergent views within the military establishment, leading even the *Washington Post* to describe the series as “unusually bellicose,” while noting the absence of any “balancing article.” These articles appear simultaneously with the Bush Administration’s open support for both the Israeli drive for religious war in the Middle East, and NATO’s training and direction of the Kosovo Liberation Army invasion of Macedonia. Such China-bashing must therefore be treated as deadly serious, despite the strategic incompetence of the arguments presented.

In the lead article, “What If . . . China Attacks Taiwan,” Richard Russell of the National Defense University, a biographer of Cold Warrior George F. Kennan, argues that the current accepted dogma, that China would be unable to militarily conquer Taiwan before the United States could come to its defense, must be rejected. China is capable, Russell argues, of a successful blitzkrieg assault on Taiwan. Russell says China is willing and able to use nuclear and chemical weapons as a means of surprise attack, and that they “might want to resort to force in the near to medium term, before Taiwan has time to strengthen its defenses under U.S. tutelage. In short, storm clouds are gathering in Asia.”

The United States, therefore, according to Russell, must abandon its long-standing policy of “strategic ambiguity,” which is based neither on pledging to defend Taiwan, which would supposedly encourage Taiwan to declare independence, nor pledging *not* to come to Taiwan’s defense, which would supposedly encourage Beijing to seize Taiwan militarily. As to President George W. Bush’s pledge to do “whatever it takes” to defend Taiwan, which was a de facto dumping of the “strategic ambiguity” policy in any case, Russell argues that the pledge is meaningless, because the Chinese can take over before the United States has the time to mobilize.

His proof lies in a tiresome repetition of the phrase “China could.” “China could” increase aircraft production and hide the planes from surveillance; train more troops clandestinely;

produce more ballistic missiles; fire “massive surface-to-surface missile barrages”; and on and on.

The racist nature of the argument is not hidden: “The Chinese might be more willing than their Western counterparts to integrate the use of weapons of mass destruction into their surprise attack to magnify the psychological blow against their victim. . . . The Chinese are less adverse than many in the West to using brutal violence against their own citizens for political objectives.”

This thinking is driven to ridiculous extremes in arguing that China might go to war as a means of using up “largely obsolescent” weapons: “Beijing might calculate that it would be a more prudent use of national resources to expend the arms and equipment in combat for the noble cause of reuniting the renegade province of Taiwan to the mainland.”

Unipolar World

Lt. Col. Roy C. Howle, Jr. contributes the second article, which argues that the United States must not only give up “strategic ambiguity,” but must “come to grips with the central question of whether it wants a unipolar or multipolar world.”

The idea that the United States should adopt a unipolar, imperial outlook, to defend its role as the “only superpower,” is not just the ravings of a military yahoo. The core defense policy group in the Bush Administration looks to a strategic Defense Planning Document, prepared in 1992 by Paul Wolfowitz, now Deputy Secretary of Defense, which raised the imperial battle cry: “Our first objective is to prevent the reemergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and Southeast Asia.”

Colonel Howle proposes that the new imperial role of the United States in a globalized world must indeed be global: “To be effective, America must recognize that the New World Order is not a place, it is a process. The security perimeter can no longer be defined in terms of this place or that, this country or that. Rather, it must be defined in terms of systems, relationships, and objectives such as democracy, free trade, stability and freedom of the seas.” As to Asia, the United States must make clear to China that “the aim of U.S. military policy and operations” are to “ensure that no player feels it can afford to use force to change the balance of power.”

Food and Energy

Completing the trilogy are two professors from the University of Hull in the United Kingdom, long a center for the

promotion of Sir Halford Mackinder’s geopolitics of Empire. In April 1995, for instance, the Center for Security Studies at Hull held a symposium for leading British and American military, academic, and government figures, to reassert the Anglo-American “special relationship,” and to bring the United States into line with the British Commonwealth’s new imperial vision for the world.

In keeping with that tradition, Dr. Thomas Kane and Dr. Lawrence Serewicz argue in “China’s Hunger: The Consequences of a Rising Demand for Food and Energy,” that China will necessarily be driven to war by its insatiable demand for food and energy: “The factors that place the P.R.C. at odds with the established world community are global, material, and integral to China’s existence as an independent polity.”

The argument is trite: that the need for resources for the huge Chinese population will “trigger outright wars over resources,” at first in the South China Sea, but then beyond, and that it is “wishful thinking for Americans and Europeans to assume that they can cajole the Chinese into adopting a putatively more civilized pattern of behavior,” and therefore the “supporters of a liberal political order” must be prepared to defend their interests.

Both China and Russia

As is clear from the imperial tone of the articles, the target is not China per se, but any combination of nations which may threaten the Anglo-American financial institutions’ capacity to enforce their policies. This was made even more explicit in a commentary by Constantine Menges of the Hoover Institution, in the July 29 *Washington Post*. Menges, who is about to release a book, *The United States, Russia and China; Geopolitics in the New Century*, sends a shrill warning that the China-Russia Treaty of Cooperation signed on July 16, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, formed on June 15 by China, Russia, and the four Central Asian republics which were formerly part of the Soviet Union, are intended to “oppose the United States on security issues and to divide America from its allies.”

In fact, *EIR* has been told repeatedly across Asia that British and American interests have used this argument, in order to *themselves* separate potential Asian allies from one another—namely, Japan, South Korea, and the Southeast Asian countries, from China and Russia. This is also the meaning of the proposal put forward on July 30 by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell for a “new Cold War” alliance in Asia, among the United States, Australia, Japan, and South Korea. What the new Cold Warriors fear is that the nations of Asia and Europe are uniting, not in opposition to the United States, but to the putrid corpse of the bankrupt international financial institutions, to which the Bush Administration is foolishly clinging, despite the most obvious stench.