

# Transforming the Military for The Clash of Civilizations

by Carl Osgood

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has often said, in recent weeks, what kind of regimes he would like to see in both Afghanistan and Iraq. He has become fond of saying that he would like to see regimes that do not harbor terrorists, that do not threaten their neighbors, and where democracy and human rights are respected. However, in a world characterized by the onrushing global financial disintegration, the strategic policies being implemented by Rumsfeld and his policymakers in the Pentagon reflect the outlook of the Clash of Civilizations, as enunciated by Harvard professor Samuel Huntington going back to 1993. This fact has significant implications for the organization and doctrine of the U.S. military establishment.

One of Rumsfeld's top priorities, since he arrived at the Pentagon in January 2001, has been "military transformation." During a Jan. 31, 2002 speech at the National Defense University, Rumsfeld defined transformation in mostly technical terms. "We need rapidly deployable, fully integrated joint forces," he said, "capable of reaching distant theaters quickly and working with our air and sea forces to strike adversaries swiftly, successfully and with devastating effect." He added that "Our goal is not simply to fight and win wars, it is to try to prevent wars. To do so, we need to find ways to influence the decision-makers of potential adversaries, to deter them not only from using existing weapons, but to the extent possible, try to dissuade them from building dangerous new capabilities in the first place." He used the employment of B-52's, dropping satellite-guided bombs, in conjunction with special forces troops on the ground in Afghanistan—sometimes riding horses—as one example of what this transformation should look like. He said that this combination of the old and the new "showed that a revolution in military affairs is about more than building new high-tech weapons. . . . It's also about new ways of thinking, and new ways of fighting."

## Millennium Challenge 2002

Some of the "new ways of fighting" were tested in an exercise called "Millennium Challenge 2002," which was run out of the U.S. Joint Forces Command, headquartered in Nor-

folk, Virginia, from July 24 to Aug. 15. The exercise, or experiment, as the military refers to it, involved 13,500 troops conducting live force operations at nine training ranges in the Western United States and off the West Coast, and simulated operations at 17 other locations. The experiment was designed to test new conceptions for organizing and executing military operations. These conceptions include effects-based operations, operational net assessment, the standing joint force headquarters, and the joint interagency coordination group. The hypothesis of Millenium Challenge, as explained by Col. Phil Mixon, the director of Concepts Development and Experimentation at the Joint Experimentation Center in Suffolk, Virginia, is that a standing joint force headquarters, which uses operational net assessment, and employs effects-based operations can achieve decision superiority, enabling rapid decisive operations.

Now, what does all this mean? A standing joint force headquarters (SJFHQ) is a team of qualified experts attached to the headquarters of the unified combatant commander. When a crisis erupts, this team can remain on the combatant commander's staff—or, if a task force is deployed to handle the crisis—the team can "plug in" to the task force commander's staff, and provide expertise on the region involved and on conducting operations in that region. At all times, the SJFHQ is responsible for doing the operational net assessment (ONA). The ONA is a "nodal analysis," as Colonel Mixon described it, which looks at the adversary as a "system of systems," looking at not only his military capabilities, but also political, economic, and social factors, and information systems and economic infrastructure. Included in this assessment, is a look at the battlespace, U.S. capabilities, and how the enemy sees us. This assessment is used to answer the question, "What kind of effects do you want to achieve?" The means to generate the desired effects are not limited to military ones, but also can include diplomatic, information and economic means, as well.

## The Clash of Civilizations' Worldview

What kind of world does all this presuppose? Brig. Gen. James B. Smith, the officer in charge of Millenium Challenge

2002, made it explicit in an interview (see below). He pointed to the “end of the Western construct of warfare,” which he traced back to the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Years War in Europe. The Treaty of Westphalia defined war as between nation-states, and such states were not to get involved in each other’s internal affairs. In the last ten years, conflict has been characterized less as between nation-states, and more as intervening into states against human rights abuses, ethnic cleansing, and so forth. General Smith pointed to a number of events, going back to the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983, to indicate how “our adversaries” have attacked the United States, not as a nation-state but as “hostile participants, terrorists, against our weaknesses.”

While General Smith was quick to specify that he was only expressing his own opinion, and that it had nothing to do with Millennium Challenge, this view is quite prevalent at higher levels of policymaking. Samuel Huntington wrote, in his infamous 1993 article “The Clash of Civilizations?” in *Foreign Affairs*, that “the great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural,” meaning that the “clash of civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.” Huntington described a phase of conflict beginning with the French Revolution, which he called “the Western phase,” defined as nation-state versus nation-state, which ended with the end of the Cold War. What has replaced it is “the interaction between Western and non-Western civilizations and among non-Western civilizations.”

Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations thesis is being propagated throughout the military professional establishment, as well. Jeffrey Record, writing in the Summer 2002 issue of *Parameters*, the professional journal of the U.S. Army War College, said: “Weak and failed states, not strong ones, have become the primary source of international instability, and they have attracted U.S. military intervention because they have become shelters and breeding grounds for such transnational threats as terrorism, drug-trafficking, refugee generation, environmental degradation, and political and religious extremism.” In an earlier work, Record wrote, “As the world’s sole remaining superpower, the United States performs on a global basis the same imperial policy task that the British military performed within the British Empire.” There is no formal, territorial empire of the United States, but “there is an American empire, nonetheless.”

Record makes no mention of the role of Huntington’s collaborator, Carter-era National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, in creating, in particular, those transnational problems in Afghanistan, beginning months before the 1979 Soviet invasion of that country, with his “Arc of Crisis” policy for ringing the Soviet Union with hostile regimes and insurgencies. Record teaches strategy at the U.S. Air Force’s Air War College, and so, is in a position to indoctrinate up-and-coming military officers in his outlook.

Huntington’s view is also well represented in the Penta-

gon by such ideologues as Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Doug Feith, and chairman of the Defense Policy Board Richard Perle, among others. Their commitment is to return to pre-Treaty of Westphalia conditions and perpetual wars of religion, obliterating the sovereign nation-state.

### **LaRouche: A Positive Mission for the Military**

The alternative to the Clash of Civilizations utopian thinking is to define a positive mission of the military within a system of nation-states. *EIR* founder and contributing editor Lyndon LaRouche has defined such a positive mission, as well as identifying the enemies of the nation-state.

On Sept. 3, 2000, in response to a conference question, LaRouche said: “The function of strategy and strategic thinking is to secure the kind of world order which we require, as a result of commitments which were shaped, essentially, in the 15th-Century Golden Renaissance. That is, we are for a system of sovereign nation-states, each committed to the general welfare of all its people and their posterity, and who believe that the relations among such states must be joint action to ensure the common ability of each such state to efficiently defend the general welfare of its own people.” The military officer, functioning as a strategist, “is not trying to find out what war to fight. He’s trying to understand what the *threat is, to the effort to defend and build this kind of state and this kind of relationship among states.*” LaRouche went on to specify that the enemy of the general welfare is the British monarchy, the British Empire, which wants to exterminate this general welfare principle, but without taking an unacceptable penalty to do so. “And therefore,” LaRouche said, “we have to have the military means to back up our will, in terms of this policy. And that’s Classical strategy. . . .”

LaRouche went on to counterpose this to the “Cabinet warfare” doctrine, as exemplified by Henry Kissinger during the Vietnam War, where he would “turn the war on and off,” in order to manipulate the Paris peace negotiations with the North Vietnamese, attempting to modify their behavior by the application of force. “This kind of foolishness,” LaRouche said, “*destroyed the U.S. military,*” which was “induced to destroy itself by accepting this kind of State Department directive on conducting Cabinet warfare.”

LaRouche concluded by defining the principle of statecraft. “The principle of statecraft, as has been proven, is the establishment of sovereign nation-states, whose only legitimate authority is their efficient commitment to the promotion of the general welfare. *And,* the proposal of a system of relations among sovereign nation-states, where we *assist each other,* and cooperate with each other, in promoting the general welfare of the people of each nation. And we will fight as necessary to protect and promote that policy. That’s Classical military thinking. And whatever is necessary to be known, or to be done, to fulfill that, is what is proper military conduct.”