

Anglo-Americans Dictate 'Peace' to Sudan

by Uwe Friesecke

After meeting the peace negotiators for Sudan on Oct. 22 in the Kenyan holiday resort Naivasha, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell declared he expected a comprehensive peace deal signed by the end of the year. Initially, government sources in Khartoum were quoted saying that nobody could dictate a deadline to the Sudanese government. But a day later, Khartoum declared officially that the government would redouble its efforts to meet the year-end deadline. This shows that Khartoum's policy is not uncontroversial within the Sudanese governing elite. But the war in Iraq is a strong enough warning of what could happen to Sudan, if it should not comply. Therefore, in Khartoum right now, policy is determined by those who are convinced that there is no alternative but to give in to the Anglo-American stick, hoping that one day also the carrot will be delivered.

U.S. and British diplomacy has invested much to bring to an end to 20 years of fighting in Sudan's South. Since 1983, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/SPLA) in Southern Sudan has been fighting the Sudanese government in Khartoum. Now, after many failed attempts, the two parties to the conflict seem to be close to an agreement. But the deal communicated by the American Secretary of State is motivated more by Anglo-American geopolitical concern for control over Central/East Africa and the Horn of Africa, than by a genuine desire for peace for Sudan and its neighbors.

Negotiations have taken place between delegations from Sudan's government and the SPLM, within the framework of IGAD (Intergovernmental Agency for Development) in Kenya since early 2002. Kenya's former army chief, General Sumbeiywo, is heading the mediation team; rather than honestly trying to mediate, it is engaged in winning one concession after the other from the side of Khartoum. U.S. and British diplomats and intelligence operatives are all over the negotiations, to make sure that the Sudanese government accepts a deal making the secession of the southern territories possible. During his meeting in Naivasha, Secretary Powell praised the two leaders of the delegations, Sudan's Vice President Taha and SPLM leader John Garang, for their commitment to peace, and promised the signing of the deal would take place with President George W. Bush at the White House in Washington. But a week later, Washington wielded the

stick against Khartoum, when President Bush extended sanctions against Sudan for another year.

So far, the winners in these peace negotiations have been John Garang and his backers in Washington and London. A united, sovereign Sudan is, for now, clearly on the losing side.

From Machakos to the Division of Sudan

What the international media characterized as a breakthrough occurred on July 20, 2002 in Machakos, a town south-east of Kenya's capital Nairobi. There, the Sudan government and the SPLM signed a protocol in which the government de facto recognizes the right of secession of the southern provinces. The text of the protocol still held out the idea of unity for Sudan, but in reality it was the first step for the breakup of the country. This became clear a year later in July 2003. The mediator, General Sumbeiywo, presented a new paper for negotiations, which differed sharply from the Machakos Protocol. In Machakos the agreement was that during the transition period of six years, national administrative and political unity would not be questioned, and thereafter the final decision would be taken through a referendum. But the 2003 proposal was for two separate administrative, political, and financial structures. It would recognize the control of the SPLA and John Garang over the South already during the so-called transition period.


Naturally, Garang agreed to this immediately. Sudanese President Al-Bashir, on the other hand, first rejected the proposal angrily and recalled his delegation. But after he had replaced his peace advisor Dr. Ghazi Salaheddine Atabani as head of the delegation, by his Vice President Ali Osman Taha, the delegation went back to Kenya and signed the deal proposed by Sumbeiywo. When the negotiations resume at the end of November in Kenya, the last disputed points—wealth-sharing, power-sharing, and control over three areas in central Sudan—will probably be settled the same way.

Nothing but the destruction of Sudan's sovereignty as the largest country in Africa has, in reality, been the agenda of the peace talks. All signs are that Washington and London are committed to see this accomplished.

During the Clinton Administration, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright used a visit to Sudan's neighbor Uganda to call for the overthrow of the government in Khartoum. The Administration was full of fanatical ideologists who wanted to destroy the Islamist government in Sudan at all costs. Susan Rice, as Undersecretary of State for Africa, or John Prendergast as director for Africa policy in the National Security Council (NSC), were among them. Today, Prendergast is special advisor on Africa to the International Crisis Group (ICG) in Brussels, a think-tank with George Soros, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Richard Allan, and Mikhail Khodorkovsky on its board. Prendergast is part of the team steering the IGAD process for Sudan in Kenya.

When President Bush came into office in January 2001,

Line of Anglo-American Division of Sudan



Oil geopolitics and “war on terror” pressures from the United States and Britain (i.e., the invasion of Iraq) have pushed Sudan to accept a July 2002 “peace agreement”; and now, after renewed instigation of civil war, a drastically-altered agreement which divides the country in two, on lines going back to British 19th-Century colonial policy.

and Powell and Walter Kannsteiner replaced Albright and Rice in the State Department, a more “pragmatic” Sudan policy was formulated by the United States. It dropped some of the fanatical rhetoric against Khartoum, but did not lose sight of the fundamental strategic changes envisaged for Sudan and the region.

The change also became apparent in Khartoum. In January 2001, Lyndon and Helga Zepp-LaRouche’s Schiller Institute organized a seminar in Khartoum, sponsored by the Sudanese government, under the title “Peace Through Development Along the Nile Valley.” Lyndon LaRouche was the keynote speaker; his warnings of the policy of the incoming Bush Administration in Washington were taken with great reserve by some of Sudan’s government representatives in attendance. It was clear that the demise of the Clinton Administration was greeted with hopes to come to some kind of an agreement with the new American government.

The Bush Administration engaged in a simple double game. On one side, they offered talks, which had been impos-

sible under Clinton and Albright; and they sent Sen. John Danforth as the President’s special envoy. He delivered his report in April 2002, recommending further U.S. engagement in the Sudan conflict. But Garang’s SPLA kept constantly threatening military attacks, aiming at the Sudanese oilfields. Right after the Machakos deal was signed in July 2002, the SPLA threatened the government town of Juba in the South. Back in Washington, Congress adopted the Sudan Peace Act, which gave the White House the right to ask for more sanctions against Sudan from the UN Security Council. And the Bush Administration kept Sudan on the list of states supporting terrorism.

Finally, in March 2003, the Iraq war sent an additional message to Khartoum for those who still might not have understood what really was at stake in the IGAD peace talks.

Anglo-American Objectives

The peace agreement being dictated by the Anglo-American powers to Sudan is part of a decades-long process of realignment of power structures in Africa. Before Garang began his rebellion in 1983, he studied in the United States and received military training in Fort Benning in Georgia. His rebellion would never have succeeded if he had not been supported financially, militarily, and politically by America, Britain, and Israel. The Sudanese war was, from the beginning, steered from the outside.

Garang’s closest ally in Africa was Yoweri Museveni, who came to power as President of Uganda with British help in 1986.

During the transitional six-year period as now laid down in Kenya, Garang would become Vice President of Sudan, and be another Anglo-American asset in Africa to guarantee the good behavior of a government. After the Congo peace agreement was dictated in a similar way, Africa—from Angola to Kenya, and from Burundi to Sudan—would be governed by regimes dependent on Anglo-American interests, not the least regarding oil and other raw materials.

If, after the end of six years, Southern Sudan should split from the rest of the country, and take with it most of the oil concessions which are largely located in the South, the remaining Northern Sudan would be rendered hopelessly weak. The new state in the South, as a landlocked entity, would not have much independent power either. Anglo-American control would be complete.

This Anglo-American strategy, to bring John Garang to power in Khartoum and/or to split the country, is also directly aimed at Egypt. The waters of the Nile are Egypt’s lifeline. The area in the South claimed by the SPLM is run through by the White and Blue Nile. Any power changes here can be used as blackmail against Cairo.

Unfortunately, Sudan and the rest of Africa will remain far from real peace and development if the Western powers continue to manipulate power and politics on the continent for their own geopolitical desires.