
Interview: Hon. Giovanni Galloni

‘The Theory of Preventive Wars Has Always Been Groundless’

In October, Italian police and anti-terrorist forces won a major battle against the networks of the Red Brigades, with the arrests and interrogations of dozens of suspects. The national operation involved hundreds of anti-terrorism specialists who struck against terrorist cells particularly in the Florence-Tuscany and Rome areas.



During the 1990s, the Red Brigades stopped the terror campaign against the state almost completely. Only a few units still remained silently underground. After 1999, these networks resurfaced with two major assassination attacks against key collaborators of the Italian Labor Ministry, who were elaborating a global reform of the labor market, collective contracts, etc. Massimo D'Antona was killed in Rome on May 20, 1999; and Marco Biagi was murdered by the Red Brigades in Bologna on March 19, 2002. Since then, investigators have been alerted and mobilized against a possible new phase of terrorist destabilization, particularly in a moment of mounting social and economic crisis.

In the 1970s and 1980s, dozens of political leaders and top representatives of the Italian state died in the terrorist war waged by the Red Brigades. The most dramatic event for the entire nation was the kidnapping on March 18, 1978 of the most important Italian political leader of that moment, Aldo Moro, who after 55 days of incarceration was killed and his body left in a car near the center of Rome. That event, like the assassination of U.S. President John F. Kennedy, changed the history of Italy and of the world. Everyone, beginning with Moro's family, and the Italian people, deserves to know the truth of it.

The assassination was part of a strategy of total destabilization of Italy. It signalled a decision of certain international forces to stop the ongoing process—supported by many, first of all by Pope Paul VI, and in which Moro's negotiation on bringing the Italian Communist Party into governing responsibilities was playing a major role—to overcome the post-


war division at Yalta and the blackmail of nuclear terror.

The question was posed then and has been raised again today: Who was really interested in maintaining, at all costs, the strategy of tension and of nuclear terror? Who was really behind the assassination of Aldo Moro?

One of the most significant actors of Italian political life of the past 50 years, Hon. Giovanni Galloni, was interviewed on these and related matters in October in Rome, by Paolo Raimondi of EIR, leader of the LaRouche movement in Italy. Galloni has been a life-long leader of the majority party of the Italian post-war period, the Democrazia Cristiana (DC), and was a very close collaborator of Aldo Moro in the most difficult years of the 1970s. He is a jurist and university professor, specialized in juridical aspects of agriculture and all agriculture-related issues. He has written dozens of essays and books on these matters, which have made him a founder and leader of this school of studies.

After participating in the resistance movement against Nazism and Fascism, he took many responsibilities in the DC, and in 1978 became its deputy general secretary. In those years, Galloni was a member of the Italian Parliament; he was Minister of Education in the center-left governments of 1987-89 (in which capacity he is shown here opening the famous Bologna University in 1987). He also was an enthusiastic political writer and debater, and in 1984-85 became chief editor of the DC's daily newspaper, Il Popolo.

In 1991, Galloni was appointed president of the Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura, the key state institution that coordinates and supervises the entire Italian legal and magistracy structure. Recently, he stood up to denounce the unconstitutionality and illegality of the so-called preventive war waged by Bush, Cheney, and the neo-conservatives against Iraq. In an article published in April 2003 in the Italian political magazine Nuova Fase, which he founded, Galloni wrote: "Every day it becomes a more serious mistake not to have followed the orientation given by the UNO. The fight against terrorism must be conducted and led by a community of states, that were in solidarity with the U.S.A. after the criminal attempt of Sept. 11. . . . What the democratic nations of the world do not accept, is that the U.S.A. unilaterally impose its military superpower outside of the UNO, to guarantee its hegemony and define relations among nations through the rules of a new 'pax americana.' "



In 1978, Prime Minister Aldo Moro (left) of the Christian Democracy (DC) was preparing the “historical compromise” to bring Enrico Berlinguer’s (right) Italian Communist Party, which was in the process of breaking with Soviet control, into government coalitions which could no longer be sustained by the Socialist Party—when Moro was kidnapped by the Red Brigades and murdered. Galloni, who was then DC vice-chairman, had been explaining the necessity for Moro’s new policy in the United States.

In this exclusive interview, Galloni goes through some of the main moments of his political life, particularly those intersecting crucial historical changes. His personal involvement in these events makes this report a true and interesting historical document.

EIR: During your political life you have had responsibilities and posts of leadership which led you to develop contacts with the U.S.A. and American political leaders. The U.S.A. and Italy had very close relations after World War II, and leaders of your party, the Christian Democracy, had intense contact and dialogue with American counterparts. The first post-war Prime Minister, Alcide De Gasperi, developed friendly relations based on the respect and the promotion of the national interests of both. What can you tell us about your personal contacts with America?

Galloni: My first trip to America was in 1976, when we were working with Moro to create National Solidarity between the Christian Democracy (DC) and the Communists. Ray Cline invited me to speak at the Center for Strategic Studies at Georgetown University. Formally, I was to speak about agricultural problems, but then he basically said: “We know you as a political figure, talk to us about current political problems.” I explained why in Italy, in order to maintain a democratic balance, it was necessary to create the conditions for the existence of a democratic alternative. Because up until that point, there had only been centrist governments at first, and then center-left governments which had the aim of keeping the Communist Party (PCI) in the minority. When he presented me, Cline said: “We are speaking with a representa-

tive of the majority party [at the time I was the national Vice-Secretary of the DC] of a country which changes government all the time, but actually has the most stable government, because the governments—at first the centrist ones, and then center-left ones—kept changing, but the majority stayed the same, and was the most stable in Europe for 30 years.”

I explained that the conditions for maintaining this stability were no longer present, because the Italian Communists were beginning to break with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Before that time, there had been some attempts made in that direction: first, by the DC with De Gasperi when the Social Democrats were brought out of the Socialist Party; and then with Moro, when the Socialists broke with the Communists. The goal was, that once the break with the Communists took place, these parties

could then become strong, like the other European Socialist parties.

However, what happened in Italy is that the Social Democrats never went much beyond 4-5% of the vote, and the Socialists were around 10-11% and never turned into a real alternative. The only thing that worked, were the efforts to create parliamentary majorities that kept the PCI on the outside. And this was an essential democratic function as long as the PCI remained linked to the Soviets. But the political picture changed the moment that the PCI, especially with Enrico Berlinguer as Secretary, began to break with the CPSU after the 1968 events in Czechoslovakia.

In the regional administrative elections of 1975, the Communists received almost as many votes as the DC. After the 1976 elections, the DC improved its position; the Socialists lost even more ground; and the Communists grew. The Socialists were starting to say (De Martino was Secretary at the time): We can no longer continue our alliance with the DC. Either the DC opens the alliance to the PCI, or the Socialists will leave the majority and join the opposition.

Under these conditions, after the results of the political elections of 1976, we were faced with a choice: Either hold new elections without knowing who would win, or take the new path suggested by Moro and Berlinguer. The idea was to set up a Grand Coalition similar to that arranged in Germany, in order to get through a certain phase of the passage toward a democratic alternative. A provisional parliamentary majority was to be created, justified by the emergency which existed in the country due to the presence of the Red Brigades—a group which the Communists opposed—and deal with the

serious nature of the economic situation, characterized by an inflation rate of over 20%. We were convinced that after this experience, the path toward a democratic alternative would be open, because even if the Communists won, democracy in Italy would not be in danger.

The answer to my remarks was given by a representative of the Pentagon. Michael Ledeen was given the job of speaking, and he said that my remarks were *politically* sound and very logical, but they lacked a sense of strategy. He said that my speech did not take into account the fact that the U.S.S.R., according to their information services, had never stopped thinking about the possibility of a third world war. In such a conflict, the U.S.S.R.'s great force on the ground gave the Soviets, according to the Pentagon's calculations, the capability to invade Europe within only a few weeks. The U.S.A. would thus find itself at a disadvantage in the conflict. The only way to block the U.S.S.R. was to have bases, especially in both northern and southern Italy, because missiles from these strong air bases, with forewarning of at least two hours before the beginning of the Soviet offensive, would be capable of wiping out the staging areas, and thus blocking the Soviet advance.

Ledeen said that Italy is a free and independent nation; if it wants Communism, then it can take it.

In France, when the Socialists brought the Communists into the government, Ledeen said, this did not create the strategic problems which Italy would create. He added that the Pentagon viewed Berlinguer's attempt to break with Moscow as merely a tactical maneuver by the Soviet Union, because the presence of the Communists in the Italian government would block the installation of military air bases in Italy. For this reason, Ledeen said that the United States would do

anything to stop the Communists from entering the Italian government, without making it an ideological question or depriving Italy of its freedom.

EIR: Michael Ledeen is now part of the so-called neo-cons pushing for a "clash of civilizations" and pre-emptive wars everywhere on Earth. Since that time, he has been involved massively in Italian internal affairs. Presently I know that he is spending much time in Italy to preach and organize support for what he believes to be inevitable global conflicts.

Galloni: This was my first conference in the United States. The second, again organized by Cline, took place a few years later, as a debate involving me, representing the DC as the head of the parliamentary group; [Franco] Tatò, the personal secretary and press spokesman for Berlinguer; and the Socialist Giuliano Amato as [Socialist leader Bettino] Craxi's personal representative in the United States. Amato's thesis was that the United States should view the Socialists (PSI) as the most important Italian party. To the American objection that a party with only 10-11% of the vote could not be the key party in Italy, Amato responded that neither of the two large Italian parties, the DC and the PCI, had a political and cultural tradition, and given the nature of the electoral system and the fact that no party could reach 50% of the vote, neither of the two parties could govern on their own. The DC or the PCI, in order to govern, had to have an alliance with the PSI, and therefore, it was definitely the PSI, led by Bettino Craxi, whether he was Prime Minister or not, which could govern the country through an alliance with the PCI or the DC. Thus, the PSI was the most significant political force in Italy.

I participated in a third meeting, again at the Center for

Red Brigaders Arrested

Italian police on Oct. 23-31 arrested eight persons accused of having participated in the assassination of Massimo D'Antona and Marco Biagi, two collaborators of the Labor Ministry. Many of those arrested declared themselves to be "members of the Red Brigades."

The investigations gained momentum last March, when two terrorists were identified during a police check on the Rome-Arezzo train. There was a shootout during which a policeman and one of the terrorists were killed. Investigators were later able to reconstruct the whole network of the "new" Red Brigades and arrest eight of their members, as well as collecting an impressive amount of evidence on their participation in the D'Antona and Biagi murders.

But the arrests raise at least as many questions as they answer. First of all, investigators are convinced that the top leaders are still free. Second, the geographical distribution of the "new" terrorist network reminds one of unsolved aspects of the Moro assassination. A parliamentary commission has established that Moro's kidnappers used to meet with the "strategic leadership" of the Red Brigades in Florence, but nothing has been done to find out where the meeting took place, and who participated. Some think that the late Igor Markevic, a member of the Caetani family, was the connection between those meetings and intelligence circles in Italy and Britain.

Shortly after the October arrests, the Moro family announced that they will seek to reopen the investigation. They argue that Moro's alleged executioners were arrested, tried, and sentenced, but have never told the full story. All of them are now free.—*Claudio Celani*



Michael Ledeen (left) was the Pentagon official who in 1976 told Galloni that the United States rejected Moro's "historical compromise" and would do everything to stop it "short of depriving Italy of its freedom." Synarchist Ledeen is today one of the most extreme of leading neo-conservative advocates of "preventive war." Between Moro and Henry Kissinger (right, in 1977, with Carlist fascist William F. Buckley), "there was more than a clash . . . Kissinger had a deep contempt for Moro," says Galloni.

Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown in 1984, when I was the director of *Il Popolo*. [Claire Booth] Luce, the former Ambassador in Italy, was at that meeting. Again, I illustrated the position of the DC after the assassination of Aldo Moro. Cline did not hide the fact that he was very close to sections of the CIA; but he assured me that there are different positions inside the CIA. Its leaders were in close contact with the Administration, whether it were Democratic or Republican at any given time.

Later on, in 1985, when I was still director of *Il Popolo*, three friends of Cline came to see me in Rome. . . . They said: We have a lot of faith in you, but you have to explain [Prime Minister Giulio] Andreotti's position, about which we have a lot of doubts. We are convinced that Andreotti is changing policy both in Italy, and regarding the Middle East, where he supports Arafat, as well as relations with the new head of the Soviet Union, Gorbachov. We fear that he is going to shift Italy's position and bring the country much closer to the East. I said that from what I knew, that view was completely groundless. Andreotti had good reasons to believe that changes were under way in the Soviet Union, and he was convinced that peace absolutely had to be reached between Israel and the Palestinians, involving the reciprocal recognition of sovereignty.

Nevertheless, from that point on, my relations with the Center for Strategic and International Studies ceased to exist. They did not believe me. So much so, that . . . when I was

a government minister in 1987, Andreotti—who was then Foreign Minister—presented the Council of Ministers with a justified request for the replacement of our Ambassador in Moscow, Sergio Romano, because the Italian Ambassador was not following the directives of Rome, but rather those from the American government. In fact, he sent reports saying that Gorbachev's representations were all fake, because in reality he was still linked to the old system. On the contrary though, when Gorbachev visited Italy, including his visit with the Pope, we realized that there was a strong change under way.

EIR: This is very interesting, particularly because after this period, Giulio Andreotti began to face a number of big political problems, targetted with attacks and scandals aimed to destroy him and the political orientation he represented. Ten years ago, a major operation was organized, with the involvement of Italian *mafiosi* incarcerated in American prisons and collaborating with the U.S. Justice Department, to accuse Andreotti of connections with the Mafia and of other crimes. This has been one of the major destabilizations of Italian political life of the past 50 years. The highest court in Italy has cleared Andreotti of all accusations. In the 1970s, Andreotti shared with Moro the highest political responsibility for Italy and the Italian governments. In that period [U.S. Secretary of State] Henry Kissinger was totally opposed to Moro and his policy. The wife and other collaborators of Moro have pub-

licly reported, after his death, that Moro felt threatened after a dramatic discussion with Kissinger.

Galloni: I don't have direct knowledge of the Moro-Kissinger conflict. When he was working for the policy of national solidarity, Moro knew very well that the conditions to bring the Communists into the government did not exist. What did exist were the conditions for a parliamentary dialogue, so that the Communists would support a single-party DC government. In that period, as the Vice-Secretary of the majority party, I directed the meetings between the parties to lay out the program of the government. In those meetings, Moro basically played the role of president. Moro had to deal with the pressure of the Communists who complained about the difficulty of giving outside support to a government formed by people who had traditionally been seen as their enemies. Moro knew well that bringing the Communists into the government would risk creating a split inside the DC, and above all, a split with the United States.

Before Moro was captured and killed, I had two very interesting talks with him. One day I was talking with Moro about the problem of the Red Brigades, and he said: "What I find amazing, is that I have evidence"—I don't know how he got it—"that allows me to say that both the CIA and the Israeli secret services have agents inside the Red Brigades, but that these agents have not collaborated with our secret services in order to explain where the terrorist bases are."

The second thing is that a few days before the kidnapping, Moro was insisting that there be a National Council of the DC before the government went to the Parliament for a confidence vote. This, he said, because it was too important a shift to be done without a general consensus among the parties. I said that according to the practice of our party, the leadership takes responsibility for the solution of a government crisis.

To settle this question, we decided to hold a small meeting at Piazza del Gesù [DC headquarters] with the Secretary of the party, [Benigno] Zaccagnini, the two Vice-Secretaries, the two parliamentary group heads, and, of course, with Moro and Andreotti. The meeting was set for 10 a.m. At 9 a.m., I had a meeting with the Secretary of the PLI [Liberal Party, of the center-right], [Valerio] Zanone, to talk about some questions of ordinary administration. He was late. So I arrived at the other meeting at 10:30. Just as everyone sat down I apologized for being late, saying that I had been with the secretary of the PLI. At this point, Moro said, ironically: "Ah, I'm glad that you of the Christian Democratic left have contacts with the PLI, because it could be useful some day."

We had the meeting and reached a compromise: that of not having a National Council, but rather a meeting of the two parliamentary groups. After the meeting, I went up to Moro and asked, what were you trying to say with that sentence? He took me by the arm and brought me into his room, where he kept me for an hour and a half in order to explain his entire strategy. If everything goes well, he said, we will form a



The "Red Brigades" in 1978 kidnapped Moro, and in 1981, American Gen. James Dozier. U.S. secret services found and special forces freed Dozier within a few weeks. There had been no rescue for Moro, nor, to this day, any finding where he was held. Moro had told Galloni of clear evidence that U.S. and Israeli secret services had agents in the Red Brigades, "but these agents have not collaborated with our secret services."

government with this formula, or something similar, until at least the Spring of 1982; that is, until the natural end of the legislature. But in the following political elections, we won't be able to run on a list together with the Communists. We'll have to do it with opposing lists. If our strategy has worked, then at that point the Communist Party will be completely split from the U.S.S.R. and the kind of dangers we have now, of incomprehension from both the inside and outside, will no longer exist. At that point, we will try to win the elections; but no matter who wins, democracy will be safe. That is why he had said that having contacts with the liberals, and the possibility of opening up to the voters of the center-right, could be important.

In this sense, Moro's true strategy remains very clear for me. It's not true that Moro and Berlinguer wanted the Historical Compromise [of Christian Democrats and Communists] of the type which the press reported. They wanted to initiate a phase shift in order to create that full democracy which was not yet consolidated in Italy.

EIR: The political strategies of certain forces, represented by Kissinger, openly and strongly rejected the global approach of

Moro; the tension between Kissinger and Moro . . . even took the front pages of some media.

Galloni: I began to notice it when I was in the United States and spoke to Ledeon. In that first meeting, I basically realized that there was more than a clash, and that Kissinger had a deep contempt for Moro. For his part, Moro saw Kissinger as still too linked to the old scheme of the Cold War. Moro rejected the ideas of those in America—even before Kissinger—who foresaw a sort of preventive third world war, carried out by the United States, before the U.S.S.R. could become strong enough in terms of nuclear capabilities and missiles.¹ Moro was convinced that at that time Yalta defended us from a third world war, and it was necessary to work for a large bilateral disarmament.

It may also be interesting to mention a meeting with [Pietro Sandro] Nenni in 1956. I had gone to see him immediately after he had been in Moscow to refuse the Stalin Peace Prize which they had given him, and he spoke to the Soviet leadership with which he had already had ties during the clandestine period. Nenni had made a pact of unity of action with the PCI. I found Nenni very irritated with [Palmiro] Togliatti that day. He said that Togliatti had lied before April 18, 1948. In Moscow they told me, he said, that Stalin himself had contacted Togliatti at that point and posed the following question: “You’re not really thinking of winning the election campaign in Italy, are you? Because I will not fight a third world war for Italy. Be careful of what you do, because if you win and insist on forming a government of the Communists, you cannot forget that according to the Yalta Treaty, Italy is in the West, and therefore a violent reaction by the Americans, who would impose a military government in Italy, would be inevitable. You currently have a significant parliamentary presence, a majority in the labor unions, a strong presence in the local institutions, and if you go in this direction you will end up being outlawed; so be careful.”

This American idea of the necessity of preventive war—because, they said, when the Russians developed atomic bombs, they would launch World War III—was completely groundless. Just as the theory of the necessity of preventive wars has always been groundless.²

1. The demand that the United States prepare and threaten a “preventive nuclear war” against the Soviet Union, was first raised by Lord Bertrand Russell in a notorious article in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* in 1946; Russell noted years later that the purpose was to intimidate Russia into agreeing to forego nuclear weapons development, and that if the demand was part bluff, “one had to be prepared to have one’s bluff called.” After Soviet development of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, Russell became an architect of Mutual and Assured Destruction and a “peacenik”; however, Anglo-American utopians epitomized by Kissinger continued to contemplate “preventive” use of nuclear weapons, as noted by Galloni, through the Cuban Missiles Crisis and well beyond—*EIR*.

2. This reference is clearly to the “Cheney Doctrine” of preventive war, including preventive nuclear war, to prevent “potential rivals” to American global superiority emerging; put forward in Defense Secretary Richard Che-

EIR: In the immediate post-war period, some DC leaders, who had been leaders of the anti-Fascist partisan movement, saw how the United States and allied forces in Italy created special organizations, like Gladio, recruiting massively among the intelligence and military networks of the Mussolini Fascist regime. These underground networks could count on a lot of weapons, and later they played a destabilizing and anti-constitutional role.

Galloni: I don’t have direct knowledge of this, because I was only 18 years old during the period of the Liberation of Italy. Immediately after the Liberation, the [Ferruccio] Parri government asked the partisans to turn in their weapons. I do remember, however, that during the gathering of the weapons in Bologna, the formation of which I was a part—which consisted of a mix of Christian Democrats and Republicans, along with the majority of the formations such as the Action Party and the PCI—did not turn in their real weapons. We gave up the so-called “91 Models” from World War I. The Communists had hidden their weapons, which were partially discovered later on. Our group did the same. My commanders said that they had greased them, put them in bags and buried them somewhere. There was the worry that the Communists would attempt to take power in Italy at a certain point. Above all, this fear concerned the Veneto region in the areas near Trieste, with the A and B Zones, where [Yugoslav Communist partisan leader, then President, Josip Broz] Tito had entered [Italy] and killed many Christian Democratic partisans. In fact, the weapons were found in the *foibe*, special caves near the Yugoslav border.

We were in Bologna in the Communist area where the mentality of the base was that sooner or later the Communists would take power like in Russia. This was the opinion which Togliatti did not share, but which he permitted to circulate. In fact, when any Communists committed political crimes, they were immediately expelled from the party. In particular, I remember that in the triangle of death around Bologna, the Secretary of one of our party sections was killed, along with the Secretary of the Association of Italian Catholic Workers (ACLI), Fanin. The fear was that at a certain point the Communists would pull out the weapons they had hidden.

The allied occupation forces had taken into account the possibility that the Eastern countries could militarily occupy our territory at a certain point, and in that case we would have had to organize a partisan movement similar to the one organized against the Nazis. It is clear that when they thought about this, and above all, when the Americans thought about it, they thought of organizing not only the Christian Democrats, but also certain elements of Fascism. And they knew that these preparations had already been made, not in order to

ney’s 1992 Defense Policy Guidance; and in Vice President Cheney’s post-Sept. 11, 2001 seizure of policy control with a doctrine of “anti-terrorism” preventive wars—*EIR*.

take power, but exactly because of the possibility of a Soviet military invasion. This was Gladio.

[Mario] Scelba had passed many harsh laws for those who had weapons. Many weapons caches—I don't know who they belonged to—were found; sometimes by chance, and sometimes because of anonymous tips.

These problems came out again after 1968, when in Italy, certain extremist fascists who were in part covered by our secret services, and in part covered by other international forces, began to emerge. They were never covered by Scelba, because he was anti-communist but also anti-fascist. In the period between 1967 and 1968, all the violent acts against democracy began to be attributed to the communist extremists. It was then discovered that most of these violent acts had been carried out by fascist extremists. I don't know if the American secret services were involved in this. It may be that they had a role.

However, there is no doubt that when the American secret services realized that these extreme-left '68 movements were present in Italy, they prepared the tools to react, which included fascist formations. This is an hypothesis, not a certainty. But the fact that at that time there were opposite extremisms and many acts of violence—of bombs in public squares, massacres, the last of which was that of the Bologna train station—there was always a backlash: There was often discussion of whether it was left extremists, or extreme-right extremists.

The red extremists positioned themselves to the left of Togliatti (and this is where the trick came in) because on the one hand, Togliatti wanted to include them among his electorate; but on the other, he knew very well that he had to respect the Constitution and the Parliament.

EIR: One of the letters written by Aldo Moro in the Red Brigades' prison speaks of a dangerous "interference" in Italy by Robert Marjolin, who came to Rome in 1964 as vice president of the European Commission, to warn against the creation of the first center-left government with the Socialist Party. This Marjolin was a collaborator in Paris of Alexander Kojève, the direct collaborator of Leo Strauss, the father of the American neo-conservatives. De Gaulle had denounced these forces as a major problem for democracy. This network is known as the Synarchists; *EIR* has written a lot about this. What more can you say about the political debate of those years?

Galloni: The problem of how to create a democratic majority while keeping the Communists in the opposition, began in 1953 when De Gasperi fell. The parties which had won the 1948 elections maintained a slight parliamentary majority after 1953, but they did not have an absolute majority in the country. From that point on, the Christian Democratic left began talking about the necessity of bringing the PSI closer to the government. At the time, the left of the DC was a

minority, and supported this idea in such an extreme way that it wasn't even taken into consideration. But the idea began to be accepted by the DC starting in 1957, when [Amintore] Fanfani, at the National Council of Vallombrosa in July 1957, made the proposal of bringing the PSI closer.

In the 1958 elections, the DC did well, with 42% of the vote, and formed a centrist government with a certain orientation toward the Socialists. From then on, certain groups in the DC began to deviate from party decisions, and various other difficulties contributed to the crisis of the Fanfani government and his removal as Secretary of the Party. With his character, his authoritarianism, he made enemies of most of the men in his own current. . . . Aldo Moro was then elected Secretary of the party at the Domus Mariae in 1959, and chosen to lead the party into its General Congress.

Once Moro became Secretary, he immediately realized that the only possibility of forming a stable democratic majority in Italy involved approaching the Socialists, and he immediately began to work in this direction. We of the Christian Democratic left gradually began to defend Moro's position. At the beginning of 1960, at the first National Council after the Florence Congress—the one in Palazzo Rospigliosi where Moro opened his majority to the Fanfani group—Antonio Segni, who was then Prime Minister with a right-leaning majority, found himself in the internal opposition. Shortly thereafter, Segni was forced to resign his position as Prime Minister. He had counted on the votes of the Liberals and the support of the MSI ["post-fascists"]; and when the Liberals withdrew their support, Moro's DC forced Segni's resignation. . . .

That is when the center-left began.

EIR: Are there other aspects of the kidnapping of Aldo Moro that we should underline in our conversation?

Galloni: After the kidnapping of Moro by the Red Brigades, the party leadership called on me, in my role as Vice-Secretary of the DC, to follow the Moro case directly from the Interior Ministry through a continuous relationship with [Interior Minister later President Francesco] Cossiga. But at the Interior Ministry, I realized that its structure . . . was inadequate for the search for Moro. I only realized why many years later. The Ministry was inadequate because it was only prepared to face popular demonstrations in the streets. We didn't have—as Moro had said—knowledge about the Red Brigades' bases; we didn't have agents of our secret services inside the Red Brigades.

Many aspects of the capture of Moro are still in the dark. Some years after the fact, when the list of the members of the P2 [secret Masonic lodge Propaganda 2] was found in Casal Fibocchi, I realized that most of the people listed were part of the security services or in the leadership of the military administration. It cannot be said at all, that the kidnapping of Moro was in any way inspired by the Ameri-

can secret services; but just as those services had not given us information on the Red Brigades beforehand, so after the kidnapping they did not help us find the prison where he was being held.

In fact, it is interesting to remember how they behaved when the American General, James Dozier, was kidnapped three years later; to remember how the American secret services went into action and found the prisoner and then freed him from the Red Brigades in a short time. Why did they mobilize for Dozier and not for Moro?

Other questions remain open regarding Moro. The true prison where Moro was held has never been discovered. Moro's brother, who is a very good criminal lawyer, said: An autopsy was done on my brother, and he was found to be in perfect physical condition. Now, how is it possible that a person who was closed up for 50 days in a room which was 2 meters wide and 3 meters long, always lying down—for a person who was used to walking 3 kilometers a day, to keep in shape—was found in such good condition? And there was never a full investigation of those grains of sand found in the hem of his trousers.

Who wanted to protect the Red Brigades? This still needs to be discovered and cleared up.

EIR: Let us look now to an earlier period of Italian political life, the period of the economic reconstruction after the war. A crucial role was played in this process by another great Italian patriot and political leader, Enrico Mattei. Mattei was the founder of ENI, the Italian national oil company, who fought for the country's modern industrial development and for energy independence. He challenged the Seven Sisters oil majors, and was assassinated in a provoked air crash on Nov. 27, 1962.

Mattei was close to the political wing of the DC of which you have been a leader. What can you say about your personal experience and contact with him, and his policy?

Galloni: I started my political activity when I was only 17 years old, and became a friend of [Giuseppe] Dossetti: first during the resistance; and immediately afterwards as a regional delegate for the youth group of the Emilia region Christian Democracy. When Andreotti was called up to be the Undersecretary to Prime Minister De Gasperi, I was called to Rome starting on Sept. 1, 1947, in order to manage the formation of the youth groups; and I founded a magazine called *For Action*. Then I went back to Bologna where I had graduated 20 years earlier, to continue my activity as a lawyer. I did not want to be a professional politician.

I participated in the April 18, 1948 election campaign in Bologna, together with Dossetti. Dossetti was challenging the Communists, but from the left, not from the right. He accused them of playing a double game, because on the one hand they acted as revolutionaries in the streets, but in their public roles they carried out a conservative policy. . . .

Dossetti . . . said that as long as the world was divided in



The crucial work of industrialist Enrico Mattei in attacking the overwhelming problems of unemployment, the need to industrialize Italy's South, and the need for productive relations with Mideast and African nations, was supported by Italy's post-war President Alcide de Gasperi and by later Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti. Mattei was killed in a suspicious air crash in 1962, a shock to Italy like the next year's assassination of JFK to America.

two parts, East against West, with the same sort of division in Italy—between the Christian Democrats and their allies, and the Communist position—then no structure of reform based on Christian principles could be promoted. Two essential conditions were missing: First, the world of Yalta must end; second, there must be a deep transformation and a great change within the Italian Church. . . . When Dossetti shut down his current of the party, he nominated a delegation of five people, including myself, which was to go to Rome to contact Fanfani, [Mariano] Rumor, and [Emilio Paolo] Taviani and form a new current, which, in Dossetti's words, was not intended in opposition to De Gasperi, but should influence him.

I came to Rome to direct the magazine *Democratic Initiative*, which published seven issues and saw enormous success. With the seventh issue, De Gasperi called Rumor and Taviani and made them an offer: They could enter the leadership of the party at the next Congress (1952) if they stopped the magazine. So Rumor and Taviani came back to me and told me to stop publishing the magazine. I refused, and practically left political activity for over a year.

After the June 7, 1953 elections, Giovanni Marcora came to see me in Milan and said: "We would like to create a magazine in opposition to the local leader of the DC—do you

want to help us?" I answered that I wasn't interested, but that if they wanted to found a newspaper similar to what *Democratic Initiative* had been, then I was available. I still had all the lists of the members of the Dossetti current, and of other friends with whom we could work on the idea. Marcora said that he still had all the lists of the partisan friends of the North. We decided to have a conference in Belgirate on Sept. 29, 1953.

During the 1953 elections (and here Mattei starts to come into the picture), De Gasperi had called Mattei and explained his intention to hold a rally in Piazza Duomo in Milan with the Christian partisans. Mattei called Marcora and gave him the funds for that rally. But Marcora didn't spend anything on the rally, and thus he still had the funds necessary for the conference and the newspaper.

So we had our meeting. But the press started to say that that meeting in Belgirate had been done with Mattei's money. De Gasperi got worried, called on Mattei and said, "What are you up to, are you creating an internal current?" (De Gasperi had given Mattei a lot of support, putting him at the head of AGIP, and passing the law for ENI. So they had a good relationship.)

Mattei—we mustn't forget—had been the administrator of the National Liberation Committee for Northern Italy. Mattei didn't know anything about the Belgirate meeting. But he didn't say so. He just told De Gasperi not to worry about the people at Belgirate because they were [Mattei's] friends and they wouldn't hurt him. Then Mattei called Marcora and told him that since De Gasperi was so worried, [Mattei] had realized that the initiative was important. Marcora called on me to go see Mattei immediately and tell him what we had done.

The meeting lasted three hours. Mattei explained everything that he was doing: his battle against Luce, the American Ambassador in Italy; against the "Seven Sisters"; the necessity of searching for natural gas in Italy and of establishing Italy's energy independence. And he concluded: "I can't give you political advice, because I'm not an expert on politics, but if you want to talk with someone who understands politics, go see my friend [Ezio] Vanoni."

Vanoni then explained to me how De Gasperi, as soon as he was nominated Secretary of the DC in 1953, after being Prime Minister, had called on him and said: "Our country's fundamental problem is unemployment; let's study a plan to deal with this problem." Vanoni had already seen some articles published in the magazine *The Base* about the Belgirate conference, and said that he was interested. Vanoni had asked a group of the Svimez, the Institute for the Mezzogiorno [Italy's South], to organize a working group with his brother-in-law, Saraceno, which would plan the industrial development of Italy and create work for 2 million unemployed within 10 years.

But the political problem was still open, because you couldn't launch a plan like this without the agreement of the

labor unions, and without having overcome the hostility of the Confindustria [the national industrial association]. Above all though, an enlargement of the parliamentary majority, toward the left, was necessary. This is why the question of opening the majority to the Socialists, interested [Vanoni and Mattei] very much.

We used this idea as a starting point for an initiative of political culture. Following a proposal by Vanoni, Mattei asked some economics professors close to us at the Catholic University in Milan to do some studies, which we then presented at the following DC Congress in 1954, when "Democratic Initiative" took the majority, with Fanfani. We had a certain amount of force in that Congress. Out of 1.5 million members, we had almost 200,000 votes. However, we had problems because Fanfani, on the one hand, stopped Mattei from supporting *The Base*—because he didn't want to have minority currents to his left; and on the other, there was the Vanoni problem; Vanoni was to join the National Council, and we couldn't be in a position different from that of Vanoni.

So, at the end of the Congress we decided that two of us would join the Fanfani list, Ripamonti and I; and we presented five national counsellors among the youth, and Vanoni for the Parliamentarians. . . .

The relationship with Mattei at that time, was one of political friendship without financial connections, except for those regarding the advertising in the newspaper we were printing. Basically, we supported Mattei politically for his initiatives with ENI, as well as through Vanoni who supported ENI, IRI, and the State Participations—industries with a state-private mix—a great deal.

Mattei's strategy was that of making Italy autonomous in terms of energy resources, and then finding gas and also oil in Italy—which ended up not being possible—but above all, to have relations with Arab countries which produced oil. Mattei wanted to substitute himself for the Seven Sisters, which used usurious methods. He used the 75-25 method (instead of the 50-50 of the Seven Sisters) and that provoked the battle with the Seven Sisters. He offered the other countries 75% of the profit of the oil exploitation, and this led to a very violent clash.

The Americans' preventive war was invented in the 1950s at the beginning of the Cold War, when many in America supported the idea of attacking the U.S.S.R. before it came to have nuclear weapons. *The Base*, in agreement with Mattei, and especially with the magazine *Politica* directed by Nicola Pistelli, always fought for the international defense of peace; for the support of the integrity of the state of Israel in the Middle East, but also for the creation of a Palestinian state; as well as the democratic development of all of the countries of the Third World, in Africa, Asia, and South America.

EIR: Thank you very much for this account of Italy's history. We will hope to continue the discussion at a future time.