

Ukraine: A Postmodernist Revolution

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Introduction 1: On Crafts

In human civilization, crafts have traditionally existed to bring about progress. Blacksmiths, farmers, musicians, and space pilots, in different ways, express man's power over the universe. Within a nation, a talented craftsman reflects the traditions of that people, contributing to the nation's glory, as well as to the world's treasury of science, technological development, and culture.

Any professional community will agree that the greatest achievements in metallurgy, agroindustrial technology, medicine, architecture, music, or poetry belong to those who enable people to elevate their identity and quality of life to a level worthy of a human being.

Others, regardless of their mastery of formal skills, are of particular, rather than universal importance. Thus Alexander Pushkin is a part of global civilization, not merely Russian or European, while Fyodor Dostoevsky is not.

At the same time, it would be incorrect to call Dostoevsky a part of Russian culture. It is even less correct, to consider the element he represents, although it developed on Russian soil, to be characteristic or typical of Russian culture. Among those in globally extended European civilization who read, edit, analyze, and interpret Dostoevsky's writings, the people who admire them represent a certain layer within the world's educated—I wouldn't say intellectual—community. That is a particular layer of educated persons who, for some personal, family, or subcultural reason, are focussed on the pathology of the human mind.

This layer of educated persons resides, actually, not in the universe, but in an artificially constructed edifice, from which they observe humanity through colored glasses, like people in *The Wizard of Oz*. Through these glasses, they see humanity as a combination of degenerates of various kinds, each lacking some particular feature or possessing a particular mental deviation. They collect humans like butterflies, and stage experiments with individuals and the masses. "Masses" is a term they have found it expedient to adopt from Marx.

Entomology was a favorite pastime of the emigré Russian nobleman and poet Vladimir Nabokov, another great student of mental and physiological perversion. His characters, like their author, are always fixated on tiny details; he disintegrated any object or living organism, or human soul, into

minute particles. In his studies of Russian literature and public life, this heir of the degenerate and therefore self-doomed Russian noble Establishment practiced a sophisticated revenge on the culture in which he had grown up. His biography of Nikolai Gogol, like his documentary novel about thinker Nikolai Chernyshevsky, *The Gift*, is a practically anatomical study, which is supposed to prove that its subject was mentally crippled from a young age.

In his verse drama about Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart and Antonio Salieri, Pushkin described the intention of such perverse talents as follows: "I have measured harmony by means of algebra." The parallel alludes to the kind of algebra, which is satisfied with formal solutions, but neglects the essence of things, the motives of the mind, the project of the Creator. The best specialists in such algebra are traditionally talented in chess—a game in which the greatest skill is to manipulate the opponent.

Introduction 2: Chessplayers

The ancient game of chess, which became an internationally recognized sport only in the 20th Century, has analogues in other fields. The skill of manipulating another human being, or a nation, for the purpose of cornering him, reached disproportionately great dimensions in the long period of that great evil game, known as the Cold War. Professionals developed the skill of manipulating events by using myths, more than facts, and nurturing the myths as a permanent source of income and status in the Establishment.

In some cases, one would find a striking similarity between the Cold War knights of darkness and the objects of the hatred they spread, as in the case of Zbigniew Brzezinski, who campaigns against a Russian empire, but expresses an imperial outlook himself.

Similarly, the successors of a subclass of Soviet propagandists are obsessed with the evil influence of the United States. They collect true facts about particular degenerates within the U.S. Establishment, and attribute them to America as a whole. The heritage of this subclass has emerged in a new, particularly ugly form in Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR). Its shadowy financial base, mostly comprised of local gangsters, allows some former professional "Americanologists" to survive and even flourish, spreading their rhetoric of irrational hate and mistrust.

There are numerous examples of how these two sets of heirs interact, with “one hand washing the other,” as the Russian saying goes. The most recent case was Ukraine, where, at politically crucial moments, the Russian parliament was represented by visiting lunatics from the LDPR, whose in-your-face “Russian nationalism” was surely greatly appreciated by the manipulators of anti-Russian lunatics within the opposition camp.

In Russia, the LDPR for ten years has occupied the niche of political alternative to both the “reformist” liberals and “conservative” Communists, effectively blocking the emergence of any clear vision or productive policies in the national interest. During this same period, dozens of Western post-Sovietologists have made a career of exposing Russia’s chauvinist intentions and imperial designs, without attempting to research the Russian and international financial backers of the pseudo-patriotic LDPR. Why? Because it is perfectly convenient.

Sergei Kolesnikov, one of Zhirinovskiy’s closest associates, sits on the board of the English Club of Moscow, and the Club’s foreign sponsors have no objections—despite the exposed connections of this person with the Solntsevo criminal community. In a serious attempt to reshape the State Duma [parliament], Vladimir Putin—despite furious warnings from the West—managed to get rid of Anatoli Chubais’s Rightist Alliance, but Zhirinovskiy’s party is still there. Unlike the political movement of patriotic economist Sergei Glazyev.

The political conflict in Ukraine, where Zhirinovskiy’s people came to the forefront of Russian political support for the candidacy of Prime Minister Victor Yanukovich, while Rightist Alliance leader Boris Nemtsov took the side of opposition candidate Victor Yushchenko, illustrates the left-right games, played on the stage of the former Soviet Union by international entomologists.

Introduction 3: The Youth

Cold War psychological warfare techniques, designed for the Communist enemy, today are used against the minds of



Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, which thrives on anti-Americanism.

children. Today’s Russian or Ukrainian child learns the word Pokémon usually before he studies his ABCs. Older school-children waste their time in computer clubs, learning the “skills” of computer games, and with them—the skills of irrational violence.

Most affected are urban teenagers in places with high unemployment and low-paying jobs, where the parents have to work at several jobs, leaving their children practically alone. A surrogate world is at hand, with fascinating bright colors, foreign words, and brilliant heroes, whose major skill is to exterminate other human beings as efficiently as possible.

The values of their fathers have been ruined; what was supposed to replace them turned out to be a combination of failed hopes and false promises, so the parents have nothing with which to encourage their children. Meanwhile, the mass media denounce the values of labor and boost the values of a sweet life, which, for most of the parents, is unattainable.

The adolescents, however, believe that all the benefits of this vivid, sweet world are open for them—just wait for a miracle, and it will happen. But they are too impatient to wait, and when a person arrives from the paradise world they see on TV and says, “Why don’t we make a revolution?”—they are ready to follow him without any doubt. They have learned from the virtual reality world of the media that revolution—sexual, in particular—is something nice, easy, and doesn’t hurt. Older guys from eastern Europe—from Yugoslavia and Poland, as well as Georgia—with experience in street demonstrations as well as street fighting, assure them it is so.

Déjà Vu

In Russia, there is one prominent politician who likes to deal with young people on the level of the virtual reality they are so attracted to, and speaks their postmodernist language: playboy Boris Nemtsov, co-chairman of Rightist Alliance Party, with Chubais and Yegor Gaidar. After his party failed in the 2003 State Duma elections, Nemtsov had more free



Zbigniew Brzezinski, who campaigns against a “Russian empire,” but expresses an imperial outlook himself.



thing seemed artificial, as if generated by a computer design program.

“These young guys look like zombies,” a Kiev friend of mine remarked. The next day she phoned her friend, who works at the Ukrainian Embassy in Moscow. Her interlocutor was reluctant to comment. “All the phones are tapped,” she said.

By whom? By the guys in orange clothing? By fugitive intelligence officer Mykola Melnychenko (purveyor of tape-recordings, which implicate President Leonid Kuchma in various crimes)? There is no answer. But a wave of similar coverage swept the Kiev TV programs, as if they were all made by the same producer. Before the “orange revolution,” TV journalists used to

time, and no obligations to the President of Russia, who had dared to refuse to falsify the results of the vote in favor of the rightists. Ukraine’s Presidential elections were a nice opportunity for the outflanked Russian rightists to take revenge: Putin was openly supporting Prime Minister Yanukovich, while the team promoting Yushchenko was gathering a lot of youth under democratic slogans and, for some reason, bright orange banners.

The Russian liberals did not realize, however, that the game in Ukraine went far beyond any ordinary election campaign. Nemtsov’s remarks, reported by Russian web correspondents from Independence Square in Kiev, where he visited pro-Yushchenko demonstrators just after the Nov. 21, 2004 second round of voting, indicated how unprepared he was for the scene upon which he arrived. The opposite side, endorsed by the Kremlin, was even less prepared.

The intentions of the authors of Georgia’s Rose Revolution, the December 2003 overthrow of President Eduard Shevardnadze, to reproduce their scenario in Kiev, were well known. Operatives who had been involved in Georgia, could be seen in Kiev for some months before the elections. A number of news agencies published interviews with anonymous figures from the Pora! youth movement, a replica of Michael Saakashvili’s Kmara! youth movement in Georgia. And yet, Moscow strategists, as well as most of the Kiev population, were startled by the huge street gatherings of people dressed in orange, marching from one state office to another and occupying them in a carefree Bolshevik manner, albeit without weapons. The design was familiar from Tbilisi—including volunteer militias that seemed to sprout from nowhere, fully clad in special, expensive-looking uniforms; including the sudden appearance of religious symbolism; including threats to legislators, that if they failed to vote in the revolutionary spirit, they would not be allowed to leave the parliament. Ordinary citizens had the same impression, that the whole

complain that state officials were instructing them how to cover events, handing the journalists special guidelines known as *temniki*. Now, the *temniki* vanished, but some new kind of censorship arrived. The same thing had happened in Tbilisi.

It is true that under Leonid Kuchma’s rule, some mass media were closed. In 2003, this happened to the famous “Criminal Ukraine” website, whose editor-in-chief, Igor Yeltsov, had been physically assaulted for his dossiers on Ukraine’s business clans. Nonetheless, his site continued to operate—until he published a dossier on ex-Prime Minister Yushchenko and his financial partners, and criticized the U.S. war in Iraq. According to other Ukrainian sources, the site was closed on personal orders from Gen. Vladimir Satsiuk, deputy head of Ukraine’s intelligence agency, the SBU.

During the election campaign, this general hosted a private party, at which the guests included Yushchenko and Supreme Rada [parliament] deputy David Zhvania—a longtime friend of fugitive Russian tycoon Boris Berezovsky. This was the very event, after which Yushchenko was hospitalized with evidently severe poisoning; and, though in early November Yushchenko received a Moscow guest from Berezovsky’s circle, the inner circle of the newly elected President does not trust Berezovsky and his group. Zhvania’s role on Yushchenko’s team, as well as that of his close partner Roman Bessmertny, has declined spectacularly. Moreover, though “official” suspicions in the poisoning of Yushchenko fall upon the SBU and certain Moscow connections, his loyal associates especially mistrust Zhvania.

Berezovsky’s relations with the Ukrainian opposition had already been reported in early 2004, when Russian media discussed Berezovsky’s intrigues as a factor in the emerging political opposition movement. But his influence in Kiev is greatly exaggerated. The scene was being prepared by more serious interests.



Newly elected Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, leader of the “orange” revolution.



Victor Yanukovich underestimated the character and organizing potential of the force behind his rival, Yushchenko.

Two Truths

Any political game involving the masses, exploits their dreams and troubles. In Ukraine, the second largest of the former Soviet republics, the hopes and troubles were on the surface. The fact of a qualitative difference between the advantages and the troubles of eastern and western Ukrainians was on the surface, too. Hardly another ex-Soviet country was so open to the world, and so democratic in terms of its political system. Any analyst could obtain detailed information about the major political figures, the most important economic assets, and the structure of the shadowy clans where the two spheres were tightly interwoven.

These clans actually emerged over 40 years ago, and gained real weight during the “cooperatives reform” (when the establishment of private businesses, specifically co-ops, was permitted), carried out by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachov in the late 1980s. That policy depleted the budget of the Soviet Union and helped to predetermine its collapse. By 1986, revenues at a major Soviet steel plant in Donbass, Ukraine, were being shared according to the formula, “Five days of the week, we work for the Union budget, two days for ourselves.” The income from those two days, according to sources familiar with the case, conveniently slipped into the pockets of two persons: Yefim Zvyagilsky and Vladimir Grinyov. Coal industry executive Zvyagilsky later (1993-94) became acting Prime Minister of Ukraine during Leonid Kravchuk’s Presidency, while Grinyov invested his fortune in arms trade deals, including some that went sour, with fatal consequences for high-ranking banking officials in Ukraine, according to Kiev sources.

The era of globalization put demands on the Ukrainian economy and all of its managers, whether operating in Lugansk in eastern Ukraine or in Lutsk to the west. Thus it is not possible to explain the political fault lines in today’s Ukraine simply in terms of clan warfare. The business elites of

Donetsk, the southeastern Ukrainian coal and steel area, were generally considered to be backers of Yanukovich in the Presidential elections. Yet it is widely, if unofficially, recognized in Ukraine, that in the Autumn of 2002, top Donetsk business figures were seriously considering a political deal with Viktor Yushchenko. Why? Because the eastern regions sell most of their wares to consumers abroad, in the West, not to the so far largely theoretical Eurasian Economic Community (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan), which anti-Russian propagandists hype as a “revival of the Soviet empire.”

Still, the eastern and western Ukraine have their own truths—not really originating from their different language and family relations with the Russians, as is believed in textbook Ukrainology.

In the so-called transitional period after the break-up of the Soviet Union, the personal fortunes of tycoons on the make directly depended, as did the survival of the industrial assets of the ex-Soviet economy, on keeping those industrial capacities in operation. The rich men of western Ukraine, who later preferred to settle in Kiev, the capital, rather than provincial Lviv in their own region, derived their income from trade turnover. In the language of Ukrainian officials, they were known as “transit kings”—a reference to the transshipment of Russian oil and gas, as well as cheap consumer goods, across Ukraine.

Rage against the *nouveaux riches* is much higher today among impoverished western Ukrainians, than it is in the eastern part of the country. Another reason for this is that many of today’s big property-owners and officials in eastern Ukraine were once coalminers themselves, and the miners are a community with customs, traditions, and superstitions of its own. The Moscow daily *Kommersant*’s correspondent was challenged by a sitting judge on Ukraine’s Constitutional Court: “Do you know what it means when the longwall goes down? No? Then, you are probably from the other side of the tracks.” The judge comes from Donetsk.

Since Soviet times, the major trouble for western Ukraini-

ans has been unemployment. For eastern Ukrainians, it was exhausting and extremely hard labor. In independent Ukraine, the difference between these two mindsets has only increased. In addition, the easterners have become closer in their outlook to the inhabitants of the adjacent Rostov Region of Russia, while the westerners found much in common between themselves and their closest trading partners from the former Comecon members, which are now the depressed countries of eastern Europe.

Meanwhile, the governments of those neighboring post-Comecon nations have been regularly fed promises of future economic miracles, to arise from their unique role in trade: oil transit most of all, and particularly after the enlargement of the European Union. When this enlargement finally came to pass, the most negatively affected party was private business in western Ukraine.

EU enlargement really did present an opportunity for Russia to establish closer political and economic relations with western Ukraine. But, in accordance with the “liberal empire” model, promoted by ex-privatization czar, now right-wing politician Chubais, this policy was entrusted to Russian tycoons, while professional diplomats tended to more distant foreign affairs. As Ukrainians were preparing to elect their President, the leadership of Russia was discussing the vitally important prospects for Russia to be recognized as a “market nation” by the government of Chile.

“We haven’t noticed any activity by the Russian consulate here,” an activist of the Russian community in Lviv (western Ukraine) told me four years ago. “The two foreign entities that are really active here are the consulate of Poland and the Hassidic Jews from the United States.” Since that time, nothing has changed—except for the elimination of the Ministry of Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs by President Putin.

When the struggling Lviv Auto Plant, which had once produced buses for the whole U.S.S.R., was bought out by a daughter company of Russian billionaire Roman Abramovich’s Millhouse Capital, Ltd., it did little to encourage love for the Russians on the part of residents of Lviv. This kind of expansion of Russian influence could only contribute to justified rage, intensifying it with irrational and blinding envy.

From the standpoint of Moscow analysts, the economic problems of Lviv, stemming from EU enlargement, could only make the task of “subordinating Ukraine” easier. And that would be true, if the Donetsk (eastern Ukraine) economic community really considered itself an agency of Moscow’s influence in Ukraine.

But, that was not the case, and it hadn’t been for at least the entire period since independence, beginning in 1991. During those 13 years, the eastern regions, deprived of financial support from the collapsed Soviet budget, have been surviving by their own efforts. The success of Don River Basin (Donbass) industries, so spectacular in the last three years, encouraged the Donetsk community to fight for independence from the

Russian oligarchs. Unlike the poorer western regions, resource-rich eastern Ukraine could withstand the pressure from Russian metals concerns, which wanted to monopolize such key manufactures as, for instance, manganese alloys.

Yanukovich’s government blocked the Russian company Severstal from acquiring the giant steel works at Krivoy Rog, when it was privatized. It did not allow Russian Aluminum to take over Zaporozhye. It prevented Russia’s Lukoil from purchasing a controlling stake in Oryana Chemicals, in the town of Kalush. Yanukovich did everything he could to increase the power of Ukrainian business interests—and in this, he had the approval of Putin, who had finally recognized, from what had happened after Georgia’s Rose Revolution in 2003, the vicious fallacies of Chubais’s “liberal empire” construct. The overconfident Yanukovich, however, underestimated the desires and capabilities of more distant economic interests, as well as the character and organizing potential of the force behind his rival.

At the same time, well-to-do Kiev also had its grudges against Donetsk. During Yanukovich’s rule, many Kiev-based trading firms were taken over by interests from eastern Ukraine, often by their criminal side. At the same time, it was rumored in Kiev that Yanukovich, if elected President, would start by firing, and perhaps prosecuting, the mayor of Kiev. The scene for the “orange,” pro-Yushchenko demonstrations, which broke out after Yanukovich claimed victory in the first running of the second round (Nov. 21), could not have been prepared without the backhanded involvement of Mayor Omelchenko.

One more reason for Kiev’s 75% support of Yushchenko’s candidacy, according to local sources, was his campaign style, featuring promises of miraculous and immediate solutions to all problems, as opposed to his rival’s emphasis on hard work. The miracle was associated by the city’s middle and upper class with the American citizenship of Yushchenko’s wife, Kateryna Chumachenko, a former Reagan White House and State Department official. They imagined that she would help to “break down the wall,” put up by the European Union.

The Two Marionettes

People in the “hatred business” speak a language with two dialects: one for themselves, the other for potential dupes, particularly the populations of target countries. Not the whole population, but those layers deemed useful for the purpose at hand. In countries where a formal democratic system figures as part of the scenario, this means the mass of voters.

In the insiders’ dialect, the figure selected to match the illusions and dreams of the anticipated voters is called “the client.” This person needs to be prepared by a select community of foreign-trained advisors, to behave in accordance with notions of Western liberal democracy, so that he may be presented to “the masses,” using an array of manipulative techniques, as the embodiment of that liberal democracy. The



President Mikhail Gorbachov and President George H.W. Bush in 1990. The period of Gorbachov's regime saw the introduction of "neurolinguistic programming" (NLP) as a method of political dirty tricks.

most effective techniques are marketed to the small community of professional manipulators under the label of "neurolinguistic programming" (NLP), which is essentially a mixture of already known mass hypnosis methods and the teachings of Russian physiologist Ivan P. Pavlov.

A parasitical community of political technologists, practitioners of NLP and related tricks, was already planted in the Soviet Union, before its collapse. It happened around the time of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachov's personal conversion to radical environmentalist ideology, in the period when Gorbachov was also introduced to George H.W. Bush's crony, the Rev. Sun Myung Moon. The first batch of foreign instructors worked through the Free Congress Foundation (FCF) under the direction of Paul Weyrich, who was president of the Kriebler Institute of the FCF at the time. The original clients included the future head of Russian President Boris Yeltsin's Information Ministry, the first democratic mayor of Moscow, and business figures like computer-importer Artyom Tarasov, who was under investigation for financial fraud already at that time.

In Leningrad (St. Petersburg), the first institution to promote political technologies was named "Ecology of Personality." It was designed for the task of pre-selecting future democratic leaders from the ranks of exceptionally loyal Soviet junior scientists and journalists.

In Kiev and Donetsk, the relevant infrastructure already existed—in particular, at the Donetsk-based Artificial Intelligence Institute, which exists to this day, thanks to Western contracts. One of its by-products was the infamous White Brotherhood sect. A similar project, the Church of Apocalypse, was planted in western Ukraine, employing former

specialists from both Moscow and Kiev. One of them, a Professor Kudin, became an advisor to Alexander Moroz, chairman of Ukraine's Socialist Party.

In the post-Soviet era, the most sophisticated centers for influencing "mass psychology" were developed not in Kiev, and not in Tbilisi, but in Moscow—a much more convenient and secure place for Western tutors. After all, it is easier to find a perfectly Western entertainment and relaxation establishment in Moscow, than in the center of the mining region, with its undeveloped environmental protection and all. VIPs need VIP conditions.

Victor Yanukovych and Victor Yushchenko were promoted by two rival Moscow institutions, represented by image-makers Gleb Pavlovsky and Alexei Sitnikov, respectively. It is well known that the Kremlin was dissatisfied with the earlier "technological" efforts of consultants Pavlovsky and Marat Gelman in Kiev, during the Supreme Rada campaign, when they worked on behalf of Ukraine's United Social Democratic Party (USDP), and actually in favor of their chosen "client" Victor Medvedchuk, leader of the USDP. Nonetheless, the choice of Pavlovsky to "prepare" the new client Yanukovych, the new Victor (the name was probably more decisive than his biography), seemed inevitable. After all, Gleb Pavlovsky was working hard to shape the new Civic Congress, the decorative body established by the Kremlin, which was to serve as a basis for the future Public Chamber, an integral element of the Kremlin's revised political system in Russia. Also key to the establishment of the Civil Congress had been Sergei Markov, a top figure at the Moscow English Club and the Carnegie Foundation's top Russian talking head for a decade, and Lyudmila Alexeyeva,

an aged emigrée entomologist from the U.S. National Endowment for Democracy (NED).

The same “bipartisan” NED was very active in Ukraine, where it was represented by more influential persons, like Nadia Diuk and Adrian Karatnycky, president of Freedom House, whose grandmother had come to the United States from Ukraine in the 1930s. And there, the NED was visibly on the side of the other Victor, Victor Yushchenko.

Adrian Karatnycky had organized international media campaigns around the infamous brutal murder of Ukrainian journalist Georgi Gongadze; efforts to prevent Yushchenko’s replacement as Prime Minister in 2001; and the flight to the United States by intelligence officer Mykola Melnychenko with his surreptitiously recorded tapes discrediting President Kuchma.

As a veteran of the anti-Soviet movement in Poland, where he had been deployed as a specialist on trade unions, Karatnycky was in continuing contact with the half-forgotten Polish former labor leader and ex-President Lech Walesa, probably promising him a political comeback on the wings of Ukraine’s liberation from “dictatorship.” To bolster the case that Ukraine was a dictatorship, Freedom House declared it a “non-free state” in 2003. According to Karatnycky’s theory, dictatorships may be “partial” and even “formally democratic.” Among Islamic states, for example, he recognizes only one “truly democratic state,” namely Mali. All the others are evidently candidates for regime change.

Businesswoman Yulia Tymoshenko, Yushchenko’s election ally, has always been regarded by Karatnycky as a “true democrat,” even when Interpol sought her arrest on an international warrant for suspicion of serious economic crimes. From Karatnycky, that meant Interpol was “under pressure from dictatorial regimes.”

Despite their international experience, despite the Ukrainian background of Karatnycky, Diuk, et al., despite support from Freedom House board member Zbigniew Brzezinski, their regime-change project for Ukraine still needed specialists from Moscow.

The key Moscow name in the campaign of the Western “client,” Yushchenko—Alexei Sitnikov—was made public by *Kommersant Daily*, Russia’s major business paper, owned by Boris Berezovsky. This paper is wealthy enough to send its special correspondent to Hongkong, where a conference for VIP financial and public figures was organized by Rosbusinessconsulting (RBC) news agency. On Nov. 15, 2004, *Kommersant* journalist Alena Antonova filed her report on a crowd of VIPs, who spent their free time at a Buddhist temple, a local bar called The Devil’s Advocate, and local brothels, where they could “get acquainted with the local skills of transvestites.”

The VIP crowd included former and current Russian Central Bank officials, top business figures from the service industry sector, and a young man who boasted about his success as political consultant to Yushchenko. This person, Alexei Petrovich Sitnikov, Doctor of Sciences (Psychology), is the

best specialist in the practical application of NLP in Russia. He heads the Moscow-based Institute of Communication Management and represents Russia in the International Public Relations Association (IPRA).

Thus, the pathetic rhetoric of Pavlovsky, who portrayed his opponents in the Yushchenko camp as mere creations of the EU-NATO apparatus of influence, should not be taken at face value. Wasn’t Pavlovsky himself part of the same apparatus of influence, back in 1993 when he exposed Boris Yeltsin for dictatorial methods, in an NED-issued monthly magazine? Didn’t his deputy, Maxim Meyer, chair a conference of experts from the Soros Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and a dozen other institutions, on the eve of the Russian State Duma 1999 elections, when all of these guests were obsessed with the task of outflanking the Communist Party?

In those 1999 efforts, Pavlovsky’s skills attained their apogee: He was even reported to have counterfeited an Israeli passport for Communist Party chairman Gennadi Zyuganov, in order to discredit him in the eyes of his “masses.” Three days years later, he would select Victor Medvedchuk, who happens to own a Tel Aviv-based law firm, for the function of Kremlin satellite in Kiev.

U.S. taxpayers, whose millions were spent in Ukraine through the NED, could ask whether the whole costly electoral effort there, waged under slogans of “fighting corruption,” served the purpose of elevating Tymoshenko, the close business partner of ex-Prime Minister Pavel Lazarenko, now jailed in the United States for embezzlement, to the post of Ukrainian Prime Minister.

Russian taxpayers, in turn, might ask if economic concessions worth \$800 million/year, granted Ukrainian producers in the framework of the Eurasian Economic Community, were justified, under conditions where the Ukrainian side, once again, is unable to guarantee meeting its obligations, due to political instability. Couldn’t those concessions have been linked with some reasonable guarantees in foreign policy? Isn’t the Supreme Rada considering a law that would allow NATO to operate on Ukrainian territory in “a situation of necessity”?

Both, finally, could ask: What about other options for Ukraine’s Presidency, which wouldn’t polarize the country? There were several options, like Oleg Dubina, former general director of Krivoy Rog Steel Plant, or Vladimir Radchenko, head of the Security Council. But the Kremlin insisted on the figure of Yanukovich.

‘I Don’t Care About European and American Interests’

Various American websites attribute the design of the “Pora!” (“High Time!”) movement, the key instrument for organizing the “orange revolution” in Kiev, as well as the similar “!!!” movements in eastern Europe, to Prof. Gene Sharp, founder of the Albert Einstein Institution at Harvard University, and author of the 1973 book *The Politics of Non-Violent Action*.

Sharp portrays himself as an independent scholar, with a background of researching the Gandhi movement in India. The Mahatma would be aghast, if he could see the lessons of his struggle for independence from Britain being dismembered into particles and reassembled at Oxford, where Professor Sharp worked for several years — for the opposite purpose of reimposing colonial rule.

These self-styled neo-Gandhians openly represent themselves as “postmodernists.” The future masterminds of the Ukrainian revolt cooperated simultaneously with the likes of Freedom House and with radical postmodernist leftist entities like Italy’s Radical Party. Ukraine’s orange soup was stewed according to a right/left recipe, “with involvement of both U.S. parties,” as the “revolutionaries” boast today.

The key operatives in such operations usually hide under pseudonyms, like Subcommandante Marcos, the masked leader of the Zapatista insurgents in Mexico. No wonder: They violate, and teach others to violate, the laws of nation-states, as well as international legal agreements. They involve school-age children, who have next to no understanding of what they are doing. In both Georgia and Ukraine, they organized illegal militia units, which underwent special training at sports schools. For the postmodernists, such practices are justified by their goals.

Sharp, the theoretician of non-violent resistance without borders, looks more like a British gentleman, than a passionate leftist. The foot-soldiers of the projects he has promoted — in Myanmar, Peru, Serbia, Georgia, now Ukraine, potentially Belarus and Albania (where the “Myaft!” movement, analogous to Georgia’s Kmara! and Ukraine’s Pora!, has appeared) — resemble the Romantic nationalists of Lord Palmerton’s “Human Zoo” of insurgencies in the 19th Century.

One such operative, an American blogger hiding under the nickname Discoshaman (as in, “disco” + “shaman”), posts regular reports from the Kiev scene. Recruiting young guys, including teenagers, into anarchist activity, teaching them how to paralyze government institutions, high schools, libraries, and courts, he confesses on his website (called “Le Sabot Postmoderne,” French for “The Postmodern Clog”) that he is a conservative, not a leftist.

The Harvard-Oxford patrons of such campaigns emphasize that their activity is similar to so-called “viral marketing,” practiced in the state-of-the-art virtual economy of the entertainment world, as by spreading an epidemic of “buzz” about a new CD.

For sure, one special skill practiced by Discoshaman and his cronies, is lying. The people rallying under the orange banners were not supposed to think: They just had to adopt the slogans prepared for them. “Yanukovych is a KGB agent,” he prompts. The next day, this will be a slogan of the crowd. “Jonathan Steele is wine and dined in Putin’s Kremlin,” Discoshaman says about a British reporter who exposed NED funding of the orange movement.

Guru Sharp is happy to conclude that new communication technologies have created great advantages for the postmod-

ernist non-violent movement, and ridicules traditional governments, which find themselves helpless before whatever “rose” or “chestnut” brand of “virus” has been planted in their soil.

Professor Sharp himself wouldn’t like to reside in any of the countries where his technology is being used. He prefers quiet places like Britain or Norway. His disciples are more sincere. The anonymous Discoshaman, the conservative tutor of teenage anarchists, declares, “I don’t care a bit about American or European internal politics. Not a jot.”

Yulia Tymoshenko, preparing herself for the role of Ukraine’s Margaret Thatcher (or, according to U.S. observers, “a mixture of Thatcher and Audrey Hepburn”), promises to expand “her” revolution to Moscow. In the crowd, you see Nemtsov, co-chairman of Rightist Alliance. Harry Kasparov, the “democratic chessplayer” from Baku, is ready to help. New horizons arise in feverish postmodernist brains, before the whole of Ukraine is even conquered.

Triumphantly returning to the United States right after the failed Nov. 21 second round of the Ukrainian elections, when President Kuchma under international pressure was dropping his support for Yanukovych, Karatnycky reported that he had been dealing with both sides — in eastern and western Ukraine. He only forgot to mention the Crimean Tatars, whom he and especially Nadia Diuk had been courting for years. A bloody Tatar-Russian clash happened in Crimea in December.

Jesse Walker, interviewing Gene Sharp for a Nov. 30, 2004 feature on Ukraine in *Reason* magazine (“free minds and free markets”), carelessly admits that a split of Ukraine is quite possible. “In eastern Ukraine, where the population is more conservative and is culturally closer to Russia, there’s been talk of seceding if Yushchenko prevails. They’ve been holding their own rallies; some areas have instigated a tax revolt. One potential outcome, if the secessionists really represent local public opinion, is two competing peaceful movements for change.”

A nice gnostic game. What will be the result? One “potential outcome, of course, is civil war. There’s no guarantee the secessionists will stick to Pora’s peaceful tactics, and there’s no guarantee Yushchenko will remain nonviolent if he takes office. Even a peaceful transformation can have a brutal aftermath.”

Should we care about this? — asks Walker. Not at all. “Still [sic — K.Ch.], the very experience of overthrowing a government this way — of building independent institutions, diffusing power through civil society, and learning first-hand that it’s possible to say no to authority — unleashes something that’s hard for any politician to control,” triumphantly concluded Walker.

The person nicknamed Discoshaman, in commentary reminiscent of an intelligence report, said: “You also have to remember that Yushchenko isn’t the democracy movement, and the movement isn’t Yushchenko. The protesters have been docile so far, but Yushchenko doesn’t have carte blanche

in negotiating. They could choose to take unilateral action. PLEASE NOTE for the record that I am in no way threatening or advocating any sort of specific direct action.”

This conservative friend of anarchists, whose appearance evidently corresponds to the revolutionary spirit (“I am so tired, my clothes need washing”), is still afraid of losing his job. Otherwise, why should his remark to the top organizers be noted for the record?

Some Russian officials, referring to recent articles in the *Guardian* and the *Independent*, are convinced that the orange chaos in Kiev is nothing but a product of the U.S. State Department. Others think the whole thing is commanded not from Washington but from Brussels, referring to the activity of EU official Javier Solana.

Meanwhile, Mr. Discoshaman ridicules all such “conspiracy theories,” insisting that the orange mess in Kiev is “genuine.” Echoing his argument, Jack DuVall, head of the U.S.-based International Center on Nonviolent Conflicts, told Walker, “You can’t just parachute Karl Rove in to make a revolution,” adding, as Walker summarized his words, that “the U.S. government is hardly the only institution that has aided the uprisings.” DuVall sits on the board of the Arlington Institute (“we use most sophisticated information technologies . . . and develop scenarios of likely futures”) with ex-CIA chief James Woolsey, who is also a board member of Freedom House.

What DuVall says about the limited role of the U.S. government is true, for the Discoshamans and Dick Morris, Gleb Pavlovskys, and Alexei Sitnikovs are a part of an international conglomerate of networks that don’t care about nation-states at all. Sitnikov said once, “It is we [the image-makers] who have guaranteed liberalism in Russia.” Not Yeltsin, not even Chubais. They are old-fashioned and outdated.

In 1996 in Moscow, I came across a brochure distributed by the International Republican Institute to help conduct election campaigns. The authors instructed the “American conservative” youth organizers: “You are to be able to express your world-outlook in three phrases, and an idea—in three words.”

Now, one word is enough, and the world outlook has fallen by the wayside. Dress yourself in orange, green, pink, or whatever else Discoshaman tells you to wear, go out on the street and shout aloud:

Pora!
Kmara!!
Myaft!!!

A Sign of Weakness

In the period of the “orange revolution” in Ukraine, the national budget had lost 1 billion hryvnas in revenue by Dec. 1, 2004. If a drunken person trashes his neighbor’s house, the court forces him to pay for the damages. Who is going to pay for the disorder created in Ukraine by a combination

of egoistical interests, combined with the egoistical political desires of anti-Russian and Russian nationalist luminaries?

Early on, some analysts tried to assure the Kremlin that any outcome of the Ukrainian election would benefit Russia. Victory for either candidate would bring stability, whereas a dysfunctional Ukraine undermines whole sectors of the Russian economy. But Vladimir Putin’s too vocal support of Yanukovych—based on belief in his own popularity in Ukraine, as the political technologists told him—dragged Putin into a trap between domestic public opinion, which blames him for political impotence, and the popularized Western view of his “imperial ambitions.”

Does the U.S. State Department benefit from Ukraine’s chaos? The first decision made by the Supreme Rada after expressing no-confidence in the Yanukovych government, was that the Ukrainian battalion should be pulled out of Iraq.

What other major players might benefit? Transnational oil companies, which had been advertising the Odessa-Brody pipeline as an alleged milestone for Ukraine’s independence (circumventing Russia in oil shipments)? Or their opponents, who proposed to use the same pipeline in the opposite direction (increasing Russian exports)? Neither one. Odessa is pulled eastward, while Brody is in the heart of western Ukraine.

NATO? The last exercises of NATO forces were conveniently conducted at the Yavoriv Range near Lviv, without any obstacles from official Kiev. If Ukraine were really to split in two, the eastern government would hardly follow the above-mentioned concession to possible NATO actions on its territory. And the ships of the Black Sea Fleet, along with the coastline from Kerch to the Danube, will be unlikely to sail under orange flags.

The industrial oligarchs? No, they are losing revenue every day.

The trading oligarchs? But they need eastern products to trade.

Cui Bono?

First: those emotional, but not very insightful political figures across eastern Europe, who for decades have dreamed about a new opportunity to see Russia humiliated—most often for irrational reasons, and always with no regard to the Russian people as such. This includes some church circles, whose disputes have more to do with real estate than with differences of creed.

Second: those individuals who managed to extract fortunes from the disaster of the early 1990s, and have been waiting for a similar situation of disorder, which would allow them to extract huge fortunes from “the revolutionary economy.”

Third: economic circles which had never been interested in the economic survival of Ukraine. Those include some Russian steel interests that covet Ukraine’s coal and steel capacities, as well as a number of East and West European

companies, whose representatives in the Eurobureaucracy view Ukraine as just a market for cheap and low-quality Polish-produced goods.

Fourth: politicians who capitalize on the alleged “essential discord between the East and the West,” most of them people with shadowy pages in their biographies from the early post-Soviet transition period: Zhirinovskiy, Tymoshenko, et al.

Fifth: the international community of political technologists, feeling itself a real master of the historical process, which has allowed them to trample national and international laws in a new fashion.

The virus, cultivated in postmodernist laboratories using the latest design, infected into teenagers, and implemented by non-governmental and anti-nation-state international networks, can't be cured by traditional well-intentioned rhetoric. It can only be confronted by an international force of reason, represented by nation-states.

Somebody more serious, too.

Definitely, the World Wildlife Fund, whose project of the “Danube Wetlands,” supported by Prince Philip’s Environmental Council of Religions, was undermined by Prime Minister Yanukovich’s decision to construct the Danube Canal—which is vitally necessary, by the way, for the economic development of western Ukraine.

Those influentials who use such conflicts for their own elevation at the global level, sowing hatred against among the “target masses” against the “target nation,” or putting up iron curtains for the purposes of large-scale trade around them, by means of convenient deals with similar degenerates on the other side (compare the war business/peace business industry around Iraq and Palestine; or the history of East Germany or Cuba).

Those particularly Anglo-Dutch types, for whom people in Ukraine, Myanmar, or Peru, by definition, are inferior races, deserving to be kept in backwardness and exploited as human cattle.

Generally, the criminal circles, which always benefit from political and economic disorder, in an easily shaped combination with the most cynical part of the trading community. They have traditionally used politicians from the first cate-

gory, above, as a watchdog and mouthpiece for their interests. Mikhail Gorbachov, who handed the whole U.S.S.R. to international criminal interests, recently declared that “a new Berlin Wall” has fallen in Kiev.

Such a combination of desires is significant enough to make a split of Ukraine possible.

Meanwhile, the “orange revolution” in Ukraine was condemned not by Belarus and Armenia alone. Also condemning it was China, which is not as easy to neglect as the legitimate Presidencies of transitional Russia and especially Ukraine.

The EU functionaries, who hurried to support what is supposed to be the West’s case against what is supposed to be Moscow’s case, would insist that this pressure is based upon principles. That is true. Evil also has its principles—according to which Lithuania and Armenia (and potentially western Ukraine) are pressured to close their nuclear plants, while George Soros et al. promote the creation of non-recognized criminal states in other parts Eurasia, such as potentially the Ferghana Valley in Central Asia, Xinjiang in western China, and so forth.

Even in Britain, some voices warn that the supposed “case of the West” endangers the West itself, or at least the European community. Peter Unwin, former Ambassador in Hungary, does not believe that the force of chaos in Ukraine corresponds to European interests:

“Look at all this, lastly, in terms of western Europe’s interests. Do we really want to see the EU take in 50 million Ukrainians as well as 70 million Turks? Do we want a union so disparate that it can never make itself effective as a political voice in tomorrow’s world? Do we, for that matter, want an EU facing an implacably hostile Russia, hostile to us because we have so recklessly forced our way into Russia’s back yard? American neo-cons may want that, but we should not.”

But most EU figures seem to be obsessed with their own careers. The demonstration of obedience to the outside manipulators of the Kiev events is evidently seen by Aleksander Kwasniewski and some others as a career-advancing chance to get adapted to new rules of the political game.

Such behavior is always regarded by Freedom House’s ideologists as a symptom of weakness, which is a pretext for a stronger attack. Will ex-anarchist Joschka Fischer, the German Foreign Minister, succeed in dealing with “something that’s hard for any politician to control”?

It seems doubtful. The scene has changed too much since Mr. Fischer’s rock ‘n’ roll youth. The new, computer generation won’t regard him as one of their own. The virus, cultivated in postmodernist laboratories using the latest design, infected into teenagers, and implemented by non-governmental and anti-nation-state international networks, can’t be cured by traditional well-intentioned rhetoric. It can only be confronted by an international force of reason, represented by nation-states—if their leaders don’t want to bequeath their legacy to the brainwashed shock-troops of contending oligarchies in a new Dark Age.