

Sen. Christopher J. Dodd (D-Conn.)

I can't think of another example in my 24 years on this committee, to see as many people of like political stripe, of common ideological and philosophical viewpoints, willing to come forward and say to us as a committee, "Please be careful about what you're doing." This is a rare moment, and our colleagues here need to take note of this.

And I think it's worthy of just describing who these people are and quickly going down the list. Stuart Cohen, acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council at the CIA; Alan Foley, former head of WINPAC at the CIA; John McLaughlin, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and Acting Director; Jamie Miscik, former Deputy Director of Intelligence; Thomas Hubbard, former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea; John Wolf, former Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation; Christian Westermann, who we've talked about—the INR analyst; Tom Fingar, assistant secretary of state for intelligence and research; Beth Freesia [ph], immediate supervisor of Mr. Westermann; a man who has asked that his name not be made public here, but an attorney at the State Department who was involved in the issue involving Mr. Bolton's effort to move one of the employees there; William Taft, a legal advisor at the State Department; Fred Fleitz, the acting chief of staff for Mr. Bolton; Neil Silver, the INR office director supervising Mr. Westermann; Larry Wilkerson, former of staff to Secretary Powell; Robert Hutchins, former chairman of the National Intelligence Council.

These are all significant people, who have all said to us in their own words, one way or the other, "This is a bad choice".

If this were a question of a person's style, I think Senator Voinovich made a strong case that can be made about whether or not this kind of a style is what you want for someone serving as an ambassador to the United Nations.

But that's not my objection. . . . My concern is that we've just come through an incredible period in American history where major decisions were made about this nation's foreign policy based on the intelligence we are receiving. People are losing their lives every single day in a far-off land here, because there was a firm belief, based on the intelligence we had, that weapons of mass destruction existed.

Now, put aside whether or not you think it's right or wrong for us to be there today. The reason—the reason that we voted the way we did on that issue, was because it was the collective wisdom of the intelligence community that weapons of mass destruction existed. We now know that not to be the case.

Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-Calif.)

I am deeply disappointed that we have not gotten all the information we requested. And I agree with my leader on this committee, Senator Biden, that this is a matter of principle. . . .

And I will just say . . . that I am going to do all I can, to see that we get this information before this gets onto the floor. Because it's not right to cast a vote where you really don't have the full information.

Mr. Chairman, I think there are many reasons to oppose Mr. Bolton. . . . First, and to me the most important is the politicization of intelligence. This is the most important issue, when we see what phony and exaggerated intelligence can lead to. It can lead to war. We've seen it. It's happening every day.

It is tragic: thousands of deaths and injuries—1,600 deaths, plus. And in my state, we have about 25% of those deaths—people who were born in California or were activated from California. So we wear that heavily in our state.

So why on Earth would we want to hire someone who has shown he's willing to put political pressure on independent intelligence analysts? . . .

The strongest opposition to Mr. Bolton outside of members of this committee comes from the people from the Bush Administration. . . .

It is hard for me to understand why the President didn't simply say he's going to send down somebody else. I guess he wants a fight. I guess he's asking people to walk the line. And if that's where we're going, that's where we're going, because we're going to have a fight. If this comes to the floor, we're going to have a fight.

Secret Downing Street Memo

The following are excerpts from a secret document reporting on a meeting of British Prime Minister Blair and his top security advisors, on the subject of Iraq; it also reports on a visit to Washington by Richard Dearlove, the head of MI-6, identified only as "C." The meeting took place July 23, 2002, well before the Iraq War. The document was leaked to the London Times, and published on May 1, 2005. The memo was written by Matthew Rycroft, then a Downing Street foreign policy aide.

SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL—UK EYES ONLY

From: Matthew Rycroft

Date: 23 July 2002

S 195 /02

cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell

Iraq: Prime Minister's Meeting, 23 July

Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.

This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.

John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on ex-

treme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the U.S. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action. . . .

The Defence Secretary said that the U.S. had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in U.S. minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the U.S. Congressional elections.

The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force. . . .

Congressmen Seek Answers

This open letter to President Bush, dated May 5, requests immediate information concerning a leaked document in Britain, which indicated the existence of a secret Bush/Blair pre-war deal. It was signed by 88 members of Congress, led by Rep. John Conyers, Jr. (D-Mich.), Ranking Member of the House Judiciary Committee and Dean of the Congressional Black Caucus. The leak has essentially been acknowledged by the Blair government.

We write because of troubling revelations in the Sunday London *Times* apparently confirming that the United States and Great Britain had secretly agreed to attack Iraq in the summer of 2002, well before the invasion and before you even sought Congressional authority to engage in military action. While various individuals have asserted this to be the case before, including Paul O'Neill, former U.S. Treasury Secretary, and

Richard Clarke, a former National Security Council official, they have been previously dismissed by your Administration. However, when this story was divulged last weekend, Prime Minister Blair's representative claimed the document contained "nothing new." If the disclosure is accurate, it raises troubling new questions regarding the legal justifications for the war as well as the integrity of your own Administration.

The *Sunday Times* obtained a leaked document with the minutes of a secret meeting from highly placed sources inside the British Government. [See previous article.] Among other things, the document revealed:

- Prime Minister Tony Blair chaired a July 2002 meeting, at which he discussed military options, having already committed himself to supporting President Bush's plans for invading Iraq.

- British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw acknowledged that the case for war was "thin" as "Saddam was not threatening his neighbours and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea, or Iran."

- A separate secret briefing for the meeting said that Britain and America had to "create" conditions to justify a war.

- A British official "reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy."

As a result of this recent disclosure, we would like to know the following:

1. Do you or anyone in your Administration dispute the accuracy of the leaked document?
2. Were arrangements being made, including the recruitment of allies, before you sought Congressional authorization to go to war? Did you or anyone in your Administration obtain Britain's commitment to invade prior to this time?
3. Was there an effort to create an ultimatum about weapons inspectors in order to help with the justification for the war as the minutes indicate?
4. At what point in time did you and Prime Minister Blair first agree it was necessary to invade Iraq?
5. Was there a coordinated effort with the U.S. intelligence community and/or British officials to "fix" the intelligence and facts around the policy as the leaked document states?

We have of course known for some time that subsequent to the invasion there have been a variety of reasons proffered to justify the invasion, particularly since the time it became evident that weapons of mass destruction would not be found. This leaked document—essentially acknowledged by the Blair government—is the first confirmation that the rationales were shifting well before the invasion as well.

Given the importance of this matter, we would ask that you respond to this inquiry as promptly as possible. Thank you.