

work, the Xiaomi company will build a plant to produce computers and related technology in the province of Tierra del Fuego.

That too is an historic opportunity to improve our supply capabilities in the goods producing and technology sectors.

What's pending, what's important: What, in my view, has to be promoted and developed?

Into the Future

When you read the joint statement issued by the Argentine embassy and the People's Republic of China, you see that the agreements and the relationship are comprehensive. That means, they range from science to technology, but also cover the details of trade and cultural exchanges.

And if there is one comment that I have to make—because from my work and professional standpoint, we are fighting for this—the cultural aspect must include exchanges at all technical levels of applied scientific knowledge. That is, agreements between Argentine universities and research centers with their equivalents in the People's Republic of China.

I will give you a concrete example, which I would emphasize, and which should not only be a matter of interest for Argentina, but I believe also for the concert

of nations of the world. I will speak about the area that I come from—civil engineering—and refer to China. If you look at the last ten years, in terms of infrastructure projects involving civil engineering: the longest tunnel, the biggest bridge, the greatest hydroelectric plant, the most rapidly built building, etc.—it's clear that they are being developed and executed by the engineering schools of the People's Republic of China. The Chinese are no longer copying the technologies of others, as was said of them in the past, but they are generating their own technologies, producing their own patents, their own innovations. And all of this in the field of culture, and specifically technological culture.

What this expresses, and I think this is very important: That Argentina should not remain asleep in this regard, and take advantage of the potential of learning.

It's also important to state—for example, when I mentioned the nuclear matter—that Argentina has knowledge and has capabilities. So, our contribution—remember that Argentina has also sold and marketed in the nuclear field through INVAP, which is another very important institution in our country related to science and technology, and we are able to build scientific reactors in China. In other words, our relations are currently win-win.

I hope that this presentation has been useful, and I thank you for your attention.

Graham Fuller

The Validity of the Concept of Spheres of Influence

The following is the edited transcript of the presentation by Graham Fuller to Panel 2 of the Schiller Institute conference, "100 Seconds to Midnight on the Doomsday Clock: We Need a New Security Architecture!" on February 19, 2022. Mr. Fuller was a vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council at the CIA and a CIA operations officer for 25 years; he is the author of numerous books.



Schiller Institute

Graham Fuller

Thank you for the opportunity to join this conference and discussion of a new international order. Of course, questions of international orders have been discussed for decades if not centuries to try to tamp down war among various states and powers. And there has

been, in some sense, some progress in that after World War I, we had the League of Nations, and then indeed following World War II, we've had the United Nations, which was a very significant improvement over the rather shakier architecture of the League of Nations.

The issue that I'd like particularly to talk about here today, comes up in connection with the problem of spheres of influence of great powers. I don't know when the term was first used by Washington in reference to Russian policy towards Ukraine, but in any case, I think it's been commonly addressed that Russia considers Ukraine part of its traditional sphere of influence. Now, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken was very quick to say that this is nonsense, that there's no such thing as spheres of influence anymore, that's

passé, that's old-think, we don't do that anymore, that's gone.

Basically, I was rather shocked at Blinken's remarks to this extent, because I'm sure he's read enough history of American foreign policy to be aware that American policy is nothing, if it is not deeply engaged in questions of projecting spheres of influence. Every school child knows well about the Monroe Doctrine, which denied access to the Western Hemisphere to any outside power, and that any such intervention by any means was viewed as a threat to the interests of the United States. And furthermore, I don't need to go through the whole history of American adventures overseas, but certainly the Monroe Doctrine has been powerfully enforced throughout the Caribbean, Central American, and Latin American areas for years, with interventions in Chile, and Cuba, and Nicaragua, and Panama and elsewhere.

So, the idea that Blinken can simply dismiss the concept of spheres of influence is pretty cavalier. But more important than simply the question of sphere of influence, we need to recognize that "sphere of influence" is simply talking about power and the projection of power into foreign policy. There's nothing new about this. Sadly, it seems to be part of the human condition. Power, the impact of power influences our family lives, our community lives, our politics, national and international; it's a basic part of the global structure. To say that *is not* to be pleased with it. Indeed, I wish that there was no such thing as spheres of influence or simply great power dominance. But sadly, we're not going to change human character overnight, although I think some things can be done to improve the situation.

Great and Small Powers

Sadly, we are not all born equal. Countries are not born equal or endowed equally. And therefore, great powers have had a normal, natural tendency to exert their influence. But part of this real dilemma here is not only the actions of the great powers, but the actions and the psychology of small powers. Because it's not comfortable to be a small power, to live as a small power in the shadow of a great power.

For starters, let me remind you of the great quotation from a former President of Mexico, who said, "Poor Mexico! So far from God, and so close to the United States." That really sums up the essence of this psychological dilemma. Furthermore, if you ask Canadians about how they feel living next to a great power, although there's no hostility there, there's

certainly concern that the U.S. can and does weigh in pretty heavily on occasion if it feels its interests are at stake. And Canadians are aware that they have to somewhat be mindful of that.

I would not want to be a neighbor, a small power, a small country, which is a neighbor of India. If you're in Nepal, if you're a Bhutan, if you're in Sri Lanka, the great power of this continental Indian power, has huge influence over these states. And they have to be very careful in what they say and do, so as not to invoke the wrath of India. I think we know in East Asia, very similarly, the power of China is immense and growing. Every Southeast Asian nation knows that. If you're a small power in Southeast Asia, or the South Pacific Ocean, you are well aware that you need to be very cautious about giving due deference to China's interests and actions.

And finally, coming to Ukraine, that's very much what this is all about. I would not want to be a neighbor, a small neighbor of Russia either. To live in the Baltics, Ukraine, or Belarus, or in the Caucasus, or any of these other small nations. The great power exertions of Moscow are definitely palpable. So, the problem in part is that these small nations, these small countries have no choice over the matter. They are where they are; they were placed there by fate. And their geographical fate is very unlikely to change in the future. So as a result, these small powers are constantly on the search for friends, big brothers, or allies, whatever you want to call them, that can help shield a bit the power and influence of the shadow of the great power alongside of which they live. That's where we see our situation today.

When we get into great power politics on the international level, one of the basic tools of this international game is that one great power not only confronts the other great power militarily, but more often, will seek to manipulate the small nations that live in the shadow of that great power, and to try to manipulate them and turn them against the great power with which the other great power is in contestation.

This is just a fact of life; it's a very difficult fact of life, and I'm not sure how one gets out of this. Because it's very tempting, as a great power to simply intervene and play at the margins, to try to make life difficult for your neighbors. That's very much the situation I see now in Ukraine. It's not the first time it's happened in Eastern Europe. It's probably not going to be the last time. But the U.S. has fallen victim to the temptation to try to put pressure on Russia by manipulating Russia's small, weak, and defenseless neighbors.

I don't know that there is a ready answer to this kind of a problem, except to ask that great powers cease to assert those influences over their small neighbors, And I somehow just don't think that's completely realistic, although surely the U.S. and Russia and China and India, among those, can do a lot better than they are presently doing. right now.

So, I think at the very least, recognition of this

inherent dilemma of great power confrontation and the existence of small neighboring countries that are vulnerable to the great powers and their manipulation by other great powers lies at the heart of what we are going to have to deal with in the future when we sit down and actually deal not only with an architecture, but what the rules should be of a future global security order.

Thank you.

Dr. Carlos Gallardo

Development Is the Name of Peace in South America

The following is the edited transcript of the English translation of the presentation by Carlos Gallardo to Panel 2 of the Schiller Institute conference, "100 Seconds to Midnight on the Doomsday Clock: We Need a New Security Architecture!" on February 19, 2022. Dr. Gallardo is the President of the Christian Democratic Party of Peru.

Good afternoon. I greet you from Lima, Peru. I am Dr. Carlos Francisco Gallardo Neira. I am a lawyer by profession and I'm the President of the Christian Democratic Party of Peru.

We thank the LaRouche movement and the Schiller Institute for this invitation to dialogue with all of you representatives of different areas, regions, and latitudes around the world, about the great importance for the world of carrying out the strategy of the Belt and Road, especially for the developing world. This Belt and Road can bring great benefits, especially for the underdeveloped sector, by closing the circle of the Belt and Road, which can raise the living conditions from less human to more human.

I'd like to say that we Christian Democrats in Peru believe that wealth and progress don't happen by themselves. They definitely come from roads, and in this there is great agreement between that strategy and those methods of physical economy, of Christian economy, and our economic model, which is based on integration and fraternal solidarity among people.

But for that, the State must play a role to promote and lead this process, so that it is based on equality of opportunities and reaches the furthest corners of our countries. That is why our founder, Héctor Cornejo Chávez, back in the 1960s, foresaw a completely differ-



Schiller Institute

Dr. Carlos Gallardo

ent Peru, one based on eight macro-regions, of course preserving the 24 or 25 departments along with their councils, and including participatory democracy through provincial municipalities, local authorities, etc.

Why do I mention this? Because Peru is totally committed, historically, to this idea of physical economy, of roads and highways that shorten distances and time, and bring people closer together. I would like to briefly mention that we in Peru are the heirs, so to speak, of our rich history, which included the Inca empire that was structured around

a road network built during the reign of Pachacútec, in its four regions ("Tahuantinsuyo"): Northwest ("Chinchaysuyo"), Northeast ("Antisuyo"), Southwest ("Contisuyo"), and Southeast ("Collasuyo").

At the time, our territory under the Inca empire reached from Colombia to Argentina, and included Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador, and part of Brazil. The idea of our leaders, before the arrival of the Spaniards, was to integrate that great land area through roads. To do that, they invented or created the Inca Road network, which was the biggest in the Americas at the time. They called it "Qhapaq Ñan," which means the "Inca Road" or the "Inca Route." This connected the south of Colombia with Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, and Argentina, and thus linked the economic and social policies with—

who? With the capital of the empire, which was Cuzco. This road network was used to transport food, clothing, and handicrafts—the trade in those days. This was very useful, so much so that when an Inca fisherman brought fish to the south of Peru, he could immediately take the fish to the Inca cities. It might be the imperial city of Cuzco or to Cajamarca and its