defense capabilities. China has very clear-cut red lines which no foreign country can cross. During the Cold War, there were no hot wars between the United States and the U.S.S.R. But unfortunately, two hot wars between China and the United States—the Korean War in the 1950s, and the Vietnam War in the 1960s and '70s. Not long ago, China tested its ICBM as a stern warning against those trigger-happy war mongers. I, myself, have long ago coined a concept called "mutually assured prosperity," MAP, for Sino-U.S. relations to replace the outdated Cold War concept of mutually assured destruction, MAD. Now, we have every condition to do that.

Fourth, China has an overall vision for the world vastly different from that of the United States. China stands for unite and prosper, not divide and rule. China stands for one human community, rejecting categorically the American philosophy of on the table or on the menu.

The Schiller Institute has put forward many great projects such as the Oasis Plan for the Middle East, in part to overcome many crises like illegal whatever refugee crises and more. Technologically speaking, China today has mastered a good number of Green technologies to make use of deserts for producing renewable energy for the benefit of mankind. But it's necessary for the regions concerned to develop enough political will so as to achieve meaningful peace and development. Or better still, to develop mechanisms similar to the three structures of development I have just described for China-ASEAN for development, for political security, for cultural civilizational dialogues. And for this one key factor, that is, vision and support from one or two major powers; that's crucial for these kinds of projects to be successful.

I know this is not easy at all, yet I'm hopeful that this great vision, better for mankind, will become reality one day. With this optimistic note, I complete my speech today. Many thanks again for your patience. Thank you very much.

### Ambassador Chas W. Freeman, Jr.

## The Politics of Tragedy, Or the Statecraft of Hope?

Dec. 12—The following is an edited transcript of the presentation by Ambassador Chas W. Freeman, Jr. (U.S. Foreign Service, ret.), from Panel 1 of the Dec.7-8 Schiller Institute conference, "In the Spirit of Schiller and Beethoven: All Men, Become Brethren!" The panel was titled, "The Strategic Crisis: New and Final World War, or a New Paradigm of the One Humanity." The video of his presentation is available here. Subheads have been added.



Ambassador Chas Freeman

says what seems to matter more than what is said. But any statement at odds with the official narrative is immediately branded as "disinformation"—denied a hearing and deleted from the public record.

In these circumstances, there is clearly a case to be made for selfdeception and political cowardice what might be called "ostrich politik." But reality is immutably out there whether we acknowledge it or not. Saying and doing nothing does not and cannot mitigate the risks of the present global crises. But taking

I stand before you as an Ameri-

can. I am acutely aware that my country's recent behavior has cost it its moral authority and turned much of the world against it. Some American travelers now avoid ignominy by impersonating Canadians. In the American homeland, the majority seek comfort and safety in denial or cautious silence. We inhabit a world in which who the initiative to do so is essential if we and our species are to survive and prosper in peace.

### The Danger Humanity Poses to Itself

The human species has never posed as great a danger to itself as it now does. If human-induced climate change does not make our planet uninhabitable, several nuclear wars in the making could well do so.

In the bipolar world order of the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis reminded everyone of the risks to human existence that a nuclear exchange would entail. After it, leaders in both Moscow and Washington resolved to avoid a war that might escalate to the nuclear level. In the latter stages of the Cold War, cooperative relations between the United States and China ruled out any thought of a nuclear exchange between the two. India and Pakistan—another nuclear dyad—showed that nuclear powers could fight without necessarily escalating to the nuclear level. But the world has changed, and the "nuclear allergy" that induced caution is not what it was.

The humane world order that the victors of the Second World War envisaged has expired. Egregious violations of international law—invasions, genocides, territorial aggrandizements, gross violations of human rights—now take place with impunity. In the unilaterally asserted "rules-based orders" that are succeeding international law and comity, the strong once again do what they can while the weak suffer what they must. The adage that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought has been set aside as all nine nuclear powers introduce new warheads and delivery vehicles and escalate their threats to each other.

Incaution has made nuclear war between the Russian Federation and the collective West a looming possibility. China and the United States are each readying themselves for a war over Taiwan that both recognize could go nuclear. North Korea promises to respond to attempted regime change with a nuclear attack on the United States. Israel seeks a war to eliminate Iran as a counter to its genocidal policies and territorial expansion and does not rule out the use of its nuclear arsenal to accomplish this.

The absence of effective means of communication between nuclear powers compounds the risk. Key arms control agreements have expired or been abandoned. No one seeks to replace them. There are now no functioning mechanisms for escalation control between nuclear-armed belligerents. Diplomatic dialogue between the great nuclear powers is rare or nonexistent.

In his four years as Secretary of State, Antony Blinken has not once visited Moscow. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov was last welcomed in Washington five years ago. Rather than listening to each other, Washington and Beijing fruitlessly exchange combative talking points. Israel and Iran have outdone Washington, Moscow, and Beijing in demonizing and ostracizing each other. In the absence of a vision for peace backed by diplomacy, the drift toward further escalation in Ukraine, West Asia, the Taiwan Strait, and Korea continues unabated.

Ukraine has valiantly resisted invasion by Russia but has now clearly lost the war. It is militarily exhausted. The war has devastated its infrastructure and ruined its economy. Russia is steadily taking more of its territory. Ukraine has been depopulated. The West continues to insist that it fight Russia to the last Ukrainian. But the remaining Ukrainians need peace, not war.

To end the war without further losses, Ukraine must return to the unpalatable Russian terms to which it agreed two-and-a-half years ago at Istanbul. Neither the West nor Ukraine has put forward realistic alternatives. Instead, both have continuously attributed to Russia aims that it has never espoused and that it has no capability to achieve—namely, conquest of all of Ukraine as a first step to the conquest of all of Europe. This is propaganda intended to bolster European support for "weakening and isolating Russia"—fearmongering derived from baseless conjecture inflamed by Cold War paranoia.

Moscow's terms for peace in Ukraine and Europe are no secret. They were clearly laid out in its December 2021 demand for negotiations. The Russian position was no surprise; Moscow first voiced it in 1994. But the West's refusal to talk in the face of a clear ultimatum did surprise Moscow. This sparked its so-called "special military operation" in Ukraine two months later.

Russia's stated objectives in Ukraine are:

"Denazification" and "demilitarization"—an end to the persecution of Russians and other minorities in Ukraine and an end to security threats to Russia emanating from Ukraine.

The restoration of Ukraine to the neutral, nonaligned status in which it was born.

Negotiations with the U.S. and others to craft a European security architecture that can reassure both Russia and the West.

#### **Historical Precedents for Creating Peace**

The first two objectives parallel the provisions of the Austrian State Treaty of 1955. This ended the occupation of that rump part of the former Third Reich by British, French, Soviet, and U.S. forces. It created an independent, neutral Austrian state in which the linguistic and cultural rights of minorities were internationally guaranteed. It provided a solid basis for today's prosperous Austrian democracy. It set a precedent on which a neutral, independent, and democratic Ukraine could yet be built. Such a Ukraine would be both a buffer and a bridge between Russia and the rest of Europe. The EU accession process could cure many of Ukraine's current ills—among them, its notorious corruption. Of note, Russia has never objected to the idea of Ukraine joining the European Union.

The Partnership for Peace, which Russia joined in June 1994, has the potential to become a cooperative security system for Europe backed by NATO. European history prior to the Cold War demonstrates that, without Russian participation in the management of peace and security, Europe cannot be stable.

Given Kyiv's repudiation of the Minsk accords and the blood Russia has spilt to protect Russian speakers in the oblasts it has officially annexed, Moscow expects to keep them. There is little doubt that this accords with the will of their inhabitants. But Russia needs to allay concerns in the West about its strategic intentions. This is a prerequisite for the achievement of a stable peace in Europe. Reluctant as it may be, Russia should consider permitting internationally supervised referenda in the parts of Ukraine it has occupied.

In Ukraine, as in the Korean conflict, an end to the fighting will likely follow rather than precede negotiations. A Korean-style armistice would perpetuate tensions and animosity rather than creating a Ukrainian peace on which a broader European peace can be built. Ukrainians and Russians must fix borders that enable them to coexist peacefully in future.

As was the case in the Peace of Westphalia, negotiations will be complex, take time, and involve talks in diverse forums with varying participants. But difficult as they may prove, negotiated solutions for both Ukraine and a new European security system are both overdue and desperately needed.

## Scott Ritter

# A U.S.-Russia Nuclear Conflict Is Not Just a Possibility, but Increasingly Becoming a Probability

Dec. 7—The following is an edited transcript of a speech from a Dec. 7, 2024 webcast presentation by Scott Ritter (U.S.), former U.S. Marine Corps (ret.), former UN weapons inspector in Iraq, from Panel 1 of the Dec.7-8 Schiller Institute conference, "In the Spirit of Schiller and Beethoven: All Men, Become Brethren!" The panel was titled, "The Strategic Crisis: New and Final World War, or a New Paradigm of the One Humanity." The video of his presentation is available <u>here</u>. Subheads have been added.



Today, I'll be addressing the issue of the potential of a nuclear conflict between Russia and the United States. I have for some time now been stating that I believe this is not just a possibility, but increasingly becoming a probability, given the trajectory of relations; the deterioration of relations between the United States and Russia, especially as they center on the issue of Ukraine. I also believe that the situation warrants being described as an existential threat to the survival of not just

Scott Ritter

I've been asked by Helga Zepp-LaRouche to prepare a video statement, given my inability to participate directly in this very important conference on international security. the United States and Russia, but the entire world. That, contrary to some public speculation or articulation by American officials—in particular, Rear Admiral Thomas Buchanan, Director, Plans and Policy, for Strategic Command, which is the American combatant command responsible for America's strategic nuclear