

# Creating Roman Legions For Donald Rumsfeld

by Carl Osgood

In his 1957 book, *The Soldier and the State*, Harvard professor Samuel Huntington presented a Hobbesian vision of what the U.S. military should look like. “The man of the military ethic is essentially the man of Hobbes,” wrote Huntington, and the military man has no responsibility to judge the ends for which his skills are to be put to use by the civilian authority who employs him. Although the partisans of today’s military transformation, such as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s director of force transformation, retired Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, speak the language of futurist Alvin Toffler, the ends toward which transformation is pointing are not far from Huntington’s vision, nor that of Hobbes, for that matter.

Cebrowski presented that Hobbesian vision as the lead-off speaker on the second day of a Dec. 2-3 conference in Washington, D.C. jointly sponsored by the Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis, the International Security Studies Program of the Fletcher School at Tufts University, and the U.S. Navy. Cebrowski said the technical requirements of transformation include such things as nonlethal warfare, directed energy weapons, the capability to maneuver into a theater of operations from strategic distances, and the conduct of urban operations. But he put those technical requirements into a strategic outlook that divides the world into two zones: a “functioning core,” where countries function within the structures of globalization; and the “red zone,” or “gap,” where they are unwilling or unable to do so.

Most U.S. military operations since 1990 have been in Cebrowski’s red zone. “Our business,” he said, “is exporting security from the core into the gap.” Cebrowski based that view, he noted, on the work of Thomas P.M. Barnett, a professor of warfare analysis at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, R.I., who has been giving advice to Rumsfeld. In an article published in the March, 2003 *Esquire*, Barnett wrote that the real reason for going to war in Iraq was that “the resulting long-term military commitment will finally force America to deal with the entire Gap as a strategic threat environment.”

## Exporting ‘Private Sector Security’

“The Gap,” of course, encompasses Africa, the Middle East (with the exception of Israel), and Central Asia, and includes countries in East Asia and South America which

are on the periphery of the Gap, either geographically or in economic terms. The Gap countries are characterized by their lack of “connectivity” to the globalized world, and are the breeding grounds for terrorism, drug trafficking, and all sorts of other global threats, say these war planners. “Until we begin the systematic, long term export of security to the Gap,” Barnett writes, “it will increasingly export its pain to the Core in the form of terrorism and other instabilities.”

The purpose of exporting security is not to give governments a chance to develop their countries, however. “The integration of the Gap,” Barnett argues, “will ultimately depend more on private investment than anything the Core’s public sector can offer.”

Barnett writes that dealing with this world “means reshaping our military establishment to mirror-image the challenge we face.” From this come the information age warriors that Cebrowski is working so hard to create. “The objective” of exporting security, Cebrowski said, “is to keep the world system up and running, and to enforce the rules.”

In his view, the concept of the citizen-soldier, with its roots in American colonial history, is being replaced by a warrior ethos. This warrior sees himself as an enforcer of the rules of the world system, as well as an exporter of security. “The warrior,” Cebrowski said, “prides himself on being responsive, but responsiveness tends towards being punitive. Our national strategy calls on us to be not only responsive, but also preventive, and we must do that.”

Just what are the rules of the world system that the transformed U.S. military is supposed to enforce? The U.S. economy is subsidized by the rest of the world at a rate reaching \$50 billion per month, resulting in a monstrous current account deficit that will exceed \$500 billion in 2003. From Cebrowski’s and Barnett’s own language, it would appear that the mission of the transformed U.S. military is to ensure that those capital flows continue, in order to prop up the present bankrupt global financial system, much as the Roman legions kept Rome afloat by ensuring the continued flow of tribute from Rome’s conquered territories. This ongoing reorganization of the U.S. military runs counter to the tradition established by our Founding Fathers of a development mission for the U.S. military, based on engineering principles.

Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Michael Hagee, speaking on the panel that followed Cebrowski, indicated no disagreement with Cebrowski’s notion of a “functional core” and a “red zone.” He spoke of an “arc of instability” that coincides with the red zone, characterized by countries that are unable to provide for the basic needs of their populations. “That’s sort of the strategic environment as we see it in the Marine Corps,” he said.

By allowing itself to see the world in such globalist terms, the U.S. military establishment is accepting a world of perpetual warfare. The only alternative is a community of principle among sovereign nation-states, to defend the general welfare of their populations.