

Statecraft in Eurasia Can Defeat ‘Strategy of Tension’

At the conference of the Schiller Institute near Wiesbaden, Germany on Sept. 26, analysts from Russia, Turkey, and Armenia, speaking at a panel titled “Strategy of Tension,” presented their perspectives on the history of their nations, the conflicts which are currently rending Eurasia, and their hopes for a better future. Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr. then addressed the meeting to underline the importance of looking at these issues from the standpoint of universal history and statecraft, to avoid the trap of being drawn into a “who hit whom” theory of strategy. He returned to one of the principal themes of his keynote to the conference (published in EIR, Oct. 8), on the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, which brought to an end the Thirty Years’ War in Europe, relying on the concept that each sovereign nation-state would seek to enhance “the advantage of the other.”

The moderator was Michael Liebig, of EIR’s Wiesbaden bureau. We publish all the speeches here.

Michael Liebig

Before we start, let me just say a few words on the subject area this morning: strategy of tension/irregular warfare.

I think, first of all, it’s important to understand that strategy of tension and irregular warfare are to be seen in the context of the systemic crisis. It is a significant symptom of that crisis. And if you look into what happened this year, with the deepening of the systemic crisis, we had non-linear discontinuities: On the one side typified what has happened with the Monday demonstrations [in Germany], the beginning of a mass strike process which we are going to see, for sure, in the rest of Europe as well; but at the same time, you had in the context of the systemic crises, irregular warfare assaults, strategy of tension actions, which already have changed, visibly, the course of history this year.

March 11, Madrid: It eliminated one of the key components of the “coalition of the willing,” the Hispanic mule,

the “Trojan Mule” was eliminated. And already the Spanish development indicates, that for those launching irregular warfare/strategy of tension, this is a very risky enterprise. It backfired in Spain. And I venture to say, it will backfire in Russia as well. Because what we have seen with Beslan and what we have seen as the *reaction* to Beslan, in terms of the Russian state leadership, is an indication of this.

Now irregular warfare/strategy of tension always occurs in a specific sociopolitical context. But, what this panel surely will clearly establish, is that any mechanistic causalities, pseudo-causalities, between acts of irregular warfare and certain sociopolitical conditions, are not just misleading, but are part of the game, a game which in reality, is a covert operation, a clandestine operation, an act of surrogate warfare, utilizing or trying to exploit or establish causalities in terms of sociopolitical contexts.

Now acts of irregular warfare are usually connected to elements within intelligence agencies, or special services as



Michael Liebig: The financier oligarchy’s “strategy of tension” and irregular warfare have to be seen in the context of the systemic financial/economic crisis.

the Russians say. But, again, it is very important, that no simplistic, mechanistic interpretations are being made, in terms of this or that intelligence agency, or not even factions within this and that intelligence agency: Because the ultimate control over such operations *doesn't* come from these intelligence services as such. They *do* come from oligarchical, financial, and synarchist financial interests, which are operating through elements within intelligence services, in order to facilitate acts of irregular warfare and implementing a strategy of tension.

Lastly let me say, because of the subject-area, the speakers on this podium—and I say this also in looking back to the very excellent seminar which we had with Lyn [Lyndon LaRouche] on Thursday—that the subject-area is sometimes in the background of those speaking about it, meaning that not necessarily everything is being said in a “megaphone” fashion. So I would advise you to listen very carefully, to what is said in what way. And I am quite sure, we all can learn a lot, then, this morning.

So thank you, and I want to ask Konstantin to begin.

Dr. Konstantin Cheremnykh

What's Behind Russia's Geopolitical Thinking?

I will first introduce myself a little. The specific and maybe unique opportunity of mine is, that at the same time I work as a physician, as a psychiatrist in a medical institution—I have been working there for many years, and this is a state-run medical institution, which means I am dealing with the poorest category of the population—and at the same time also, for many years I have been involved in political analysis. And therefore, I know also something “from the top.” And this combination of employment and interest, allows me to see the two things in continuity, as well as the effects on the lowest level of the society, from some changes from the very top.

And certainly, for me, as a citizen of my country and as a specialist in my field, it is for me a special interest to understand and to explain for myself and for others, what is happening, and what is going to happen with my country, to what extent this is related to global processes, because we all know that we are now in this period, which is called globalization, and which is advertised as something very positive for all of humanity. But as Michael Liebig has just emphasized, there is for instance one phenomenon, like irregular warfare, which is just—as I will try to illustrate—a symptom, an element. So this new system of relations between countries, companies,

services, peoples, nations, areas in the world, and so on, is called “globalization.”

LaRouche's Influence in Russia

Actually, in general, my report is very sad, but I should start with some optimistic statement. The optimistic statement is that the ideas of the Schiller Institute and ideas of Lyndon LaRouche and his name, are now—and this was especially evident during the last two or three years—much more familiar to the Russian audience. And not only to scientific and academic circles as before, but also to the highest level of the political and administrative establishment, and the establishment of the experts. And Lyndon LaRouche himself and his associates are now received at the highest level of the Russian administration, and their names could be seen in Russian papers, including also the names of such persons as Jonathan Tennenbaum, economist Lothar Komp, and others.

So, that's certainly a very positive sign on the one hand, and it reflects, I must say, also the fact, that the Russian audience, including the top figures in Russia, are trying to understand what is happening on the global level. And they see, it is becoming absolutely self-evident, that the global economic and financial crisis is happening now, before their eyes. And in any kind of economic business paper, you see such terms as “financial bubble” or “real estate bubble,” terms that hadn't been used before.

At the same time, in the Russian press, the significance of the elections in the United States, which are going to happen this November, is regarded as an event of great importance. And I also see the reflections of the results of the work of the LaRouche Youth Movement in the United States, in the recent reports in the Russian press, and also in the British press, that part of the U.S. population which hadn't been voting for many years, is now going to vote, and it is going to vote in order to get out the Bush and Cheney Administration, for both the economic collapse in the United States, and for the ugly war in Iraq, which is both anti-human and inefficient.

I have to remind you, that the fact that the Russian leadership is now informed about the ideas of Lyndon LaRouche, also suggests a certain responsibility. It means that now no top Russian politician can say, that he hasn't learned about this name, that he hasn't been informed about the sense of these ideas, that he hasn't heard the warnings, the forecasts of Lyn.

Putin's Relations With Bush

I have to remind you, that quite recently the President of Russia made not just compliments, but even tried to protect George Bush, as the President of the United States, from his political opponents. This happened for instance in the United States, during the G-8 meeting. This happened later at a special press conference, which coincided with the discussion in the U.S. Congress on the matter of Saddam Hussein and his intention of terrorist actions in the U.S. And the President of



Dr. Konstantin Cherenmykh: "The fact that the Russian leadership is now informed about the ideas of Lyndon LaRouche, also suggests a certain responsibility."

Russia decided to play, this time, on the side of the U.S. President.

This has to be somehow interpreted. I'll try to do this.

You probably know, that the Russian President didn't have any kind of experience of dealing with any other U.S. Presidential figures. He never worked in the United States. He became the Prime Minister in 1999, and the next year he became the President, and George Bush was the first President whom he met, and he was very friendly. George Bush was very friendly to Mr. Putin, especially after the events of September 2001.

This looked quite sincere, but actually there was a big manipulative interest behind it. Because at that time, the Bush-Cheney Administration wanted to punish the Arab States, by creating a counterforce, an alliance of alternative oil suppliers for the United States, including Russia; including also some African countries, like Nigeria, like Angola, and so on. And the message to Putin was at that time, that the U.S. Administration quite understands the matter of international terrorism, including the matter of the Caucasus, the matter of Chechnya, and therefore Russia is supposed to become one of the major leaders, the major partners of the United States in the international warfare against terrorism.

This was a kind of temptation, which was to a certain extent partial; this was reacted to by the Russian leadership, this proposal was accepted. But later things changed, as you know. And as you know, later, Russia as well as the major European states didn't support the war in Iraq. And at least since that time, the relations between the White House and the Kremlin have been slowly and gradually, but definitely deteriorating.

Still, as I told you several months ago, there was still a kind of affinity of the Russian leadership to the present U.S. leadership, until several events, which followed one another and all of them were events of the subject we are discussing now: the terrorist actions, in various places. And the most

terrible of them came on Sept. 1. It is significant, that most of these terrorist acts were timed to historical dates which are important for any Russian; for instance, the terrorist action in Nazran and several other towns of Ingushetia on June 22, which is the date of Hitler's intervention into the U.S.S.R. in 1941, as well as the assassination of the President of Chechnya, Ahmed Kadyrov, on May 9, which is V-Day in Russia.

The Beslan event happened on Sept. 1, which is nothing but the beginning of the school year, but Sept. 1 was also the date of the Republican Convention in the United States. And it was not only just the date of the Republican Convention—at least it was seen so in Russia—it was the date when it was to be decided, who exactly would run as *Vice President* from the Republican nomination. Will it be Dick Cheney, or somebody else?

After this, Vladimir Putin made several statements on Sept. 4, Sept. 6, and a week later. Each of them concerns certain aspects, and reflects the fact, that this last terrorist act was the moment of truth—better late than never. In his first statement, he said that this kind of terrorist act is not something from within, that it involves a kind of foreign interest, and a foreign interest, which implies an intention of certain forces to make Russia disintegrate.

Changes in the Russian Political System

And shortly after that, a week later, Vladimir Putin made another political statement, which was addressed to the . . . change in Russia's political system. This change was commented on a lot in the Western press, but I have to make some emphasis on this, I'll at least try to explain. I don't regard this change as something perfect, or only positive, and so on, but I'll try to explain the intentions behind it.

This political transformation contains three elements:

First of all is the change in the system of elections to the Russian parliament, which provides that the elections are only held among parties, and individual candidates will not run. It is known, that the political parties in Russia, for the last three years, have been significantly transformed, and it is true, that to a very large extent, they are under control of the administration. So, the system, which is being introduced, is very similar to the system we have in Kazakhstan, or to the system which was in East Germany in the times of the German Democratic Republic.

The second change is the transformation of the elections of governors. Now the governors will not be elected by the whole population of the region or autonomous republic inside Russia, but will be elected only by the local legislative assemblies. It is true that in this case, an ordinary citizen is not involved in the expression of his will, or involved only indirectly through the mechanism of the legislative assembly.

What is behind this idea? This I have to emphasize. There are three points, here. The first point is, and this I know just from the reality of my region and of many other regions: The idea of this change, which is to become a change of the

The Caucasus Chessboard



Constitution, is that the oligarchical interests, through various mechanisms of bribery or direct pressure, will not be able—not be able—to influence regional elections, or at least, this ability will be very restricted, because, what is most important, is that the candidate whom the legislative assembly will discuss and vote up or vote down, will be the figure proposed by the President himself, in every region.

The second point is, that this also eliminates the parasitic community of image-making services, which has emerged in Russia, and didn't exist for many years, actually before the time of Yel'tin's reform. This was actually very influential, and actually belongs to various oligarchical interests.

And the third problem is, what was obvious during the elections in Ingushetia, and also in some other examples, which I will mention later—in the southern regions of Russia, especially in the Caucasus, the election of governors may involve not only oligarchic interests, which are domestic or primarily domestic; but can also involve very serious foreign interests, including not just foreign corporations, but also criminal interests of the international scene.

So, that that's how I understand the intentions of the President.

I mean that, it is not true, that they are not related to the earlier terrorist actions, although I know that this plan was developed long before that.

Danger of Disintegration of Russia

So returning to the issue put forward by the President in his speech on Sept. 4 and later on Sept. 6: The issue of the



Russian President Vladimir Putin, on Sept. 7 in Moscow, mourns the victims of the terrorist action in Beslan. He said on Sept. 4: "Some people would like to tear off a juicy morsel from us, others are helping them do it. Helping, on the assumption that Russia, as a major nuclear power, is still a threat to them. And therefore this threat should be removed. Terrorism, of course, is only an instrument for achieving such goals."

disintegration of Russia is a real danger, although right now it doesn't seem to be a real danger. And a lot of Western papers write, that the President of Russia is a dictator, that he controls everything, that he controls the independent press, that he controls the political parties. This is true, but it is true only superficially, and it is true only for some things, which are on the surface.

I'll demonstrate, that it's not correct, but first I have to say something about this disintegration process. To analyze it, we have to start from the history of the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. and what the mechanisms were, what was the reason for that? And how did it happen, that such a great military empire collapsed very fast? And at the same time, how did it happen that in this process we have achieved not only countries which have established themselves as sovereign nations,

with their own attributes of sovereignty; but we also have unrecognized territories, unrecognized republics, which don't have any kind of official international status, but which are out of control of the nations to which they formally belong?

So, from the very beginning: When I came to eastern Germany for the first time, it was several years ago, and Michael Liebig remembers, that that was in Dresden. And the first question I got there from the older generation, who remember the Soviet Union well, was: "What happened with the U.S.S.R.? Why did all this happen? We don't understand. Explain please." Even from their questions, I understood, that this is not quite understood even by the older generation there. To my mind, it is necessary for the younger generation here also to know how this worked. First of all, what were the strong sides and the weak sides of the Communist state, which existed for 70 years, and then stopped existing?

But, still I say, that the major problem here, was the problem of ideas, and the problem that the Russian Communist idea, the Russian materialist idea had some internal, immanent problems within itself, some internal conflict, which predetermined its implosion later. It was a wrong understanding of the role of the human mind, scientific mind, and so on. Any kind of transformation of matter, in Lenin's thought, was regarded as a reflex, as a reaction. That means, that the mind as such, the idea as such, was not regarded as a subject; that is very important. The second thing was in atheism—and this has to also be understood—from the very beginning [of the Soviet system], the original idea was that man is prior to God, because religion is something outdated and man is stronger than God.

But then, thanks to Nikita Khrushchov, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU] between 1955-64, this was reduced to a very primitive, consumerist type of conception. And at least since that time, the attempts of the U.S.S.R. to expand its ideas to other countries were ineffective, because it was impossible to reach any understanding with the religious communities, especially Islamic communities. It was well understood and well exploited in the strategic American circles and institutions, which were looking for a kind of a counterforce. And at that time, they developed—and I think my Turkish friend will maybe say something about this—it is called the "green zone" along the borders of the U.S.S.R. And this involved—and it's very important—the results of the British strategy in its historical continuation, the works of Bernard Lewis, the works of Alexandre von Bennigsen and other theoreti-

cians—as well as [Samuel] Huntington, and so on, whom you know very well.

At the time, and especially later, the real Islamic revolutionary movement, which started in Egypt, and then was suppressed by Gamal Abdel Nasser, who was the friend of Khrushchov, was later used and exploited. And some positive elements in this revolutionary teaching in Islam, were inverted into a kind of a philosophy, which could briefly be described as a philosophy of suicide or a skill of suicide. From this and through the experience of Afghanistan, when the Soviet Union and the United States have actually gotten into the same kind of swamp, which undermined later the sovereignty of both countries—both the United States and the U.S.S.R., and it is especially obvious today—from this moment, this suicide training was transplanted and reproduced in all of what is called "territories of irregular warfare." And especially, and it is very important that some territories, which I mentioned, don't have sovereignty, even officially, no matter how they emerged.

Chechnya in the early 1990s was exactly such a territory. It was a perfect place for such suicide training. The same territory was a perfect place, at the same time, for illegal trade on a global level: For instance—and the geopolitical link is important again—exactly at this time Chechnya, and especially the mountainous [part of] Chechnya, was used not just as a transit line for arms and drugs, but as a facility for a refinery plant for heroin, a very large one. It was established there in the mountains of Chechnya, in a former Soviet military facility. And it was assembled from parts—actually it was imported from Britain: The role of the British in the Caucasus is really a long story.

But, one factor, which is important, and important not only for this area—and this has to be understood—is the question of oil. In this particular example of the Caspian oil, which was used as a temptation, for a number of political elites, including the national elites of the new states which have emerged, and to the local elites, including the Chechen leadership, the first one and the second one. So, the idea that Chechnya can get a lot of income from oil transit, came directly from a British-American Azeri-based, Baku-based oil corporation. And at the same time Zbigniew Brzezinski was involved, and the recently arrested Mark Thatcher, the son of Baroness Margaret Thatcher. These international links are absolutely clear in this situation.

Liebig: Konstantin, I'm afraid we have to stop here. I know what an enormous treasure of knowledge and insight Konstantin is, so I hope that at least some aspects can be further discussed in the discussion period, including this absolutely fascinating concept, in terms of the self-destructive corruption of both sides of the Afghanistan war: The type of nemesis dynamic which set in there.

So, thank you, Konstantin. And I would ask Altay Unaltay to address us.

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