This article appears in the June 21, 2024 issue of Executive Intelligence Review.
European Election Results Discredit
EU and Member State Governments
[Print version of this article]
June 14—The Parliament of the European Union, the institution that loves to lecture the rest of the world about democracy, is in fact powerless. It cannot legislate on its own initiative and cannot even dissolve itself. Its function relative to the Executive of the EU, the Commission, is similar to that of consultative bodies under absolute monarchies. Only once during a given term is it relevant: when, at the beginning of its five-year legislature, it elects the European Commission. But even in that case, the European Parliament (EP) is strongly conditioned by deals struck inside the European Council, where governments of member states agree on who will be the next Commission head, a choice which is eventually voted on by the parliamentarians.
With that said, the political importance of the June 6-9 election for the European Parliament should not be underestimated. Citizens rejected almost all the ruling governments, thus undermining the legitimacy of the pro-war and pro-Green Deal policies pushed by those governments. In particular the Franco-German alliance, the driving axis of the EU, suffered a smashing defeat, with the German “traffic light” coalition receiving barely 30% of the vote and French President Emmanuel Macron’s party receiving only half as much as its main adversary, the National Rally (NR). (In a desperate attempt to stay afloat, Macron announced national snap-elections, hoping to repeat the gimmick of rallying all anti-NR forces in the second round.) Even the success of the Italian center-right coalition under Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni could partially be seen as a vote against the EU, as those parties have all opposed the Green Deal follies and have recently distanced themselves from Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s mad policy of becoming involved in military strikes on Russian territory.
The European elections can therefore be seen as a major referendum against EU policies. In democratic countries, such a pronouncement by the people cannot be ignored. But in the EU, democracy is an export-only item; here, rules are different. Thus, one can expect European leaders, although delegitimized, to stick to their agenda, beginning with the election of the next president of the European Commission.
As the EU Council convenes at the end of June, they will have on the table the name of Ursula von der Leyen, candidate of the European People’s Party (EPP), the supposed “winner” of the recent elections, who hopes to win a second mandate. She needs a majority vote of 55% in the Council, representing 65% of European citizens. This formula makes it complicated: none of the four largest countries by population is ruled by parties belonging to the EPP. Thus, a compromise must be reached, and former European Central Bank (ECB) chairman Mario Draghi is still an option in the background.
Furthermore, the candidate must eventually be voted in by the European Parliament. Traditionally, the EP approves the deals made by the European Council, and the so-called “Ursula majority” (a grand coalition of centrists (EPP), liberals, and socialists), although weakened, still has a tiny majority on paper. This majority, however, disappears if there is the same percentage of friendly fire as occurred five years ago. Furthermore, the liberal and socialist components of the coalition have expressed their dissatisfaction with the opening of von der Leyen to right-wing factions. Thus, surprises may be in store.
European Elections: A Well-Deserved Defeat for the German Greens
The three parties of the German government coalition (SPD, Greens, FDP) were all among the losers of the election for the European Parliament. For the Greens, it was a smashing defeat, as they lost 40% compared with the vote four years ago. This was a result of the growing disgust with the party’s war policy and the Green Deal, both of which put a heavy economic and financial burden on the population.
The growing opposition to the government’s policies was strongly reflected in the considerable gains for the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party and for the BSW, the new party founded just a few months ago by Sahra Wagenknecht. In spite of a truly massive campaign by all the other parties and mainstream media against the AfD, it has emerged as the second-strongest party after the Christian Democrats (CDU). Moreover, the BSW, which strongly opposes more weapons supplies to Ukraine and supports the Chinese peace proposal for the Ukraine conflict, received more votes than the aggressively pro-war Free Democrats.
The results in terms of percentage: CDU/CSU 30% (+1.1); AfD 15.9% (+4.9); SPD 13.9% (-1.9); Greens 11.9% (-8.6); BSW 6.2% (+6.2); FDP 5.2% (-0.2); Linke 2.7% (-2.8).
Another striking aspect of these election results is the clear division between the western and eastern parts of Germany. While in the west, the CDU came in first in most voting districts, in the east the AfD was the winner in almost all districts, and the young BSW emerged as the third-strongest after the CDU. This could be a portent for the Berlin coalition in view of the three state parliamentary elections scheduled for September (Saxony, Thuringia, Brandenburg, all in the East). In all three of these states, the coalition partners came in well behind the AfD, the CDU, and the BSW, in that order. A serious political crisis affecting all of Germany, with an upsurge of unrest, is preprogrammed if the AfD wins those elections and all the other parties continue to boycott cooperation with them.
Unlike Macron’s action in France, in which he dissolved the parliament immediately after the election results came in and decreed early elections for the end of June, the German government will likely try and stay in power, despite its miserable showing, until the end of its term in the autumn of 2025. That implies a growing instability and ungovernability that will radiate from Germany into the rest of Europe.
Macron Continues His Flight-Forward Trip, This Time Electorally
Despite all the hype in France around the commemoration of the 80th anniversary of D-Day, the Renaissance Party of President Macron could not avoid a stunning rebuke in the June 9 European Parliament elections. As expected, the party of Marine Le Pen, the National Rally, came in at over 31%, more than double the total for Renaissance (14.6%). Even on the left wing, Macron’s party surpassed the Socialist Party by only 0.8%, with La France Insoumise, headed by Jean-Luc Mélenchon, at 9.9% and the Greens reduced to 5.5%. The abstention rate was higher than all, at 49%. In the months preceding the vote, the popularity of the French President had already been abysmally low, principally because of his economic policies, but also due to his submission to the “rules-based order” and Brussels.
While the European elections have traditionally favored a “protest vote” in France, Emmanuel Macron nonetheless announced within hours of the results that the National Assembly would be dissolved, and that new elections would be held on June 30 and July 7. Whatever the outcome of those elections turns out to be, Emmanuel Macron can remain President until the end of his term, in April 2027. Although it may seem unlikely, during this time the National Rally (NR) could become the strongest party in the national parliament, at which point the lead candidate of the NR, Jordan Bardella, could become Prime Minister. Note that contrary to positions taken by Le Pen’s party in the past, Bardella has insisted that he is not in favor of France leaving NATO or the euro, much less the European Union.
As President of Solidarité et Progrès, Jacques Cheminade pointed out in a tweet on June 9 that Bardella was the first to demand new legislative elections, and Emmanuel Macron announced them. This can lead to two possibilities: either a “mutually destructive cohabitation” or “an even more federalist orientation,” Cheminade wrote. The respect with which Macron handled Bardella during a meeting at Saint Denis last September, and which, as Bardella himself recognized, gave his campaign credibility, “is worth thinking about,” Cheminade added, meaning that the establishment could offer a government deal to the NR in exchange for dropping their sovereignist demands. “As for real sovereignists, they should finally draw the lesson of what has happened, and come together above and beyond personal questions and labels. On the basis of a project to free France from the financial and cultural occupation forces, and internationally, to campaign for a new mutual security and development architecture to break with the weapons-build-up oligarchy that is leading us to a Third World War.”
