

Sniffing the New Wind from the East

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

Wiesbaden, 10 Feb. 1977 — All the main signals from Moscow suggest that the Politburo majority around Secretary Leonid Brezhnev is committed to throwing all sorts of vital Soviet interests overboard in a desperate effort to sew up a March "SALT II" signing with Secretary Cyrus Vance. Those are the facts, but the facts are by themselves more than a bit too simple.

First, the official new line in *Pravda*, *Izvestia* and so forth, alleging the "pro-detente Jimmy Carter," does not represent either the Politburo's knowledge or perception of the Carter Trilateraloid regime. Arbatov, Bovin and other pertinent apologists of the "new line" are not merely mistaken; from the standpoint of Soviet leaders' knowledge, they are publishing the grossest lies for the edification of Soviet and Washington readers.

Second, if "SALT II" were concluded on the indicated basis reported in high-level circles, it would represent a conscious abandonment of what Soviet leading circles have defined as basic strategic policy since the 1962 Cuba missiles crisis.

In light of these and related facts, only three broad alternative conclusions can be recommended: (1) The Soviet leadership has, for the moment, capitulated to the mere threat represented by Carter's operational thermonuclear confrontation scenario; (2) The Soviet leadership is repeating the "Hitler-Stalin Pact" tactic with Cyrus Vance et al; (3) the present literary and related postures from Moscow are a calculated-deception operation. All three alternative appreciations are sufficiently credible that they must be examined more closely to get at the reality.

If any Politburo ruling faction of the moment has in fact capitulated to a Carter threat, if the war-winning strategy and technological breakthroughs are intended to be abandoned in favor of a return to the "deterrence balance" policy of the Khrushchev period, then such a Politburo faction is in a very precarious position within the Soviet leadership. The Soviet military, the Novosibirsk establishment, the "hard-liners" of all Eastern Europe, and other elements of the Soviet state and party machinery will become most restive.

The Hitler-Stalin pact syndrome does not present itself as a stable proposition either. The Hitler-Stalin pact had two principal elements: the "Rapallo" consciousness which persisted in both Germany and the USSR even after the Hitler accession to power; even though the German and Soviet spokesman of Rapallo had been purged prior to 1939, the objective self-interests involved persisted to the point of representing sufficient basis for the only possible temporary detente between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Nazi-Soviet negotiations and relations of the 1939-1941 period preceding Hitler's Operation Barbarossa indicate that Stalin was eminently conscious of this correlated feature. However, the dominant feature of the 1939-1941 Hitler-Stalin pact was the total isolation of the USSR after Munich 1938. This

latter is absolutely not the situation of the Soviet Union today.

Thus, in respect to both of the alternatives summarily treated just above, it may be granted that some disoriented elements around the Politburo might seriously entertain either or a combination of the options, but the majority of the Soviet apparatus is simply not capable of tolerating either.

The third alternative is the most intriguing. It is, in a sense, a variant of the Hitler-Stalin pact syndrome, and would represent a major blunder by the Soviet leadership; but it is the sort of blunder which the Soviet apparatus more broadly is capable of tolerating.

The question of the margin of a Soviet war-winning capability is not clearly settled, at least to the best of our knowledge of all the available literature and oral reports available to us on the subject. Indeed, this question could not be settled decisively on a purely military basis in any case. As Vietnam most recently and emphatically illustrates, the question of the final margin of war-winning capability in depth is fundamentally a political question. In any case, whether or not the Soviet leadership perceives itself as possessing a significant margin of war-winning capability, the vacillator will always tend to opt to wait a bit, to build up yet a bit more of the favorable margin before committing his forces to war. The potential compromise position between the "softs" and the "hards" within and around the Politburo would therefore tend to be a grand deception operation, whose principal specific features would be an intent to throw the Carter forces somewhat off-balance psychologically and to gain time for war-preparations.

Technically, as a national Soviet policy, such a grand deception tactic has certain grounds on which to seem to succeed. Technological new dimensions in war-winning capability are either in or approximately at the implementation and deployment phase. They would continue, although discreetly, pending some "SALT III" to presumably cover these areas (e.g., such as the Rudakov and similar Soviet areas of research). From the narrowest, nationalist point of view, the grand deception operation would be directed to permitting the Soviets to make a confrontation at a time of their own future choosing, taking advantage of the Carter energy and related policies to weaken USA and NATO war-fighting capabilities relative to the Warsaw Pact. I could place myself in the position of a Soviet leader and envisage the technical competence of such a policy taken in and for itself.

Such a grand deception operation unfortunately tends to correlate with the political shortcomings of the Soviet leadership, and in fact assures thermonuclear war.

This is no time for grand-deception operations by anyone. The only effective policy for avoidance of general war for this period has the following essential elements: (1) A recognition that the *ancien regime* of Chase Manhattan and its puppets and political allies is

irreversibly committed, like the Hitler regime of 1938, to policies of bluff and actual general war, and hence only a deliberate wrecking of the monetarist power of Chase Manhattan et al. can prevent general war; (2) That the potential political and economic correlation of forces to break Chase Manhattan et al. exists, and hence war is essentially preventable by those — and only those — specific means; (3) That, as 1973 demonstrates, the crucial question is the task of educating the wilful impulses for practice of the anti-Chase Manhattan global forces around a correct and coherently presented strategic policy.

Thus, either of the three mooted, alternative Soviet policy turns would and must represent a Soviet commitment to near-term general thermonuclear war — whether by intention or blunder. Soviet concessions to Carter represent a Soviet withdrawal from all effective peace strategies and thus reduce Soviet options to early thermonuclear war.

Characteristic Weaknesses of the Politburo

During the approximate 60 years since the October 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, Soviet perceptions of Communist political strategies for Western Europe and elsewhere have been predominantly a failure. It is nonsense, of course, to speak of Eastern European nations as Soviet “captive nations,” but is also true that the Red Army created the indispensable preconditions for the establishment of socialist governments in those states. The case of Cuba and other Soviet-oriented varieties of socialist governments in the developing sector have evolved as a consequence of the same general sort of special conditions which produced the Bolshevik Revolution. Under the reign of lower Manhattan “American Century” monetarists, the full potential for capitalist forms of industrial and related development in those developing nations required nationalization of lower Manhattan-linked national firms, and an orientation toward the Soviet economy in response to lower Manhattan’s economic-warfare reprisals against the pertinent national economy.

With some exceptions, which represent a bumptious political minority within Politburo and related circles, the Soviet insight into political processes is significantly inferior to that of the period of Lenin’s leadership of the young Soviet republic. There are many contributing reasons for this continued political primitiveness of the Soviet leadership overall, for which 60 years of combined “containment,” invasions and persisting threats of war are the most significant. The political bankruptcy of the Communist International of the 1930s and its post-war heirs in the capitalist sector has aided in preventing Soviet leaders from developing a competent, sensuously-premised comprehension of the organic realities of the global political process as a truly political process. Hence, the characteristically predominant Politburo regression to state *realpolitik* under conditions of stress.

This is complemented by a kind of national paranoia among Soviet leading circles. They are predominately detached from any sensuous perception of the internal realities of the “outside world,” more so than the leaderships of Eastern European states and parties. The

“outside world” is for most of them a world of “strangers,” in which prospective allies and adversaries alike are deemed essentially untrustworthy and so forth.

This “national paranoia” feeds Oblomovist currents among Soviet leaders — for which the current shift in Soviet manifest posture is a characteristic expression: the official view of the Carter Administration prominent in recent issues of *Pravda* and *Izvestia* reveals Oblomov wildly fantasizing in his bed with the covers pulled entirely over his head.

This politically conservative Oblomovism pervading much of the Soviet leading circles has nurtured a kind of para-Trotskyist delusion among especially the Atlanticist utopian political-military factions, a utopianism for which the lunatic Zbigniew Brzezinski and the Naderite warmonger James R. Schlesinger are, together with cautious warhawk (“dawk”) Paul Warnke, notable expressions. They have seized upon those features of Trotsky’s analysis which they choose to excerpt for this purpose. Such miscalculations lead directly and quickly into general thermonuclear war.

The Soviet leadership’s Oblomovism does not extent to the sensuous perception of tangible self interests of the Soviet state itself. Any direct threat to the perceived fundamental strategic defense capabilities of the Soviet Union pushes Oblomov out of bed, racing to the nearest red button. On this point, the lunatic USA utopians adduce from the 1962 missiles crisis experience only what they wishfully choose to adduce. Threaten to set fire to Oblomov’s bed and Oblomov becomes very secretive and disposed to prompt corrective action.

Whatever Mr. Schlesinger, Mr. Harriman, and their friends imagine to be the operative political combinations in the Soviet leadership, whatever delusions may momentarily reign in the Soviet leadership majority, what both Messrs. Harriman and Schlesinger refuse to acknowledge — according to our direct several discussions with them on this point, both directly and through suitable intermediaries — is that the present operational policy commitments of the Carter Administration must soon kick the tripwire which awakens Oblomov to the fact that a pyromaniac is preparing to set fire to his bed.

The follies of current manifest Soviet policy-turns and the coordinate insanities of the Carter administration are that their respective, *fey* illusions commit both to an inevitable early thermonuclear holocaust.

The Imminent Scenario

The Carter administration is immediately committed to breaking the back of its Western European and Japanese opponents by an early-March Middle East scenario which is most emphatically focused against Saudi Arabia, and which cuts off Western Europe’s and Japan’s major energy supplies. This is in general, a replay of the 1973 scenario by which Rockefeller et al. played upon vacillations among Europeans and Arabs to the effect of breaking up Euro-Arab anti-depression negotiations of the 1971-1973 period.

If such a Middle East scenario succeeded, and if Europe and the developing sector therefore submitted to a variant of the Schachtian-fascist International Resources Bank cartelization hoax, the Soviets would be

“geopolitically” isolated, and unavoidably committed to an early thermonuclear war. That Middle East crisis would be the “lesson” which educated the Politburo, and impelled the Soviet leadership toward a war-fighting commitment. Strategically, such a commitment would then be correct, because all alternatives to war had been eliminated.

To the extent that Secretary Brezhnev is prepared to play a Munich 1938 Neville Chamberlain to Mr. Carter’s Hitler, the March consolidation of the indicated terms of “SALT II” make World War III imminently inevitable. However, at the moment, such a development is not inevitable; if the CMEA proceeds aggressively to aid Western Europe and leading Arab and other developing-sector forces in consolidating a new, gold-based monetary system linked to the transferable ruble, such action would collapse Chase Manhattan Bank, and thus invalidate the premise of the Carter administration’s presently operational confrontationist policy.

This alternative, this actual road to world peace, is what the Brezhnev leadership is ostensibly incompetent to perceive. If it perceives such political alternatives, it lacks conviction in such matters under stress. Hence, either the Soviet Politburo quickly dumps the Arbatov-Bovin-Kuznetsov idiocies, or Western Europe takes independent preemptive initiative in the matter, or by March of this year the world will be poised on the brink of

an essentially unpreventable general war.

Those leading USA and other circles who choose to breathe a sigh of relief at the appearances of Politburo gutlessness and ignorance thus place themselves in the same category as those foolish English people who hailed Neville Chamberlain’s 1938 return from Munich.

Then, perhaps, the world is too cowardly and stupid, in respect of the present leading forces of most nations, to survive? Only the Labor Party and relatively few strategic co-thinkers in various leading circles inside and outside the USA show the combination of perception and firmness of will to get us out of the most hideous mess the human race has faced in its recorded history. We shall quickly discover what other forces have sufficient intelligence and courage to associate themselves openly with the U.S. Labor Party. If they do not, they show themselves inadequate in combinations of intelligence and will to survive.

Meanwhile, it should be no mystery why the Labor Committees developed necessarily at arm’s length from the ideology and influence of the Communist parties. The best Communists have amiable intentions, but lack, as organizations, the independent qualities of intelligence and will to cope effectively with the principal political and economic complexities of this present time. Such Communists’ ineptitude is the aggravating element in the growing war danger.

EXCLUSIVE

National Security Council Sets Up Task Force For Middle East War

Jimmy Carter’s National Security Council began drawing up plans this week to meet the European-Arab Dialogue with a political-military show of force by the United States, Israel, and Iran.

According to sources on Capitol Hill, a National Security Council (NSC) task force for a Middle East war is being assembled by White House energy czar James Schlesinger and NSC Director Zbigniew Brzezinski. The chief target of the NSC — whose membership is almost entirely composed of the Rockefeller family’s Trilateral Commission — is to disrupt, by threats and if necessary by force, the spreading array of trade and financial arrangements among Western Europe, the Arabs, and the socialist countries to dump the U.S. dollar. The centerpiece of these efforts is the pending nationalization of the giant Arabian-American Oil Company (Aramco) by the government of Saudi Arabia.

The takeover of Aramco by Saudi Arabia, an action which has drawn support from diverse political forces in Europe, Japan, and the United States, would free as much as 10 million barrels of oil per day to fuel world development. At present, that vast volume of oil production is under the tight control of the four Aramco partners — Exxon, Mobil, Texaco, and Socal. Should the

Saudis finalize the nationalization, a host of European state-owned oil firms, British and Japanese companies, and U.S. independent refining and marketing companies would have unrestricted access to Saudi crude oil. In addition, the *political* power wielded by the Rockefeller family and the New York banks through their control of Aramco production would be destroyed, and Exxon and its sisters virtually eliminated as a major factor in the world oil market.

According to sources on Capitol Hill, when Frank Zarb, then head of the Federal Energy Agency, toured the Middle East late last year, he became alarmed at the thought that the political control of Aramco’s vast oil resources would pass into Saudi hands. He recommended that the U.S. take action, but President Ford refused. Now, the source reported, the Carter regime — Schlesinger and Brzezinski — is planning to throw the entire muscle of the NSC and the State Department behind an effort to halt the nationalization.

Showdown In March?

According to the best estimates, the Carter Administration has set a four-week fuse on the Middle East powderkeg. Pentagon sources report that before leaving