

involved to benefit from a more even distribution of supply.

“The development of electricity production with the proposed supplementary plan would amount to 10.5 percent a year between 1975 and 1985, compared to only 7 percent with the already existing government plan, and would increase the possibilities of improving the standard of living by 20 percent (increase the minimum wage and wages, decrease the duration of labor, and progression of social benefits, while the supplementary 20 percent rate of economic expansion would allow unemployment to be absorbed . . . .

“The UOGC believes that the extraordinary rapidity of amortization (in the nuclear energy field), unprecedented in the economic history of our country, can only incite the public authorities to the most rapid possible implementation of the proposed nuclear program . . . . The amortization must be achieved through classical methods of fiscal administration, and the energy produced must be sold at the resulting marginal cost of production. This will benefit the economy of the country — and permit it to move back to a level of internal production ranking it second or third in the world . . . .”

## French Nuclear Official Blasts U.S. Approach To Nonproliferation

*At its January 1977 meeting in Tokyo, the Trilateral Commission formally recommended a world-wide, three-year moratorium on the development of nuclear fast breeder and reprocessing technologies. The U.S. Carter Administration had called for such a policy to halt the transfer of technologies it alleges will aid in the proliferation of nuclear weapons by countries which now lack that capability. This U.S. Administration policy has been sharply denounced by leading nuclear experts and governments around the world, including André Giraud, the president of the French Atomic Energy Commission (CEA), whose speech before a recent Trilateral Commission meeting in Bonn, West Germany is excerpted below. Although Giraud did not speak for the CEA, his remarks accurately reflect the public policy position of the French government.*

During the recent London “Summit” meeting, the heads of States and Governments of the seven main industrialized countries have thus defined their policy in the final communiqué:

“Increasing reliance will have to be placed on nuclear energy, to satisfy growing energy requirements and to help diversify sources of energy. This should be done with the utmost precaution, with respect to the generation and dissemination of material that can be used for nuclear weapons. Our objective is to meet the world’s energy needs and to make peaceful use of nuclear energy widely available, while avoiding the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons. We also agree that, in order to be effective, non-proliferation policies should as far as possible be acceptable to both industrialized and developing countries alike.”

You will notice that, in so doing, our governments have committed themselves to select a policy fostering at the same time the aims of nonproliferation and the development of nuclear energy. For us, it is out of the question to jeopardize this development, for two reasons:

- The first one derives from the energy supply situation of most European countries, which cannot accept to see their economy become increasingly dependent upon oil producing countries, and risk to face first an unbearable unbalance of their external trade, and then

strangulation when oil will no longer be produced in sufficient quantities either because of normal exhaustion of natural resources, or due to insufficient investments, or to the decision of a cartel or even of a single country.

- The second reason is linked to our concern about world stability. The experts recently assembled in Istanbul have unanimously agreed that the comparison between provisions on oil demand and supply demonstrates that an unprecedented world energy crisis is due for tomorrow, and not for the day after.

To overcome that crisis, the world must urgently mobilize all its means of action, among which nuclear energy must play an essential and large part. Our world, where ideologies, racisms, rich and starving populations are face to face, is not organized to afford, in peace, an energy rationing — and it would be useless, in order to preserve this peace, to have reduced the risks of proliferation, by means which would simultaneously increase the risks of tensions and world conflagration.

We have even the duty — the European countries are unanimous on this point — to prepare without any delay the conversion to fast breeder reactors in order to avoid the waste of uranium reserves. The energy policy of the next 20 or 50 years cannot rely on a mere gamble. The reserves taken into account must certainly be estimated at a level widely superior to the quantities discovered until now. But in this respect, we have to limit our wishful thinking to what is estimated by the majority of experts. One must remember that the construction of fast breeder reactors can only follow by several years the construction of the first generation reactors, which supply them with the necessary plutonium. Their development is the responsibility of the industrialized countries in which they will normally be built for many years....

We consider that a nonproliferation policy to be efficient must be realistic, or more precisely that it must not be unrealistic. It cannot be based on the fact that only the big industrialized countries control or will control uranium, know-how and money. Nor is it realistic to imagine that the considerable investments which have been made already to develop a certain cycle of nuclear

energy will be abandoned without at least major and agreed upon reasons. Neither is it realistic to imagine that certain countries will jeopardize their vital interests (such as, in the case for Europe, the concern about energy supply) or even, more generally, their dignity and the marks of their present or future sovereignty.

The fight against proliferation of nuclear weapons must, on the contrary, respect if possible these factual elements, and rely on a combination of technical, institutional and political provisions....

In that respect, the European countries consider as unacceptable the recent demands of certain uranium producing countries which seem to have flirted with the idea of forming a political cartel. Not because they require commitments on peaceful utilizations (this is quite natural) but because they went beyond the international rules of nonproliferation to decide, in place of the European governments concerned, the use that will be made of uranium in the energy balance of their countries. How is it possible not to see that such a blackmail on uranium — if I may say so — would constitute the

most decisive incentive, if it was needed, towards reprocessing and fast breeder reactors? Similarly some countries, among which France, feel that the system called "full fuel cycle safeguards" which uses nuclear cooperation as a means to oblige a country to put under international safeguards even the activities it has developed by itself will lead such a country to develop its whole program on a purely national basis, that is, free of any safeguards; this will increase the risk of proliferation in that country and in others.

Finally, one cannot hope that the countries will accept some restrictions and let their vital interests depend on a foreign country or on an international organization, if they do not have the absolute certainty that promises made to that effect will be fulfilled. They will not trust promises for the future if promises made in the past are not respected. The success of a nonproliferation policy requires that agreements are not renegotiated under pressure. The present evolution of the international situation does not appear to us, from that point of view, quite encouraging.