

sharp increase in the danger of a nuclear missile catastrophe.”...

By showing Carter how concerned it is about Brzezinski's views, it may persuade the president that his national security adviser is a good man to have around for more reasons than all the obvious ones. If Brzezinski is the hard-liner that the Russians take him to be, and if he has the influence on the president that they suspect he has, then the diplomatic and strategic game is played for higher stakes than it otherwise would be. In a game for higher stakes the United States, with the greater resources behind it, is the more likely winner — so long as the game is kept to conventional stakes, and stays away from the nuclear ones.

Washington Post, editorial, “The Aircraft Sales: Why Now?,” Feb. 16:

...President Carter were wise, in our view, to make it a package deal.

Whether he has struck precisely the right military

balance, nobody can say with certainty. But our hunch is that the military effect of these transactions may be of less importance than their psychological and diplomatic effect. And this brings us to the question of whether the timing was right. The announcement of a wholly new sort of American arms sale to Egypt and Saudi Arabia, coupled with sales to Israel that were considerably below that country's requests, was bound to unhinge the Israelis at a particularly delicate moment. Israel and its supporters in this country had already sensed what seemed to them to be a sharp swing in American public opinion—and in the sentiment of American policymakers—in the general direction of President Sadat. For that reason it might have been more sensible to delay all three sales until there was more evidence that the negotiating process set in motion at Jerusalem had been gotten more firmly back on the track. Instead, the arms sales have given symbolic confirmation to Israel's worst fears....

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Pravda Cites Problems In Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

Pravda on Feb. 11 carried a full-page statement on the status of the SALT negotiations between the U.S. and the USSR. In addition to its opening and concluding summary statements, the Pravda article commented in detail on most of the issues and weapons directly involved in the negotiations. The most important of these comments are included in the excerpted and condensed translation from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service which follows.

It seemed that the go-ahead had been finally given for these great and important matters. However, as the facts show, this development of events is not to the liking of forces in the United States who are not pleased with the positive development of Soviet-American relations and are constantly trying to retard or even wreck altogether the accord on strategic arms limitation. They are stubbornly striving to make this question the subject of an acute domestic political struggle in the United States. The opponents of the agreement became particularly active when prospects for concluding it emerged.

These forces operate in various ways. Figures, particularly high-ranking retired military men, “specialist theorists” on strategic issues, bodies like the so-called “Committee on the Present Danger,” and certain press organs playing the role of direct advocates for the Pentagon and the military-industrial complex, openly oppose any arms limitation agreements with the USSR and are urging the buildup of military efforts and the securing of military supremacy over the USSR. Manipulating the thesis of the defense of U.S. “national security interests,” they are shamelessly concocting something like

scenarios for waging nuclear war: waging, not preventing, war. They are calculating how many nuclear warheads and bombs would be needed for a strike against such-and-such a country. The people want peace and stable detente, but these men are pondering what else to invent to destroy people.

The opponents of detente in the United States have no interest in peace. Essentially they are also acting at variance with their own country's vital interests, no matter how much they might expatiate to the contrary....

In addition to the open opponents of an agreement on limiting strategic arms, there are also figures in the United States who do not appear to oppose an agreement directly but who in fact strive by every means to erect more and more obstacles to its conclusion. All this is done on the outwardly decent pretext of trying to “retouch” or “improve” the agreement. True, when the government fails, in their opinion, to heed their arguments sufficiently, these figures do cast aside their masks and start accusing it openly of being too “soft” and “compliant” toward the Soviet Union at the talks. Then even the outward difference between them and the open opponents of an agreement disappears.

They would like to “retouch” the agreement being worked out in such a way as to undermine the fundamental principle of equality and identical security for the sides and to obtain clear advantages for the United States to the detriment of the Soviet Union's security. Or, if that proves impossible, they at least want to further delay and complicate the reaching of an agreement.

The Soviet side has repeatedly stressed that there must be no illusions that the USSR will accept limitations which give one-sided advantages to the United States. Those American figures who try to instill in public opinion the idea that unacceptable agreement terms can be imposed on the Soviet Union are doing their people a real disservice....

It is necessary to lay particular stress on the dangerous nature of attempts to leave loopholes so that cruise

missiles can be deployed on the territory of other countries — the United States' NATO allies first and foremost. This question is part of an overall problem of insuring that the agreement worked out completely excludes the possibility of strategic arms being handed over to third countries, or of the agreement's being circumvented through the agency of third countries. The sides must adopt unequivocal commitments on this score. If this does not happen, the viability of the agreement will likewise be reduced to nothing....

Another question constantly exaggerated by certain circles in the United States in connection with the new agreement is the question of monitoring its observance....

The present arguments about the supposed unreliability of monitoring are aimed at casting doubt on the system adopted by the sides for monitoring by means of each side's national technical facilities — a system which has reliably proved its worth. The implementation of existing accords in the strategic arms limitation sphere has proved conclusively that these monitoring facilities fully serve their purpose. This is entirely applicable to the new agreement as well....

Thus the fantasies about the "unreliability" of monitoring are designed for uninformed people and — and this is the main thing — are deliberately aimed at sowing doubts about the agreement as a whole.

It is necessary to dwell separately on the question of new types of strategic armaments and the modernization of existing systems. The opponents of an agreement have raised an outcry about these issues, attempting to make out that the American side is here putting forward far-

reaching "radical" proposals while the Soviet Union is not prepared to make such a decision. There is just one aim — to distort and defame the Soviet position....

The U.S. position on the issue of modernizing existing strategic armaments is based on the same aims. Once again some people would like to "retouch" the previously agreed clauses of the treaty in such a way as to limit arbitrarily certain Soviet weapons systems while leaving the United States with complete freedom regarding a whole series of components of strategic forces. The adoption of these proposals would mean in practice that the agreements would not only fail to limit the qualitative race in strategic armaments but, on the contrary, would impart great new impetus to it....

Nor must it be forgotten that the United States is creating more and more means of mass destruction, including the neutron weapon. The Soviet Union has submitted proposals on the general prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction and also on the mutual renunciation of the production of neutron weapons specifically. We will resolutely strive for the implementation of these proposals....

It is useful to mention all this again in connection with the situation which is taking shape in the United States at this time concerning the question of the conclusion of the new agreement. The American and world public must be clearly aware that those who are trying to wreck or delay the conclusion of the agreement are acting directly against the interests of strengthening peace and security and are setting the scene for a new spiral in the race for the most dangerous means of warfare which can only have one outcome — a sharp increase in the danger of a nuclear missile catastrophe.

Carter Moves To Break Coal Strike Deadlock

President Carter moved this week to take charge of the chaotic coal strike negotiations before a deadlock caused major shutdowns of the U.S. industrial heartland.

Following the rejection last weekend of a tentative contract by the bargaining committee of the United Mineworkers union, the President ordered the coal operators and the UMW back to the bargaining table — in the White House and under the supervision of Labor Secretary Ray Marshall. Carter, despite what one source described as "intense behind-the-scenes pressure" by Energy Secretary James Schlesinger to use his powers under the Taft-Hartley act to "end" the strike, has reaffirmed several times during the week his belief that the dispute must be settled by "free collective bargaining."

It is widely recognized that invoking the Taft-Hartley bill will in no way alleviate the coal shortages in the Midwest, and will likely lead only to more violence.

The Chance for Solution

The President's action opens up the way for a quick settlement of the strike and offers a chance to return

stability to the nation's coal fields — stability that was destroyed by a 15-year, British-inspired conspiracy that ran the once mighty UMW through a "left-wing union democracy" meatgrinder. (see *EIR* Vol IV, No. 52, Dec. 26, 1977).

Sources close to the White House report that the President's actions are being taken to avoid allowing the coal strike to destroy the U.S. economy; these sources indicate that Carter's circle of advisors is becoming increasingly aware that the prolonged coal strike is being used by anti-U.S., antidollar monetary interests to help trigger runs on the dollar on the international money markets. Any policy to restore strength to the dollar must include a quick ending of the coal strike.

The intervention, far from being the act of desperation that the East Coast press is portraying, has been calculated to achieve the maximum impact and have the maximum chance for success.

The President's action is part of a coordinated attack by industry-linked political forces, especially in the Midwest, against the efforts by Institute for Policy