

The Dossier San Maco, Part II

Kissinger, Terrorism And The 'Nixon Plan'

Exclusive to the
Executive Intelligence Review

The Executive Intelligence Review this week reprints the second and concluding installment of a document originally published in 1974 in the Italian magazine *Il Settimanale* and presented in the EIR for the first time in English. The contents of this document have been "overlooked" ever since by the Italian and international press and intelligence community. Now, they must be urgently underlined because they provide precious corroborating evidence that the current efforts of Henry A. Kissinger and his comrades and dupes to set the United States on a collision course with the Soviet Union are a replay of what occurred in early 1974 — to the identical end of undermining the actual national interests of every western nation involved.

"Dossier San Marco," as explained by *Il Settimanale*'s introduction at the time of its publication, was nominally authored by one Guido Giannettini, an Italian journalist. Giannettini was in fact working with French intelligence as an interface with that wing of Italian military intelligence (SID) characterized by the cited Captain La Bruna and General Maletti. In turn, this wing of the SID is the intelligence arm of the Italian political faction most easily identified with current Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti and a corresponding grouping in the Vatican.

What is unique about the Giannettini "Dossier" is its attempt to independently document, particularly in the later sections of the report, the international political fight generated by the commitment of American circles around then Secretary of State William Rogers and the Nixon Administration for a divestiture of British "spoiler" capabilities. What has subsequently become known as the "Rogers Plan" was identified in the Dossier San Marco as the "Nixon Plan." The document correctly takes the Nixon Administration strategy of using a planned massive capital-export approach as the key to solving the Middle East and other conflicts around the globe through economic development, as the determining international phenomenon for which the 1968-1974 wave of terrorism and government destabilizations was the classic response by the opposing forces.

Unlike, therefore, the "analyses" now current in the British and British-allied press that terrorism is an arm of the so-called East-West fight between "capitalism" and "socialism," the Dossier San Marco correctly — if sometimes too implicitly — dispels such "left versus right" myths. It gets down to the real issue of growth

factions versus feudalist rentier factions as the game-masters of the international arena.

The Giannettini document has a special relevance today because of the light it sheds on the activities of Henry A. Kissinger. As recounted in the recently issued Campaigner Special Report, "Expel Britain's Kissinger for Treason," it was in 1973-1974 that Henry Kissinger on behalf of and in collaboration with British Secret Intelligence Services washed down the drain the Rogers Plan for Mideast peace and supplanted Secretary of State Rogers. The result was the Yom Kippur war of October 1973, the provoked "Arab Oil Embargo" with its disastrous consequences on the western and developing economies, and the toppling of every major government which had been collaborating in the Rogers Plan efforts — including Italy's and that of the United States, through the Kissinger-orchestrated Watergate operation.

In 1974 then Minister of Defense Giulio Andreotti, who is now Italian Prime Minister, temporarily suspended the State Secrets Act to allow the Dossier's contents to be made public.

Of all the obvious flaws of the Dossier San Marco, the most significant is one which New Solidarity International Press Service and the EIR have corrected in depth in numerous locations over the recent period, i.e. the failure to identify Britain specifically as the controller of what are otherwise clearly "flunkeys," such as former West German Chancellor, Social Democrat Willy Brandt. In the Dossier, Brandt, together with Israeli intelligence (Mossad) and the like, is presented as the "mastermind" of the international deployment against the Rogers Plan. In Giannettini's schema the British government and intelligence networks figure as merely another part of the international conspiracy.

There is little question that this could have been an oversight on the part of those French intelligence networks which in fact commissioned the writing of the Dossier San Marco. On the contrary. The Gaullist faction of French intelligence knows precisely who runs such nonentities as Willy Brandt and such British creations as Israeli intelligence.

Nonetheless, despite the political decision made by its authors to leave a certain measure of "cover" in the story, the resulting document is unique, outside of the U.S. Labor Party and allied publications, in identifying the most important networks and individuals determining world events in that period, and identifying them as belonging to one of two camps which are not determined by any left versus right mythology.

Behind the Putsch of 1970

Following the changes that intervened in September 1969 in the plans of the international centers of agitation after the failure of the Czech operation, the British and Israeli services planned an operation — which can be conveniently called “Operation 3947” — tending to reinforce Western and Israeli positions in Europe and in the Mediterranean....The objectives of “Operation 3947” are still unknown, except for the following two:

(1) To reduce and possibly to scrap the defect of naval inferiority of Israel in confrontations with her adversaries, recovering five “Sa’ar” sentry missile launchers blockaded at Cherbourg by the French embargo, and at the same time accelerating construction of new “Reshef” sentry missile launchers in Israeli shipyards.

(2) To reinforce the Western and Israeli strategic-political situation in the Mediterranean, destroying the Italian regime (very weak in confrontations with the left) by means of a military coup d’etat.

Among the principal bodies involved with “Operation 3947” were: the British DI-6 service (Defence Intelligence 6), operating principally out of the Embassy in Rome...; the Israeli military information service AMAN (Agaf Modlin); liberal circles allied to the Great Unified Lodge of England and the Great National Lodge of Italian Masonry; the British banks Hambros and Barclays.

For the second objective of “Operation 3947” (changing the Italian regime) collaboration with the following circles was discovered: the “National Front” of Junio Valerio Borghese; “Avanguardia Nazionale” which belonged to Borghese’s “Front”; military circles, and veteran organizations.

Elements of the U.S. and German military services (*DIA — the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, and MAD — Militarischer Abschirmdienst — NSIPS*) also participated in preparations for the putsch.

During the second half of 1970, contacts between Interior Ministry circles controlled by AR Office were stabilized with the men of the putsch. The head of the AR office channeled a doctor, Drago, known as a right-winger...and pledged in favor of the putsch. Yet, his intentions were exactly the opposite...thus it was through that complicity promised, and not maintained, that ultimately, on the night of December 7-8, 1970, he permitted a squad of Valerio Borghese to penetrate from under ground, the offices of the Interior Ministry (Palazzo del Viminale) and to occupy it with the collaboration of Interior personnel.

Secret meetings in Rome on December 5-6, 1970 had determined to actuate the putsch on the night of December 7-8. According to some sources, the conspirators, whether politicians or military, were induced to blame the action on the AR Office, which led them to believe they had the cover of the Interior Minister, Restivo — the only one in the dark up to March 17, 1971 — of members of the government and State administration, of President Saragat and the United States government. The maneuver intended to acquire

precise proof so as to blame the right wing and military circles. This was not only part of a Socialist political game, but also fed into the traditional rivalry of the police with respect to the Carabinieri and the AR Office, with respect to the SID.

As has been noted, the putsch rapidly receded when the participants found out about the double game of the Interior Ministry, and the lack of cooperation in the political and military spheres.

It is thus rather disconcerting to reveal that the news of the failed putsch, in all its details, was known to political and journalistic circles by December 8-10, 1970, as well as to police and security services, and yet was not divulged until March 17, 1971....

Then, after three months of absolute silence, the March 17, 1971 Communist afternoon daily in Rome, *Paese Sera*, broke the story of the failed coup d’etat in December, maintaining a certain equivocation about the data to make it appear that the danger made it incumbent upon the left to mobilize itself to “defend republican legality.” Massive arrests and searches in right-wing circles were begun, and Interior Minister Restivo...received the text of an official declaration containing the government’s theses, just minutes before having to testify before Parliament and answer accusations from the left opposition Deputies.

The partial elections of June 13, 1971 were only three months away, and in this sense the provocative maneuver against the right succeeded perfectly.

At the beginning of 1971, some British and Israeli circles who had attended to “Operation 3947” made contact again over Italy, asking this time for a legal operation to move the axis of the country toward the right via massive support of the (*Mussolinian — NSIPS*) MSI in the partial elections of June 13, 1971, and in the succeeding elections of May 7, 1972....

The principal circles operant in this were the British DI-6...the Israeli military information service AMAN; the British banks Hambros and Barclays; circles in the Israeli government, among them General Moshe Dayan, Itzhak (*sic*) Rabin and Arig Sharon; and elements in the NATO command, principally in AFSOUTH (Allied Forces Southern Europe).

To these were joined American circles in the position of exercising influence on the DC right and on local power groups in Sicily, a key point in the partial elections of June 13, 1971.

The results of the maneuver were the following:

- June 13, 1971 — clamorous electoral success of the MSI
- December 24, 1971 — election of Giovanni Leone to the Presidency of the Italian republic.
- February 2, 1972 — Giulio Andreotti charged with the formation of a center government (in reality, center-right).
- March 13, 1972 — Admiral Gino Birindelli, of NATO Command, Joins MSI.

Behind The “Black Clues”

Between the end of 1971 and the beginning of 1972, the operation to move Italy’s political axis toward the right ran aground as some of the forces involved withdrew and

other forces intervened in a contrary sense. This led to the reshaping of the electoral success of the MSI-DN (*Movimento Sociale Italiano-Destra Nazionale — NSIPS*) and the total inversion of the rightist tendency with a movement toward the left.

The origin of this radical change can be found in the Nixon plan for the Mediterranean, and above all in negative reactions that such a plan provoked among the political forces damaged by it.

The Nixon plan for the Mediterranean, elaborated at the end of 1971 and the beginning of 1972, was designed to avert the threatened embargo of Arab-supplied oil, towards the adoption of a new American policy, to be gradually actuated in the following phases:

(1) Creation of a Mediterranean alliance allied to the United States but pro-Arab, formed of Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey.

(2) Increased economic intervention by the United States in Arab countries, including those directly involved in the conflict with Israel, like Egypt (as for example, concession to the U.S. of the construction of the Samed oil pipeline, Suez-Alexandria, and the October 1, 1973 vigil in the fourth Arab-Israeli war).

(3) Assumption of a political line equidistant from confrontation in the Middle East conflict and from collaboration with the USSR to conclude peace in the region.

The Nixon plan collided against five principal obstacles:

(1) The interests of the State of Israel or an important part of its ruling class; (2) The political line and prestige of Henry Kissinger, which had been seriously eroded in November 1972, with Nixon's risk taken on the occasion of a peace settlement in Vietnam (which was a real presidential attempt to redimension the embarrassing security affairs advisor); (3) The political line of the CIA faction operating on the left; (4) The line of Jewish and pro-Jewish Americans and foreigners; (5) The interests of China principally in relation to reflections on the political-strategic situation in Asia and the Indian Ocean.

As a consequence, countermoves destined to provoke the failure of the Nixon plan for the Mediterranean were put into operation, based on two principal operations within the United States, and in the Mediterranean area.

The internal U.S. operation consisted of the mounting of the Watergate affair, towards which the best presidential advisors were sacrificed; Henry Kissinger received exceptional powers; and which impelled Republican Party leaders to present him as a White House candidate in the next elections.

In the Mediterranean area, the reaction to the Nixon plan especially interested Italy, a key country in the projected regional alliance.

In fact, the best way to provoke the failure of the projected Mediterranean alliance foreseen in the Nixon plan was to block every move to turn the Italian political axis toward the right, but to turn it instead toward the left. Only an Italy turned toward the left would have refused the projected alliance with "fascist" countries like Spain, Greece and Turkey. And an alliance without Italy remained practically unrealizable.

To carry out such a maneuver it was necessary to launch the left and above all its actively involved

groups, like the PSI and the extraparliamentarians and to sustain their propaganda campaigns, especially the launching of the so-called "black clues," the most effective way to make difficulties for the right.

The other obstacle in a left change was represented by the armed forces, generally well disposed toward the right; and the armed forces were aimed at in the advanced stages of the maneuver.

In brief, the operation began according to the following schema:

(1) The Israeli Command and AMAN were induced to progressively reduce their support of the Italian right from the beginning of 1972; (2) The Americans and British did likewise; (3) Gioglio Almirante and the leadership of the MSI-DN were induced to conduct a low-profile electoral campaign for May 7, 1972, not presenting themselves as an alternative to the regime; (4) the Israeli Mossad assumed (and not only for motives concerning the Italian situation) the control over the European extraparliamentary left (end of 1971) at the same time the West German services abandoned it; (5) The Mossad intervened at the base of left provocations on the so-called "black clues" printing them in rapid succession.

The other occurrence which greatly influenced, though indirectly, the Italian events was the Soviet-German Oreanda accord of August 1971. This was the basis for the Mossad's assumption of control over the European extraparliamentary left.

At Oreanda, in fact, Leonid Brezhnev induced West German Chancellor Willy Brandt to abandon a pro-Chinese line and support for the European extraparliamentary left. The exposure of the German services by the Mossad provoked a purge of members of the European extraparliamentary left who were not Trotskyist, or assimilable.

In particular, this purge included two operations to physically liquidate non-assimilable members of the extraparliamentary left as well. These were not executed by the Mossad, but by those tied to the German services in collaboration with the pro-Israel faction of the CIA.

The German services were otherwise interested in the disappearance of dangerous testimony on past collaboration between the European extraparliamentary left and the SPD of Willy Brandt. The two operations were:

(1) March 15, Feltrinelli at Segrate, near Milan. Feltrinelli was unrecoverable because of his contacts with Arab organizations, and because he was considered dangerous and manipulable, since he had left behind evidence that he was involved in the attacks of December 12, 1969; evidence that came to the attention of investigative bodies, like that represented by Commissioner Luigi Calabresi (that is, the political office of the Milan Police Department).

(2) June 1, 1972 — Neutralization of the RAF (*Rote Armee Fraktion — NSIPS*), better known as the B and M band (*the Baader-Meinhoff gang — NSIPS*), by the special brigade GSG 9 on orders from the West German Interior Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

The elimination of Commissioner Luigi Calabresi on

May 17, 1972, is tied to these events. Calabresi, in the weeks preceding his death, had been investigating the liquidation of Feltrinelli and the activities of the guerrilla organization he had formed, the BR-GAP (*Red Brigades* — *NSIPS*). His investigations had brought him to precise clues: the collaboration, in the recent past, of Brandt's SPD with the European extraparliamentary left, including Feltrinelli's BR-GAP, against which there was precise evidence of participation in the attacks of December 12, 1969.

This clue, if pursued to its end, would have rendered fatal the political instrumentation of the elements of the search as it emerged, producing the following results:

It would involve Brandt in a colossal scandal of international proportions; it would collapse the "black clues" campaign in Italy, and would radically overturn the political situation, provoking the end of the opening to the left.

He was dealing with a very high risk, as much for Germany as for the forces interested in Italy's turn toward the left. In short, the German services armed a professional killer, who May 17, 1972, killed Luigi Calabresi in Milan, in front of his house on Via Cherubini.

The liquidation of Calabresi eliminated one of the major obstacles to the indiscriminate exploitation of the "black clues." Calabresi, in fact investigated the BR-GAP, their activities and the forces behind them moving in the contest of the redirecting Italy to the left, and was also convinced of the left matrix of the attacks of December 12, 1969. His declarations, released on the same evening, were unequivocal: "It is toward this sector we must direct ourselves; extremism, but extremism of the left."

In the context of rendering practically impossible the Nixon plan for the Mediterranean, the Mossad launched two operations in Italy:

At the end of 1971 and the beginning of 1972, indirect operating contacts were stabilized with the interested circles involved in the "black clues" operation against the right and the armed forces, principally with the Socialist Party, the extraparliamentary left, the Veneto secret antifascist military center, the CIA structures operating in Italy in the same context, the AR Office and other circles in the Interior Ministry, the *Il Mondo* group (Pietro Sanavio) and the "Magistratura Democratica" group (Luigi Bianchi d'Espinosa, Giancarlo Stiz, Gerardo D'Ambrosio).

Between December, 1972, and January, 1973, a functionary in the Israeli Embassy in Rome, Bonney, made contact with right-wing press, attempting to induce them to make public and "blow" the news of the Mediterranean alliance foreseen in the Nixon plan.

While the second operation failed...the first was fully successful, making the second one superfluous. In fact, the loss of any initiative on the part of the right...as a result of the "black clues" campaign, made Italy unable to actuate the Nixon plan...dooming it to failure.

As the target of the "black clues" campaign, the extreme right group from Veneto headed by Freda was chosen. The principal motives were the following; many of the interested persons knew the Veneto circles well — Mariano Rumor, Luigi Bianchi D'Espinosa, Giancarlo

Stiz, Gerardo D'Ambrosio, the General of the secret antifascist military center, Captain L. Sartori, Juliano, Mangano, Sanavio (*Il Mondo*), Saviane (*L'Espresso*).

The attention of Commissioner Juliano was already pointed toward the Freda group; Freda was shown to have had anti-Jewish propaganda, organizing, among other things, a public demonstration in March 1969 at the Sala della Gran Guardia in Padua in collaboration with members of the Palestinian organization "Al-Fatah," and acquiring a stock of "timers" — without taking any precautions to preserve his incognito, which excludes his intention of using them personally for terrorist acts.

Freda was an infiltrator into the pro-Chinese Communist Party (PCdI), and in other extreme left circles, which infiltration was revealed by the Mossad, which was interested in Freda as anti-Israeli and pro-Arab....

From the end of 1971, at the point of the Mossad's infiltration into the operation, the "black clues" campaign became more intense, developing toward an incredible series of "coincidences" and aberrant episodes.

September 4, 1971 — Judge Gerardo D'Ambrosio asked to be put in charge of the investigation into the death of Giuseppe Pinelli; his request welcomed.

October 5, 1971 — Scarcely 20 days after obtaining control, D'Ambrosio accused Commissioners Calabresi and Allegre (the latter had requested authorization to search Feltrinelli's offices December 19, 1969) and other minor functionaries of the death of Pinelli. Never had the Italian magistracy proceeded with such promptness.

December 8, 1971 — Luigi Bianchi D'Espinosa took up the inquiry into the reconstitution of the fascist party, directly against the MSI.

December 15, 1971 — Judge Stiz and Carabinieri Captain L. "discovered" that the attacks of 1969 were not attributed to a "red clue" (the Valpreda group), but to a "black clue" instead, formed by a Padua lawyer (Freda) and a bookseller of Castelfranco Veneto (Ventura), who was arrested.

March 3, 1972 — Pino Rauti, national director of the MSI was arrested, but the charge did not stick and the investigators were forced to free him April 24, 1972.

March 15, 1972 — Feltrinelli's body found near Segrate, leading to the discovery of the BR-GAP organization that had carried out numerous terrorist acts...but after the physical elimination of Commissioner Calabresi, all the members of the organization arrested were freed, and all investigations ceased.

In spring, 1972, someone (probably men of Captain L.) secretly informed Stiz that the Triestian Judge Serbo was on the point of taking up the Freda case himself. Stiz within hours succeeded in transferring Judge D'Ambrosio from Milan; in fact, Stiz and L. considered Serbo a personal enemy (he had already caused one provocative maneuver to fail); however, he was not a leftist and not subject to manipulation.

In the spring of 1972, the Armed Command (of Padua) was dissolved, signaled by Yugoslav services — always informed by the secret antifascist military center at Veneto — because this would have been controlled by "fascist" elements.

May 17, 1972, Commissioner Calabresi was

Around the middle of 1972, the police participated in a scarcely credible maneuver, attempting to attribute to the extreme right (Gianni Nardi) the killing of Calabresi, but abandoning the trail soon after.

Near the end of 1972, and the beginning of 1973, the right-wing weekly *Candido* launched an inquiry in Germany into the "timers" used in attacks and found: (1) a signed and notarized declaration by the responsible person of the German manufacturer affirming that the number of "timers" used in the attacks and sold in Italy at the end of December 1969, was not 57 as claimed by the examining judge, but hundreds; (2) the photographic proof that the "timers" bought by Freda were different from those used in the December 12, 1969 attacks.

If these proofs confirmed Freda's testimony, about his consigning of 50 "timers" to "Al-Fatah" the examining judge took no notice of it....

Around February, 1973, "K" learned from confidential sources in Israeli services that said services collaborated in obtaining evidence of "black clues."

At the beginning of March 1973, someone close to Israeli services announced to "BH" a future extension of provocation maneuvers, citing names of persons who would be involved eight months later.

May 17, 197 — an agent provocateur of dubious past, easily manipulated, Gianfranco Bertoli, just after entering an Israeli kibbutz, threw a hand grenade of the Tzshal (*Israeli Defence Force — NSIPS*) at Prime Minister Rumor in Milan — on the occasion of a memorial service for Calabresi — after ascertaining that the Minister was out of range.

Less than three months later, August 12, 1973, Sergio Saviane recounted a...story in the pages of *L'Espresso*...that since the end of April, the Trotskyist journalist Sergio D'Asnash (of *ANSA*) had insisted...he foresaw Bertoli's attack before it took place...linking the Bertoli case to the "black clues" to make it more consistent and more credible.

In reality, in the middle of 1973, Judge D'Ambrosio connected in one context three persons of three completely different cases: (Freda, Martino and

Bertoli), thus extending the "black clues."

May 15, 1973 — Judge D'Ambrosio was involved in the "black clues" campaign as a witness — there were already 12 witnesses deceased under unclear circumstances; Giuseppe Pinelli, Cornelio Rolandi, Alberto Muraro, Vittorio Ambrosini, Armando Calzolari, Dante Baldari, Angelo Casile, Gianni Aricó, Annalisa Borth, Mario Della Savia, Edgardo Ginosi, Adriano Romualdi — a right-wing journalist, Guido Giannettini, noted for writing for military publications, consenting in some fashion to present himself to the left press as a "SID agent" and thus involving himself in the "black clues," the state security services and the armed forces.

October 15, 1973 — the chief of the political office of the Padua Police Department, Giosué Salomone, "discovered by chance" a 1969 dossier containing revelation of an attempted fascist plot.

November 12, 1973 — At Ortonovo in Lunigiana, an obscure element, easily subject to manipulation, Giampaolo Porta Casucci, produced a voluminous dossier on a supposed fascist-military coup d'etat possessed by the head of the mobile squadron at La Spezia, Rodolfo Venezia, a noted admirer of Israel and probably a collaborator of Mossad.

Dr. Venezia, without having time to examine the dossier, "intuited" that the plot was "connected" to Freda and transferred the case automatically to D'Ambrosio, who with amazing promptness linked Freda, Ventura, Merlino, Bertoli and Porta Casucci in a single context.

Thus, on December 14, 1973, Giampaolo Porta Casucci was freed without much noise, but the new "plot" of the "black clues" remained a success.

On January 6, 1974, the left newspapers renewed attacks against the Armed Forces, leaking arrests of officials as members of the new "plot"; on January 13, Lt. Colonel Amos Spiazzi was arrested.

On March 5, 1974, the magistracy exhumed the accusation against Gianni Nardi for the murder of Calabresi, with as yet minor credibility, which provoked skepticism even in the Communist press. (*End of memoir A.*)