

Carter's "split personality" during his statements underscores the faction fight which is still going on in and around the Administration. It is now clear that Brzezinski and his allies are attempting to suppress an intelligence community report demonstrating that Cuba and the Warsaw Pact had nothing to do with the Zaire invasion. At the same time, UN Ambassador Andrew Young is being increasingly vocal about the economic development-based alternative to confrontation politics in Africa.

Speaking on the CBS television program *Face the Nation* May 20, Young called the notion that a Cuban troop presence in an African country ipso facto represents a strategic threat to the U.S. "ridiculous." Young emphatically disassociated himself from recent moves by Brzezinski, the CIA's Stansfield Turner, and others to circumvent the Clark amendment. Said Young, "There's enough support in this country and in the Congress for us to do *openly* anything we want to do in Africa," and he emphasized "development assistance" as the type of "constructive action" which built African support for the U.S. Persistent efforts by CBS reporter Marvin Kalb, a Kissinger crony, to depict Young as "out of step with the Administration" — because he refused to agree that "the President's hands are tied" in the face of Soviet aggression — produced a headline in the *New York Times* the next day, "Young Voices Dissent on Policy in Africa."

Young quickly issued a statement, in coordination with the White House and State Department, emphasizing that "I was affirming our policy. I share the President's concern about the many legislative restrictions on foreign assistance . . ." Young went on to cite restrictions on aid to the *governments* of Mozambique and Angola as a focus of concern, and to reiterate his support for an open U.S. Africa policy of economic development.

Meanwhile, State Department sources said privately that President Carter will consider a "working agreement on African development proposals being put forward by French President Giscard d'Estaing and will discuss them when he meets with Giscard later this week. A lead editorial in today's *Baltimore Sun* explicitly endorsed Giscard's policy which, said the *Sun*, "Carter should welcome." When Secretary of State Cyrus Vance met with Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda earlier this week, Kaunda specifically requested U.S. military and economic assistance for Zambia, raising the prospect of increasing cooperation between America and the five black "frontline states," including Angola and Mozambique, bordering Rhodesia in southern Africa.

In an interview published May 22 in the *London Times*, Young stressed economic development as the key to resolving the tense situation in southern Africa.

It is not definite, however, that the "Young Plan" for Africa will be implemented — the Administration has yet to spell out the required development strategy in terms of the energy-intensive capital goods export plan put forward at the Fusion Energy Foundation's recent conference on southern Africa. Current Congressional restrictions on U.S. economic aid and export policy could be swept away if such a plan is articulated by the President.

Young: U.S. Needs A Constructive, Not A Military, Solution For Africa

Here, portions of U.S. Ambassador Young's interview in a CBS-TV's Face the Nation May 21. Questioning Young were CBS's Richard Hottelet, the Washington Star's Henry Bradsher, and CBS's Marvin Kalb, who is also the sycophantic biographer of Henry Kissinger.

BRADSHER: Well, aside from covert-type CIA activity in a continent like Africa, there seems to have been rising concern in the Administration this past week that public activity — granting military aid, economic aid — is unnecessarily hampered by some of the legislative restrictions now, and there's an examination of this whole problem. Do you feel that this country is too slow to react in public ways?

YOUNG: I think so. I think we have to realize that we neglected Africa for almost ten years, and we are playing catch-up. The places where we've had problems are the places where we have not quite caught up. I think where we did take an active and aggressive role in Rhodesia and in Namibia, and in our relations with the frontline states and Nigeria, I think our policy is doing very well. And frankly, I think we are much better off in Africa now, at this moment, if you analyze it objectively, than we have been for the last decade....

KALB: Mr. Ambassador, you seem to be saying, one, that you disapprove of any kind of covert operation. You seem to be saying, too, that we should not be moving too quickly, that we ought to think a little more carefully. The thrust of what one has heard here in Washington from the very top people, including the President on the record in the past week, has been that we need the ability to move much more quickly, and it has been explicitly stated that the Administration is seeking a review, even of its covert possibilities. You seem, therefore, to be somewhat out of step with the drift of what is being said here by the Administration.

"What the Press Says"

YOUNG: Well, I'm out of step with what's being reported in the press about the Administration.

KALB: It isn't just the press. These are public comments by the President —

YOUNG: But in the conversations that I've been in, involving the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Secretary of State, I don't think that there's the panic that one reads

in the press. I think we're much more confident of our Africa policy than the emotional reaction, which is understandable. But it's an emotional reaction that I think is dangerous. I don't know that it helps the United States to — not to think.

BRADSHER: You say that we've gone in only at the request of countries and with their cooperation. This is the Soviet and Cuban answer also. They say they've gone in to help countries that have asked for their help. Do you feel now that this kind of Soviet and Cuban help is really the famous quote that you've had thrown back to you many times, I'm sure — a stabilizing presence in Africa? . . .

YOUNG: I think that the attempt to solve problems in Africa militarily does no good at all. The 20 or 30,000 Cuban troops in Angola now are in a military operation of repression. They say in Ethiopia that Eritrea can only be settled through political means, and yet there is some evidence that they are gradually being sucked more and more into military involvements in Eritrea. Insofar as they attempt to solve the problems of Africa militarily, they are definitely a destructive force. But I don't think it's right for us to become a destructive force because they are a destructive force. I think our influence in Africa is because we have been willing to be constructive, and that if you look at the 51 nations of Africa, and if you look at where the Soviets were 10 years ago and where they are now, they are in far fewer places with far less influence than they are now. We've had a steady, quiet approach — development assistance, the Peace Corps, Public Law 480, helping with food and development, our Agency for International Development, with seed farms. I can remember just 10 years ago, we were terribly concerned about the Chinese in Tanzania. The Chinese built a railroad. All that railroad is doing now is hauling Western goods. There is little or no influence of the Chinese in Tanzania. But we were panicked about the Chinese 10 years ago. Now our relationships have never been better with Tanzania. I would be absolutely certain that in 10 years our relations, even in Ethiopia and in Angola, will be better than will be the relations between those countries and the Soviet or Cubans.

HOTTELET: What about relations with the Soviet Union? The President has warned that what they are doing in Africa now endangers their relations with the United States. Will this be reflected in aspects of Soviet-American relations and Cuban-American relations that go beyond Africa — for instance, SALT and disarmament and various other things that are up for discussion between the capitals?

“No Emotional Linkages”

YOUNG: I would think it's in our interest, because of adventures that we oppose in Africa, to make a linkage which would require

us not to sign a Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. I think we also have to be concerned about the Soviet Union's internal development. I think all of the hardline talk that's coming from people who mean very well in this country is probably serving also to strengthen hardliners in the Soviet Union. Given the question of a possible imminent succession to Brezhnev, I would be very concerned to keep our relations with the Soviet Union on as reasonable and intelligent and less emotional basis as possible.

HOTTELET: But can one compartmentalize relation between great powers? Isn't the climate in which arms negotiations, competitions of various kinds take place — isn't this climate decisive for success in each individual especially important field?

YOUNG: I think we determine the climate, and I think it's important for governments to respond to their own interests rationally, and not to allow themselves to be swept away with all kinds of emotional linkages. Once we begin to do that, I think we hurt ourselves, not the Russians.

KALB: Mr. Ambassador — excuse me for getting back to this, but in the past week the President, the Secretary of State, any number of top officials — have raised the issue of the Cubans. They said the Cubans trained these Katangese before they went into Shaba. They talked about the equipment, the Soviet equipment. You seem to be criticizing the Administration's approach . . .

Katangans Trained by the West

YOUNG: Well, I don't think I'm criticizing the response. There's no doubt that there has been some Cuban involvement in training of the Katangese. I think it's also important to remember that these are the same Katangese that fought with the Belgians, and that were originally trained by western sources. They also fought on the side of the Portugese against the MPLA government. It was only after MPLA became the government of Angola that they reached some rapprochement. It was only, also, after continued attacks from Zaire into Angola that Angola, by supposedly western-backed, fortunately, not U.S.-backed guerilla operations against the government of Angola — it was only after several years of that that they were unleashed by the Angolans.

Now, there is a story in the London Times today that implicates the East Germans in the development of and training of the Katangans, and that they are very concerned about the missile development going on in Zaire by a private West German company, and they have undertaken to assist the Katanga gendarmes. What I'm saying is that Europe divided up Africa in the 1890s, and that division didn't make any sense at all in Africa. They

split tribes; none of the geographic boundaries are determinative as far as African heritage is concerned, and almost anybody can make trouble in Africa against anybody else.

BRADSHER: Let me ask you about a couple of other areas of that trouble. One is Rhodesia. There's been this apprehension, also, that the Cubans will become more directly involved there. As long as the neighboring black-governed states to Rhodesia continue to support the guerillas, the Patriotic Front there, do you see any hope for settlement at all, or will it just go on to a military solution?

YOUNG: Well, I think that depends, also, on us, and it depends on South Africa, and it depends on Ian Smith. I think, in spite of the fact that there is a support for armed struggle, there has also been a support by all of those front-line states to the Anglo-American plan.

BRADSHER: But when you were in Dar-es-Salaam a month ago in order to try to set up a general meeting of all these parties, the front-line states had encouraged you to believe that the Patriotic Front would be cooperative. You got to Dar-es-Salaam, Secretary of State Vance got there —

YOUNG: We found that they were cooperative.

BRADSHER: You found that they were less cooperative than the front-line states had expected them to be.

YOUNG: No, I didn't. In the first opening sentence of that meeting, Mr. Mugabe asked us, what are the terms of our negotiations, and can we make binding agreements? Our response was that we are setting up the basis for an all-parties conference. The Patriotic Front then said, well, there's no need in us making concessions to you, since they will not be binding. We will wait until a all-parties conference. They assured us, that in addition to their positions, they had three or four fall-back positions. They were perfectly willing to negotiate.

They also agreed, without question, on the presence of a United Nations peace-keeping force. That, to me, is the single, most important issue in Rhodesia and Namibia. If we can have 4,000 or 5,000 U.N. troops protecting the order and stability of the country during a transition period we can have a free election and we can determine a legitimate government, selected by all of the people in Rhodesia. We won't have peace unless we have that kind of all-party agreement under U.N. supervision.

BRADSHER: You talk about the importance of the attitude of South Africa, also. This is a key in Namibia, Southwest Africa. There are some people who seem to think that the South Africans, although they accepted the five-nation western plan that you helped work out, some people seem to think they then turned around and sabotaged it by attacking into Angola, the camps of the — the Southwest African Peoples Organization, SWAPO. Do you feel that there is really the chance of going ahead with that now?

YOUNG: Yes, I do, because I think we have to realize that in every country, ours included, there's always a tension between the forces of hope and faith, and the forces of fear and reaction, and I think we saw a conflict, really, between the two Bothas. Pik Botha, the Foreign Minister, was, I think, working along with the western powers, and Defense Minister, P.W. Botha, was taking a hardline position. My notion is that that fuss was directly related to the declining fortunes of Connie Mulder as a possible successor to Vorster, and so what you had was internal South African politics being played with an international issue, and that's terribly dangerous.

“Develop Africa Like the U.S. Sun Belt”

Here, portions of an interview with Ambassador Young in the London Times of May 22.

Q: But that wasn't one of your more controversial points. What about saying the South African government was illegal or saying Cuban troops had a proper purpose in Angola?

A: No I never said Cuban troops had a proper purpose in Angola. I said the Cubans were a stabilizing influence in Angola. They were then and they still are, in the sense that their technical assistance, their doctors, their agricultural experts are basically keeping the country on an even keel, they are in fact defending and protecting the Gulf Oil installations in Cabinda. What I've always said is that we have to look at the Cubans like we look at anybody else. When the Israelis did those kinds of things across Africa, we praised them. When our Peace Corps goes around doing those kinds of non-military activities, essentially development assistance, we give the highest praise for it. When the Cubans went into the Horn in a big military way, I didn't hesitate to say that I thought they were now bringing chaos, they were contributing to death and destruction rather than to life and development.

I just think that a foreign policy that's going to be based on morality has got to be credible. It's got to be honest. It's got to be truthful. With a military foreign policy where you're going to back your policies with your guns you can shade the truth. If you're going to have any respect established for America's role in the rest of the world we've got to be perceived everywhere as consistent and honest and just.

Q: People who know perhaps more than you about Russian foreign policy felt that you were naive at the time of Angola not to anticipate events like the Horn. In a sense you gave the Cubans a credibility which they then used for their adventures in the Horn.

A: Now don't blame me for the Horn. Siad Barre advertised what his intentions were long before any Cubans were anywhere in the area. Siad Barre took Somalia troops several hundred miles into Ethiopian territory. Now that was the time to make a condemnation. When we didn't make any condemnation

then, we sacrificed some of our credibility when we condemned somebody else going in. I think we've either got to be against aggressive acts all over the place, not just aggressive acts by certain people. Perhaps it is naive, but either you're going to go around killing people all the time when you disagree with them or you're going to establish some basis of trust and accommodation. This we have managed to do in Europe. We have managed to do it in our economic relations, and we have managed to make some progress with strategic arms limitation talks. My feeling is that if you're going to limit your military responses, which I think the American people have decided to do, you've got to be more aggressive with your diplomatic approaches. We have done this and done it very well in the Middle East and we have done it I think and done it very well in Southern Africa.

Q: But what makes you think that United Nations sanctions are helpful. You're going to force the South African whites, who already have a defensive mentality, further in on their own resources particularly their own military resources.

A: Well a few days ago I was in our Orange Free State, the black belt of Alabama. This was the part of the United States where 10 years ago people were saying "never". It was in fact economic sanctions that when strictly and swiftly applied brought about change — when the black community said that either we will all profit together or we will all go down together. It was amazing how quickly people began to realize that the system of capitalism accommodates change, and that when you included blacks in the economy it didn't take anything away from whites. In fact it brought about an economic boom in our south land. We now talk about the southern part of the United States as the sun belt — it's the growth region of a nation. The sun's always been here, the thing that's different, the thing that has brought about the tremendous economic boom in this region, is that blacks and whites are no longer fighting each other. They are working together and we have a fantastic climate of economic development and prosperity for everybody. I think that Southern Africa, South Africa, Rhodesia is a potential sun belt — once they begin to deal with their problems together rather than blaming their problems on one another or on the Communists or on the United States.

Crush The British Bukharinite Snakes

The following analysis was released on May 24 by U.S. Labor Party Chairman Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

Over the past week, a subversive British faction within the Soviet leadership has surfaced with the sole purpose of destroying the historic Schmidt-Brezhnev and Lopez Portillo-Brezhnev agreements for ending the threat of war with world economic development. The British mode of operation is precisely the same as that which destroyed the Zhukov-Eisenhower agreement on Atoms for Peace, precisely the same as that which destroyed the 1970 "Rogers Plan" for peace in the Middle East. The British Bukharinite snakes, Henry Kissinger, and their masters in Great Britain are up to their same treacherous tricks.

The occasion of their game this time is the highly commendable surgical operation by French President Giscard against the British-Belgian provocations in Zaire. Giscard's action was in complete consonance with the agreements made by West German Chancellor Schmidt and Brezhnev in Bonn on May 6 to ensure stability and peace throughout the developing and advanced sectors through the transfer of high-technology industry. My commendation of that action is not at all to be confused with the praise of the American "Philby" Henry Kissinger or the London Daily Telegraph.

As in 1970, the British Tories have feigned support for the French action, vociferously lying that it is part of their NATO strategy to run the Soviet Union out of the Third World. As in 1970, the British Labour Party, typified by Foreign Minister David Owen, have taken up the line of self-righteous opposition to "American imperialism." As in 1970, the British-linked Bukharinite snakes in the Soviet Union have turned to the right, screaming that Brezhnev's allies in France have "be-

come neocolonialist" and "sold out the working class."

These Bukharinite snakes are being run by the McCleans, the Philbys, the Arbatovs. Too weak to oppose the historic shift of President Brezhnev in his Bonn and Moscow agreements directly, they are mobilizing the most backward "proletkult" tradition within the Soviet Union to wreck this basis for world peace. Their assignment is war provocations — they will not stop at provoking incidents with China, in Africa, or anywhere else.

If Brezhnev is serious about his peace initiatives, he must move at once to crush these British Bukharinites. If not, we are headed irrevocably for World War III.

America too has its Philby. His name is Henry Kissinger. It has been his assignment to destroy the ability of the Carter Administration to join the Schmidt-Brezhnev-Portillo agreement. At Britain's behest he has praised Giscard; through CIA Director Turner and National Security Council staffer David Aaron, circulated lies about how Carter is about to wage war against Angola; brazenly lied about so-called Cuban and Soviet involvement with Katangese tribesmen whom all Europe knows have been trained by Belgium and London's NATO.

My advice to President Brezhnev and President Carter is this. Designate appropriate persons in the State Department, and their opposite numbers in the Soviet Union, to arrange a business meeting immediately. Set the agenda for this meeting firmly: the British Bukharinite agents must be cleaned out.

In the sense that Kissinger is playing the Tory counterpoint to the Soviet faction's Labourites, those who call Henry Kissinger a Soviet agent are right. Like the Bukharinites in the Soviet Union, he is playing a pure British wrecking operation. He must also be crushed.