


EIR Special Report

Trilateral coup in the GOP: the Peking connection

by Kathleen Murphy



When Ronald Reagan received the Republican presidential nomination in Detroit July 17, party conservatives rejoiced. Still smarting from Barry Goldwater's humiliating defeat in 1964 and Reagan's narrow loss to Gerry Ford for the 1976 GOP nomination, they greeted the Californian's official elevation as a long-sought victory over the liberal East Coast faction which has increasingly dominated the party ever since Abraham Lincoln's assassination.

But among the thousands of euphoric delegates and true believers who gathered to hear Reagan's acceptance speech, there could be found sober-minded individuals who had serious misgivings. When the Ford-Kissinger-Reagan negotiations so smoothly opened the door to George Bush's accession to the vice-presidential slot, they began to ask themselves: Did *we really* win?

Obviously not. As top Reagan adviser Robert Neumann commented in an interview last week: "The conservatives thought they had won, but they lost. Reagan's a down-to-earth pragmatist who knew he had to deal with us, and people like Helms [North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms—ed.] are going through a trauma as they wake up to the fact that we're in, and they're out."

Although the Republicans anticipate a clean sweep at the polls next November, Reagan's election would be worse than a hollow victory; it would be a disaster. As Neumann implied, and the convention and subsequent developments demonstrate, Reagan's strings are being pulled by the same Anglo-American policy faction that installed Carter in the White House, to such hideous effect.

Unless the Democratic Convention is opened up, and Carter replaced by a more viable candidate, the American electorate will face the following presidential choice: An aging Reagan whose young and eager Vice-President is a former Trilateral Commission member; Carter, a Trilateral puppet since



1974; and John Anderson, also a Trilateralist. The implications of this situation for both the nation and the world are ominous.

Despite superficial differences, characterized by the "right" versus "left" mythology, the Carter-Reagan-Anderson policies converge on the same points: destruction of the industrial base of the U.S. economy; increasing isolation from our European allies; and a geopolitical strategy based on a Jerusalem-Washington-Peking alliance that makes a confrontation with the Soviet Union, possibly escalating into World War III, as certain as death and taxes.

The purpose of this *EIR* Special Report is to explain why a Reagan administration would represent no improvement, and would probably mean an absolute worsening for the United States in the strategic and economic arenas.

First, Lyndon H. LaRouche provides the appropriate context for understanding Reagan's policy orientation. In his analysis, "Republicans Reenact Last Days of Saigon," the "dark horse" Democratic presidential candidate identifies the Republican nominee's top advisers as "feudalist kooks" drawn directly from Hapsburg networks and committed to imposing a Malthusian economic order on the advanced Western economies. Their pro-Chinese stance, he points out, does not derive simply from the idiotic belief that Communist China could serve as a military ally against the Soviet Union, but from a deep-seated admiration for the Chinese economic model.

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Next we profile George Bush, the pathetic nonentity who seems never to have gotten past the mental stage of a 16-year-old prep school crew captain, but who nevertheless represents a direct line of command from the East Coast policy elite into the Reagan camp. As the country's first envoy to the People's Republic, Bush was intimately involved in the Kissinger-Nixon "China Card" and firmly believes in the necessity of a U.S.-China alliance.

We then present short dossiers on the "Gang of Four"—Richard Allen, William Casey, Henry Kissinger and William Van Cleave—and several other influential Reagan policy advisers.

EIR Military Strategy Editor Susan Welsh dissects the policy which a Reagan administration is likely to pursue, exposing its much-touted military buildup as a wretched fraud.

The no-growth perspective embedded in Mr. Reagan's Friedmanite economics is analyzed by *EIR* financial expert David Goldman, while an accompanying piece documents that the Republicans' new "pro-labor" posture reflects the Chinese model.

Abandon hope, all ye who enter here

Dante's immortal injunction would have made a fitting slogan for the Republican Convention.

Even before the convention's opening, it was clear that something was awry. After attacking George Bush for his connections to the Trilateral Commission in the early part of the campaign—a tactic to which the *Wall Street Journal* credited Reagan's two-to-one victory in the New Hampshire primary—Reagan began to backtrack on this issue until finally, during the Texas primary campaign, he openly apologized to Bush. Simultaneously, he started to soften on the Kissinger question. Having made Kissinger a target for four years, Reagan suddenly began to make overtures to the former Secretary of State. He met with him several times, as did his foreign policy coordinator Dick Allen, and then let it be known last month that he "wouldn't rule out" a cabinet post for his former enemy.

Nevertheless, most Republican traditionalists were shocked when Kissinger emerged from a meeting with Reagan on the convention's second day and declared that the two saw "eye to eye" on all substantive policy questions, including the need for strengthened relations with the People's Republic of China. Nor were party conservatives prepared to see Reagan nearly negotiate away his presidential powers to the Ford-Kissinger duo—and then embrace Bush as his running mate.

Yet there is every reason to believe that the Reagan-Bush ticket had been in the works for months. Some insiders even claim that after losing to Reagan in New Hampshire, Bush conceded the top spot and aimed his campaign at the Vice-Presidency instead. And, suggest-

ing that key layers within the Anglo-American elite had been deliberately planning the Bush coup for some time, U.S. Trust Company chairman Hoyt Ammidon, a Ditchley Foundation official, reportedly commented early this year: "George is one of us, of course, but he doesn't have the charisma to get elected himself. His best route to the presidency is via the back door."

In a similar vein, the London *Times* editorialized July 18 that Bush "is the best qualified for the role of alternative President—which is how one has to see the office of Vice-President if the President has his 70th birthday soon."

Remarks such as these have led a number of anti-Bush Republicans to speculate on the possibility that Reagan will be forced to resign because of ill health, or even assassinated. Result: President Bush.

How Bush got the nomination

How did Reagan get away with naming Bush as Vice-President? The media brouhaha over the "secret" negotiations the Reagan camp carried out with Ford and Kissinger over the "co-presidency" provided an indispensable smokescreen. As the Bush league accurately predicted, faced with the appalling prospect of another Kissinger administration, many Bush opponents were actually relieved when the negotiations fell through and Bush was nominated.

Massachusetts Congressman Silvio Conte, himself a Bush delegate, admitted that the Ford hoopla was aimed at making Bush acceptable. "It's just a campaign to get Bush in there. A lot of conservatives don't like Bush, and this takes the heat off him. They're in a frenzy now, but tomorrow they'll take him."

And Gerry Ford acknowledged his own role in the Bush affair when he told the National Hairdressers and Cosmetologists Association Convention July 21: "I worked in a discreet way for George Bush. It worked out very well. I never told anybody I would accept the vice-presidency."

Moreover, for months the media spokesmen for the Eastern Establishment such as *New York Times* columnist James Reston had been churning out commentaries which insisted that Reagan broaden his base by bringing representatives of the "moderate" wing of the GOP onto his policy team. The message: Unless Reagan is prepared to give us power over crucial policy areas, we will not support him. It now seems likely that Reagan's cabinet will include such Rockefeller Republicans as George Shultz, Alexander Haig, and Alan Greenspan.

Even if Reagan manages to hang on to the presidency, he will probably soon find himself presiding over a "corporate presidency" in which he'll play the role of figurehead director while his cabinet members and other strategic post-holders wield the real power. This was a

secondary aim of the Ford gambit: namely, popularizing the idea of a reshaped presidency where powers traditionally in the hands of the President are shared among one or more co-presidents.

The specific demands that Ford is said to have made during his negotiations with the Reaganites—control over the National Security Council and Domestic Council and veto power over appointments to the Secretary of Defense and Office of Management and Budget—are lifted almost verbatim from the final report of the Murphy Commission. Set up in 1972, and chaired by Robert D. Murphy, the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy issued a number of recommendations in 1975 on the restructuring of the U.S. government, including expanding the responsibilities of the Vice-President to include national security matters. Two key Reagan campaign officials, William Casey and Anne Armstrong (one of several Bush backers brought into the campaign after the convention), were members of the commission, whose actual intent was to eliminate the centralizing policy role of the presidency.

Though Ford's demands were rejected, there is ample evidence that Bush will function as a de facto co-president. Republican National Committee chairman Bill Brock, appearing on Face the Nation July 21, optimistically predicted that the vice-presidency would soon be significantly upgraded. At the same time, the media outlets which created the Ford "co-presidency" hype in the first place are now turning their guns on Reagan, calling into question his "judgment" and "understanding of the office of the presidency" on the grounds of his apparent openness to Ford's suggestions. The clear implication is that Reagan should share his responsibilities with someone more politically experienced—like his Vice-President.

A nine-to-five President?


Reagan is extraordinarily vulnerable to this kind of pressure. It is widely known that he is unusually dependent on his advisers, and tends to over-delegate responsibility. Not surprisingly, the Rothschild-owned London *Economist* sees this as a virtue: "Chief among Mr. Reagan's strengths is his readiness to delegate," the *Economist* editorialized in its July 12 edition.

He will probably continue this dangerous practice in the Oval Office, according to his brother Neil, a convention delegate. "I rather suspect he'd be a nine-to-five President," he told the press last week. "I shouldn't speak this way about the presidency, but I believe that if he's elected to the White House, he'll handle it with one hand while he enjoys life with the other."

No wonder Bush was recently sighted chuckling softly to himself, rubbing his hands in gleeful anticipation of the power to come.

GOP reenacts the last days of Saigon

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.,
Contributing Editor



"Like panicked drunks at a hot night's lynching," 1980 Democratic presidential candidate Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr. commented July 17 on the Detroit Republican convention, "the many good Republicans involved will be ashamed of what they have done once they have returned home and sobered up."

LaRouche proposed that a competent view of the convention would focus less on "useless inductive reasoning in terms of details," and concentrate on "those dramatic ironies which echo the essence of the Nuremberg rally-like theatrics."

The candidate explained: "The mind must take in the convention as a whole and overlay that image with two alternating themes of comparison: the biblical account of Belshazzar's feast, and 1975's last days of Saigon."

Foreign policy

There were two principal features of the fall of Saigon which mirror with eerie precision the dominant features of the Detroit convention. The first of these two features is the striking analogies in strategic thinking. The second is the parallel between the internal reasons for the Thieu regime's collapse, and the refusal of the convention to acknowledge the reasons for the accelerating internal collapse of the United States today.

The foreign policy posture of the convention emphasized a dumping of the U.S.'s European allies, with reliance by an "Island America" on two principal military partners, Begin's Israel and Communist China. Like Saigon of the 1972-1975 period, the present policies of the governments of those two latter military partners are aimed at short-term confrontation with the overwhelmingly superior power of the Soviet Union. Is the United States prepared, in will and military means, to deploy strategic force to defeat the Soviet Union?

The government of Israel's Prime Minister Menachem Begin is presently poised on the brink of acting out the dusty RAND Corporation "breakaway ally" scenario. Peking is presently committed to and deployed