

Investigations into indicated withholding of information vital to U.S. national security by former National Security Adviser Kissinger

Submitted to the U.S. Senate by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

The first hard indications of Soviet commitment to beam-weapon systems appear in the 1962 and 1963 editions of Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii's *Military Strategy*. Three paragraphs of that text are crucial:

In our country the problem of eliminating rockets in flight has been successfully solved by Soviet science and technology. Thus the task of warding off strikes of enemy missiles has become quite possible.

It is interesting to note that the problem of anti-missile defense is far from being solved in the West. The United States has developed the "Nike-Zeus" and "Wizard" systems . . . for the direct encounter between a missile and an anti-missile missile . . . work is being conducted on the use of space means (anti-rocket "screening" systems).¹

To which is added in a later part of the same text:

Possibilities are being studied for the use, against rockets, of a stream of high-speed neutrons as small detonators for the nuclear charge of the rocket, and the use of electromagnetic energy to destroy the rocket charge in the descent phase of the trajectory or to deflect it from its target. Various radiation, anti-gravity, and antimatter systems, plasma (ball lightning), etc., are also being studied as a means of destroying rockets. Special attention is devoted to lasers ("death rays"); it is considered that in the future, any missile and satellite can be destroyed with powerful lasers.²

The third of these three cited paragraphs is dropped from the third, 1968 edition of Sokolovskii's text. This omission does not indicate that the U.S.S.R. has discontinued such features of its earlier strategy. On the contrary, the omission correlates with most substantial progress in development of such capabilities. Most significant is evidence to this effect presented and discussed at sessions of the Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs which Kissinger either attended personally, or to whose proceedings he had direct access through participation by persons and agencies associated with Kissinger's official duties. Most significant among these Pugwash conferences are:

1) The 9th Pugwash Conference at Cambridge, England in which Kissinger chaired Working Group II, Aug. 25-30, 1962. Kissinger's panel was devoted to the subject of "Problems of Balanced Reduction and Elimination of Conventional Armament," a panel which included Soviet representatives S. G. T. Korneev, General-Major N. A. Talensky, and V. A. Kargin of the Soviet Academy of Science.

2) The 11th Pugwash Conference, at Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia, of September 1963, at which the anti-ABM campaign was launched, which Kissinger attended.

3) The 13th Pugwash Conference, at Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, Sept. 13-19, 1964, which Kissinger also attended, at which limited "nuclear freeze" was introduced.

4) The 16th Pugwash Conference, at Sopot, Poland, on Sept. 11-16, 1966, at which Kissinger chaired Working Group II: "The Reduction of Tensions and Political Settlements in Europe."

The recommendations of Kissinger's panel at the 16th Conference are most indicative, as they include: "The reunification of Germany was accepted by all members of the group as a necessary part of any lasting system of security in Europe," a revival of the Gomulka-Rapacki Plan of the 1950s, and a policy which serves as continuing impetus for efforts to de-couple the Federal Republic of Germany from the Atlantic Alliance.

5) Kissinger did not attend the "Wingspread" Pugwash Symposium on "The Impact of New Technologies on the Arms Race," held in Racine, Wisconsin, June 26-29, 1970. However, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)-related officials did.

Participating in this "Wingspread" conference were: Franklin A. Long, 1971-76 Director of the Arms Control Association, Harvard's Abram Chayes, co-author with Jerome Wiesner of the 1969 *ABM—An Evaluation*; Harvard's Steven Weinberg, 1970-1973 consultant for the Institute for Defense Analysis, and for ACDA. Also participating in this conference were Soviet representatives Oleg L. Kozinets of the Physical Institute of the Academy of Sciences, Roald Sagdeev of the Institute of Nuclear Physics, and Vyacheslav Seychev of the Institute of High Temperature.

During the Wingspread conference, Bruno Brunelli of

the Italian Laboratory of Gas Ionization conducted discussions with Sagdeev and Seychev on the potential military implications of pure fusion triggers such as high-powered lasers, high-velocity macroscopic particles, and intense relativistic electron beams. Seychev discusses MHD systems as a compact source of electrical energy for relativistic beams adequate to trigger plasma reactions, and adds:

These special advantages make the MHD generator attractive for military applications. There have been some publications about military applications of MHD generators both for tactical aims and for strategic aims (for jamming radar and other things).

While the summary of the discussion states:

Lasers or electron beams of high enough power to ignite a fusion reaction could conceivably be used as weapons in their own right.

To suggest that this information, conducted with ACDA consultants, was not available to Kissinger et al. in connection with negotiation of the 1972 ABM treaty, is totally beyond credibility. The implication is, that the policies which Kissinger et al. have been introducing to U.S. strategic practice have been directing the U.S. government's efforts in a manner opposite to vital issues of strategic parity, and with more or less full knowledge that this was the effect they were producing by such practices.

Between the conclusion of ABM treaty-negotiations and President Nixon's ratification of that treaty on Sept. 30, 1972, there was a most significant Pugwash event:

6) The 22nd Pugwash Conference, held at Oxford, England, Sept. 7-12, 1972.

At this conference, Manhattan Project veteran Bernard T. Feld issued the false statement lately reported from such sources as Moscow and the *New York Times*:

Development, testing and deployment of ABM systems or components that are sea-based, space-based, or mobile land-based are prohibited, also deployment of ABM systems involving new types of basic components to perform the current function of ABM launches, interceptors or radars (e.g., laser ABM) is prohibited.

The truth is contained within the "Agreed Interpretations, Common Understandings, and Unilateral Statements" appended to the treaty itself. Among the agreed interpretations initiated by both powers are:

[D] . . . in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion in Accordance

with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the treaty [emphasis added to original].

The applicable section of Article XIII, is:

1(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;

1(g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms.

Article XIV provides for amendments and review.

Kissinger and other specialists in strategic doctrine, weapons systems evaluations, and arms-control fields, were fully aware of the Soviet Sokolovskii doctrine, were aware of the central function of ABM systems in making such a doctrine practicable. They were also aware that at the point Soviet *Military Strategy* edited out reference to relativistic-

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physics technologies of ABM systems-design, the Soviet Union was pressing forward with scientific and technological breakthroughs in such military technologies. During meetings at which Kissinger and others reviewed such technologies and their implications, including the Pugwash conferences, this connection was emphasized repeatedly, and clear evidence of Soviet progress and commitment was repeatedly presented.

It is not indispensable to draw the conclusion that Kissinger et al. operated so as witting agents of influence of the Soviet Union, or of some particular current within the Soviet leadership. How effectively Soviet psychological manipulations shaped their views is not an insignificant question, but is not the most immediate and primary issue. The simple, clear, and irrefutable fact, is that they employed their positions of trust and influence, both in official and quasi-official capacities, to falsify the composition of facts available to the Executive and Congress, as well as our



The closing reception of the thirteenth Pugwash Conference at Karlovy Vary.

citizenry generally, and that they did potentially fatal damage to the defensibility of our republic by means of such witting falsification of national strategic estimates.

Whatever their personal motives in this misconduct, they selectively advanced and withheld vital information, to the effect of manipulating the strategic policies and practices of our republic, knowing that we would not have tolerated their policies had they not willfully, massively, and persistently misled us. Whether this was done out of some sympathy with Soviet circles, or done for any different motive, the result has been the same. If the motives involved are arguable, their deeds are not in doubt. They knowingly falsified vital strategic information, to impose upon us policies which were implicitly fatal to the most vital interests of our republic. Whether they did so out of pro-Soviet or anti-Soviet motives, no Soviet agents could have succeeded better than they have done.

A summary of the implications of the Sokolovskii strategic doctrine, and of the growing disparity to Soviet long-term strategic advantage, fostered by the Nuclear Deterrence policy of the U.S.A./NATO, shows clearly how monstrous are the consequences of the actions of Kissinger et al. in connection with this matter.

The significance of Sokolovskii

The doctrine of Nuclear Deterrence (or, Mutually Assured Destruction—MAD) assumes the effects of an intercontinental salvo of thermonuclear strategic missiles to be so devastating for both principal powers, that continued strateg-

ic war-fighting beyond the first hour of general warfare is no longer possible. MAD therefore implicitly restricts the continued development of military capabilities to strategic arsenals plus local-war capabilities. The vast, middle range of classical war-fighting capabilities has been allowed to wither away by attrition. In-depth economic capabilities of major powers and their allies for fighting continued general warfare have been eroded.

The two features of warfare established by Leonardo da Vinci and Niccolò Machiavelli, and made traditional doctrine by the successive work of Lazare Carnot and General Scharnhorst, have been dropped from the agenda of strategic policy-making. The first such principle was the principle of technological progress in developing the productive powers of labor of republics, the material basis for capabilities in depth of mounting and winning war. The second principle was a well-trained and well-equipped citizenry in arms, implying certain technological as well as general cultural strengths of the citizenry. We regressed, in all categories but thermonuclear arsenals, to a parody of the "limited warfare" or "cabinet warfare" doctrines of the 18th century, the doctrines of set-piece warfare fatally discredited a century and three quarters ago, at the battle of Jena.

So, technological progress in maintaining and increasing the in-depth capabilities of agro-industrial republics ceased to be the foundation of our nation's military policy. We and our principal allies have been engaged for two decades to date in transforming our economies into the emiserated rubble and weakness of "post-industrial societies." To any per-

ceptive strategic planner in Moscow, the obvious conclusion has been: "The capitalist powers are destroying themselves from within. Probably, before the end of the century, the Soviet Union will achieve unchallengeable world hegemony. However, during the last moment before it succeeds in destroying itself, the Western powers will become maddened by desperation, and capable of making a thermonuclear attack. We must prepare to defeat such an attack, but without provoking them to resume a high-technology build-up."

There is only one effective technological means for implementing such a military doctrine: strategic (and tactical) systems for destroying missiles in flight. Anti-missile missiles can not satisfy this requirement; super-saturation of rocket countermissile defense (e.g., SPARTAN-SPRINT) is not unduly costly relative to the costs of such rocket-based countermissile systems, while such rocket-countermissile systems have unpleasant side-effects for the defending forces. The degree of firepower required for effective ABM and other anti-missile systems can be achieved only by a range of relativistic-physics technologies derived from the mathematical physics of Bernhard Riemann, and centered around the upper ranges of laser-like devices in the electromagnetic spectrum.

To understand the general feasibility of such ABM systems, and Soviet capabilities for developing and deploying such systems, a few general observations are necessary, and sufficient for appreciating the implications of what Kissinger et al. have done.

A strategic ABM system must satisfy four categories of assignment. These assignments center on the fact that strategic missiles reach speeds of 3 kilometers per second or higher, and carry often multiply-targeted warheads in each, plus the problem of submarine-launched and short-range thermonuclear and nuclear missiles assigned to strategic targets. The targets to be defended are principally four: 1) Major military targets, 2) Major logistical targets, other than population centers as such, 3) Population centers, and 4) Areas targeted for large-scale residual radioactive fall-out. The assignments are:

- 1) A space-based missile-killer system of perhaps four echelons, each echelon assigned to destroy not less than 50% of the missiles and deployed warheads which survive the countermissile action of the preceding echelons. In other words, not more than approximately one-sixteenth of an initial launch of 5,000 or more missiles must survive space-based countermissile measures.

- 2) Anti-Submarine Warfare systems capable of locating, targeting, and destroying submarines at the moment of outbreak of general warfare.

- 3) Point-defense systems based on beam weapons technologies, assuming the functions of the saturable SPARTAN and SPRINT systems.

- 4) Longer-range terminal-defense systems, both to supplement point-defense of military, logistical, and population

center targets, and to eliminate warheads falling between point-defended targets.

The design must assume loss of parts of these echelons of defense to countermeasures, and must have not only redundancy in each echelon, but must have sufficient depth that the terminal and point-defense systems could cope with much more than the optimal expectancy of 6-7 percent of total launch.

A power which shot its capability against such a defense system would be helpless afterward against the power it had attacked.

The principal problem for developing such a defensive system is firepower: speed and frequency with which the systems can accurately target missiles and warheads. The best-available speed is the speed of light, or velocities near the speed of light. The best available frequency is provided by high energy laser-like devices in the upper ranges of the electromagnetic spectrum: X-ray lasers, gamma-ray lasers, and, beyond that "wavicle," or "particle-beam" lasers. In the nearest term, the results desired can be accomplished by lasers in the lower, visible-light portion of the spectrum. Our problem here is delivering high energy-flux densities of energy to power the laser-like devices for which the ideal downstream option is small, controlled thermonuclear explosions of pellet-charges.

There is also the problem of target-acquisition and targeting. On principle, hitting an adversary missile in the stratosphere at orders of 5,000 kilometers distance is an engineering development task, not a fundamental problem otherwise. Aiming the laser-like device is a similar, related problem. The higher the range of the electromagnetic spectrum used in space, the briefer the period the beam must dwell on the target it is assigned to make it non-functional. In space, we should wish to have something in the order of a four-ply system capable of firing 50,000 or more well-aimed shots within an interval of less than ten minutes, together with energy-systems capable of sustaining delivery of suitable high energy-flux density energy to the firing system.

There are other kinds of capabilities in addition to lasers and laser-like electromagnetic beams, but the point to be made bearing on the case of Kissinger et al. is made adequately by limiting our attention to the laser-like part of the program.

The kind of work we require to be accomplished by the beam of the laser or laser-like device is implicitly defined by Professor Bernhard Riemann's 1859 experimental design, entitled "On the Propagation of Plane Air Waves of Finite Magnitude." This deals with the generation of acoustical shock waves, like the "Mach cone" by a supersonic projectile. However, the principle is general, not limited to acoustical shock waves.³ These kinds of waves, peculiar to all media, are called by Soviet scientists "Riemann Waves." These shocks are generated on the condition the wave transmitted is treated as a hydrodynamic wave, approximating a

sine-wave form, like ordinary alternating current in an electrical line. When this transmitted wave encounters an appropriate set of constraints, it delivers shock to the barrier so defined in a manner determined chiefly by its relative amplitude and wave-length, such that a low-amperage wave of high frequency does more work than a high amperage wave of low frequency.

Thus, by concentrating a relative lower amperage into a very high frequency laser beam, the work that beam accomplishes on its target in a very small area can easily be at energy-flux densities above the absolute boiling-temperatures equivalent for any existing material. Our task of beam-weapon defense is to pack fairly high energy-flux density energy efficiently into generation of laser-like beams.

These beams have additional, fascinating and essential characteristics. Coherent electromagnetic radiation behaves

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on targets in a most interesting fashion. It "self-focuses" the work done down to very small areas, the areas of molecules, of atoms, of atomic nuclei, and even smaller. We say that different parts of the electromagnetic spectra used for monochromatic laser or other laser-like devices are characteristically "absorbed" by molecules, atoms, nuclei, sub-nuclear phenomena. Its work is, in other words, focused on such sub-microscopic scales of area. The energy-flux densities delivered by a relatively low number of kilowatts are immense.

Moreover, these "absorption characteristics" are well-defined for each upper range of the electromagnetic spectrum. Plotting these ranges logarithmically, as a logarithmic spiral, on the appropriate cone, it is shown that these ranges are harmonically ordered according to the same principles as Kepler's determination of the ordering of the solar orbits, and as Sommerfeld et al. recognized the similar harmonic determination of characteristics of atomic spectra.⁴ As we go beyond the range of gamma-ray laser-like beams, to higher

ranges, the beams of electromagnetic radiation behave also as "particles" ("wavicles"), as Riemann's work implicitly predicts, and produce nuclear transformations. It is in this latter area, the relativistic particle-beam ranges of the spectrum, that the best accomplishments of Soviet scientists and laboratories have been achieved, aided by laboratory programs we have not provided U.S. scientific teams.

One of our principal, continuing difficulties, in attempting to promote such research and development in the United States and Western Europe, is that policy-influencers continue to think of these kinds of relativistic systems in the terms of popular reference associated with the statistical theory of heat. It is not realized, sufficiently widely, that these technologies are not only the basis for immediately developing a revolution in military strategies and tactics, but represent potentially a revolution in our definitions of raw materials and productive processes widely, as well as revolutions in biological science's practice, such as the more or less immediate potential of looking into the molecular structure of living cancer-cells. The benefits to society which could begin to be realized during the coming decade mean a new industrial revolution launched within the remainder of this century, a new industrial revolution which makes the so-called computer revolution seem a mere child's exercise by comparison, and which increases the potential productivity of an operative in industry vastly more than was accomplished by the successive development of the heat-powered machine, chemistry, and general use of electrical power. We need but to think in terms of the Riemannian physics now being vigorously applied by leading Soviet specialists to the development of beam-weapons technologies.

This is not "music of the future," it is a revolution in military science and industry within our reach now.

It is these technologies which were broadly referenced as the technological kernel of Soviet military doctrine during the early 1960s, technologies which Soviet specialists have defined with accelerating rigor over the intervening decades. To any specialist familiar with the field, what Soviet specialists have described at Pugwash, and other conferences, and what is otherwise rather well-known as Soviet laboratory accomplishment, signifies that the Soviet Union is coming close to the solution of all of the principal problems which must be mastered for deployment of a full-scale strategic ABM system, and tactical systems as well. (Such tactical systems on a cheap, fast MIG-27, costing a fraction of a first line U.S.A./NATO combat aircraft, would be a deadly proposition.)

The tempo of such development, and the manifest commitment to that tempo was known to Kissinger et al. at the beginning of the 1970s, even before the massive further advances since. Sokolovskii's doctrine may appear to be on the "back burner" since approximately 1977, but only until Soviet strategic ABM capabilities are ready to be deployed. If you were a Moscow strategic planner, preparing for contin-

gency of a nuclear strategic salvo from the United States, what would you do?

Against this longer-range Soviet strategy, the only competent strategy available to Moscow, Henry Kissinger et al. caused us to disarm ourselves. One day, when Moscow was ready, the ground-based systems would be deployed fully, discreetly. Then, we would look up and know that Soviet space-lift capabilities had put something equivalent to a four-ply space-based missile-killer system into orbit. If Kissinger et al. had been successful, we would have no alternative but to learn to say "Yes, Comrade" in Russian.

War-avoidance options

We of the United States do not seek war, we seek a durable peace in a world ordered in a manner acceptable to the vital interests of our posterity. Advocates of Nuclear Deterrence informed us that thermonuclear weapons made general warfare unthinkable; that doctrine brought us to the brink of an October 1983 into March 1984 new missile-crisis, far more dangerous even than that of 1962, and gave us no options but either submission or nuclear warfare during the second half of this present decade.

On March 23, President Ronald Reagan acted to change our strategic doctrine. That decision is irreversible. Within hours of the promulgation of the new strategic doctrine, the Soviet Union upgraded its beam-weapons ABM-systems development. Both powers are now irreversibly locked into the new strategic doctrine. The slower-paced, covert aspects of Soviet preparation of strategic ABM capabilities are nullified.

At the moment, Moscow is very unhappy. Sokolovskii is still in effect, but Moscow knows that the implications of the new strategic doctrine oblige us to model a rebuilding of our economy along the lines of our 1939-43 efforts. As the citizen digests the new reality, our institutions of government and political parties will exhibit the political prudence of differing among one another only as to how the new doctrine might be best implemented, not whether to implement it or not. Those among our political currents which resist the new strategic reality will fade from positions of influence.

This reality must become clear in Moscow over the coming weeks. Moscow's dreams of a reversal of the strategic doctrine by a Nuclear Freeze movement or other means will fade away, however reluctantly. Moscow will force itself to reconcile itself to the fact, that the United States of the late 1990s will not be the pathetic heap of whimpering "post-industrial" rubble some gentlemen in Moscow formerly dreamed we were becoming. It is not the new strategic doctrine which provokes acerbity in Moscow now; it is the fact that we have elected to resume our former position as a great economic power. They will continue with Sokolovskii's doctrine, but they will direct it to tasks of protracted survival of both our powers, not to the prospect of dominating us during the course of the 1990s.

The next several years remain dangerous years. Until the

new strategic ABM defenses are established, military capabilities will continue to be dominated by relics of the past. During this period, the only rational option available to the two powers is to negotiate strategic stability over the period between now and the time both powers have deployed their strategic ABM defenses.

If that perception is shared by both governments at the time the threatened missile-crisis begins to erupt this Autumn, both governments will have acceptable options during those negotiations which must occur then. Until March 23, the vital strategic interest of both powers was the deterrent capability of each. Until March 23, the two powers were locked into irresistible strategic forces against immovable forces. What Moscow demanded, we could not permit ourselves to concede. What we demanded, Moscow's self-interests forbade it to concede. They were about to escalate strategically in response to Pershing-II's; we would have been obliged to escalate in countermeasure taken against their escalation. As long as we adhered to Nuclear Deterrence, and their strategic policy was locked into our MAD doctrine, neither of us had any other choice but to hope that the escalation neither could avoid would not lead to a radioactive miscalculation. Now, the new strategic doctrine redefines the vital strategic interests of each. The impossible negotiations of Fall-Winter 1983-84, now become manageable—if difficult—negotiations.

The great source of danger during this period is that our policy-making might be strongly influenced by the same kinds of misdirection we have suffered at the hands of Kissinger et al. during the past. The influence of misdirection is what we must explore and rid ourselves of now. That sort of thinking and influence which misled us into the dangerous conditions looming this past winter, must not be permitted to operate in influencing the new strategic policy-making required by the event of March 23rd.

1. Sokolovskii, V.D., Marshal of the U.S.S.R., *Soviet Military Strategy* (Moscow 1968), 3rd edition. Stanford Research Institute, 1975, page 298. This edition is conveniently referenced to earlier editions.

2. op. cit., page 454, editor's notes.

3. The writer's method of economic forecasting (the quarterly LaRouche-Riemann forecast for the U.S. economy published by *EIR*) includes distinctive mathematical features based directly on this Riemann paper. E. Schrödinger's famous work on the electron was developed from the reference point provided by the same 1859 paper. Ordered, particle-like entities occurring in plasmas, such as "solitons," belong to the same general category. By the very nature of the method as it was developed, Riemann's 1859 paper implicitly defines a principle of universal lawfulness, such that the paper itself, represents what Riemann describes in his 1854 habilitation dissertation as a "unique experiment." Once the experiment was proven for aerodynamics, it was implicitly proven for hydrodynamics generally.

4. These remarks reflect in part work in progress by Dr. Jonathan Tennenbaum in the mathematical (geometrical) fundamentals of quantum electrodynamics from the vantage-point of Riemann.