

Aspen's has-beens launch a 'new' policy drive against beam defense

by Mark Burdman

It was only a matter of hours before the backers of Henry A. Kissinger responded, in their fashion, to the greatest republican challenge to the oligarchical system since the signing of the Declaration of Independence on July 4, 1776.

On Nov. 26, 1984, in Washington, D.C., Helga Zepp-LaRouche unveiled before an international press corps the founding text of a new "Movement for the Inalienable Rights of Man," enunciating the principles of republican statecraft evolved from the Declaration of Independence and the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. Later in the day, in New York City, in the first of five planned international press conferences on three continents, a group of washed-out policymakers from yesteryear held a press conference under the auspices of the Aspen Institute International Group to put forward the recommendations of a two-year-long Aspen "East-West" study based on the principles of the 1815 Congress of Vienna's Holy Alliance, whose founding and only purpose was to crush the influence of the American Revolution worldwide.

The document released in New York, "Managing East-West Conflict: A Framework for Sustained Engagement," poses as an attempt to be the hegemonic policy document of the "Western world" in future dealings with the East bloc, and it has been endorsed by 31 well-known advocates of appeasement from 10 countries, ranging from Canada's Pierre Trudeau to West Germany's Helmut Schmidt to Sweden's Pehr Gyllenhammer, a business partner of Henry Kissinger.

Yet, while the report is billed by its creators as a "new look" at formulating a concept of "sustained and positive engagement with the East" and "a philosophy of interdependence" with the U.S.S.R., this concept of bringing together the oligarchies East and West into a common command structure for managing the world is hardly more than a recycled version of the policies of the Kissinger era of "détente." Its only new point of emphasis is its extreme antipathy to the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, the beam-weapon program, which is now the official policy of the U.S. government; here, too, however, the thinking is hardly original, but echoes the most recent anti-SDI formulations from the Soviet Communist Party newspaper *Pravda*.

Given that the entire policy package put forward by the Aspen group, as embodied in the policies of the Mondale campaign, was rejected by the American electorate in one of

the greatest landslides in U.S. history, the prestige of these creatures has come into question in both the United States and Europe.

On both continents, Aspen is appropriately being rechristened the Has-Been Institute—much to the displeasure of the has-beens who direct it.

'Can you deny you're a has-been?'

At the New York kick-off conference, the "Managing East-West Conflict" report was released by a panel that included former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance; former U.S. Secretary of Defense and World Bank president Robert McNamara; former Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Elliott Richardson; former High Commissioner for Germany John J. McCloy; former Canadian Foreign Minister Mitchell Sharp; and Aspen president Joseph Slater. Prominently situated in the audience was Hamburg's apparently alive Countess Marion von Dönhoff, publisher-editor of *Die Zeit* and a leading publicist for Kissinger in Europe.

With an air of pomposity, Slater and Vance propounded on the study, noting the nearly two years of effort that went into it and the study's key recommendations: a policy of "no early use" of nuclear weapons in Europe; "reinvigorating" the arms control process while remaining "cautious" on research on strategic defense-related weapons; creating a "Strategic Panel composed of a small number of United States and Soviet representatives who would hold high-level 'confidential' meetings for discussion, but not negotiation, of critical subjects"; and establishing a "network of crisis control centers . . . to provide instant contact in the event of perceived danger of use of nuclear weapons."

After contentless and rambling presentations by Canada's Sharp and Chase Manhattan banker McCloy, who is evidently past senility, McNamara came to the gist of the matter, declaring bluntly, as he smiled the smile that made him notorious during the days of the Vietnam War: "The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is the cornerstone of stability. Actions that violate it must be avoided. . . . Attempts for a leak-proof popular defense must be curbed."

Following this, a representative from the Schiller Institute, the first to be called on in the question-and-answer period, asked the august panelists how they could refute the

Schiller Institute's proposal that the name "Aspen" should be changed to "Has-Been." Visibly agitated, conference chairman Vance jumped in, "Of course, there are similarities, but also differences, with the policies of Kissinger. *But these are not has-been policies!*" McNamara added gruffly, "*We don't need the Schiller Institute to tell us how to deal with the Russians!*"

Adding to the has-beens' embarrassment, television cam-

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eramen from the major TV networks laughed uproariously at the Schiller Institute proposal. Said one: "That's exactly what I was just thinking! That guy McCloy is still fighting World War II against the Japanese!"

Worse yet: one has-been was heard complaining to another: "Where were all the press today? The electronic media came, but where were the rest?"

More of the same occurred the next day in Bonn, West Germany, when former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, looking fatigued and decomposed, tried to describe the "Managing East-West Conflict" report before a combined American and West German press corps. When he had finished, a Schiller Institute representative noted that these policies had been decisively rejected by the American population in the Nov. 6 election and asked: "What legitimacy is there, after all, for the Aspen Institute, which is now known in the U.S. as the Has-Been Institute? What is the broad-based support for your Institute in the West—and I repeat, in the West?"

Schmidt fumbled for an appropriate reply, but the damage had been done, as the entire American press corps burst into laughter.

On Nov. 28, an Aspen official in West Berlin was overheard complaining about the lack of responsiveness of the

press to the new study and about the widespread circulation of Schiller Institute material in West Berlin.

On the same night, 350 has-beens attending the annual by-invitation-only Aspen dinner and dance in New York were greeted with copies of the Schiller Institute name-change proposal.

Where has-beens will be

The New York and Bonn conferences, matched by Nov. 27 events in Rome, London, and Tokyo, are the most prominent in a wide array of activity by has-beens trying to impose their policy perspective over the wishes of the citizenry of the United States and the nations of Western Europe.

On Nov. 28, in the vaults of Citicorp in New York, leading Aspen officials huddled in private, reportedly to discuss using the "budget-deficit" pressure on President Reagan to "whittle away" (in Henry Kissinger's words) at the SDI. According to New York insiders, Kissinger was one of the featured speakers at that event.

Kissinger, Schmidt, and a host of fellow has-beens are the main attractions at a Nov. 30-Dec. 1 meeting of Aspen-Berlin on "European technology." Aspen-Berlin sources report this is preparatory to a by-invitation-only conference on "space defense" in Berlin in January 1985, featuring the "crème de la crème" of the has-been crowd.

During the same Nov. 30-Dec. 2 weekend, Vance is the U.S. representative at a Chicago meeting of the "Palme Commission on Disarmament and Security," along with Soviet officials Georgii Arbatov of the KGB and Gen. Mikhail Milstein of the GRU (military intelligence), as well as Sweden's Olof Palme.

Then, on Dec. 15-16, the Pugwash Conference, the granddaddy of the has-been crowd, will be meeting in Geneva. Soviet Central Committee members Aleksander Bovin and Vadim Zagladin (who is conducting a high-profile Soviet vilification campaign against the Schiller Institute) will join McNamara, Austria's Bruno Kreisky, and others to map out an East-West offensive against the American beam-weapon program.

Aspen Institute: 'Save the ABM treaty!'

The following are excerpts from the Aspen Institute International Group report, "Managing East-West Conflict: A Framework for Sustained Engagement."

... The Group has examined the nuclear danger, indeed the dangers and costs of any war between East and West, and it has proposed measures to lessen the risk. It is deeply con-

scious of the need to defend our Western political and cultural values, and of the very different attitudes and values espoused in the East. . . . The course advocated by the Group, a course involving active, sustained and positive engagement with the East, does not offer the deceptive simplicity of "win" or "lose". . . . As John J. McCloy, one of our wisest and most experienced members, has said, the West "needs a philosophy of interdependence" which will "challenge the Soviet Union to positive action". . . .

These objectives are best served, in our view, through sustained engagement—a marked increase in all areas of constructive contact with the East. This engagement should be actively pursued across the entire range of relations. . . . The separate military alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, should move from a condition of mutual insecurity toward mutual security. . . .

We believe it is essential to reduce Western reliance on nuclear weapons in Europe. We therefore recommend that the Atlantic Alliance move toward no early use of such weapons. A consensus appears to be forming in support of this important objective. There is less agreement as yet on how the objective is to be attained and time is needed to sort out various approaches. . . .

Curbing the Arms Race. There are deep-seated political and ideological problems between East and West, and curbing the arms race will not automatically solve them. The continuance of the nuclear arms race, however, and its expansion into previously unexplored technological areas, will tend increasingly to poison political relations, making resolution of problems ever more difficult and ultimately imperiling peace itself. . . .

Western programs should proceed cautiously, so that new systems and advancing technology do not close off negotiated solutions. . . .

Caution is called for with regard to strategic defense. The parties to the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems retain the right to conduct research on ballistic missile defense. We urge, however, that the objectives of U.S. and Soviet research be kept limited while the larger strategic problems are given careful examination within the U.S., among the Allies (on the model of the NATO study on ABMs in 1968), and between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in accordance with the provisions of Agreed Statement D to the Treaty. Decisions or actions which would run counter to the ABM Treaty should be eschewed. This Treaty is a cornerstone of strategic stability. It should be built on and improved where necessary, but not undercut.

The troubled arms control process demands a high priority. . . . We recommend:

Talks should begin promptly between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. on controlling anti-satellite weapons. Observation, communication, and other satellites have made a vital con-

tribution to strategic stability, which must not be squandered in destabilizing efforts to gain unilateral, transient advantages. . . .

Opening a New Channel. In addition to activating these negotiating forums, and providing Western negotiators with sound, mutually advantageous proposals, we recommend that the West, in the first instance the United States, propose the creation of a new body: a Strategic Panel. This body would initially be composed of a small number of high-level U.S. and Soviet representatives. It would be official, its deliberations confidential, and its working methods informal. But it would not be a negotiating forum, nor would it be a substitute for the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission, though in certain respects it could be patterned after that valuable body. Rather, the Strategic Panel would be charged with establishing a security dialogue, weaving together the many strands of arms control negotiations and defense policy decisions involving NATO and the Warsaw Pact. As early tasks the Panel could, for example, explore ways of reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons in Europe, *controlling technological innovation*, improving verification and treaty compliance, and enhancing stability [emphasis added].

We further recommend that the West propose a network of Crisis Control Centers, linking the capitals of the nuclear weapons-states and perhaps other key locations as well. These centers, basically technical communications facilities, would provide instant contact—audio, visual, and documentary—in any situation involving the actual or possible use of a nuclear weapon. . . .

Full Normalization. It will take decades for a situation that could be called "normal" to evolve in East-West trade. . . . The World Bank and International Monetary Fund can also be helpful in defining possibilities and criteria for viable projects. Western governments should encourage membership in the Bank and Fund for the East European governments not yet participating. . . . Before long it could be useful for a group of Wise Men to take up the basic problems of East-West trade. . . .

Meeting New Challenges. . . . A higher level of exchanges and more openness will obviously be difficult to achieve. The West should not lower its sights, however, and its eventual goals should include charging the best minds of East and West with developing joint projects aimed at solving the great problems of the next century. . . . Some of these are problems that East and West share as developed societies, for example, the environmental impact of modern industrial society. Simply ascertaining the consequences for human health of thousands of new chemical products developed every year is more of an enterprise than any one nation can manage.