
Book Review

Soviet military superiority: A very rude awakening

by Criton Zoakos

Soviet Military Supremacy.

The Untold Facts About the New Danger to America.

Quentin Crommelin, Jr. & David S. Sullivan.
Washington, 1985.

Rude awakening, salutary as it is, is no match for a state of alert wakefulness. Crommelin's and Sullivan's book, *Soviet Military Supremacy*, is just this sort of rude awakening. The book's first edition has been sold out in Washington and is no longer available in bookstores. This is good, provided that the Soviet Embassy did not buy up all the copies: The raw data incorporated in the book should be in the possession of every American household.

These data, as the authors state in a footnote, "have been reviewed and cleared for publication" by the Central Intelligence Agency. This means that the data reported in the book are accurate, but not complete. If you, the reader, experience a state of shock at the massive Soviet strategic superiority documented in the book's tables, just hold your breath. The public, CIA-authorized version presents a picture not half as bad as the real-life disaster.

Here are some of the data, comparing Soviet and American strategic arsenals:

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Launchers (ICBM)	
U.S.S.R.	1,850
U.S.A.	1,000
Heavy ICBM Launchers	
U.S.S.R.	820
U.S.A.	0

Silo-Buster ICBM Warheads

U.S.S.R.	7,070
U.S.A.	0

Total ICBM Warheads

U.S.S.R.	20,200
U.S.A.	2,100

On-Line Ballistic Missile Throw-Weight

U.S.S.R.	12.4 millions of pounds
U.S.A.	4.4 millions

ICBM Launchers with Reloads

U.S.S.R.	1,850
U.S.A.	0

Modern Stockpiled and Reload ICBMs

U.S.S.R.	3,350
U.S.A.	0

Modern Reload ICBM Warheads

U.S.S.R.	9,300
U.S.A.	0

Total Reserve Strategic Launch Systems

U.S.S.R.	3,700
U.S.A.	0

Surface to Air Missile Launchers

U.S.S.R.	13,800
U.S.A.	0

Primary Anti-ICBM Launchers

U.S.S.R.	100
U.S.A.	0

Secondary Anti-ICBM Launchers

U.S.S.R.	3,500
U.S.A.	0

Operational ASAT Systems

U.S.S.R.	Four Types
U.S.A.	0

Ground Combat Divisions

U.S.S.R. 195
 U.S.A. 16

Battle Force Ships

U.S.S.R. 2,249
 U.S.A. 524

Attack Aircraft

U.S.S.R. 6,750
 U.S.A. 2,606

Tanks

U.S.S.R. 51,900
 U.S.A. 4,960

Armored Personnel Carriers

U.S.S.R. 63,390
 U.S.A. 7,090

Artillery Tubes

U.S.S.R. 46,300
 U.S.A. 1,350.

In comparing the levels of defense spending during the first Reagan administration, the authors produce the following telling score-card:

Soviet vs. Carter and Reagan military spending
 (billions US\$)

	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	Total
Soviet	360	378	418	460	480	2,096
Carter (proj.)	184	210	238	268	300	1,200
Reagan	185	210	227	254	286	1,162
Reagan vs. Carter	+1	0	-11	-14	-14	-38
U.S. vs. U.S.S.R.	-175	-168	-191	-206	-194	-934

The authors conclude: "Almost no Americans realize that, because of Congressional inaction, defense spending under President Reagan is *far below* the levels even President Reagan thought were necessary for our safety."

The book's self-appointed task is to shake Americans from their present complacency, by presenting the figures, the facts, and their immediate implications. Presentation of facts, figures, and implications has been presented more or less competently. At any rate, more competently than the 1985 edition of the Defense Department's *Soviet Military Power* handbook. It is doubtful that this competence is enough to produce the intended result and arouse the American people.

Strong as it is in facts and figures, the book is pathetic in

identifying the causes of our present devastating strategic calamity. For example, it identifies very accurately the extent of this strategic calamity: "These Soviet offensive and defensive advantages gravely threaten—have almost eliminated—the effectiveness of our retaliatory deterrent. . . . Because of its vulnerability America could be increasingly subject to Soviet coercion and intimidation through the power implicit in an overwhelming nuclear advantage."

After accurately identifying the Soviets' ability to deliver an absolutely destructive preemptive strike, they conclude: "In sum, two and a half legs of the U.S. Triad are now vulnerable, and the remaining half-leg of the Triad (strategic submarines on patrol) may itself be vulnerable already . . . or soon will be. Thus, at the top of the pyramid of forces the vulnerability of our strategic forces is at an all time high."

In the aftermath of the Walker espionage affair, specifically compromising U.S. strategic submarine security, the Crommelin/Sullivan conclusion is probably too optimistic. Then, there is the following ominous warning, penned before President Reagan's disheartening capitulation on the SALT II compliance issue on June 10, 1985:

"During this decade and possibly this year, Americans could face, and probably will be required to confront, in one form or another, the choice of incredibly perilous resistance to or docile acceptance of a new Communist dark age. . . ." Well, friends, where have you been?

Or, more to the point, how do you explain that all this—and perhaps more—is happening to us.

Blaming it all, with declaratory righteousness, on the "liberals" and the "media" hardly scratches the surface. The calamity occurred in 1966-67 with the so-called "paradigm shift" into the abomination of the "technetronic era" and "post-industrial society." If you read your Ogarkov adequately, you know the Russians approach war-fighting from the classical standpoint of total economic-technological-industrial-scientific resource mobilization. Their strategic edge is derived from this "wartime economic mobilization." The book's failing is in this point.

From this vulnerability, derives the lack of adequate criteria in selecting the means you need for effecting what you desire, the mobilization of the American people. This paucity of criteria, leads you to the debacle of praising Henry Kissinger's presumed "acknowledgement of the failure of his policy."

You are wrong on Kissinger on two counts: He agrees that his arms-control policy failed in order to argue, not for a national mobilization as you desire, but to argue for a "reduction of the U.S. sphere of influence to approximately 25% of its post-war extent," in his own inimitable formulation. Your second mistake: What American, what layer of our society, would ever work up an enthusiasm to mobilize for national salvation under banners waved by the despicable Dr. Kissinger?