

## Saving SALT II will invite more Soviet aggression

by Nicholas Benton

On June 10, the United States continued to disarm itself, as President Ronald Reagan announced his decision to commit U.S. forces to compliance with the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), which was never ratified. It is a bitter irony that on that same day, at a plenum of the Soviet Central Committee in Moscow, Soviet party chief Mikhail Gorbachov demonstrated that the Kremlin leadership understands full well the relationship between victorious war-fighting and in-depth mobilization of the economy.

Gorbachov instructed the Soviet leaders to integrate a Soviet scientific and technological boom in the national economy with the Soviet war machine. Speaking to a special meeting of the Central Committee on introducing scientific-technological progress into the Soviet economy, Gorbachov outlined a crash program to double the rates of plant renovation, machine building and R&D programs "to expand the network of big research and production amalgamations."

The American President announced, through a statement read by National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane, that the United States will continue to adhere to the strategic arms limits of SALT II, "despite the Soviet record over the last years" of outrageous violations.

The President's decision places the initiative with the pro-SALT II compliance crowd that is committed to sabotaging the Strategic Defense Initiative in this country. The Soviets are emboldened by the decision, as well, to escalate toward gaining a sufficient strategic advantage to achieve world domination by 1988.

The SALT announcement follows on an array of disarmament moves this spring—ranging from the unilateral Republican action to cut the defense budget, to the latest compromises on the MX missiles, to the formal U.S. acceptance

of International Monetary Fund surveillance rights over the nation's economy, to the so-called "tax reform" package that guts the nation's essential "smokestack" industrial base.

### Soviets spit on Reagan's 'extra mile'

While Reagan might have been convinced that he was only "buying time" to make a stronger case against Soviet non-compliance with SALT II by his decision to, as he put it, "go the extra mile," the reality is that the Soviets are in a nonstop drive for war and will use the next period to gain vital ground in their efforts, while attempting to trap Reagan in Henry Kissinger's "SALT framework" to abandon the Strategic Defense Initiative.

This was shown by the official Soviet reaction to Reagan's decision. The government news agency TASS charged that "His words made it clear that Washington will continue to defy arms agreements without hesitation, or bypass them if they are an obstacle for Washington's arms programs." TASS continued: "His speech was another step to destroy all that was gained by the U.S. and the Soviet Union on arms control in the 1970s."

Reagan ignored the strong advice of Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger to formally abandon the bankrupt SALT framework because the many well-documented cases of gross Soviet violations of the treaty indicate, as Reagan himself had noted in speeches during his recent European tour, an ominous Soviet trend to develop a first-strike nuclear war-fighting advantage.

Instead, the influence of Secretary of State George Shultz and National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane prevailed, and the President announced that, despite Soviet violations, he would unilaterally continue to comply with the terms of

the SALT II treaty. In an attempt to toughen his stand, Reagan assigned Weinberger to prepare a comprehensive report due in November on "specific actions which the United States should take to augment as necessary the U.S. strategic modernization program as a proportionate response to, and as a hedge against the military consequences of those Soviet violations of existing arms agreements which the Soviets fail to correct."

However, as *EIR* founder and contributing editor Lyndon LaRouche has pointed out, such a "proportionate response" can ill afford to wait for November to be implemented. In addition to the universally acknowledged Soviet violations—the development of one new ICBM over the treaty limit, the incription of telemetry (coding) violations, and the Krasnyarsk radar station violation—the Pentagon's *Soviet Military Power 1985* publication released in April cites two other ICBMs being developed beyond the rail-mobile SS-X-24 and road-mobile SS-X-25 (page 31 of the cited book). Further, a National Intelligence Estimate report not yet public, but in the hands of three U.S. senators (Republicans McClure and Symms of Idaho and East of North Carolina), identifies a Soviet "accelerated deployment of two new missile systems," which minimally means that the new systems are beyond the experimental stage and going into mass production.

That means the "X" is now dropped from both the SS-24 and SS-25. In response to the Soviet war buildup, Lyndon LaRouche called, on June 9, for retooling idled Detroit auto plants to turn out 1,000 MX missiles a year. This, together with a crash program to develop the SDI, is essential immediately to achieve such a "proportional response" as the President has decided to delay until the end of the year to consider.

In the SDI case, Weinberger made it clear at a Pentagon press conference last month that the Soviets have been working on their equivalent of a directed-energy strategic defense for "16 or 17 years," requiring a U.S. crash program as a minimal "proportional response."

The Soviets, together with the nation's treasonous press—led by the *Washington Post* and *New York Times*—while barely repressing a collective infantile glee over the President's compliance decision, sought to further trap Reagan by massaging the "pragmatic" egos of misled patriots. "This was not capitulation," they all agreed, "but a shrewd move by the President to gain time and force the Soviets on the defensive."

Of course, they all hastened to add, while the President's "wise and tough" strategy will put the Soviets on the line to deliver on arms reduction, the President has to make this possible himself by being willing to put the SDI on the bargaining table at Geneva. Thus, the President is caught in the SALT trap invented by Henry Kissinger.

In reality, it is the Soviets who are stalling for time, as they have during the entire era of the "SALT framework" to achieve the substantial advantage they have attained to date. For the United States to saw up a Poseidon submarine (which,

with plans to launch a new Ohio-class Trident submarine this fall, we are required to do to remain beneath the SALT ceiling on multiple-warheads) acts on the Soviet mind like a signal to rape. To them, a man willing to "go the extra mile" can be forced to go a third, fourth, or fifth. To go, as Reagan said, "an extra mile in seeking an interim framework of truly mutual restraint" with a dictatorship bent on war—as Hitler taught the West in the 1930s—will not bring peace, but threatens to make war inevitable.

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## Documentation

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### What the President said

*The following is the full text of President Reagan's statement to the press on the expiration of the SALT II Treaty, as read by National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane on June 10:*

In 1982, on the eve of the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START), I decided that the United States would not undercut the expired SALT I agreement or the unratified SALT II agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. Despite my serious reservations about the inequities of the SALT I agreement and the serious flaws of the SALT II agreement, I took this action in order to foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint conducive to serious negotiation as we entered START. Since then, the United States has not taken any actions which would undercut existing arms control agreements. The United States has fully kept its part of the bargain. However, the Soviets have not. They have failed to comply with several provisions of SALT II, and we have serious concerns regarding their compliance with the provisions of other accords.

The pattern of Soviet violations, if left uncorrected, undercuts the integrity and viability of arms control as an instrument to assist in ensuring a secure and stable future world. The United States will continue to pursue vigorously with the Soviet Union the resolution of our concerns over Soviet non-compliance. We cannot impose upon ourselves a double standard that amounts to unilateral treaty compliance.

We remain determined to pursue a productive dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at reducing the risk of war through

security, stability and predictability. Therefore, I have reached the judgment that, despite the Soviet record over the last years, it remains in our interest to establish an interim framework of truly mutual restraint on strategic offensive arms as we pursue with renewed vigor our goal of real reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals in the ongoing negotiations in Geneva. Obtaining such reductions remains my highest priority.

The U.S. cannot establish such a framework alone. It will

require the Soviet Union to take the positive, concrete steps to correct its noncompliance, resolve our other compliance concerns and reverse its unparalleled and unwarranted military build-up. So far, the Soviet Union has not chosen to move in this direction. However, in the interest of ensuring that every opportunity to establish the secure, stable future we seek is fully explored, I am prepared to go the extra mile in seeking an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.

Therefore, to provide the Soviets the opportunity to join us in establishing such a framework which could support ongoing negotiations, I have decided that the United States will continue to refrain from undercutting existing strategic arms agreements to the extent that the Soviet Union exercises comparable restraint and provided that the Soviet Union actively pursues arms reduction agreements in the currently ongoing Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva.

As an integral part of this policy, we will also take those steps required to assure the national security of the United States and our allies which were made necessary by Soviet noncompliance. Appropriate and proportionate responses to Soviet noncompliance are called for to ensure our security, to provide incentives to the Soviets to correct their noncompliance, and to make it clear to Moscow that violations of arms control obligations entail real costs.

Certain Soviet violations are, by their very nature, irreversible. Such is the case with respect to the Soviet Union's flight-testing and steps towards deployment of the SS-X-25 missile, a second new type of ICBM prohibited by the unratified SALT II agreement. Since the noncompliance associated with the development of this missile cannot be corrected by the Soviet Union, the United States reserves the right to respond in a proportionate manner at the appropriate time. The Midgetman small ICBM program is particularly relevant in this regard.

Other Soviet activities involving noncompliance may be reversible and can be corrected by Soviet action. In these instances, we will provide the Soviet Union additional time to take such required corrective action. As we monitor Soviet actions for evidence of the positive, concrete steps needed on their part to correct these activities, I have directed the Department of Defense to conduct a comprehensive assessment aimed at identifying specific actions which the United States could take to augment as necessary the U.S. strategic modernization program as a proportionate response to, and as a hedge against the military consequences of, those Soviet violations of existing arms agreements which the Soviets fail to correct.

To provide adequate time for the Soviets to demonstrate by their actions a commitment to join us in an interim framework of true mutual restraint, we will plan to deactivate and dismantle according to agreed procedures an existing Poseidon SSBN as the seventh U.S. Ohio-class submarine puts to sea later this year. However, the United States will keep open all programmatic options for handling such milestones as they occur in the future. As these later milestones are reached,

I will assess the overall situation in light of Soviet actions correcting their noncompliance and promoting progress in Geneva and make a final determination of the U.S. course of action on a case-by-case basis.

I firmly believe that if we are to put the arms reduction process on a firm and lasting foundation, and obtain real reductions, our focus must remain on making best use of the promise provided by the currently ongoing negotiations in Geneva. Our policy, involving the establishment of an interim framework for truly mutual restraint and proportionate U.S. response to uncorrected Soviet noncompliance, is spe-

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cifically designed to go the extra mile in giving the Soviet Union the opportunity to join us in this endeavor.

My hope is that if the Soviets will do so, we will be able jointly to make progress in framing equitable and verifiable agreements involving real reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals in the Geneva negotiations. Such an achievement would not only provide the best and most permanent constraint on the growth of nuclear arsenals, but it would take a major step towards reducing the size of these arsenals and creating a safer future for all nations.

*Following is the President's Message to Congress on U.S. compliance with SALT II.*

The attached classified report responds to a requirement in the FY-85 Department of Defense Authorization Act (Section 1110 of P.L. 98-525) requesting a report that:

(A) describes the implications of the United States Ship Alaska's sea trials, both with and without the concurrent dismantling of older launchers of missiles with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles, for the current United

States no-undercut policy on strategic arms and United States security interests more generally;

(B) assesses possible Soviet political, military, and negotiating responses to the termination of the United States no-undercut policy;

(C) reviews and assesses Soviet activities with respect to existing strategic offensive arms agreements; and

(D) makes recommendations regarding the future of United States interim restraint policy.

In accordance with our prior interim restraint policy, the United States has scrupulously lived within the SALT I and II agreements governing strategic offensive arms. The United States has fully kept its part of the bargain. By contrast, we have found and reported to the Congress that the Soviet Union has violated major arms control obligations, as fully documented in comprehensive reports to the Congress on this subject in January 1984 and February 1985. Multiple Soviet violations of the SALT II Treaty and of other agreements were fundamental considerations in assessing a future United States interim restraint policy.

The basic United States strategic goals remain unchanged. In the years ahead, the United States objective is a radical reduction in the levels and the power of existing and planned offensive nuclear arms, as well as on stabilization of the relationship between nuclear offensive and defensive arms, whether on earth or in space.

I firmly believe that if we are to put the arms reduction process on a firm and lasting foundation, our focus must remain on making best use of the promise provided by the current negotiations in Geneva. The policy outlined in my report, involving the establishment of an interim framework for truly mutual restraint and proportionate United States responses to uncorrected Soviet noncompliance, is specifically designed to go the extra mile in giving the Soviet Union the opportunity to join us in this vital endeavor.

I believe that this policy, addressed in the classified report and the unclassified fact sheet, both recognizes the recent views of the Congress and serves as a basis for bipartisan support.

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## The response from Moscow

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The Soviet news agency TASS on June 11 attacked President Reagan's speech on SALT-II, saying that he proclaimed devotion to the process of arms control, yet "at the same time, his words made it clear that Washington will continue to defy arms agreements without hesitation or bypass them if they are an obstacle for Washington's arms programs." President Reagan, TASS charged, was trying to neutralize world public opinion by claiming that the U.S.S.R. violates its commitments, but the President failed to produce any proof. "His speech was another step to destroy all that was gained by the U.S. and the Soviet Union on arms control in the 70s."

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