

---

## Western European Union Colloquium

---

# Participation in the SDI: Can the Federal Republic take the lead?

by Heinz Horeis

The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, and the much-debated issue of whether Europe will participate in it, was the main topic at a colloquium held by the Committee on Scientific, Technological, and Aerospace Questions of the Assembly of the Western European Union (WEU) on Sept. 18-20 in Munich, officially devoted to "The Space Challenge for Europe."

What the colloquium showed is that anyone waiting for a consensus among European governments on SDI participation, is in for a long wait—at a moment when the Soviet Union's drive toward showdown has made decision urgent. *EIR's* interviews with participants at the colloquium show that spokesmen for industry and defense, and not just in West Germany, are "chomping at the bit" for decisive leadership from Bonn.

### France says no

The official position of the Socialist government of François Mitterrand was clearly voiced by Herbert Curien, French minister for research and technology: "The American SDI and similar efforts by the Soviet Union," he said, "clearly raise the question of Europe's attitude toward an anti-ballistic missile program with a strong space component. France for its part considers that such a program can only revive the arms race and that it is therefore undesirable." Curien demanded that Western Europe should undertake "traditional military space activities," related to "non-aggressive applications of space technology: communications, information gathering, navigation, etc., which allow the defensive potential of present means to be maintained without becoming involved in a new arms race." This rejection of the SDI is not likely to change, especially not since Defense Minister Heranu, who at least had some cautious sympathy for SDI, has been replaced by Paul Quiles, a leading figure of the anti-nuclear movement in the Socialist Party.

The official position on the SDI is not undisputed in France, however, as the presentation by Prof. Marceau Felden of Paris University showed. "The decision announced by President Reagan in March 1983," he told the colloquium, "was neither fortuitous nor based on hypothetical scientific data. It resulted from the converging emergence in the 1980s of at least six major technological breakthroughs, which presented the problems of vulnerability of intercontinental bal-

listic missiles in new terms." Felden summed up in a way that contrasts sharply to the widespread notion in Europe that deployment of strategic defense is a question of at least 15 years: "In a few years and without sacrificing present means," Felden declared, "it is quite conceivable for the United States to have a first relatively low-performance system, but deterrent enough to avert a Soviet attack."

He concluded that there is no longer any real obstacle to developing and deploying first-generation SDI systems, and therefore Europe's decision is "purely a political one." He continued, that "the long-term repercussions [of SDI] are liable to be irreversible for us. . . . Technological and economic spin-offs will be considerable," so the "real stake" for Europe is "its place and perhaps even its survival in the 21st century."

Felden was speaking for certain military, industrial, and political layers in France, that favor a positive European response to SDI. These layers seem to have a new angle for dealing with official rejection of SDI, which has to do with Eureka—French President Mitterrand's proposal for a European civilian high-tech research program, made early last summer, and intended as anti-SDI. The French pro-SDI forces' idea is to add a military component to Eureka and thus create a "European complement" to SDI. However, this sly trick is not very likely to work; even though the French government might agree to it, its probable result will be to complicate, and drag out a decision on European participation in SDI.

### German government must take lead

Just before the WEU meeting, the "Teltschik commission" with representatives from German industry, science, and politics, returned from a fact-finding mission on SDI in the United States. As stated during the colloquium the mission was a success; the "openness found in the U.S. was more than expected before, and there are now good prospects for cooperation." Bavarian prime minister Franz-Josef Strauss, who had been briefed on the results of the Teltschik commission the day before, declared in his welcoming address to the colloquium that now a "clear and final decision" on SDI is necessary.

Professor Timmermann from the West German Defense

Ministry summarized how SDI is judged by the Teltschik commission's findings: "The U.S. research program on SDI is one of the efforts which are justified, politically necessary, and relevant to the security interests of the Atlantic Alliance." For Europe, he demanded: "We should jointly pursue considerations on a European anti-missile system which, either independently or as an element of SDI, would open up space as a dimension of defense."

That Germany should take a leading role was stated a week later by the Christian Democratic defense committee in Bonn. The committee called for adding a German research effort to the cooperative SDI project, including work on defense against Soviet medium-range missiles, long-range aircraft and cruise missiles, and funded by the defense ministry's regular budget.

If the Bonn government decided to other, as yet undecided, European countries would probably follow. However, one of the biggest obstacles is in the German government the Free Democratic Party of Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, declared during the WEU colloquium, that "in questions of SDI, foreign policy must have *absolute* priority." Unfortunately, Genscher's foreign policy toward the Soviet Union is increasing Soviet military buildup.

---

## Interview: Jean-Marie Caro

---

# 'Eureka should not be anti-SDI project'

*The following interviews were conducted by Heinz Horeis during the WEU colloquium on the European challenge in space, held in Munich Sept. 18-20.*

*Jean-Marie Caro is president of the assembly of the WEU, Member of the French Parliament, and member of the opposition party UDF.*

**EIR:** Mr. Caro, in your speech you demanded a "clear decision" on the colloquium is showing, is lacking. What could the WEU do about this?

**Caro:** First information on these two projects, especially on Eureka. We have some more knowledge on SDI, because we had some meetings in Washington in knowledge on Eureka we have is through the press.

My opinion is

prove the comprehension of the compatibility of the two projects through to be a complement in the sense of partnership with SDI. Eureka should not be a anti-SDI project. . . .

**EIR:** If you say that Eureka should be a complement to SDI, then this would mean that Eureka will be a kind of European Defense Initiative?

**Caro:** The French government presently declares Eureka a civilian project, but we know that the military implications will be very important, too, so Eureka can take research on the new strategic

**EIR:** You also said that the standpoints of the WEU countries on SDI are not so far apart. What leads you to this not so obvious conclusion?

**Caro:** I do not have the information at the moment to say, that the European governments are in agreement on a coordinated reaction regarding Reagan's proposal, but I know, that after long dis

the whole aspect of an European attitude towards scientific, technological side as well as the political and military

meeting of the ministers in

As a French member of parliament, I must say that I am urging my government to be complete about the European attitude towards SDI and Eureka. What they are doing, is not clear. They are playing a sort of "hide

**EIR:** How would you, as a French politician, judge a positive decision of the German government on SDI, which may be possible after the return of the

Could this help your country to find a clearer position?

**Caro:** Yes, of course, because a common language between France and Germany has always been the aim of French politics. At this time, the French are farther answer to SDI than some months ago, and I hope that West Germany will help change this.

**EIR:** One essential point was more or less missing in the discussions during the colloquium, except for Professor Felden's speech: seeing SDI as a military necessity in response to the Soviet offensive threat. Why is this position unclear within WEU?

**Caro:** We have a majority in the Assembly in favor of SDI, but we also have some tendencies against it.

I think that

with everything Professor Felden said in his presentation. This American challenge gives Europe a magnificent chance to develop its own identity on this crucial point. For France, it gives us a chance to see whether in some years our nuclear defense would run the risk of becoming obsolete, and what we have to do after that.

## 'Germany must decide this year'

*Dr. Christian Lenzer is chairman of the WEU Committee on Scientific, Technological, and Aerospace Questions, Member of the German Parliament, member of the Christian Democratic Party (CDU).*

**EIR:** The range of positions toward SDI that emerged during the conference are best described by the following two poles: On the one side, the French minister for research Curien, who said that "SDI is undesirable," and, on the other hand, Professor Timmermann from the German Ministry of Defense, who said that SDI is a "political necessity." Of course, in Germany, even inside the government, whose official position is in general quite favorable to SDI, there are a number of voices still being raised in dissent. Meanwhile, in France, President Francois Mitterrand has said a clear "No" to the Strategic Defense Initiative, that is, to French participation in it—although it does appear as if opposition leaders who have declared their support for SDI may win legislative elections next year, and thus form a new government. But for now, President Mitterrand is sticking to his Eureka program, a supposedly civilian alternative to developing an anti-missile technology, but focused on much of the same technology. Taking this into account, how do you judge the possibility of reaching a European consensus?

**Lenzer:** Speaking as a German politician, I think that in the past we had some sort of unclear discussion—Eureka, proposed by the French President and a purely civilian project, on the one side and on the other side, SDI, the offer of the U.S. President for establishing a missile defense system in space. First, this alternative is wrong. The projects are not mutually exclusive; both are possible.

SDI concerns security policy and questions of general military strategy. Here a political answer has to be found, and I personally have come to a positive conclusion. I am in favor of a German participation in the research phase—and I emphasize that for the next years we are only speaking of research—of SDI. I am in favor of everything that stabilizes the alliance and strengthens the defensive capabilities of NATO—under the condition that the integrity of the whole alliance is preserved with SDI.

Eureka, on the other hand, aims at focusing the European research capacities and manpower on certain selected, market-relevant sectors: communications technology, laser tech-

nology, micro-electronics, materials research, space technology. These are purely civilian applications, aiming at increasing the competitiveness and productivity of the European economy, so it can face the Japanese and American challenge in the high-technology sector.

**EIR:** I certainly agree, the two programs are not necessarily mutually exclusive. And, in fact, one of your own parliamentarians in West Germany, Mr. Willy Wimmer, recently proposed that Germany, too, should have its own missile-shield research program, saying that this would not be opposed to or an alternative to participation in the American SDI, but rather supplement it from the standpoint of what may be Germany's own special needs. Of course, whether a program is initiated from the military standpoint, or initiated from the civilian standpoint, in either case it will have tremendous implications in terms of spillovers into the civilian economy. But, this does not answer the decisive question, whether a European consensus can be reached on SDI.

**Lenzer:** Of course this is the decisive question. I would welcome very much—and this is also the opinion of the West German government, especially after the results of the Teltschik commission—if we as Europeans would say: Yes, we participate in the R&D phase of SDI. With this we would not lose anything, especially since it does not yet include a decision on a future

**EIR:** Do you see the possibility <sup>the</sup> Teltschik report, the German government could play a pioneering role by deciding positively on SDI and by this pushing the other European countries forward?

**Lenzer:** Well, I do not like to use the expression "pioneering role," because in European policy you have to deal with certain vanities and delicacies, but I can say that, because of its

Republic of Germany can play a very decisive melody in the European concert. I would welcome it if the German government now, after having carefully examined the whole question for some time, would come to the conclusion, which I think, is most probable: Yes, we participate in the research and development phase of SDI, and furthermore, that it would use this conclusion in the whole European discussion.

**EIR:** In Europe we have been talking about SDI for more than two years now. Don't you think that now we have to make a decision, especially, if you see this against the ground that the first generation SDI systems in the United States are a question of only a few years, as Professor Felden explained this morning?

**Lenzer:** I agree with this unconditionally. A thorough examination is never bad, but now further examination does not seem to be of much value. Within the next months, we have to find a decision; whether this can be a joint European decision, is still open, but I think that the German government should decide by the end of this year.

# 'What's lacking are political decisions'

*Interview with Dr. Helmut Ulke, president of Dornier-Systems Inc., one of the leading German aerospace companies. The interview was conducted in German.*

**EIR:** For two years, there have been discussions in the Federal Republic, in which politicians have taken the position of a definite "maybe yes, maybe no." What influence has this lack of resolution had on the planning by German and other European industrial firms?

**Ulke:** Industry can actually respond only if politicians decide for participation in the SDI. When this decision is made, when the politicians and military strategists participate, only then can we act. This does not concern merely the political frame of reference. The military requirements must also be clear, then those responsible for contracts in the Ministry of Defense can respond, and then we can respond in turn. Of course, this is an interactive process; we can submit certain ideas to those responsible, and they can then examine them.

**EIR:** Concerning participation in the SDI, there are three possibilities: First, there could be cooperation between American and German firms, with no political influence of any sort involved. Such influence would be limited merely to delivery of components. Second, there is the possibility that German firms, in the framework of an international treaty, still to be created, would work on the SDI. Third, the European nations—or some European nations—could create their own SDI and work together with the United States on a complementary level. Which of these possibilities do you prefer?

**Ulke:** I believe that your three possibilities are not quite right. Alternative 1) and 2) are coupled together since, even if German or European firms work together with American firms, there must be an overall agreement concluded on the transfer of know-how. If it is not merely a matter of component delivery, but rather a higher level of cooperative work is desired, then the general boundary conditions must be worked out between governments. Profit will be gained from know-how; new technologies will be invented, patents registered, and appropriate protection can be provided only on a governmental level.

**EIR:** Without an overall agreement, you would thus exclude any possibility that German firms would cooperate on the development of the SDI technologies?

**Ulke:** In so far as it goes beyond merely a matter of delivering components, *only* with the agreement of the appropriate

government! Investigation of the rough overall agreements was the whole purpose of the visit of the Teltschik Commission to the United States.

**EIR:** What is your response to the third possibility?

**Ulke:** I consider that possibility promising if European nations, or at least some European nations, would decide that they would work independently in certain sub-areas because of the high technological content of those areas.

For the next few years, the SDI program will still be pure technology, not yet the defining of concrete systems. The surrounding technological areas still need to be explored which will allow a possible definition. And when it is seen what content the SDI program has as a whole, then I believe that the purely scientific implications will be so great that Europeans will unconditionally join in.

The attempt to reach that is being done now with Eureka, which is not an anti-program but rather an alternative. The question is really quite simple: If we do not directly participate, then we must still identify the technological tasks which arise from the SDI and which have economic relevance. Only in that way could we be competitive during the next 20 years if the United States uses \$100 billion to get the research and development started.

**EIR:** Do you consider it realistic that a program as undefined as Eureka can generally compete with the task- and goal-oriented SDI program, with its deadlines?

**Ulke:** I personally consider it completely unrealistic that the governments of Europe will decide on anything which can be competitive. But perhaps I am a pessimist; it could be, that, for the first time in the last 20 years, a simply defined program, not restricted to specific applications, might come about, a major program with a technological content similar to the SDI. It is well known what sensitive technological areas the SDI encompasses, and that those will have all kinds of applications in other areas.

However, I certainly doubt that anyone in Europe will spend the billions merely for the sake of the technology. That can already be seen in the debate in the Federal Republic, where not one mark has been allocated, not even for a definition of what the program could be.

**EIR:** How then would you see the state of European industry in 10 to 20 years if we do not participate in the SDI or if we don't manage to set up something comparable?

**Ulke:** I think that our not undertaking something similar, to raise ourselves to a higher level of technology, would be a catastrophe. You can certainly see today the areas where we have lost out to the Japanese or the Americans—say with computers, with micro-chips, where we are dependent on imports. If these gigantic investments in these fundamental technologies come about, the entire machine-tool sector, its production and control, will be revolutionized. Laser technology, applications to software, etc., all these are the technologies which will be available to the participants in the SDI. And so I consider it very risky if similar programs, which will raise our level for the future, are not undertaken in Germany.

Whether our future is certain is arguable. Previously there weren't such programs, or, I have to make one reservation, there is a research ministry with a grand total of 7 billion deutschemarks per year. But these funds are in part so tightly tied to existing programs that Minister of Research Riesenhuber is afraid to start something new because he will then have to remove something else from his list of priorities.

**EIR:** In Professor Felden's talk today, he stated that the first SDI systems and technologies could be available in the United States in only a few years. If we consider that, plus what is already going on in the United States, then there can be no time for further protracted discussions. Otherwise, we miss the boat.

**Ulke:** That is our problem. I have visited all major American firms, and every one already has \$100 million in contracts for current SDI research. And what do we have? Well, political discussion of whether or if!

If we put aside the military question—and on this, opinion even in the United States is divided—it is certain that America will receive this technological stimulus, whatever the motivation behind it all is. Every American understands the necessity that, following the Apollo Program, this stimulus is significant and rational. And with that, they have a technological push of \$100 million, while we have been discussing for two years whether to in general, whether there is an alternative, whether we can do something which is motivated in a somewhat different way. There hasn't even been a cabinet level decision on whether we can start anything.

**EIR:** Can't there be some help in the decision-making process from the side of industry here, with a group from industry, science, and perhaps also the military, defining what the specific tasks and requirements in Europe are, which technologies are necessary, and what the firms could contribute to that?

**Ulke:** That proposal is old hat. Every systems firm, every firm in Germany which could make a contribution, has made proposals on which technologies are relevant to and impor-

tant for the future to the Federal government. For the Eureka program, the Ministry of Research has prepared collections of the papers we delivered, and even in the Ministry of Defense there have been discussions over which technologies should be supported in the firms making the proposals or which should be made the focus of the future.

We have gone through these exercises; what's lacking now are the political decisions.

**EIR:** Is there a basis for a quick decision present?


**Ulke:** The Americans have made it clear, and General Abrahamson has made it clear in all of his speeches, that they see a clear definition of tasks in connection with the tactical threat—similar to the definition of tasks which the United States sees in connection with defense against missiles launched from submarines. The basis for a political decision or the posing of a problem which the Europeans could solve, is unambiguous and clear. Only now the politicians must make a decision that we do something. It is not that industry was simple minded and had no good ideas on what must be investigated and carried out.

## New!

From New Benjamin Franklin House  
Publishing Co., Inc.

Colonize  
Space!  
Open the  
Age of  
Reason

Proceedings of  
the Krafft A.  
Ehricke  
Memorial  
Conference  
June 1985



Sponsored by the Fusion Energy Foundation and  
the Schiller Institute  
ISBN: 0-933488-41-6

Order from: Ben Franklin Booksellers, Inc., 27  
South King St., Leesburg, Va 22075

\$9.95 plus shipping (\$1.50 for first book, \$.50 for  
each additional book).