

tura, which has the entire Russian people “firmly in grip.” Everything, absolutely everything, is pre-planned, predictable, and determined. And even if this pre-planning is not always fulfilled, the divergences are never great enough to impinge on the system. And the amazing thing is, that everyone in the Soviet Union is happy with this system. They feel embedded in a great plan, complain now and then about the inadequacies of its fulfillment, but are relieved of any responsibility to do any planning themselves, or decide anything themselves. Things are much calmer, much more secure, if one knows, that everything is decided “up there.” That is the foundation of the feeling of security, which the *Nomenklatura* needs in order to block all the avenues to power for all the others. Changes in the internal social structure never come “from below”—God forbid!—but “from above.” In Gorbachov’s case, God did not forbid it, but Gorbachov’s sweeping broom only hits some—the system remains.

Then comes this American President, who wants to make the entire system of strategic weapons, built up so painstakingly over 30 years, into junk. Naturally—and only a few people in the Politburo and the Central into junk. Naturally—and only a few people in the Politburo and the Central Committee know this—the Soviets also have their SDI, but this work was relegated to the top-red classification category from 1967 onwards. That way, the work could proceed on the “back burner,” and it was easy to keep the “new” and “unaccustomed,” the “upsetting” under control, to be able to slowly and securely think over the new technologies and develop ideas for the next 20 years. The entirety of Soviet plans for the future are in disarray because of the American initiative, an unhealthy hecticness protrudes into the business, because the Politburo knows, of course, that the Soviet Union cannot keep step with the U.S.A. in the sector of new weapons technologies, because the weaknesses of their system have produced gaps and technological backwardness. The “Soviet Eureka Pact” in Prague at the end of last year will not bring the desired “leap,” because bureaucratic problems in technology transfer, and especially financing, cannot be overcome.

One thing is sure: The American SDI is the genuine and possibly most acute danger the Soviet Union faces. The “unique blessings of communist rule,” and “true socialism” are threatened at the point of their central nervous system: central planning, long-term predictability of everything.


We in the West have to understand, that this Soviet battle against SDI will be with us for a number of years. The Soviets do not want to live with this danger, and the Americans are not going to leave them alone.

Whether we Europeans really join in, or not, is irrelevant to this fundamental battle. For our own technological future, it is decisive. The Soviets will have to transform their “SDI” into a “Crash Program,” whether they want to or not. Basic decisions are still necessary, or we Europeans will be sitting in the middle, odd man out.

Currency Rates


The dollar in deutschemarks

New York late afternoon fixing




The dollar in yen

New York late afternoon fixing



The dollar in Swiss francs

New York late afternoon fixing



The British pound in dollars

New York late afternoon fixing

