

U.S.-Soviet affairs after Shultz's visit to Moscow

Following Secretary of State George Shultz's latest trip to Moscow, it is becoming apparent that the focus of tension between the two superpowers is shifting from the arms control arena, to competition in the developing sector, where the fight for economic resources and strategic raw materials rages. Whether the United States, and the West, will be effective in stemming the Soviet advances in the Third World, depends, to a large extent, on the outcome of the now raging debate over economic policy in Washington.

Moscow understands that if LaRouche's policies for large-scale industrialization of the Third World win out in Washington, the U.S. wins. Even policies less sweeping than LaRouche's, e.g., French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac's "Marshall Plan for Africa," would be effective in turning back the Russians' renewed offensive in the Third World. With this shift in emphasis in East-West relations, Moscow's "arms control" posture is designed to influence the overall policy debate in the West.

Mikhail Gorbachov's offer, during George Shultz's April 13-16 visit to Moscow, to eliminate all shorter-range intermediate range nuclear missiles from Europe as a measure complementary to the INF "zero option" proposal, was accompanied by some other impressive offers, including certain far reaching concessions on verification procedures.

Yet, contrary to appearances, the central issue in the U.S.-Soviet relationship right now is not the arms control issue, but rather a fight for the political and economic future of the so-called developing sector, the Third World. General indications, including large scale deployments of diplomatic, military and economic missions, suggest that Moscow is rapidly committing itself to a renewed expansionist drive throughout the Third World, in pursuit of raw materials and

other resource grabs, military and naval presence and political expansion.

The hottest areas of such Russian activity right now are the Indian Subcontinent, the Persian Gulf, Middle East, North Africa, the tier of English-speaking sub-Saharan Africa, especially the "front-line" states, and Ibero-America in a very special way, through the surrogate mediation of powerful dope-running networks. All the areas targeted by the Russians are, at this time, of special strategic importance, either in the context of the unraveling world financial/debt crisis, or in the context of efforts to secure raw materials and strategic resources.

No net concessions by Russians

So, in Moscow, during Shultz's visit, the Soviets introduced these militarily cosmetic but otherwise astonishing offers as part of a last-ditch effort to manipulate, primarily, the government of the United States, including manipulation of U.S. economic and financial policies toward these parts of the world, now actively debated in the Reagan administration.

The assessment of several senior specialists in Europe, is that neither the entirety nor any part of the published package offered to Shultz would be a net military concession by the Russians, but only a potentially strategically decisive concession by the U.S.A. and the Federal Republic of Germany. The Soviets are altering the profile of their nuclear, biological, chemical warfare, and other similar capabilities, to the purpose of improving their capacity for a first-strike or theater assault. This includes replacement of the SS-20 by a more advanced system, the about-to-be-deployed SS-27, and reducing the numbers of Soviet ground-force troops while up-

grading their net firepower and mobility. If the U.S. were to fall into a such a Soviet-designed "zero-option" trap, the elimination of SS-20s and trading-off of shorter-range missiles, would have the effect of eliminating U.S. nuclear response in Europe, lowering the level of U.S. troop commitments, while all the supposed Soviet concessions made would merely enhance their net assault capability above the level existing prior to negotiations.

From this vantage-point, since no actual Russian net military concessions have been put on the table, the offer is to be assessed as essentially a political tactic, intended to weaken the political will of Western governments, whether or not any among those governments actually fall into the trap laid for Secretary Shultz's recent visit.

Soviet deployments in Third World

Whereas, in the European theater, the Soviet military has been successful in disguising its modernization and reorganization program as "arms control proposals," in all other continents, it is still projecting an image of robust military expansionism. In Asia, apart from the fact that the continent is waiting with concern for the redeployment of SS-20s from Europe into Asia, there is significant growth of Soviet naval and air forces in Vietnam, in the Indian Ocean and the Arab Sea, and the Persian Gulf; there is further growth of Soviet military assets in Syria, and a dramatic overall increase of Moscow's political influence over all Middle Eastern governments, best symbolized, perhaps, by the fact that Kuwait requested, and Moscow provided, military protection to Kuwaiti oil shipments in danger of Iranian attack. The potential for a Russian stranglehold over European and Japanese oil supplies, has grown significantly.

Also grown to dangerous levels, is the potential for a Soviet military invasion of northern Iran, or a Soviet-sponsored creation of a Baluchistan state carved out of parts of Iran and Pakistan; with respect to India, the Soviets, with significant help from some of their allied Western intelligence networks, have been successful in pushing forward their long-term plan to eventually dismember the republic of India.

Respecting Africa, Moscow is applying steadily growing pressure by numerous means, principal among which are 1) direct Soviet military presence, 2) Soviet military assistance, 3) Cuban military presence and assistance, as, especially, in Angola, and 4) political subversion with aid of Western pro-Moscow sympathizer political networks.

Angola and Mozambique

Respecting sub-Saharan Africa, the two strategic pivots of Soviet policy are Angola and Mozambique. In Angola, Soviet policy is to continue to pressure the puppet government for military successes against Jonas Savimbi's liberation movement, UNITA. Ultimate Soviet purpose is to use Angola as the military springboard for a final military showdown with the Republic of South Africa in Namibia. It is

generally accepted, including by Soviet military planners, that if the fate of South Africa ever came to a final decision by force of arms, then the South Africa military would choose Namibia as its decisive battlefield. The Soviet and Cuban presence in Angola is meant for eventual action in Namibia against South Africa.

Respecting Mozambique, Soviet policy appears to be in some sort of coordination with the International Monetary Fund. Moscow is committed to a complete economic disintegration of society in Mozambique, following which, Moscow intends, at its own leisure, to make certain offers for assistance, with certain very onerous strings attached. Mozambique naval and air ports would be important military assets for the Soviets. Right now, Zimbabwe's military involvement in the Mozambique civil war, with over 12,000 Zimbabwean troops involved, gives the Russians an additional lever in increasing their influence over both Zimbabwe and nearby Zambia. In the middle of a growing economic crisis, Zimbabwe's Mugabe is spending one-quarter million dollars per day, for food alone, for his troops in Mozambique; recently, he purchased a fleet of MiG 29s from Moscow, which he is attempting to deny because of the purchase's expected impact on the already depressed economy. Nearby Zambia is in worse economic shape, its transportation system has collapsed, and it is rife with rumors of military coups. The Russians, however, continue to build the pressure, especially by means of their military build-up in Angola, now in its third year.

According to one senior observer of southern Africa, "the Soviets are engaging in a substantial build-up in Angola. This is the third consecutive year they have prepared major offensives, until now unsuccessful, but look at the wider perspective. The Soviet perception is that the U.S. Congress is not willing to become involved in further aid for UNITA; therefore now is the opportunity. The logistical build-up is in southern Angola and the target will be again Mavinga, from where they can move on Savimbi's headquarters in Jamba. The international climate favors the Soviets in southern Africa."

Soviet planning is not pivoted around the judgment that Congress will not provide further assistance to UNITA, per se, but on the expectation that the United States will fail to adopt a policy of large-scale industrial and agricultural development of Africa, as proposed by LaRouche. Moscow's present overall posture is to contribute to the effort of those in the U.S.A. who oppose the LaRouche development proposals. Moscow views France's policies toward the Third World, and Africa in particular, with the same hostile attitude as it does LaRouche's. If we do not develop Africa, Russia will end up controlling its natural riches.

Following Shultz's latest trip to Moscow, the turns and twists of the superpower rivalry are making it more abundantly clear than ever before that "development is the new name of peace," as was aptly expressed, 20 years ago, in Paul Paul VI's encyclical, *Populorum Progressio*.