

EIR Feature

My policy on Soviet arms control proposals

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

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Sunday's news dispatches reported that Soviet Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachov will soon propose that Moscow will evacuate Soviet troops from the captive nations of Eastern Europe, if the United States will withdraw its troops from Western Europe. News reports say that Gorbachov will make this proposal officially during the forthcoming Warsaw Pact meeting in East Berlin.



I have been waiting for Moscow to make such a proposal as part of the public relations campaign for the so-called zero-option agreements. If the United States were to accept such a proposal, it would mean that Soviet troops could soon occupy the entirety of Europe whenever Moscow might choose to do so. This propaganda stunt is one of wily Soviet Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov's really clever strategic tricks, aimed at confusing and duping the West into virtual strategic suicide.

Under present conditions, accepting such a proposal would mean that U.S. forces leave Western Europe, never to return, while Soviet forces in Russia would move back to the frontier of Germany whenever they pleased. Within a few years, when the Russians had deployed their own "SDI," which the Soviet military is now deploying at the most rapid rate possible, they would be able to overrun Western Europe at their pleasure. Under these conditions, most of Western Europe would most probably accept Soviet terms without firing a shot in resistance.

This would leave the United States sitting alone in North America, with more than two-thirds of the world's industrial might—and about three-quarters of the world's developed mineral resources, and most of the sea lanes—in Soviet hands. It would be only a short step beyond that, for the massively outpowered United States itself to accept Russian imperial overlordship of North America, too. In return for our willing submission, Moscow would allow us to keep about the same degree of independence as Poland or Czechoslovakia today.

Obviously, for those reasons, I am opposed to any U.S. troop withdrawal from Western Europe. Any presidential candidate who disagrees with me on that issue, is not thinking straight.

Obviously, only a lunatic wishes to leave the United States or Western Europe exposed to Soviet nuclear arsenals. Even if all nuclear weapons could vanish



Today's frontiers of military technology, and the tradition they embody: (Left) High-energy laser beam director, an experimental pointing and tracking system designed to track targets in flight and direct a high-power laser beam to selected aimpoints. (Right) One of Leonardo da Vinci's most advanced military machine tools. A hydraulically driven complex for forming a stave of a gun barrel having a heavier breech section than that at the muzzle. The power transfer diagram is worked out at the bottom. Such cannon barrels were too large to make by forging methods before Leonardo's invention.

magically, we have suffered enough major wars in this century already. However, there has to be a better way of avoiding nuclear war than surrendering to one Soviet strategic expansion and demand after another, as we have done step-by-step, mostly, since 1945.

I say: Forget the so-called Zero Option, and forget about pulling U.S. forces out of Europe. There has to be a better way of avoiding nuclear war, than surrendering, inch-by-inch, to expansion of the Russian empire. There is a better way. What most of you know by the name of "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) is the key to that better way. SDI is not the total answer, but it is the key to making all other options workable ones.

I explain that in a better way. I must explain it, because none of the other presidential candidates—Republican or Democrat—in the race has the special technical background needed to explain key strategic issues involved.

"Hold on a moment, buddy," some of you are thinking; "Are you asking us to believe that Cap Weinberger doesn't know as much as you know about this?" Of course, responsible Defense officials such as Cap Weinberger and General James Abrahamson's staff are experts in this area. I have merely stated that the other presidential candidates presently in the running do not. There are some things which knowledgeable officials such as Cap Weinberger or General Abrahamson should not discuss in public, but which are perfectly proper for me to discuss in public.

When I speak publicly, since I am not a government

official, I am presenting a proposal. If a Cap Weinberger or General Abrahamson were to say the same thing publicly, that would be revealing that our government is already committed to some of the same things I am presenting as a candidate's proposal. In other words, if they speak, they are revealing secrets of our government; if I say the same thing in the form of a personal proposal, I am not revealing government secrets.

Let me restate that same point in a slightly different way. I was among the designers of the SDI policies adopted both by the United States and among our allies. My proposals, made publicly before the SDI was officially adopted, are obviously not national secrets. However, the question of how much of my proposals on SDI or other military policies has been adopted by our government or our allies, is a governmental secret.

So, for a defense official of our government to repeat some of the same things I said publicly back during 1981, 1982, and early 1983, would be revealing that the government is committed to those details of my policy. It is that commitment by government which is the national secret involved. So, when I speak about my own policy, I can say anything I wish to reveal, and I do not compromise our national security by revealing this. However, as a responsible citizen, I can not and will not reveal any commitment to details of my policy by our own or allied governments, unless it has already been made public, or unless I were specifically authorized to leak that information.

Before getting into the details of the better way I propose, I summarize my role in designing the SDI.

My role in the SDI

I have been working on designing the new strategic doctrine now called SDI since 1977. When I, as a leading Democrat, met with Reagan administration officials during 1981, to present my suggestions for a bipartisan agenda, SDI was one of the items on the agenda I presented. Most of the other items on my agenda, including the dumping of the Volcker policies carried over from the Carter-Mondale administration, were not adopted by the administration; my proposal for what became SDI was the item in which the relevant officials expressed the greatest interest for continuing discussions.

There are some things I did during the 1981-83 period which I am not free to discuss at this time. Some things are either matters of national security, or involve privileges of the Executive Branch. However, the parts of my activities on which I must still hold back information have no direct bearing on the scope of this report.

There were two technical aspects to my design for an SDI. The advanced physics involved, I had available through my position as a director of a prominent scientific association, an institution which our government has most ungratefully, recently, shut down, in a highly illegal procedure. The economic feasibility of SDI was a matter directly within my specialized technical competence. The key to SDI is, that if we use advanced physics principles, the cost of destroying a missile is less than the combined cost of building, deploying, and launching that missile. By the end of 1981, my work on the economic feasibility of SDI was approximately finished.

It was understood, that the proper way for the U.S. government to move into an SDI doctrine was to present the idea of such a change publicly, to avoid creating the situation in which either the Soviets or our allies would be surprised by our government's announced adoption of such a policy. So, for that reason, I was the first to announce—at a well-attended February 1982 public conference held in Washington—what became known as the "SDI," thirteen months before the President's televised announcement of March 23, 1983. By the time SDI was announced as official U.S. doctrine, I had given in-depth briefings to groups of relevant military officials in France, West Germany, and other allied nations. Although the President's announcement of SDI came as a surprise to many, every foreign government of our allies and adversaries knew the policy in detail months before the President's announcement.

I have been deeply involved in the technical side of the strategy business since 1981. My function has included key responsibility for assessing Soviet war-plans, so that we might be better able to judge what our technical requirements and timetables must be, to match the Russians' capabilities for posing a military threat. So, I have been virtually nose-to-nose against the top Soviet war-planner, Marshal Nikolai

Ogarkov, one of the most intelligent and dangerous opponents the United States has known during this century, a man vastly more dangerous than Adolf Hitler.

In this connection, I have been deeply involved in studying the total strategic situation of the United States and its allies in every nook and cranny of this planet. Anything that might affect the total capabilities of either our side or the Soviet side, I have been obliged to study, and to analyze the way in which local developments affect the total strategic picture. This has included my work on cultural and political

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issues, economic policies, the Soviet direction of most of the narcotics trafficking and terrorist deployments around the world, and the special danger represented by assassination and sabotage capabilities of both the Soviet military spetsnaz forces and similar lethal arms of the Soviet KGB.

My commitment has been to discover how the United States could avoid nuclear war without continuing to back down, step-by-step, to Russian imperial aggression and subversion. In other words, what combinations of cultural, military, anti-drug, anti-terrorist, and military policies would halt Soviet-directed subversion, and deter Moscow from resorting to the kinds of military adventures which would plunge the world into total war.

My solution is a policy of "peace through strength." According to former National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, this was the policy which President John F. Kennedy was to present in the address he would have delivered on the evening of the day he was assassinated. This includes not only military strength, but also cultural, political, health, and economic strength, and greatly improved internal security against irregular Soviet forces such as terrorists, drug-trafficking, and spetsnaz and KGB spies, saboteurs, and killers. It means building up strong bonds of alliance or merely

friendship with as many nations of this planet as possible, which means treating our allies and other friends fairly on all issues which might tend to divide us. It also means treating our own citizens fairly in quality of income, education, employment security, food supplies available, and in health policy.

That said, much of this is technical, that some seems complicated. Competent policy shapers have no choice; it is the world which is very technical, and very complicated. There are no simplistic solutions of the sort which can be identified by simple campaign-slogans, or by double-talk filled up with popular "buzz words." There is no sound strategic or military policy for the United States which does not require very serious thinking. Anyone who seems to make the issues involved simple, emotional appeals to popular prejudice, is telling you dangerous foolishness; if he believes what he is saying, he is the sort of bungling fool you should wish nowhere near the White House.

I start with the Russian imperial threat.

Moscow's plan for world-conquest

Officially, the rulers of Moscow have been committed to making Moscow the capital of a world-wide new Roman Empire since A.D. 1510. If we look at the changes in the world's political empire since 1510, we see the red blob spreading from Moscow, conquering nearby Slavic peoples, overrunning then the non-Russians of the Caucasus and Asia, and spreading and spreading. Under Czar or Commissar, this imperial commitment to world-conquest has never changed.

Throughout modern Russian history, since even before 1510, as early as A.D. 1440, the people of Moscow have hated Western culture, which they have always called, ever since, the culture of "the Rome of the West." The few Czars, such as Peter the Great and Alexander II, who attempted to civilize Russia with Western European and North American culture, were deeply hated by most Muscovites for this reason. For the same reason, at the end of World War II, the Russians celebrated their victory by butchering the Christian priests and destroying their churches, in the Ukraine and Romania, just as Russians had committed mass-murder against about 40,000 Polish prisoners of war at Katyn during the war.

During the 1880s and later, following the assassination of President Lincoln's ally, Czar Alexander II, by the Czarist secret police, the Okhrana, the same Russians responsible for killing this czar elaborated a new policy for world-conquest, based on a plan to overthrow the entire Romanov dynasty, and to create a new dynasty based on the most fanatically anti-Western strata of Russian society, the so-called "Old Believers" (Raskolniki). The key figure in writing up this new plan of world-conquest was a writer wholly owned by the Okhrana, Fyodor Dostoevsky. Dostoevsky's "Diary of a Writer" is the best source to study to understand this plan.

During this time, the same faction within the Czar's interior and justice ministries behind the Okhrana actions created an assortment of ultra-radical, violence-prone illegal organizations, including the famous Russian nihilist assassins, the Populists (Narodniks), and the quasi-Marxist Russian social-democrats of V.I. Lenin and his Menshevik competitors. By a somewhat complicated process, these forces inside high places in Czarist Russia organized the 1905 revolution as a dress-rehearsal, and then launched the revolutions of 1917, bringing the Bolsheviks to power. Leading Okhrana officials, who had been "controllers" of the Bolsheviks before October 1917, became top officials of the Bolsheviks' secret-police organization, the Cheka, immediately.

Although the early Bolshevik rulers kept Dostoevsky's name in the background for decades—chiefly to avoid frightening Western Marxist recruits—Soviet policy has never deviated from the policies set down in Dostoevsky's plan. Today, the Okhrana's successor, the KGB, has officially raised Dostoevsky to a Muscovite sort of cultural and political sainthood, and the Queen of all the Russias, "Czarina" Raisa Gorbachov, has made Dostoevsky the central figure of her Armand Hammer-funded arm of cultural subversion against the West, the Soviet Cultural Fund.

Russian imperial policy was stated very plainly by dictator Khrushchev, during his public appearances in the United States: "We will bury you!" So far, since Khrushchev made that threat, Moscow has gone a long way toward accomplishing just that.

There is no exaggeration in using the term "Russian Empire," to describe today's Warsaw Pact alliances, nor are we carelessly slinging nasty labels on an adversary when we say that the Russians are imperialists. Since the Chaldeans, an "empire" means a system of colonies and semi-independent "satrapies" under the administrative and military domination of a master race.

Like the ancient Chaldeans and Magi of the ancient Mesopotamian empires, the Russians of today place great value on assigning to each ethnic or religious "nationality" a Russian-approved form of distinctive ethnic or religious "culture." Evgenii Primakov's Soviet Oriental Institute is one of the most notable Soviet intelligence agencies which fulfills this function of the ancient Babylonian priesthood. It selects and concocts an approved list of "customs" and "myths," which it endorses as approved beliefs of the subject ethnic or religious nationality. It concocts these mythologies both as "religious" ideas used to foster subversion—as in the case of Peru's Sendero Luminoso terrorists—and as the approved culture of the "nation" brought to power by aid of such subversion.

For obvious reasons, like the ancient Babylonian priests, the Soviet "Magi" of today bury certain common features in each of the assorted cults manufactured at locations such as Tashkent. The ideas of man, nature, and God, in each case, are the same pagan belief-system of the ancient Rus worshippers of the "blood and soil" cult of Matushka Rus, the doc-

trine of Stalin in his famous, barely literate text on the "nationalities question." The cult is hewn in such a way as to assist the Moscow overlords in manipulating more readily the ethnic or religious entity organized around this cult-mythology.

So, today, Moscow deploys its Soviet State Orthodox Church, to demand that Western Protestant and Catholic churches modify their liturgy into "ecumenical" conformity with the dogmas of the Russian church, attacking the "Filioque" of the Latin Creed with about the same degree of fanaticism it directs against the U.S. SDI.

What the Russians have in mind for the nations of Western Europe and North America, for example, is not placing the Red Flag over such structures as our national Capitol or the White House, but rather "allowing" us to have an "independent" government, such as those of Soviet-ruled Eastern Europe today, undoubtedly with a slightly greater appearance of independence than such Eastern European states. The way things would work for us, were that to come about through aid of "zero-option" agreements, would be that the candidates and policies of the candidates would be selected with Moscow's prior approval. Our present Federal Constitution, with its presidential system, would have to go, of course, to be replaced by a parliamentary system, under which arrangement Moscow could quickly and quietly dump any head of government who displeased the imperial overlords, without having to upset the system of self-government charitably allowed to us.

We would deliver to Moscow the goods it required, at the prices Moscow chose to pay—as we see this trend in present U.S. and Western European charity to Moscow in subsidized food shipments. Moscow would pay for these purchases whenever it pleased Moscow to do so. We would have no real power over our foreign policy. We would have no industries Moscow did not allow us to maintain. Twenty to thirty percent of our national product would be skimmed off for delivery to the imperial overlords in Moscow. Nowhere in the world would there exist an organized force capable of saying "No" to any Moscow demand.

That is what Russian imperialism means in practice. That is the Soviet strategic objective, which they intend to have solidly in place by the end of this century, after which they will turn to the question of China.

From the beginning, to the present day, Soviet policy toward the West has been "total war." By "total war," strategic specialists mean a combination of two kinds of warfare: what we call "regular warfare," the use of lethal force by regular military forces, and what we call "irregular warfare." They see the two kinds of warfare as interdependent. "Irregular warfare" is the Soviets' method of fighting war against their enemies up to the brink of regular war; once regular warfare begins, irregular warfare does not end: irregular warfare is increased in intensity to the

maximum as a partner of regular warfare.

"Irregular warfare" means generally what most people are accustomed to call "subversion," enriched by assassinations and sabotage. It includes undermining the culture of the West, corrupting Western politicians, business leaders, and political parties. It lays heavy emphasis on "peace movements" and "anti-nuclear movements" of the sort started up by the most evil man of the 20th century, Bertrand Russell. It means subverting ministers, priests, and rabbis, and churches and temples, to become vehicles to radiate Moscow's influence.

It means working to cause Western economies to weaken themselves from within. It means promoting radical movements, as Moscow backs Ramsey Clark's cronies among the "radical ecologist" movements of Europe and North America today. It means promoting the international drug-traffic, which Moscow has now largely taken over, at the point of production and initial distribution, since the beginnings of these Soviet operations in 1967, as a way of destroying large sections of the population of the West. It means deploying international terrorism, created by Moscow as a partner of the international drug-warfare program in 1967.

It means building up paramilitary capabilities controlled by Moscow, such as nearly 10,000 West German paramilitary forces deployed for mass violence (under direction of GRU auxiliary officers trained in and directed from chiefly East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Syria). It means deeply penetrating the rear echelons of the interior of Western nations with Soviet military spetsnaz sabotage and assassination units, and similar units of the KGB.

In discussing Soviet military strategy as such, I shall concentrate only on the key strategic role performed by Warsaw Pact spetsnaz units, which operate directly under Soviet military command, and which are used for such included missions as deploying "hand-carried" nuclear bombs, chemical-biological weapons, and radio-frequency weapons, missions used as a substitute for Soviet missile-warheads against strategic military and logistical targets, at the moment of outbreak of war.

Selected assassinations of Western public figures and military commands, near or at the point of outbreak of war, are included among military-strategic Soviet operations under the direction of Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, in his present position as Soviet Deputy Supreme Commander in time of war.

What the Russians have done, is to redefine war-planning in such a way that the various aspects of irregular and regular warfare are treated in a combined way, under the kind of war-planning we associate with the German General Staff under von Schlieffen.

This is an extremely important point. Not only do we in the West fail, so far, to see irregular and regular warfare in this integrated way. Since the negotiations with Moscow

establishing the United Nations, at San Francisco, we of the West have abandoned classical war-planning, and have substituted a diplomatic doctrine of military policy called "crisis management." "Crisis management" doctrine means, that our defense officials and military professionals are prohibited from using any thinking which is based on traditional military science.

Some among our professionals may think in "Clausewitzian" terms privately, but they are not permitted to reflect such thinking in the shaping of defense policy, or in terms of functions of military command under combat conditions. It was this "crisis management" policy which led to a "no-win peace" stalemate in Korea, and was directly responsible for every disgusting feature of the U.S. protracted war in Southeast Asia.

So, the Soviet military commanders are way ahead of us in official military-science practice today. Not only is their ongoing irregular war against us conducted under the direction of military war-planning requirements, but they are permitted to think ahead in a way which Western commands are officially prohibited from doing. So, Soviet commanders have wide ranges of policy-options which are not available to Western governments at this time.

This brings us again to Marshal Ogarkov. He is the author of the currently operational Soviet master war-plan, the so-called "Ogarkov Plan." He is the military peacetime commander of all combined ground, sea, and air forces on the Western front, facing Western Europe and the Atlantic theater of the United States. He is the senior field commander of all Soviet forces in all theaters. He has been nominated recently as Deputy Supreme Soviet Commander, a post which has remained unoccupied since Marshal Zhukov occupied this post during World War II. After the first secretary of the Communist Party, General Secretary Gorbachov, he is the most powerful man in the pecking order of strategic command in the Russian empire, and is the actual director of warfare operations globally under conditions of actual war-fighting.

At present, the Soviet economy is undergoing a massive, and often bloody-handed reorganization. The Russians call this reorganization "perestroika." "Perestroika" is a leading feature of the Ogarkov war-plan, in which "perestroika" is defined as a limited period of military mobilization of the Russian economy, in preparation for the launching of a full-scale first strike attack against the West.

One of the facts which has put me personally into direct opposition to Ogarkov in the global strategic picture, is the fact that he and I are pushing the same conception of how the next world war might be won, despite so-called "nuclear deterrence" capabilities. Not only is he the most vigorous backer of Soviet SDI's "crash development and deployment," as I am his opposite number on this point in the West as a whole. He understands the place of SDI within the total

What others have to say about Gorbachov's offers

Senate Majority leader Robert Byrd (D-W. Va.): "The President should not race into an agreement solely based on political expediency."

Senate GOP leader Robert Dole (R-Kan.): "We shouldn't count our arms-control chickens before they are hatched . . . those little birds may not be the sort of thing we would like on the dining room table."

Rep. Richard Gephardt (D-Mo.): "Arms control must be the top priority of the next President. . . . In pursuit of arms, this administration has busted the budget of the United States."

Sen. Albert Gore, Jr. (D-Tenn.): "A positive step which pushes us in the right direction . . . the President ought to pick up some of the threads that were dropped at Reykjavik."

Rep. Jack Kemp (R-N.Y.): "The Soviets approach arms control the way Andy Warhol approached art—anything you can get away with."

Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.): "An historic opportunity that in the long term promotes an accord on strategic arms."

Rev. Pat Robertson: "We have so much military presence in Europe. . . . It seems like we ought to be able to deploy those men somewhere else."

House Speaker Jim Wright (D-Tex.): "This is our best chance since Alexander Kerensky to negotiate satisfactorily with a leader of the Soviet Union."

picture, as do very, very few officials in the West today. So, I recognize Ogarkov as the greatest single threat to us, and Moscow has repeatedly identified me, since March 23, 1983, as the greatest single threat to Moscow's plans.

Among supporters of the SDI in official and other key positions, it is broadly understood, that the kinds of defensive weapons proposed by Dr. Edward Teller's Lawrence Livermore Laboratory are an effective means for destroying most of the missiles and warheads in a general Soviet nuclear-missile barrage, and that the intrinsic cost of destroying a missile by this means is approximately one-tenth the cost of constructing and launching that Soviet missile. Unfortunately, too few among the supporters of SDI have yet understood the fuller and deeper implications of the SDI policy I presented to French and German military authorities at the close of 1982. Unfortunately, Marshal Ogarkov does!

For this reason, most of the published official and think

tank assessments of both the Soviet internal situation, and Soviet strategic policy, are more or less incompetent.

They do not understand how the Soviet economy functions, and often see it as failing, when, by Russian standards, it is more or less successfully accomplishing its assigned strategic mission. Some folk assume that the Soviets are attempting to take some of the pressure of military spending-levels off the civilian economy, when the Soviet command has precisely the opposite intention. Their domestic economy policy is based on the policy of preparing either to win a

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global war, or to be so capable of winning such a war, that the West capitulates to Soviet demands step-by-step. Their economy is operating on the basis of the pre-war mobilization specifications of the Ogarkov war-plan.

Consequently, Western experts often see the inevitable, sometimes bloody-handed political friction “perestroika” causes in Moscow, as implying a growing internal factional threat to the policies of Gorbachov and Ogarkov. They refuse to understand the nature of the Ogarkov Plan, and therefore misread the symptoms of the implementation of that plan.

There is a more specific point, which I wish to stress at this point. Ogarkov’s plan, like mine, is not only committed to the most rapid full-scale deployment of a global “SDI.” Gorbachov and I are thinking in similar ways about what is known to military science as high rates of “technological attrition.” We are also each thinking of the importance of having all the essential elements of production of high rates of technological attrition within our respective national economies, I in the United States, he in Russia itself.

The difference is, that under my policy, the United States can outpace the Soviets in technological attrition, and the Soviet command understands this. I have been told directly, more than once, by high-ranking adversaries among Soviet officials: “Yes, your plan for strategic defense will work, but your economy will outpace ours. Therefore, we will never allow the United States to adopt your policy.”

The combined populations and agro-industrial potential

of the combined economies of North America, Western Europe, and Japan, are each more than twice the Soviet potential. On condition that we follow the correct choices in economic and military policies, Moscow would never dare attack us. That, I consider an excellent way to have durable peace—especially if one understands the mind-set of our Russian adversary.

We have another vast superiority over Moscow, our Western European Judeo-Christian culture. The nations of Western Europe, Japan, and of North and South America combined, have throughout a developed form of culture which enables us to develop and to assimilate very high rates of technological progress. Traditional Muscovite culture does not permit them to match us in this.

Moscow could not even contemplate further imperial expansion, unless it could rely upon our undermining our own traditional pro-technology culture, and our willful, systematic destruction of our agro-industrial output and development. It can not dare further expansion, unless it induces us to weaken ourselves greatly from within—culturally, morally, economically, and militarily.

If we followed my strategic doctrine in these matters, we would rapidly outpace the Russian empire so much, that within a generation or two, Russians would be forced to recognize the permanently hopeless inferiority of their present culture, and would begin to change their culture into what would be predominantly as near an imitation of ours as they could manage. That is my policy for winning victory through peace based on strength.

The Soviet command understands very well what I am proposing, and therefore sees me as the greatest danger which any public figure poses to their mad dreams of world-conquest. They hate me all the more, because I do not underestimate the Russians, especially not Marshal Ogarkov.

In this day and age of sports and movie fans, it is considered “showing the right attitude” to insist that the Russian system doesn’t work, that everything they do is a failure, that they are about to collapse, or that present leaders are about to be overthrown. “Rah! Rah! Rah! Siss-boom-bah! Yeah, team!” Unfortunately, Russian military production has outpaced the combined output of the United States and its allies. Since 1945, they have been winning, and we have been retreating, especially since 1967. “Siss-boom-bah!—bunk!” The fact that an adversary is a deadly one, means exactly that he is not to be underestimated, even if we must offend the “sports fans” in noting this fact.

Our defense policies must be precisely the right ones, especially for the increasingly most dangerous months and years just ahead. That Soviet marshal and his immediate collaborators are among the military geniuses of this century—in strategic matters as such. They are not likely to miss many opportunities, and will probe us now for every exploitable chink in our material capabilities and political will. We must not permit sloppy, pragmatic compromises, to spoil the very precise set of strategic policies we must follow to get

safely through the next months and several years of greatest danger.

The relevant ABCs of military science

Modern military science developed around Renaissance Florence. Strategic principles of statecraft were founded by the great Cosimo de Medici. International law bearing upon war and peace, was established implicitly by Cardinal Nicolaus of Cusa. The first modern strategist was France's King Louis XI, whose example is well worth study in light of the Soviet threat of today. The first military scientist as such, was Leonardo da Vinci, as echoed by his follower Niccolò Machiavelli.

The principles of Machiavelli's "Commentaries on the Ten Books of Livy" were given exemplary application by Oliver Cromwell's New Model Army, the precedent for 18th-century U.S. military policy. The founder of modern "grand strategy" was France's Jean-Baptiste Colbert—also relevant for study today. The great impetus for further development of military science was supplied by Gottfried Leibniz. The great commander of the 18th century, until the 1793-95 work of Lazare Carnot, was Prussia's Frederick the Great. U.S. military policy under General Washington, incorporating Prussian and French military science, stunned the world. Carnot established modern classical military science, and his accomplishments were improved upon rather fundamentally by the Prussian reformers, vom Stein, von Humboldt, and Scharnhorst.

Those are the broad essentials.

Within this, 18th-century France resumed the work of Leonardo and Leibniz, in the application of projective geometry to analysis of the relationship between offense and defense. The question was, how to situate mobility, firepower, and depth of capabilities, respecting options for defense and offense. A modern, updated version of this application of projective geometry, is indispensable for analyzing the implications of Soviet military strategy and how to deal with them.

The ABCs are elementary enough to be more or less readily understood by the thoughtful layman.

Let us define the offensive and defensive forces, respectively, as each representing a certain number of military personnel deploying in a certain amount of territory. First, look at the offensive forces. Measure the mobility, firepower, and depth of these forces, per capita and per square kilometer of area in which the forces are operating. Next, let us use the same measurements of the enemy forces against which the offensive firepower of the attacking forces is directed. By estimating the likelihood that a shot by attacking forces will reduce the mobility, firepower, and depth of the defending forces, we can construct the idea of "effective firepower." Mobility and depth pertain, then, to the possibility of enhancing the effectiveness of firepower directed.

Then, simply shift the definitions slightly. Obviously, the defenders are shooting back, an offensive action by the

defending force. Is the defense or the offense more effective?

Our job, in either case, is not to pile up a "body count." Our objective is to reduce the enemy's mobility, firepower, and depth. People are killed in that process, of course, but the killing of persons is not the objective. The killing is an unfortunate but unavoidable side-effect of doing the things which win war. It is the adversary's effective (!) mobility, firepower, and depth which must be destroyed; it is the degree to which we accomplish that result, not the simple number of adversaries killed, which measures whether or not our action is tending to win the war.

So, our choices of weapons, of organization of our forces, and methods and objectives of rapid development in continuing deployment, are properly shaped to produce this very specific sort of war-winning result. By using the right sort of Riemannian geometric model, we are able to assess these questions of doctrine and policy most effectively.

If we are wise, we do not limit the application of this method of analysis to battlefield situations in the particular actual or hypothetical case. Instead we examine the way in which the same principles operate more broadly, in terms of seeing total war—integrated irregular and regular warfare, spread over the extent of the pre-war period, as well as that of regular war-fighting.

This leads us to consider a very special kind of case, in which it is possible to win a war without actually coming to the point of regular warfare. In other words, if we create, for the potential adversary, a pre-war condition which makes his launching of war prelude either to a defeat, or to endurance of losses beyond his willingness to tolerate them, then we can win the peace without actually coming into a condition of regular war-fighting.

This special case helps to draw our attention to a more general case, the study of a mixed condition, in which irregular warfare may represent such percentages of the total-war effort as 25%, 50%, 75%, or even 100% of the total war-effort. For example, in what are called "low-intensity wars," the victorious party will probably expend between 70% and 80% of his means on non-military political, cultural, and economic operations—or else, he will often likely not be the victorious party, as we should have learned before escalating in Southeast Asia. Non-military means are not merely supplements to regular warfare, nor merely substitutes.

Now, the measurements become more complicated, although the basic principles remain much the same. The introduction of modern technical forms of mobility and firepower (especially) makes the geometry of our model much more sophisticated. No longer can we use the images of school-book projective geometry. We must use much more advanced geometries, particularly those developed during the 19th century by two of the century's greatest scientists, Karl Gauss and Bernhard Riemann. That aspect of the technical details I need not present in this report. I assume I have given you the gist of the idea, and that will be sufficient for our discussion now.

Now we must come to the crucial point of my design of SDI, a point on which Ogarkov has based his design of the fraudulent "concessions" Gorbachov has offered, in the effort to lure the United States into a strategically suicidal "zero-option" agreement: high rates of "technological attrition."

Ogarkov has assumed that the catastrophic economic situation building up in the United States since Carter-Mondale has brought the West into the kind of economic and budgetary crisis in which the West will render itself incapable of deploying significantly increased breadth or depth for its military forces, a condition in which the rate of technological progress in weapons-design and so forth will be at a relative minimum. Under these conditions, if Ogarkov's "perestroika" restructuring is pushed with a sufficiently bloody hand inside Russia, Moscow can sustain rates of technological progress in warfare capabilities which the West will not match even approximately.

For various reasons, the United States has wishfully deluded itself into imagining that Moscow can not drive its economy at such a combined pace of military production and technological advances in military hardware. What is true in the "least worst" among these misguided estimates among U.S. and Western European specialists, is that "perestroika" produces all of the problems of bottlenecks and political frictions which any war-mobilization level of military production would cause inside Russia. Ogarkov took this fully into account in presenting his policy.

First, the Soviet military planners have emphasized the following point to the Soviet political command.

In the preceding two world wars of this century, intense war-economy mobilization began after regular warfare was under way. However, the decisive margins of destructive force represented by nuclear and related initial-assault weapons ensures that all defense plans based on post-D-day mobilizations of reserves are the folly of wishful budgeteers; no such post-D-day mobilizations will occur in time to overcome the effect of the first 48 to 72 hours of initial war-fighting. Second, that the destruction suffered by initial bombardments will lower productive potentials of combatants to a fraction of their pre-war levels. Therefore, Soviet war-planners have submitted and won the argument, that the kind of full-scale war-economy mobilization which heretofore followed the outbreak of hostilities, must be completed before the war is launched!

In summary, the maximum level of war-production which one might imagine to be reached after the onset of war, must be reached prior to the outbreak of war!

Ogarkov et al. have also stressed, that the Soviet civilian economy could not withstand the strain of such a war-economy mobilization indefinitely. After peak levels of such mobilization are reached, further war-economy mobilization would cause the productive potential of the economy to fall, with ultimately potentially catastrophic strategic effects. So, "perestroika" means, that the Soviet command is preparing

to launch a first-strike attack by about the point that the war-economy mobilization approaches saturation-levels.

The political and other impact of "perestroika" on Russia must be understood solely in those terms of the Ogarkov Plan.

Second, in his writings—and we must presume elsewhere—Ogarkov himself has repeatedly insisted, that Stalin's great strategic blunder prior to Summer 1941, was to shift from the economic policy of 1929-35 to the lower level of strain on the civilian economy of the 1935-41 period. The lack of broadly based technological progress and logistical depth in Soviet military production during the 1935-41 period was crucial to Hitler's initial victories of 1941, according to Ogarkov.

He insists that that error must not be repeated. Yet, Western analysts generally assume the Soviet policy will tend to snap back to an approximation of Stalin's post-1934 adjustment. The fact that Ogarkov's "perestroika" is operational is sufficient proof that such analysts have their heads buried in an awkward place.

Based on these features of "perestroika," we know that Moscow has selected the present period of economic and political crisis in the West as a "window of historic opportunity" for pushing through a global strategic victory. If the Western economies were to revive, and resume pre-1967 rates of technological progress, Russia's present strategic opportunity would vanish. The launching of "perestroika," given the fact that the Soviet command is fully aware of the difficulties of extending that indefinitely, signifies that Moscow is viewing the second Reagan administration, plus the initial period of his successor's term, as a "Now or Maybe Never" chance for making Soviet strategic victory an irreversible fact shortly down the road.

The Ogarkov Plan is a further elaboration and refinement of the doctrine of Marshal V.D. Sokolovskii's 1962 *Military Strategy*, emphasizing Soviet "SDI" as the key to a war-winning assault against the United States and its allies. However, Ogarkov has grasped a point which I have tried to persuade our government to recognize.

The SDI is not merely a "defensive system," to be deployed once a more or less "perfected" design is approved by the accountants, and then adopted. In 1982, I specified four successive SDI systems to be deployed by about the end of this century: an initial Mark I, then an improved Mark II, then an improved Mark III, and then a Mark IV. Each improvement would be deployed between three to five years after its predecessor. The total cost of the Mark I, I estimated at about \$200 billion; the total cost of all four systems, about \$1 trillion (in 1982 dollars). However, the total net outlay for all four systems would be no greater than the cost of the first Mark I system, since the increase in productivity in the civilian sector of our economy, caused by spillovers of SDI technologies, would increase the federal tax-revenue base so that the SDI would more than pay for itself in this way.

This pay-back would occur for us, only under the condition that we used a system of investment tax-credits and

special, low-priced investment credit to encourage manufacturers and utilities to invest in the new technologies SDI will introduce directly into the civilian machine-tool sector.

The Soviets can not match us in this, since our culture favors high rates of assimilation of new productive technologies by our labor-force, whereas Russian culture produces a labor-force which stubbornly resists high rates of technological progress. However, if we are not following such a program, Ogarkov recognizes, then the poorer potential performance of the Russians will be sufficient to produce new kinds of weapons-systems our federal budgets and so on will prevent us from matching. This special factor of Soviet advantage gained from the errors in our economic policies, was first conspicuously demonstrated during the 1970s, by the qualitative superiority of speed and other factors of new generations of Soviet submarines.

What I have just described is, in first approximation, what military science names "technological attrition." High rates of technological progress by one power, in the case that its adversary is technological stagnant or nearly so, ensures a potential war-winning capability for the former.

Earlier, I have identified some outlines of the way in which factors of mobility, firepower, and depth, per capita and per square kilometer, fit into a geometrical function defining "effective firepower." Now, let us modify that picture, by constructing our geometrical function to include "technological attrition." This image suggests the appropriate conception to be applied in understanding what Ogarkov allows Gorbachov to seem to be so generous in offers of "zero-option" conditions.

I must introduce a conception here, which most readers will not understand. However, it is so indispensable to analysis of Ogarkov's strategy, that I must mention it nonetheless. It is better that you should know that something important exists, which you may not understand, than not to know so important a factor does exist. If I attempt to construct a geometrical function to include technological attrition as an independent variable, I face the difficulty that there is no simple linear algebraic function which can describe the functional effect of successive advances in technology. The function is of a type which mathematicians and physicists term "non-linear."

This sort of function happens to be, as the fellow says, "just my meat." All of my accomplishments in economic science are based on recognizing the nature of a Riemannian solution for the role of a representable line of succession of technological advances, each superseding the other, in an economic process.

I explain the practical meaning of this in language which I hope will help the reader to understand the military problem involved.

The reader who has gone through a pre-1960s pre-science course in secondary schools or freshman university mathematics, is familiar with graphs which show a process increasing in a line without sharp breaks, up to some upper limit,

usually called an asymptote. The familiar S-curve, for example. Do processes exist which do not permit that kind of graphing? This takes us into Riemannian physics directly. One of the simplest illustrations of this is the way Riemann forecast the possibility of powered flight beyond the upper limit of the speed of sound.

For a long time, even after Riemann, most physicists denied that transonic powered flight were possible. This view was held by many up to the point in the postwar period, our first military supersonic flights occurred. It was assumed by so-called conventional mathematicians, using conventional gas-theory as the basis for their argument, that once the plane reached the speed of sound, that a barrier existed which would prevent faster speeds. Already in 1859, Riemann proved this was not so. As the powered projectile reached the speed of sound, a new condition is introduced, a condition of a type which physicists call a "singularity." At this point, the local laws of physics operating seem to be changed in a definite way.

This is the general nature of the effect of continuous technological progress on economies. From the standpoint of conventional, linear mathematical physics, the old laws of physics appear to break down, and new laws take their place, in the form of "new factors" which suddenly pop into the equation. Another way of saying this, is that "new physical principles" take over.

The specifications I gave for SDI technologies were based on using known kinds of "new physical principles." Once we move into the domain of those new technologies, a whole series of new kinds of technologies appears one after the other. That I attempted to show our government. Ogarkov has succeeded in convincing his.

When we enter the domain of generation of coherent pulses of electromagnetic radiation as either tools or weapons, if we apply to the use of such technologies principles of harmonics we should readily learn from optical biophysics, we are operating in what might seem to many at first as a new universe. Among the array of such weapons, are not only defensive SDI weapons-systems, but, at a more advanced level, also radio-frequency assault weapons.

What most strategic analysts and policy-shapers in the West are overlooking so far, is the fact that Ogarkov's willingness to dump large portions of presently deployed types of nuclear assault-weapons, if the West does likewise, is that he is basing his current adjustments in the Ogarkov war-plan on the deployment of more advanced kinds of assault weapons. These include a new generation of missile-systems more advanced than the SS-20 (for example), and also include increased reliance upon radio-frequency assault weapons, including anti-personnel weapons against which, presently, there is virtually no defense. If Ogarkov can accelerate the deployment of the Soviet version of "SDI," now being readied rapidly, changes the mobility and firepower with more advanced kinds of weapons systems, and reorganizes his strike-forces order of battle to take this into account, Ogarkov

might be able to produce several Russian military varieties of "Sputniks of the 1990s," rendering us, if we are not prepared, helplessly outflanked on the technological flank of war-fighting.

For that reason, Ogarkov's game behind Gorbachov's "zero-option" hoax, is to enable Russia to shift its production capacities from production of the less-advanced weapons systems Moscow is now deploying, to more advanced systems, including new kinds of assault weapons on the other side of the next level of technological singularities.

Unless we commit ourselves now, to putting U.S. military production through the paces of high rates of technological attrition, and if we accept Moscow's zero-option offers, Ogarkov could win. If we were to accept the zero option, we might seem to buy a period of relative strategic calm in the European theater. However, this apparent Soviet pull-back from advanced positions in Eastern Europe would be merely a regrouping of Soviet forces, pending the early deployment of the Soviet SDI and the reorganization of Soviet forces around the new series of weapons issued. Then, Moscow would be ready to strike, and is clearly intending that this attack will be launched at approximately the point that the present Soviet war-economy mobilization peaks at near-saturation levels.

If I were to become President, Ogarkov could not win. I know the game, and know how we can win it without actually going to war. I can force Moscow to give up the game, as one it knows it can not win, and which it can not afford to play out for long, unless it were assured of winning.

Some of Ogarkov's cute tricks

Some folks have been conditioned to accept without question the slogan that "thermonuclear arsenals are the ultimate weapon." Many also believe that the use of such weapons is "unthinkable." Both popular assumptions are without any foundation in fact.

Back in early Eisenhower administration days, good old Charley Wilson, over at Defense, was in a defense-budget-cutting fit. We could reduce our military forces, he argued, by relying upon thermonuclear weapons and airpower to deliver them. We could reduce "conventional forces," cut tax rates, and so on and so forth, if we simply proceeded with a doctrine of "a bigger bang for the buck." Charley was good at his trade, but it wasn't national defense. Coming from business management into military planning, and trying to substitute a few catchy ideological buzz-words, like "bigger bang for the buck," may sell on the rubber-chicken circuit, but it is terrifyingly incompetent defense policy.

Thermonuclear weapons are very powerful weapons, but, from a military standpoint, very bad weapons. Once they go bang, they often produce as many effects of the type we don't want as those we do. Over the years, we have recognized that good old Charley didn't really understand nuclear arsenals; we have reshaped our arsenals for smaller blasts, and vastly improved accuracy, with the idea that we should use these

weapons only for a range of special purposes, such as destroying adversary military forces, including his own missiles. With the advent of new physical principles, we have in sight weapons better suited to the military planner, weapons which have the potential of killing just as many people, and sometimes getting through adversary defenses where nuclear arsenals can not. These new kinds of weapons are much more "ultimate" than nuclear "bangs," and we know that they are by no means the "ultimate ones."

No weapon could ever be so devastating that its use would

What most strategic analysts and policy-shapers in the West are overlooking so far, regarding Ogarkov's willingness to dump large portions of presently deployed types of nuclear assault-weapons, if the West does likewise, is that he is basing his current adjustments in the Ogarkov war-plan on the deployment of more advanced kinds of assault weapons.

be categorically "unthinkable." The use of any available weapon is as "thinkable" as it is "unthinkable" to accept the consequences of not using it. There will always be someone around, in the right position to decide that it would be "unthinkable" to accept the consequences of not using a particular sort of weapon.

Just to illustrate the point, let us see how our acceptance of the zero option would affect the spread of AIDS.

We know now of the existence of several species of viruses with effects of the sort we associate with AIDS. In addition to the "original" AIDS virus, which is already evolving rather rapidly, we have others also spreading rapidly, which are as much like AIDS as a tiger is a lion. So, instead of thinking of just one species of AIDS virus, we must think of an "AIDS virus group." This infection is now estimated to be approximately 100% fatal, after periods of incubation varying from several to fifteen years, is transmitted in many ways (in addition to the famous "sex" and needles), and appears to be cooking up new ways to transmit itself. There is no cure in sight, and the best estimate of experts is that we could not expect a vaccine or cure in earlier than five to ten years—while the number of fatally infected persons appears to double each eight to twelve months.

The question is: What is the probability of stopping the AIDS pandemic if the Soviet empire were to dominate the world during the course of the 1990s? The answer, unfortunately, is, "Probably zero."

First fact to consider, is that we either care for persons infected with AIDS, or we kill them as a way of stopping them from spreading the infection. If we care for them, the combined cost to society for dealing with AIDS will probably reach an amount much larger than the defense budget by some time during the 1990s. To develop a cure, will require a massive investment in very advanced biophysics technology of research, on the scale of a Manhattan or Apollo Project, at least.

Second fact to consider: Would we be able to mobilize such expenditures under the conditions of Moscow's early phase of world-domination? Almost certainly not.

What happens then? Either the entire human species, or nearly all of it, is wiped out by some time during the first half of the coming century. In that case, is it "thinkable" not to use whatever means are required to prevent Moscow's world-domination? The alternative is to shoot immediately each AIDS-infected person. Would you rather that, or find a way of preventing Moscow from achieving imperial domination? There are other major reasons for resisting Moscow's imperial aggression, but the AIDS example is sufficient to make the point. There is a point at which not resorting to the "unthinkable" becomes less "unthinkable" than not resorting to such action.

In military planning, a "good weapon" is one which does precisely what is required, and an absolute minimum of anything else.

I shall not go into details of what I know about radio-frequency weapons, because I have not yet decided what ought to be kept secret about these techniques—not only from Moscow, but from some nuts who I might hope should never know even as much as I know presently about these techniques. I shall merely say, that they are thermodynamically efficient in performing their mission beyond the wildest imagination of most of you, and that there is, to all intents and purposes, no defense of persons against them, but to eliminate the weapon before it is fired. Practically speaking, these weapons are as deadly as a neutron bomb, and leave less residual after-effects than a neutron bomb.

That said, I shall come directly to my horrifying concluding point.

The Ogarkov Plan for the European theater of Soviet first-strike launch of general war, requires the immediate destruction of approximately 250 selected military and logistical targets in Western Europe, as far as Brittany in France, and southern regions of England. Up to now, the conventional view has been that Moscow would accomplish this destruction with warheads from short- and medium-range or intermediate-range nuclear missiles. This has been a useful study by some key Western specialists, very valuable to us in planning the deploying of strategic and tactical defense of West-

ern Europe—since knowing the trajectories of missiles is very convenient to the fellows who are assigned to intercepting and destroying those missiles.

Let us ask the question: Why use an interceptable nuclear missile to deliver a lethal effect which can be carried to the target in a briefcase or at least a truck? Now, probably, you begin to see the reason I stressed the importance of considering Soviet spetsnaz forces' deployment in assessing the Soviet's offers of terms of a zero option!

Let us consider two cases. The case of Soviet targets in Western Europe, and the United States.

Let us consider three types of "carry weapons" which Soviet spetsnaz forces could covertly deliver against what are otherwise Soviet first-strike missile targets in Western Europe: 1) Small nuclear devices; 2) chemical or biological weapons; 3) radio-frequency weapons. The first could be delivered by an ordinary sort of motor vehicle. The second, could be delivered in a briefcase, generally speaking. The third could be deployed inside a trailer truck. To take out a port facility, or analogous logistical capability, nuclear devices would be implied. To take out the personnel of every large NATO and related military command-center in Europe, radio-frequency weapons and alternative use of some select repertoire of chemical-biologicals might be preferred.

How could such weapons be delivered into spetsnaz units' hands deep inside the European rear echelons? Presently, the easiest thing imaginable. In containers by way of ports such as Rotterdam and Hamburg, or the freight terminals of major airports, or in TIR trucks operating in Western Europe from origins in the Warsaw Pact nations. They would not need to be introduced assembled. The components of radio-frequency weapons are what is needed, with some components acquirable in the West. Chemicals and biologicals can be prepared in the West, generally speaking. Nuclear weapons components incur greater difficulties for the spetsnaz.

The general principle was emphasized by Britain's Col. David Stirling, in proposing the development of the famous British SAS for operations in North Africa during World War II. Five properly selected and trained men, operating in a team, against the enemy's deep rear echelons, can cause more net damage to the enemy than a regiment on the first line.

In the case of spetsnaz operations in the Western European theater, the Soviet objective is to occupy this territory in case of war. Therefore, unless the Soviets perceive no alternative means, they will prefer the means which cause the least annoying after-effects for Soviet units operating in the affected area. This would tend to limit their use of nuclear weapons, and would greatly delimit the use of somewhat unpredictable biologicals in that region. In the United States, the Soviet spetsnaz would be operating with no such restrictions. Long-lasting after-effects are, generally speaking, no deterrent against use of almost any weapon suited to the means available for its deployment.

It is doubtful that the Soviets would use anything but spetsnaz for these kinds of strategic "hand-carry" sorts of

operations. Their loyal paramilitaries from among the natives of Western European countries and the United States may be just that, but the Soviets would never entrust such "auxiliaries" with an operation as politically-strategically sensitive as this sort of monkey-business. These would be hardened spetsnaz under strict Soviet military command.

For other D-day operations in our rear echelons, such as assassinations of selected key persons, the KGB's killers would tend to come significantly into play, with numerous targets assigned to the locally recruited paramilitary auxili-

By delimiting the scope of political and logistical infrastructure around the spetsnaz, and actually catching a few of these, to be able to determine the nature of their assignments, the way is prepared for a more general clean-out. It must be done fairly quickly. "Perestroika" should be read as a signal that we have not many years to fritter away cleaning up this mess.

aries as well. The command structure of the Soviets is such, that an irregular means of conducting a strategic military action would be highly compartmentalized within the appropriate channels of the military command itself.

Have we no defense against this sort of "hand-carry" strategic attacks? We could, but presently, in strictly technical Latin, our internal security stinks.

The strategic opportunity for Ogarkov's use of spetsnaz surrogates for missiles, depends upon the fact that Soviet spetsnaz and similar KGB units swim in our societies like fish in the sea, to borrow Mao Tse-tung's famous imagery.

Inside our mass-based radical movements, such as the radical ecologists and other counter-cultural sub-cultures, there are various layers, arranged sociologically like concentric circles. Soft mush-heads on the outside, and hardened killers of "criminal energy" in the smaller, inner layers. For example, in West Germany, there are approximately 10,000 persons of "criminal energy," ready to kill or be killed, inside the radical ecologist ferment as a whole. Inside the 10,000 hard-core, there are well-trained paramilitary forces totaling to an estimated 2,000. Around the 10,000, there are violence-prone mush-heads, ready to deploy as a screening force around the contingents of the inner 10,000, and to do assorted vio-

lence and sabotage, but who have not yet been sufficiently criminalized to be prepared to go forth to kill or be killed. Around that screening layer of violence-prone mush-heads, there are the outer layers of the Green Party-pivoted "radical ecologist" strata as a whole, including the punkers, the squatters, and so forth. The innermost kernel overlaps the terrorist gangs as such. This is the general situation throughout Europe.

All of the crucial deployments are under direct Soviet control. Paramilitary "officers" are on the scene directing the deployments of the violence-prone forces. The photos of these "officers" have been taken in many cases, such that their identities, political party affiliations, and East bloc training are known. The entire complex of terrorist forces is under Soviet control, via such channels as East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Syrian intelligence, the latter the up-front coordinator of Soviet-directed international terrorism since 1967.

Around the radical ecologists as a whole, there are their liberal sympathizers, especially those associated with sundry forms of the anti-nuclear and peace-march movements.

These locally recruited forces inside the nations serve as an essential part of the political and logistical infrastructure in which Soviet spetsnaz and KGB operatives swim "like fish in the sea." Once this configuration were made clear to the general public, and the dangers of the spetsnaz and KGB units made clear, the hard-core would tend to be isolated rather quickly, and easily arrested and given harsh sentences in consonance with the quality of criminal acts in which they are apprehended as perpetrators. This would remove the sea from the GRU and KGB fish—which is one very efficient way of catching fish.

The security of freight transport and airports and seaports could be tightened up, and TIR and other suspicious vehicles subjected to random spot-checks. (Many of the East-bloc drivers prove to be East bloc military or intelligence operatives.)

By delimiting the scope of political and logistical infrastructure around the spetsnaz, and actually catching a few of these, to be able to determine the nature of their assignments, the way is prepared for a more general clean-out. It must be done fairly quickly. "Perestroika" should be read as a signal that we have not many years to fritter away cleaning up this mess.

It is not necessary to have a "witchhunt." "Witchhunts" tend to destroy the very system of law we are supposed to be defending against Russian imperial or other sorts of dictatorships. Clean operations, which never abuse the innocent, are possible with proper training and coordination of the agencies responsible.

However, this hideous special problem of strategic use of spetsnaz aside, the basic solution to the overall problem is to move ahead quickly now, with the general policy of defense and economic development which I have identified here.

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
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