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country ungovernable, seizing factories, schools and slum districts . . . and paralyzing transport."

How much Moscow is depending on Washington, was revealed in a July analysis of Chilean affairs published in América Latina. Author Yuri Koroliov compared the situation in Chile to Nicaragua in the final stages of the rebellion against Somoza, and forecast "decisive events" after the plebiscite. He warned, however, that while the "revolutionary vanguard" in Chile is capable of overturning the "game of the bourgeois opposition," and "taking power," the major obstacle to this strategy is the possibility that a majority of Chileans might vote for Pinochet, out of fear of civil war.

Washington, too, was preparing to position itself to stop "an eventual nationalist turn by the dictator" if Pinochet won the vote, Koroliov noted. That is why the U.S. Senate voted to provide \$1 million to build up the opposition forces, "which can become a counterweight in the case of an eventual nationalist turn."

Washington's intervention has swung the election and its aftermath in Moscow's favor. As the *New York Times* gloated in its editorial on Oct. 7, "Mr. Abrams has been properly blamed for policy failures in Central America. He is entitled to a full measure of credit in Chile."

The communist battle plan for Colombia

by Valerie Rush

According to spokesmen of the Unified Workers Confederation (CUT) of Colombia, that labor federation will hold a general strike on Oct. 27. Nominally, the strike is to protest the Barco government's refusal to consider its petitions, submitted in May of this year, for everything from a general wage increase and food price freeze, to a lifting of the state of siege and moratorium on the foreign debt. In the beginning, the petitions of the CUT were intended to improve the increasingly precarious living standards of the Colombian population. In fact, many of the so-called "democratic sector" of the CUT believe that their strike is to pressure the government into such concessions. The reality is otherwise, however.

The increasingly dominant communist forces within the CUT intend the national strike, under current conditions of destabilization within the country, to "deepen the mass struggle." It is no secret that much of the CUT leadership is linked to the Colombian Communist Party, A Luchar, Frente Popular, and their various guerrilla armed wings—the FARC, M-19, ELN, EPL, etc. Their concern is not to improve living

standards, but to "aggravate" conditions of instability in the country, the better to facilitate the seizure of power.

The moment of insurrection

The Moscow-directed Colombian Communist Party (PCC) has repeated, publicly, a thousand and one times that its fundamental objective is the seizure of power. Its chief, Gilberto Vieira, has emphasized that the most important developments leading to the "insurrectional moment" have been the creation of the CUT in November 1986, and the formation of the umbrella Simón Bolívar Guerrilla Coordinating Council this year. According to the PCC's "political thesis," approved at its 15th Congress held last December, this "unifying process" has been indispensable to reach the current stage of "accumulation of forces," characterized by "a greater sharpening of the battle in Colombia, with a greater protagonism of armed or intermediate forms." The penultimate phase is "co-government," leading to the final insurrection.

The communists say in their "Thesis": "We could speak of a stage in which the level of conscience, of unity, and of use of various forms, has increased. What characterizes this increase is the emergence of a new kind of popular movement . . . in which different kinds of projects come together, worker and democratic unity is strengthened, and the practice of revolutionary sectors overlap."

And what are these new forms of struggle which, according to the communists, must be combined to achieve strategic objectives? "It is not a matter of limiting ourselves to legalized mass actions whose potential grows daily more limited. And much less limiting ourselves to institutional action. We must also act within what we could call informality. . . . In this period, new manifestions of popular action have appeared, such as occupations of public offices, seizure of establishments, churches, or institutions; long-term peasant marches . . .; blockades of highways, agrarian strikes, and other previously unknown expressions of the people's will."

The PCC and its FARC want a national strike because it dramatically augments their irregular warfare arsenal. One need hardly imagine the implications of simultaneous regional strikes, peasant occupations, terrorist assaults on defenseless populations, ambushes, kidnapings, bombings, and assassinations, joined to a nationwide paralysis of production and transportation—and all under the centralized command of the communists.

The communists' global plan for irregular warfare includes culture, politics, economics, religion, and military strategy. They know what they want, and have a strict timetable for achieving it. The "democratic" forces within the CUT, under instruction from the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) and the Inter-American Regional Organization (ORIT), have squandered their influence and their efforts in forging "lesser-evil" alliances with the "moderate" communists, who are now engaged in placing the substantial human resources of the CUT at the disposal of Moscow's narco-terrorist armies.

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