

the Communist regime has been totally isolated among the nations.

Any disadvantage for our enemy is bound to be an advantage for us. How much advantage we can receive depends solely on how we respond. The most influential country in determining the degree of our advantage and of the enemy's losses is the United States, followed by Japan, and then the other countries. Therefore we should pay special attention to the motives of the United States government and of the Japanese government.

In this, we must consider that a disagreement in principle is involved. Our cultural tradition is concerned with justice and not with profits. This is a founding principle of our nation, and we will not give it up. But other nations may not agree with this principle of ours. Many countries are concerned with profits and are indifferent to injustice. Therefore, we cannot judge the motives of others according to our own feelings, nor can we expect other people to treat us according to our own principles.

This means that we should clearly understand what the principles of other nations are, so that our diplomatic work can be conducted smoothly. The reaction of the American people to the Tiananmen massacre seemed to me to be the strongest. In the House of Representatives and the Senate there was total agreement that the United States should mete out the most serious condemnation and censure to Beijing. This represents the truthful voice of all Americans. The attitude of President Bush did not satisfy the wishes of the Congress. Even though Bush canceled arms sales and asked American citizens to leave the mainland, James Lilley, the U.S. Ambassador to Beijing, made a series of conciliatory statements, and also announced that the United States would not impose any further economic sanctions. None of this had any serious effect on the Communist regime. None of this stopped the Communist regime from launching a manhunt against the leaders of the democracy movement.

Why did Bush refuse to take more decisive anti-Communist attitude? Because he was more concerned about the triangular relationship with Communist China and with the Soviet Union, and about trade relations, personal friendships, and avoiding the loss of all the effort invested in relations with Beijing. The massacre created a conflict between justice and profit. What should Bush have done? I hope that he will be able to unify justice and profit. As for us, we should aggressively increase our essential relationship with the United States, according to our plan.

We will do the same thing in regard to Japan. We must help them to understand the advantages and disadvantages that emerge from the conflict between justice and profit. Since Japan has invested large amounts of money in mainland China, with the United States in second place, they are concerned about the possible total loss of their investments. Therefore, their condemnation and sanctions against the Communist regime were so weak and cautious.

Castro seeking deal with Bush

by Gretchen Small

Under a cloud of confetti about a drug war, Cuba and the Bush administration have entered a new phase of negotiations toward reestablishing relations. With Moscow the silent partner in this elaborate dance of back-channel negotiations, acrimonious public attacks and diplomatic "signals," there is no doubt that the big push toward a deal is on. What is in doubt, is who in Cuba shall be the beneficiary of the deal.

Engaged in open battle with Gorbachov, and well aware of Washington's efforts to also curry favor with potential successors, Fidel Castro proved in July that he is willing to sacrifice whatever and whomever he can to ensure that it is he who keeps the franchise on power.

On July 11, Castro took to Cuba's airwaves to announce that his government now wishes to open "communications" with Washington on fighting drugs. Two days later, Gen. Arnaldo Ochoa, a once-close friend deemed potential opponent, and three others were executed by firing squad, on charges of "carrying out hostile actions against foreign states, trafficking in toxic drugs, and abuse of authority."

"There are two kinds of Communists," Castro explained in his annual July 26 anniversary of the Revolution address: "Those who let themselves be killed easily and those of us who won't let ourselves be killed at all."

Havana Trials, 1989

The cover for both operations—the executions of opponents and negotiations with Washington—is a suddenly discovered "intolerance" for drug trafficking in Cuba.

The Castro regime, which has used narcotics trafficking as both a source of funds and the cutting edge of warfare against the other nations in the Americas for two decades, launched its anti-drug charade on June 14, with the announcement by Armed Forces Commander Raúl Castro that the popular army general, Arnaldo Ochoa, several aides, and top officials of the Interior Ministry had been arrested. The Cuban nation was told that Fidel and Raúl Castro had discovered with horror that this small group had cut drug-running deals with the Medellín, Colombia drug cartel in the last three years.

What followed next was a spectacle not seen since Sta-

lin's Moscow Trials in the 1930s. Ochoa and crew were tried by a special military tribunal, found guilty, and condemned to death. The case was given extraordinary publicity by the Cuban government. Speeches given at each stage of the trial and sentencing—particularly those where the “crimes” were listed—were broadcast on Cuban television and radio. Soon enough, a drugged-looking Ochoa admitted guilt and requested his own death.

No one escaped the drama. On July 9, each member of the Council of State stood up to declare—before the cameras—their support for the decision to execute the four principal accused. One by one, each exalted the severity of execution as the penalty demanded by “the angry masses” and “all of those who are willing to continue on the right path.” “Fidel's word is always true, as is the policy of our party, our Revolution,” Council member Vilma Espin cried.

No Stalinists here, Culture Minister Armando Hart insisted. “This is a group decision,” and any comparison “with crimes committed in certain historic times in other countries supported by state power,” is just “demagogy.”

Less than one month later, General Ochoa and three others were executed. Ten others were sent to prison with lengthy sentences. Seven generals from the Ministry of Interior were then purged, including the First Vice-Minister, the Chiefs of Intelligence, the Border Patrol, and Fire Prevention and Extinction, and the deputy chief of the Political Department.

The claim that “traffickers know now, once and for all, that they will be unable to count on Cuba for drug trafficking,” as Cuba's official newspaper *Granma* wrote in June, is ludicrous. On Aug. 4, 1985, Fidel Castro himself not only defended the chief financier of the cocaine cartel, Robert Vesco, but defiantly promised that he had and would continue to provide Vesco protection—a promise he has kept to this day. “I know that he was here, that he received medical treatment, and that he can come back again,” Castro stated. I told Vesco, he added, “If you want to live here, live here.”

Judging by Castro's desperation, Castro may soon announce that he is sorry, and that he never realized that Robert Vesco was involved in drugs.

The condominium squeeze

Castro's problem is that no power seems interested in striking a deal with *him*. Thirty years after Castro seized power from Fulgencio Batista, Washington and Moscow are looking beyond the graying dictator, with an eye to the generation who will replace him.

The battle between Castro and Gorbachov's crowd is completely out in the open. “Perhaps the Cuban Revolution is not ideal,” wrote Sergei Mikoyan, director of the monthly journal of the Soviet Academy of Sciences' Latin American Institute, *América Latina*, in June. It “still has not been able to reach high levels of production, and therefore, of living standards”; sufficient stimulants to increase productivity and labor quality have not been found. “To be content with what

has been achieved is inadmissible.”

Mikoyan made no bones Castro was the target. “When the Cuban Revolution is discussed, the eternal dilemma of the role of the personality in history cannot be ignored,” he wrote. “The potentialities of a pluralism of approaches towards optimal methods of constructing socialist society are still not being utilized. . . . Perhaps the presence of an exceptional leader in a small country inevitably means such a result for the collective conscience. Not without reason is it said, that ‘Our deficiencies are the continuation of our merits.’ ”

Castro's strategy for survival in the face of increasing Soviet pressures appears to be based on an estimation that if he can hold out long enough, Gorbachov may soon find himself in trouble at home. Thus Castro exclaimed in his July 26 speech, “If we woke up tomorrow to a great civil war in the Soviet Union, if the Soviet Union disintegrated completely—something we hope won't happen—the Cuban Revolution will continue to resist.”

Castro expressed no love here for the United States. Because Bush thinks socialism is on the wane, he will “carry out a policy of peace toward the big [Communist] powers and a policy of war against small countries,” Castro warned, adding that “never has any administration, not even Mr. Reagan's, been more triumphant . . . and more insolent and threatening than the Bush administration.”

And so the ballet proceeds

While Castro raves in public, and President Bush states that Cuba will have to do “much more” before being rewarded by better ties with the United States, back-channel negotiations between Washington and Havana are already under way.

“In recent weeks President Castro was reportedly approached by the United States to mediate in the long-running Panama crisis,” the London *Financial Times* reported July 1. “If there was a drug connection between the Panamanian and Cuban military, then General Ochoa's arrest would be a logical first step to break it. President Castro's best efforts to secure General Noriega's withdrawal from power may, some analysts now believe, be being traded for an easing of U.S. sanctions against Cuba.”

Assistant Secretary for Narcotics Affairs Melvyn Levitsky told a House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on July 25 that while the United States has “serious reservations” about Cuba's anti-drug turn, the administration is “taking a fresh look at areas in which the government of Cuba could tangibly demonstrate the seriousness of its claimed willingness to cooperate against drug-trafficking.” Rep. Charles Rangel (D-N. Y.) reported that Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Michael Kozak has already begun meeting with the new head of the Cuban Interest Section in Washington, José A. Arbesu Fraga, who was assigned to Washington in June as the Ochoa show got under way.