

## CIA, KGB agree to bash U.S. allies

by Joseph Brewda

One day after the conclusion of the Wyoming discussions between U.S. Secretary of State Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, a little publicized conference began at Rand corporation headquarters in Santa Monica, California. The participants at the Sept. 25-30 conference were exclusively retired senior officials of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and the Soviet KGB. The topic of their closed-door event, according to U.S. participants, was joint CIA/KGB operations against international terrorists and international narcotics-trafficking organizations.

While the exact results of the Wyoming and California discussions are not known at this time, both events were intended to further the appeasement process begun at the 1986 Reykjavik summit. Observers note that the CIA/KGB conference may have led to secret agreements to mutually support the post-Reykjavik U.S.-Soviet deals, even against traditional U.S. allies. The Santa Monica conference appears to culminate a series of secret meetings between the two intelligence services begun in 1987, where broad-based joint operations were discussed under the cover of combatting narcotics and terrorism.

Those who know the murderous record of Soviet intelligence, will not be pleased to learn that the KGB has expressed enthusiasm over the California meeting, in comments made by its participants to the U.S. Armed Forces publication *Stars and Stripes*. "This is the first time that former senior officials of the KGB and CIA have met in a public policy forum," gushed Soviet delegation leader Igor Belyaev, political observer for the semi-official KGB mouthpiece *Literaturnaya Gazeta*. "This is a real opportunity for an exchange of views and for the development of a new approach in the international arena," he added.

Former KGB counterterrorism chief Valentin Zvezdenkov articulated one of the two primary public-relations formulations used to justify the proposed pact, in his comments to the same publication: "The terrorism mafia is pooling its resources." Consequently, he intoned, "It is time that the

world forces find a common approach and a common way to prevent terrorism and protect all human beings."

Meanwhile, *Literaturnaya Gazeta* South America analyst Vladimir Vessensky attended the conference to provide the other "humanitarian" cover for the event: combatting international narcotics cartels. A self-professed expert on South American narco-terrorist organizations, Vessensky offered Soviet intelligence assistance to the Bush administration's recently proclaimed war on drugs, participants report. Vessensky even plans to co-author a book on narco-terrorism with Rand terrorist expert and conference participant Robert Kupperman, these same U.S. attendees state.

Indicating the importance that the White House placed on the gathering, U.S. participants included former CIA director William Colby, who is now back at the agency as an adviser to CIA director William Webster; former covert-operations specialist Miles Copeland; and former CIA deputy director Ray Cline. Both Copeland and Cline have remained top U.S. intelligence hands, whatever their formal ties to the CIA may now be. Both have been close to President Bush for at least two decades.

The conference itself was sponsored by the Washington, D.C.-based Center for Strategic and International Studies "Terrorism Committee," through its front organization, "The Search for a Common Ground." Cline runs the Terrorism Committee; former Cline aide John Marks directs the Search for a Common Ground. No minor affair, Terrorism Committee members include former CIA director Richard Helms, former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, former U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Edward Meyer, longtime CIA propagandist Walter Laqueur, and Rand specialist Robert Kupperman, whose firm hosted the event.

### Economic warfare

Although the reported agenda of the conference centered on a combined war against terrorism and narco-terrorism, some Western European observers feel that a more likely subject of discussion was battering U.S. allies in Europe and the Third World through economic and financial warfare. That this was a key agenda topic, some say, was indicated by a strikingly unusual speech made by CIA director William Webster on Sept. 20, shortly before both the Wyoming and California discussions.

In his address before the World Affairs Council of Los Angeles, Webster asserted that the agency would be shifting its strategic focus away from East-West military issues, since the Cold War is now allegedly over. Instead the agency would refocus its attention on economic matters, since "intelligence on economic developments has never been more important." Having established that theme, the U.S. intelligence chief asserted, "Our political and military allies are also our economic competitors," and ominously stated, "The national security implications of a competitor's ability to create, capture, or control markets of the future are very significant."

Lest the audience misunderstand the target of his address, Webster explicitly labeled "Japanese and European surplus capital" as "creating some potential risks." In a threatening allusion to Third World nations' considering debt moratoria on their unpayable debt, the CIA director also asserted that "along with the globalization of international finance has come the greater use of the financial system by governments and groups whose objectives threaten our national security."

### Earlier preparations: terrorism

Although the Santa Monica intelligence-planning conference is a dramatic development, it is not the first discussion of its type to have taken place since the Reykjavik appeasement process began. Some say that Soviet dictator Mikhail Gorbachov first proposed the pooling of the resources of the KGB and CIA himself, back in December 1988. The pretext for the proposal was the terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland that month. This pooling of resources would be popularly justified by a humanitarian war against terrorism.

According to London *Sunday Mail* correspondent William Lowther, Gorbachov's December initiative met with a favorable response. Lowther reported in a April 7, 1989 column that "preliminary talks were held between the Americans and the Russians in Moscow, and CIA bosses decided to consult with British intelligence—their chief allies—in London." After noting British intelligence enthusiasm over the Soviet offer, Lowther further projected, "Intelligence officials from the three services may meet to plan actual joint operations as early as June" 1989.

One of the first public responses to the Gorbachov December 1988 offer was that made by CIA director Webster in an exclusive interview published in *U.S.A. Today* on Jan. 12, 1989. Asked if he believed that Soviet intelligence would share information with the United States regarding the Lockerbie Pan Am bombing, Webster stated: "I would guess they would. It's a view that I have held that conflicts with many who have thought that the Soviet Union was monolithically responsible for terrorism. . . . We've had intimations of a desire of the Soviets to work in the world arena to reduce the threat of terrorism."

An unprecedented January meeting between U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Jack Matlock and then KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov, shortly following Webster's press interview, furthered the process, some analysts note. That same January, Cline's "Search for a Common Ground" held its first CIA/KGB meeting in Moscow, to discuss collaboration against international terrorism and narco-terrorism.

Then in March 1989, Secretary of State Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze raised the discussion to a state-to-state level at their Vienna, Austria meeting. U.S. administration spokesmen report that intelligence agency collaboration in a program of measures against terrorism was first formally discussed at that meeting. The topic continued

as a formal agenda item at the Baker/Shevardnadze meeting in Moscow that May.

### And drugs

While terrorism has been the main pretext used to justify joint CIA/KGB operations, the narcotics plague has also been an issue seized upon by both powers as a public relations basis for ever-expanding collaboration. This ploy goes as far back as 1987, and was also initiated by Moscow.

According to U.S. State Department spokesmen, the idea that U.S. and Soviet intelligence services could assist each other in combatting drugs first began in 1987. That year, Canadian embassy officials in Moscow were startled when they were abruptly contacted by officials of the Soviet Foreign Ministry with information regarding a narcotics ring active in both the U.S.S.R. and Canada. Breaking all precedents, Soviet officials warned Canadian authorities that the Soviet freighter *Buktarma* was carrying five tons of Afghan hashish from the Soviet port of Murmansk to the Canadian port of Montreal. Royal Canadian Mounted Police officers promptly flew to Moscow to exchange narcotics intelligence with Soviet Customs authorities on the ring. A multi-million dollar Montreal ring was busted as a result. Later that year, Soviet officials tipped off British police authorities to another narcotics ring, to the delight of the pro-détente British press.

Responding to this unexpected offer of assistance, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Narcotics Matters Barbara Wrobloski, and former Drug Enforcement Administration chief John Lawn, traveled to Moscow in April 1988, to hold talks with their counterparts on intelligence exchanges.

Then in January 1989, Secretary of State Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze signed a Memorandum of Understanding at their Paris meeting which provided for government cooperation on the chemical analysis of seized narcotics. The midwife for that agreement, former U.S. Ambassador to Bulgaria Melvyn Levitzky, himself no stranger to the intelligence world, has now replaced Wrobloski as the State Department's top narcotics officer. Since that time, expanding U.S.-Soviet intelligence-sharing on narcotics trafficking has been a formal agenda item at every Baker/Shevardnadze meeting, according to State Department spokesmen, including at Wyoming.

As in the related case of Soviet responsibility for much of international terrorism, the U.S. government has suspended all reference to Warsaw Pact involvement in the narcotics trade, as the negotiations have proceeded.

In March of 1989, the State Department issued an *International Narcotics Strategy Report* which flatly lied, "There is no evidence of any current involvement of Bulgarian government, government agencies in drug trafficking." That same month the executive director of the U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control, Giuseppe di Gennaro, traveled to Bulgaria to ludicrously laud "Bulgaria in her struggle against illegal trafficking of narcotics."