

The shaky throne

Will the new “democratic authoritarianism” return a Tsar to the Kremlin? Part 3 of Roman Bessonov’s series on “The Anti-Utopia in Power” in Russia.

In the Soviet Union of 1990, on the eve of the dissolution of the Communist Party (CPSU) and the U.S.S.R. itself, the Democratic Russia movement based its propaganda on liberation populism, declaring itself to be the people’s movement, with no higher objective than to crush the corrupt *nomenklatura* and establish a more just political system that cared for all citizens. This goal was proclaimed at public rallies, written in magazines such as *Ogonyok*, and printed on the millions of posters produced for the country’s first really multi-candidate election campaigns, the Supreme Soviet elections of 1990.

The mirage of “multi-party democracy” never came to life, as we have seen in the sorry history of the Russian political parties’ splintering and resplintering into warring, impotent fragments.¹ While democracy-watchers from the U.S. International Republican Institute (IRI) and kindred organizations promoted and applauded the fragmentation process as a measure of success, something else came lumbering onto the scene: the figure of a Russian Tsar. In this article in our series on the strategic blunder, passed off as the “democratization” of Russia, we look at the cultivation of Boris Yeltsin, especially by the British elite, as such a figure.

New powers behind old fences

The new, democratic order in Russia was supposed to be personified by Yeltsin, the maverick who had publicly rejected the privileges of his CPSU Politburo and was now returning to the center of power. In May 1990, members of the newly elected Supreme Soviet of the R.S.F.S.R.² chose Yeltsin as its chairman, by a narrow margin, making him “President” of Russia. A year later, in June 1991, he won the first-ever election of a Russian President by direct popular vote.

Yeltsin set a pattern for his fellow reform politicians. First, the heralds of the new order easily stormed the newly open legislative bodies, sweeping into the majority in *soviet* after

soviet at various levels of authority. No sooner were they ensconced in legislative power, than most of them, following Yeltsin’s example, prepared for the next step: into the Executive branch, the state administration.

The change in their behavior was astonishing. Gavriil Popov, leading critic of the “command-administrative system” of the Soviet economy, now demanded “strict administrative force,” as soon as he was elected mayor of Moscow. Anatoli Sobchak, backed by Democratic Russia (DR) in his campaign for the St. Petersburg mayoralty, began his new career by denouncing the “system of *soviets*”—in which his fellow democrats were the overwhelming majority! Another pioneer of democracy, Ilya Zaslavsky, launched his real estate purge on the very day of his election as head of a district *soviet* in Moscow, simultaneously denouncing the “Communist system of *soviets*” and insisting that a local administrative body should be controlled only by a “limited group of people.”³

At a 1991 conference of Democratic Russia, held right after the dissolution of the CPSU, DR co-chairman Zaslavsky asserted that his organization represented the interests of the “new middle class.” Some former political prisoners were offended by such a label, but Zaslavsky evidently knew what was to come: the “institutionalization” of illegal business activity, which Vitali Naishul, a follower of Friedrich von Hayek, at that very moment, was promoting as the ideal path for economic reform,⁴ would bring into dominance a new force—not a conventional middle class, but a layer of people at the financial top of society, who skillfully manipulate the reforms for their own fabulous enrichment, and maintain a coterie of hangers-on from the world of politics and culture, the better to cloak themselves as “democratic” forces.

Hundreds of Democratic Russia activists were disappointed or even depressed, upon realizing within a year or less after the August Revolution,⁵ that their rallies and demon-

1. Roman Bessonov, “Russian ‘Democrats’ Recruited to Conservative Revolution” (Part 2 of this series), *EIR*, Oct. 4, 1996, describes the fragmentation process.

2. Russian Socialist Federation of Soviet Republics, the name of the Russian Federation as a unit of the U.S.S.R.

3. *EIR*, Oct. 4, 1996, p. 58; Part 2 relates Zaslavsky’s activities.

4. Roman Bessonov, “The IRI’s Friends in Russia” (Part 1 of this series), *EIR*, Sept. 6, 1996, summarizes Naishul’s October 1991 *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* article on this topic.

5. In current Russian parlance, “August” refers to the three-day coup attempt against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachov, carried out by a State Commit-

strations had served neither their fellow citizens, nor themselves, but rather that hitherto “invisible” class, which was now visible everywhere with its Mercedes, high-fenced mansions, gangster manners, primitive interests, and no soul. The new class, meanwhile, underwent an amazingly rapid ideological transformation to neo-conservatism. Seeking protection for their property from the new poor, those new rich that originated from among the heralds of liberty, now were interested in “law and order.”

The Oktyabrsky district of Moscow, under Zaslavsky’s rule, and the top-down control of the Russian media by Yeltsin’s crony Mikhail Poltoranin,⁶ are just two models of the “democratic authoritarianism,” which the politicians most favored by British circles and the U.S. “democracy” promoters from the IRI sought to establish throughout Russia. In the second half of 1992, this effort made a dramatic and qualitative advance.

The cost of British support

Inside Russia, the “shock therapy”—the overnight decontrol of prices, even though many suppliers enjoyed monopoly positions in their sector—imposed by the Yegor Gaidar government’s cohort of Mont Pelerin Society-trained radical free marketeers, had devastated the living standards of the Russian population and the functioning of industry, within a matter of months after its implementation in January 1992. In the United States, the defeat of George Bush looked more and more certain. The future “Sir” Bush had taken Margaret Thatcher’s lead on strategic matters, from their shared sour reaction to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, to the hyper-enthusiastic rampages of the Persian Gulf War in 1990-91. Uncertainty as to whether President Bill Clinton would be as compliant, dictated an escalation of London propaganda, as well as concrete efforts, for a “democratic” dictatorship, in the person of Yeltsin, to be consolidated in Russia.

It is a well-known phenomenon in Russian history, how British strategists appreciate Russian Tsars—especially if they have a clear line of sight to the Achilles’ heel of the latter, and some leverage to keep up a level of instability in his dominions!

Review some items from the record of that period:

April 13, 1992: Lt. Gen. William E. Odom, former director of the U.S. National Security Agency (1985-88), wrote in the *Washington Post*, “If [emerging dictators] are committed to privatization and building a strong and honest state administration, they . . . might be the best hope for a future return to democracy.” In conversation with *EIR* about the Odom article, a London strategist rejoined that the International Monetary Fund would prefer an “authoritarian Presidency”

tee for the Emergency, in August 1991. Yeltsin, as Russian President, resisted. The coup collapsed, and so did the U.S.S.R.

6. Roman Bessonov, “Kriple’s Friends in Yeltsin’s Service,” *EIR*, Oct. 4, 1996.

in Russia, to a “democratic” system.

March 17, 1993: The *Financial Times* of London editorialized, “The West may soon have to choose between an obstructive parliament and a government aiming to introduce the conditions for stable democracy, including a market economy. It would have to choose Mr. Yeltsin. It cannot side with the parliamentarians whose hard core is anti-market, anti-democratic, and anti-western. Democracies must back even authoritarian rulers if the alternatives are worse.”

In November 1992, a week after Clinton defeated Bush in the United States, President Yeltsin hurried to London. The agreements he signed with the British leadership were so detailed and thorough-going, that the London press, joined by *Izvestia* from Moscow, chorused that a Russian-British

The Windsors ‘do’ Russia

Queen Elizabeth II’s state visit to Russia in October 1994 was the first such excursion for a British monarch, since the 1918 execution of Tsar Nicholas II and his family. Nicholas was a close cousin, in the previous generation, of Elizabeth and of her consort, the Duke of Edinburgh (Prince Philip). Alexandra, the wife of Nicholas, was one of Queen Victoria’s many grandchildren.

Preceding his mother, Prince Charles visited St. Petersburg in 1994, at the head of a team of British businessmen.

But Prince Philip led the way, on another track. In a March 14, 1992 article, the London *Spectator* reported that, for “ecological” and other reasons, Philip was “anxious to rediscover his Greek Orthodox roots” (he was born a member of the Greek royal family). “He has personally planned a number of foreign trips that will take him on a pilgrimage to the holy peninsula of Mount Athos and to meetings with Patriarchs of the Eastern Orthodox Church.” In May 1991, Philip had met with the Russian Orthodox bishop in Britain, Metropolitan Anthony Bloom, in preparation for a solo visit to Russia in 1993, “the first time that a senior member of the royal family will have visited the country since the Romanovs were assassinated in 1917 [sic].”

The Queen’s visit was announced in February 1994. As the date drew near, President Yeltsin, on a stopover in Britain on Sept. 26, 1994, en route to the United Nations General Assembly in New York, declared about the pending arrival in Moscow of the British monarch, the leading light of the international oligarchy, “It means Russia has firmly and irrevocably entered on the democratic path.”



The Russian imperial two-headed eagle is being invoked as a national symbol by such anti-communist “liberals” as Mark Zakharov, member of the Presidential Council and director of the Leninsky Komsomol Theater.

treaty of such quality had not been signed since 1766.

Prime Minister John Major promised to double economic aid through the Foreign Office’s “Know-How Fund” and other institutions.

For the first time, the Russian mass media wrote that both Queen Elizabeth II and Prince Philip were relatives of the Russian royal family, giving a hint of the royal family’s own intense diplomacy on the Russian front (see box). While Yeltsin was still in London, British royal relatives of the Romanovs provided genetic material, for purposes of identifying the remains of Tsar Nicholas II, found near Yekaterinburg. Russian officials, being rather materialists than Christians by education, realized that this royal flirtation promised something substantial, such as return of former royal properties and treasures.

That was not all. While Yeltsin headed for England, the Moscow human rights milieu was in an uproar over the crisis in North Ossetia and Ingushetia, two entities in the North Caucasus, where Russian forces were intervening into inter-ethnic clashes, and Yeltsin even declared a state of emergency on Nov. 2, 1992. In retrospect, after the bloody war in Chechnya (1994 to the present), the Ingushi and Ossetians look fortunate, in that this conflict coincided with the period of uncertainty and hesitation in the Russian leadership, between the U.S. Presidential election and Yeltsin’s visit to Britain. Yeltsin’s emissary, Sergei Shakhrai, appointed on Nov. 11 while Yeltsin was in London, brought the situation to the brink of war, but a solution was reached through the energetic

efforts of the Ossetian and Ingushi leaderships. Ingushetia accepted a different role—as the scene not of a bloodbath, but of a British-dominated “free economic zone,” which later served as a safe haven for Chechen paramilitary groups.

But Yeltsin’s explicit and implicit strategic compromises seemed to be justified by the main result achieved in Britain. This was a *carte blanche* for a new type of image, the one that had been more natural for Yeltsin all along—the image of the Tsar.

The image of the Tsar

On Dec. 4, 1992, on the eve of the Seventh Congress of People’s Deputies of the Russian Federation, *Izvestia* published an article prepared by one of those “creative intellectuals,” who were predetermined by their nature to be tsarist lackeys. Mark Zakharov, member of the Presidential Council, chief director of the Leninsky Komsomol Theater, and a well-known anti-communist “liberal,” titled his work, “The American Star or the Two-Headed Eagle?” defining Russia’s choice as being between American “cosmopolitanism,” and allegiance to the Slavic brethren (the very tendency, which was manipulated in Russia by Britain, on the eve of World War I).

Zakharov wrote:

“In 1914, Russia had no territorial claims, no bravado, no ambitions—nothing but the will to save the sovereignty of the fraternal Slavonic Serbia, at the cost of any humiliation of state power, in order to prevent elimination of the result of the Balkan liberation wars [of Serbia, Bulgaria, et al. against the Ottoman Empire].

“I like stars—but not to the extent of sacrificing the ancient Russian design [the author chose a very modern, imported word: *dizain*—R.B.] and the sacred places of Slavonic architecture. There is a primordial national genetics, which shaped the magic secret writings in its depth. But now we see those pseudo-proletarian cosmopolitan signs, scattered all over the country. Red Square has been transformed into a garbage pit for relics imported from Germany. . . .⁷

“The two-headed eagle of Gosudar Ivan Vasilyevich [Tsar Ivan the Terrible—R.B.] has been encrusted onto the Russian Orthodox identity in a natural way, directing its keen glance both to the mysterious West and to the alarming East. The two-headed eagle is the historical heritage of our keen forefathers. Very soon the stars with hammers and sickles will disappear from everyday life, as the schizophrenic slogan ‘Proletarians of all countries, unite!’ has disappeared.

“I am not confused by the imperialist details of the two-headed beauty. *The British monarchy has proved its blood ties with democracy*, and its royal crown merely emphasizes

7. Zakharov alludes to the embalmed corpse of Lenin, still on display in his mausoleum on Red Square, and labelled “German” because the funds for the Bolshevik leader’s return to Russia, during World War I, were supplied by German agencies. But the real mover of that project was the Anglo-Venetian superagent, Alexander Helphand (“Parvus”).

and consolidates the historical continuity of the British national unity.”

Thus, it took only 40 years after Stalin’s infamous “anti-Cosmopolitan” campaign, for a person of Jewish origin to be singing Hosannahs to a religious state based not even on Orthodox, but on pre-Christian mythology. To be sure, Zakharov, who more recently has been favored by the Dostoyevskian-Nietzschean publicist Aleksandr Dugin, does not represent the whole of the “creative intelligentsia” in Yeltsin’s support group, but the very fact of such an article being published in the pro-Yeltsin *Izvestia* was more than remarkable.

A striking detail in Zakharov’s article was the name of Ivan the Terrible, in the context of “any humiliation of *derzhava*”—the state (military power), or statehood. Russian historians such as Karamzin and Klyuchevsky, among others, testify that the reign of Ivan the Terrible was a disastrous, rather than a glorious period, for Russian statehood, as well as the economy—especially in the last period, when Ivan was obviously insane. Whatever the modern monarchist authors may write about that gloomy period, its essence was irrational tyranny, a combination of dictatorship and chaos. But wasn’t that the objective of British policy toward almost any country, and emphatically Russia?

A yes-man’s transformation

Mark Zakharov’s article could be regarded as a preface to the scandalous speech of Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev at the Stockholm Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), on Dec. 14, 1992. The *Washington Post* reported the impact of Kozyrev’s words: “For nearly an hour today, the world appeared to have been plunged back into the Cold War. . . . Kozyrev shocked a gathering of foreign ministers and diplomats by declaring that his country’s new-found cooperation in international affairs was over. Instead of abiding by UN sanctions imposed on Serb-controlled Yugoslavia for its aggressive actions, he demanded that the sanctions be lifted and said Russia would take ‘unilateral measures’ if this were not done. . . . Russia would ‘defend its interests’ with military and economic means to press 14 former Soviet republics back into the Soviet mold.” Kozyrev added that, “The present government of Serbia can count on the support of Great Russia in its struggle.”

Some diplomats rushed from the hall, to call home and find out if there had been a coup in Russia. Acting U.S. Secretary of State Larry Eagleburger, ex-officer of Kissinger Associates, Inc. and ongoing collaborator of British schemes in the Balkans, cornered Kozyrev to demand that he clarify what he meant. After these consultations, the Russian foreign minister returned to the rostrum, to say that his speech had been a joke, an “oratorical device” to show what would happen if “the most extreme elements of the opposition in Russia” took charge.

Joke or no joke, Yeltsin was preparing changes in Mos-

cow, even though Kozyrev’s departure as foreign minister came only later, at the tail end of 1995.⁸ “The Democrats should look for a ‘back-up’ candidate for prime minister,” *Izvestia* analyst Albert Plutnik wrote during Yeltsin’s visit to Britain. Gaidar’s days as prime minister were numbered. Yeltsin’s outburst of rage, when the Seventh Congress voted no-confidence in Gaidar, was less sincere irritation, than a build-up of his image as a Tsar (“I can do without a parliament!”). Two weeks before the Congress, Yeltsin also eliminated the post of State Secretary, until then occupied by his crony Gennadi Burbulis.

Ivan, or Fyodor?

At the Seventh Congress, the opposition bloc of the moment, Arkadi Volsky’s industry-linked Civic Union, achieved little. Viktor Chernomyrdin, the natural gas industry chief, collected fewer votes than Yuri Skokov, but was appointed prime minister by Yeltsin; the Congress agreed to this “compromise figure,” being happy enough to see Gaidar go. The Congress might have ended more or less quietly, had Yeltsin not put on the agenda the question of his “special powers.” The answer was a harsh speech by Vice President Rutskoy, who began to ally with Yeltsin’s opponents in the Supreme Soviet (at that time, the standing parliament was a subset of the Congress of People’s Deputies).

Before long, Rutskoy was deprived first of his staff, and then of his Kremlin office. Most of former State Secretary Burbulis’s functions were shifted to Yeltsin’s new favorite, Sergei Shakhray, who headed a new institution, the State Law Department, with a gloomy abbreviation, GPU (the acronym of the old Soviet secret police). This young, energetic politician began to compose what was later called “the Bonapartist draft” of the Constitution, significantly reducing the rights of the parliament.⁹

Yeltsin’s next move was rather hysterical than rational. He proclaimed what he called a state of “special rule” of the country. The Supreme Soviet convened an extraordinary Congress of People’s Deputies, at which Yeltsin came within a few dozen votes of being impeached. The would-be Tsar got a painful flick on his nose. Slamming the door of the

8. Kozyrev quit his government post after winning election to the State Duma in the December 1995 election, as an independent candidate representing the Arctic port of Murmansk. IRI officials in Russia have boasted about how they helped Kozyrev’s campaign.

9. Shakhray was not in favor for long. In March 1993, several Russian papers published a report, citing unnamed U.S. sources, in which the head of GPU was called a possible replacement for the “outdated” Yeltsin. One journalist, Dmitri Travin from St. Petersburg, wrote in *Ekho*: “In Moscow and Washington, there is a general opinion that Boris Yeltsin should be replaced by a younger politician having the same views, but more capable of their implementation.” Travin co-authored the economic part of the program of Gaidar’s party. He was very close to Anatoli Chubais and the members of the Naishul group, as well as free market economist and adviser Anders Aslund, from Sweden. He joined Naishul as an admirer of Chile’s General Pinochet. Travin did not make clear exactly whom he meant in Washington.

Congress as he stormed from the room, he seemed to be asking: “Am I a Tsar, or not a Tsar?” like the feeble-minded Fyodor Ioannovich, son of Ivan the Terrible. The ministers of the defense and security services didn’t follow him out.

On April 25, 1993, Yeltsin held a nation-wide referendum on his regime, asking the population if they had “trust” in him, and if they wanted early Presidential or parliamentary elections. Amid heavy accusations of vote fraud and manipulation, Yeltsin won his supposed new mandate, but the referendum did not solve Russia’s constitutional crisis. Looking back from the year 1996, the lavish expenditure of funds on the referendum campaign was a definite success . . . for the IRI, which did its best to prove that the Russian President couldn’t do without its campaign expertise. On closer inspection, we discover that international agencies carefully rationed their activity:

- One of the parties which voted *against* Yeltsin in the April referendum was the centrist faction of the Social Democratic Party, called the United Social Democrats (USD). It got financial support from the foreign department of the AFL-CIO, which collaborated closely, at that time, with the IRI. The USD’s analytical apparatus worked with Arkadi Volsky’s Russian Association of Industrialists and Businessmen (RAPP), whose experts were in contact with Vitali Naishul’s economics group. Authors from these institutions were frequently published in magazines sponsored by the National Endowment for Democracy, the parent organization of the IRI.

- Nikolai Travkin’s Democratic Party of Russia, calling itself “conservative,” also maintained contacts with the IRI, as did Volsky, the founder of the Civic Union and of RAPP.

- In St. Petersburg, the Movement of Democratic Reforms joined the local organization of the Civic Union. It was headed by Prof. Konstantin Khudoley, a member of the Commission for Romanov Family Identification, and a specialist in the Russian Empire’s securities abroad.

The Anglo-American lobby was playing both sides, and it seemed that the Tsar was put on a throne that had all four legs half-sawed-off, beforehand. But the “court” of privileged writers, actors, and journalists around Yeltsin was convincing him that everything was all right.

The court

Such Russian words as *lakeistvo*, *kholuistvo*, *nizkopoklonstvo*, *presmykatelstvo* and, especially, *rabolepiye*¹⁰ are not easily translatable into European languages. All of them

10. Nonetheless, we shall try:

lakeistvo—servility, related to “lackey”;

kholuistvo—toadyism;

nizkopoklonstvo—obsequiousness, from the literal meaning, “bowing low”;

presmykatelstvo—grovelling;

rabolepiye—servile fawning, from *rab*—slave.

have approximately the same meaning: a desire or readiness to be a humble servant or even (in the last case) a slave, to look at the Master from below, eyes full of adoration and dedication, and eagerly fulfill any, even a most dirty or humiliating task, if the Master should order it.

All these terms sound “bookish”; you’ll seldom come across them at a factory, in the village, or in the Army. Such language was generated precisely in the social layer for which it was most typical—the court writers and actors around the Russian emperors, the layer which later developed into the so-called “creative intelligentsia” under Soviet power. The qualities these terms define are the flip side of the sought-for immediate and utmost freedom for its own sake: rebellion against tyranny, coupled with hatred of God, which since the 1840s was called “nihilism” in Russia. Both sides of the coin showed up in history as exaggerated, ridiculous forms of expression of the “court” people’s feelings toward the state and its leadership, and defined the irrational behavior of both servants and rebels. The two sides of the coin meant either “a part of the supreme elite,” or “an enemy of the nation, as not accepted into the supreme elite.”

Really great writers and thinkers, who created the national culture, never regarded themselves as part of either the nihilist or the sycophant intelligentsia, while their successors in the Soviet period never identified themselves as either “Soviet creative intelligentsia” or “dissidents.” Chaadayev, Pushkin, Griboyedov, or Leskov were rebellious, but not nihilistic; being in the state service, they never became “men of the court.” Mayakovsky preferred being a “proletarian writer” to an *intelligent*, Yesenin preferred the image of a “hooligan,” and the aged historian Lev Gumilyov, son of the poetess Anna Akhmatova, said in his last interview, in 1990: “I’m no *intelligent*—I’m a soldier.”

Film director Stanislav Govorukhin, making his perestroika-era film *The Russia We Have Lost*, full of nostalgia for the old monarchical traditions, could hardly imagine how soon and how eagerly his colleagues in literature, art, and music would convert into new “courtiers,” borrowing the worst possible manners of the 19th century *kholui* (toadies).

In the Yeltsin era, every aspect of the “revived old Russia” emerged in an awkward and grotesque way. Along with pseudo-Cossacks and pseudo-cathedrals, Russia got a pseudo-nobility. Toy monarchist parties allied with anarchist groups (one person of noble ancestry, called Engelhardt, even developed a notion of “syndicalist monarchism”!), and puppet “nobility balls” favored young bankers of Komsomol origin. Tiny primitive people, most of them having made scant impact in literature and art before, sang praises to the Guarantor of Democracy—that was the honorary title for Yeltsin. They were followed and accompanied by well-known people who had some reason or another to cherish Yeltsin—sometimes only because it was in Yeltsin’s time, that their party bosses were removed and they were, finally,

allowed to draw spots and hooks on a canvas and call it a painting, and also to become famous as former victims of the KGB.

Those who were students in early 1980s were astonished and ashamed to see their favorite author of philosophical songs, the master of Aesopian language Bulat Okudzhava, side by side with Yeltsinist fanatics Andrei Nuikin, Valentin Oskotsky, or former parody-writer Aleksandr Ivanov. The writers of the "village prose" school were no less astonished, to see their colleague Victor Astafyev in the same environment. The itching to be a humble servant infected film director Eldar Ryazanov, actors Oleg Basilashvili and Lia Akhedzhakova, academician Dmitri Likhachov, et al. Their fits of hysterical love for the Guarantor produced an impression of sincere devotion, which became most disgusting. Behind their hysterical appeals to Yeltsin in 1993 to "kill the snake" (of the first freely elected parliament!), one could discern the disease that struck them all: the will to represent the narrow elite, which also made most of the voluntary slaves bitterly hate each other.

One could have told Yeltsin already in 1991 that such

"courtiers" would readily betray him. They did, beginning in late 1994, as soon as Radio Liberty began to treat Yeltsin with some skepticism, and new leaders, who played on his decline of popularity after the October 1993 massacre, announced their claims on supreme power. He was betrayed by the people who had danced ecstatically around him a year before, like pagans around an idol—the same Yakunin, the same Borovoy, Yushenkov, et al., and the artistic-literary milieu faded away, leaving him alone with his professional servants.

Historians may calculate how much home-bred corruption and criminality affected the country in the early 1990s, and how much the foreign "assistants" did. But the damage done by what is defined by *kholuistvo*, *nizkopoklonstvo*, and *rabolepie* is incalculable. There was Yeltsin, and his closest people, and the hypocritical British and U.S. Republican strategists—and there were Russian citizens, also from the highest levels, who were ready to crawl as a worm before them. That is the phenomenon which the British had studied for centuries, and taught their U.S. and French marionettes how to use.

Coming soon in EIR

Syrian dictator Hafez al-Assad, the terrorist and drug-running kingpin, will be the subject of a forthcoming *Special Report* to be published in *EIR*. The study will show how the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale, which carved up the Mideast through its post-World War I Sykes-Picot agreement, still controls the Mideast. Contrary to claims that Assad's Syria is some sort of "rogue" state, it is, and always has been, controlled by British and French intelligence (helped, in more recent times, by George Bush's faction in the United States), which has always used Syrian terrorism for their geopolitical benefit.

The Assads have been French imperial lackeys for over 50 years. Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger put Assad into power, and George Bush sustained him there. That, and nothing else, is the secret of



Partners in crime: Syrian dictator Hafez al-Assad (left) and former U.S. President George Bush.

Assad's political longevity.

Under that sponsorship, Assad has emerged as one of the world's biggest heroin and hashish traffickers, earning billions of dollars a year at the trade. Bush, whose role as cocaine kingpin has been widely exposed in recent weeks, also became one of the world's

heroin kingpins, through his association with Assad. *EIR's* study documents the fact that two of the most important Syrian-run terrorist organizations, the Kurdish Workers Party and the Lebanese Hezbollah, have the same Anglo-French/Bush factional backing.