

Indonesia's 'Dwifungsi' military use policy

One of the primary targets of Indonesia's enemies is the system of "dual function" (*Dwifungsi*) for the Indonesian military. Under *Dwifungsi*, there are two divisions within the military, of equal stature: one, for military affairs; another, for civic affairs. Although the military remains under civilian control, military officers are given positions in most of the major civic institutions of the nation, alongside non-military personnel. This includes mayors, ambassadors, governors, ministers, the judiciary, business, labor unions, and so on.

This is decried as "anti-democratic" by the UN's non-governmental organization (NGO) apparatus, but it is particularly disliked for the model it provides for the governments in Myanmar and Cambodia, which are both in formative stages. Both of these nations face powerful domestic narco-terrorist armies, which have historically been controlled by foreign interests. British efforts to maintain control over the Golden Triangle drug supply require the dismantling of military influence in government policy, both in Myanmar and Cambodia. And yet, both of these nations have had considerable support and advice from Indonesia's government and its military, and

are able to defend the necessity of a strong military role in government and society by pointing to the success in Indonesia.

Indonesia, unlike the rest of the "tiger" economies of Southeast Asia (Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore), has *not* participated in massive arms purchases over the past few years. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord told the Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on Sept. 18, that "although the military plays a leading governing role, Indonesia's defense expenditures as a percentage of GDP total 1.5%, ranking it 119th in the world, between Guyana and Guatemala." He quoted a senior Indonesian official: "We would rather spend the money on economic development."

Indonesia recognizes that its military strength and preparedness depend, not on the quantity of weapons on the shelf, but on the in-depth productive potential of its economy. When Suharto set up the Council for Strategic Industries within B.J. Habibie's BPP Teknologi in 1983, a major goal was to guarantee that the nation could avoid dependence on outside sources for defense supplies. The European and American "Conservative Revolution" ideologues, who have cried the loudest about "democracy" in Indonesia, are often speaking both for the arms exporters and the financial institutions which profit from arms sales and speculation. Indonesia's military remains a major roadblock to such looting, and a defense of both economic and military sovereignty.

the government party, Golkar, winning every election by wide margins.

The current emergence of Sukarno's daughter, Megawati Sukarnoputri, as the rallying point for the youth-based opposition, with significant input and direction from London-based non-governmental organizations, led by Lord Avebury's Tapol, must be seen in the context of her father's contradictory history and status in the country. Sukarno is honored as the founder of the nation, and author of the five guiding principles of the nation, called Pancasila, which are still followed today. His complicity in and responsibility for the 1965 coup attempt is purposefully left unsettled, although his ties to the PKI are considered a weakness that nearly destroyed the country. Megawati admits that she is more of a symbol than a leader. The youthful supporters know little or nothing of the poverty and instability of the Sukarno era, nor of the chaos of 1965, which resulted in Suharto's "New Order."

Suharto's record of economic development is, in fact, remarkable. Once the world's largest importer of rice, Indo-

nesia became self-sufficient in 1984. Universal primary education has been achieved, even in the most remote islands. Poverty has been reduced from 60% in 1970 to less than 15% today, although the chasm between rich and poor plagues Indonesia, as it does every other nation, including the United States. The Suharto regime has always maintained strict limitations on opposition parties, but the specter of a revived "Sukarnoism," with all the communist and populist implications, has provoked particularly severe countermeasures. These include the recent government-supported removal of Megawati as leader of one of the two official opposition parties, the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) and the reinstatement of the previous leader, Surjadi, which has become the cause of international howls of displeasure from the human rights mafia at the United Nations and in London.

The real target of these (and other) attacks on the Suharto regime, however, is its economic nationalism and its rejection of IMF demands, especially since the 1993 consolidation of power in the cabinet by nationalist leader B.J. Habibie.