

# Bush League liars orchestrated Clinton's 1993 bombing of Iraq

by Mary Jane Freeman

It's June 26, 1993. President William Clinton announces that he has just ordered a "cruise missile attack on the Iraqi intelligence service's principal command and control facility in Baghdad," because investigations by the FBI and CIA found "compelling evidence that there was . . . a plot to assassinate former President Bush, and included the use of a powerful bomb made in Iraq." Information that has recently come to light, shows that there was no such "compelling evidence," but rather a little "massaging of the facts" by high-level officials. In effect, a British policy coup, aided by the corrupt permanent bureaucracy within the Justice Department, had occurred (see *EIR*, April 25, p. 22).

President Clinton had been in office a mere 158 days. Various factions, inside and outside the government, were working overtime to ensure that he would not reverse the genocidal policies behind Margaret Thatcher and George Bush's Gulf War, or their follow-on plans to create a "clash of civilizations" scenario, of Islam versus the West. Even if it meant manufacturing evidence, these networks were determined to box Clinton into a policy of "dual containment" toward Iraq and Iran.

This episode has again come under scrutiny as part of Justice Department Inspector General Michael Bromwich's review of allegations of misconduct and illegalities at the FBI's forensic lab. The IG's 500-page report, released on April 15, identified a pattern of false reporting of forensic investigations in some of the biggest criminal cases of the decade, including the Oklahoma City and World Trade Center bombings. The report also raised serious questions about forensic evidence provided to President Clinton by the FBI and through senior Justice Department bureaucrat Mark Richard, regarding the so-called Iraqi assassination plot against former President Bush.

Based on *EIR*'s review of the recently released report on the FBI Crime Lab (see *EIR*, April 25, p. 26), in conjunction with events leading up to the June 26 missile attack, a shocking picture emerges of how the President was induced to come to the decision to bomb Iraq.

In the case of the alleged assassination plot against Bush, FBI whistleblower and forensic scientist Dr. Fredric White-

hurst alleged that his test results on the "explosive material in the main charge of the Bush device" were "purposely misinterpreted . . . in order to link the explosive material to Iraqi agents." He further charged that the misinterpretation "very possibly" was done to "support the retaliatory missile strike by the United States."

The Inspector General's report rejected this, concluding that "the evidence does not support" the claims that anyone "changed or purposely misinterpreted Whitehurst's results. . . . Nor does [it] support [the suggestion] that the [United States] launched the missile strike against . . . Baghdad based on a misinterpretation of Whitehurst's results." However, it found that the FBI Crime Lab agent who was the lead investigator on the alleged Bush plot, "omitted and rewrote parts of [a] Whitehurst" report. The omission and rewording of Whitehurst's findings ultimately resulted in the FBI providing only a partial picture to the President, one that fit with the thesis that "Iraq did the dirty deed."

## A battle to shape Clinton's Iraq policy

On Jan. 15, 1993, a *New York Times* interview with Clinton featured the President-elect's comments concerning future U.S. relations with Iraq. While saying that he supported Bush's actions to renew the bombing of Iraq, Clinton opened the door to resolution of "the bitter disputes there." Asked whether he expected the same kind of personal animosity that existed between Bush and Saddam Hussein to characterize his relations with Saddam, Clinton said, "I'm not obsessed with the man. . . . If he wants a different relationship with the United States . . . all he has to do is change his behavior." The genie was out of the bottle; the new President wanted to change course.

Within 24 hours, after the London *Guardian* ran the *Times* interview and a *Times* news article insinuated that Clinton's responses meant that the new President would be soft on Saddam, both Clinton and his Secretary of State-designate Warren Christopher, felt obliged to distance themselves from the potential for changing U.S.-Iraq relations. But London, Bush, and the foreign policy establishment in the United States did not rely on this denial. Even though Saddam announced a



*George Bush with his buddy Sheikh Jaber Ahmad Sabah, the Emir of Kuwait, in 1990. The investigation of the alleged assassination attempt against Bush in Kuwait in April 1993 “purposely misinterpreted” evidence in order to implicate Iraqi agents, according to an FBI forensic specialist. Bush’s friends in Washington succeeded in getting President Clinton to launch a missile attack against Baghdad targets.*

unilateral cease-fire in anticipation of Clinton’s inauguration, during the last five days of Bush’s regime, missiles again rained on Iraq. On Jan. 19, on the eve of Clinton’s inauguration, the *Guardian*’s Martin Walker wrote, “In the context of allied bombing . . . Clinton was forced to close that door” on new relations with Iraq. Still not leaving things to chance, should Clinton change course in the future, Walker let the British Foreign Office’s fallback policy option for the region out of the bag: to contain “Iran and the growth of Islamic fundamentalism.” Based on “sources,” Walker claimed to know that “behind the scenes, the Clinton administration is refining U.S. policy” to deal with this new threat.

On Jan. 17, two days before Walker’s piece in the *Guardian*, Lyndon LaRouche, who was still in prison at the time, had already seen through the British-Bush strategy against the incoming President. LaRouche responded to a question on the issue, that the establishment people were using the lame-duck Bush administration “to create as many messes as possible internationally, so that when Clinton [takes office], he would be so tangled in foreign policy complications, that essentially, they’d have him ruined. . . . There’s a plan to get a war going with Islamic fundamentalism internationally.” LaRouche outlined that atrocities against Muslims, such as bombings, would be used to bring fundamentalists to power, who in turn would become the great new enemy of the West.

### **How the plot was hatched**

During February and March, the new administration faced the increasing genocide in Bosnia, and deployed U.S. troops to Somalia. The Iraq front was quiet—until Bush showed up in Kuwait on April 14 for a three-day visit to commemorate his Gulf War victory. In addition to the festivities, Bush was there with a delegation of Enron Corp. executives to scout lucrative business deals with the Kuwaitis. Clinton had continued support for the sanctions against Iraq, but in mid-April, his administration declared that it no longer insisted on Saddam’s removal from power as a precondition to lifting the sanctions. On cue, on April 26, the *National Review*, a U.S. outlet for British propaganda, editorialized, “Whatever the administration’s intentions, the change is being read throughout the Middle East as a big step toward American acquiescence in the status quo.” The next day, the *Washington Post* reported on a story in the Saudi newspaper *Asharq al-Awsat*, which disclosed that the Interior Ministry of Kuwait had rounded up a group of Iraqi-supported terrorists, in possession of explosives, “who planned to assassinate Bush during his visit” to Kuwait. For the next eight weeks, using the so-called Bush assassination plot, a war-and-a-half broke out over the President’s policy drift toward resolving disputes with Iraq.

The Bush plot had refocused attention on Saddam and the Iraqis. Was Saddam and/or his intelligence service behind

the plot? The Kuwaitis reported that they had retrieved a Toyota Landcruiser with 80 to 90 kilograms of plastic explosives connected to a detonator (the so-called Bush device), and ten cube-shaped plastic explosive devices with detonators (the cube-bombs), from the 16 suspects arrested during the Bush visit, most of whom were part of a smuggling ring. Kuwaiti officials also claimed that some suspects “confessed” that Iraqi intelligence was behind the plot.

Teams of counterterrorism and explosives experts from the CIA and FBI were sent to Kuwait to examine the evidence and interview the suspects. It was the findings of these various investigations which were used to persuade President Clinton to bomb Iraq.

### The Crime Lab and Mark Richard

Within days of the CIA and FBI teams’ arrival in Kuwait, the May 8 *Washington Post* ran a provocative headline, “U.S. Links Iraq to Plot to Assassinate Bush in Kuwait.” The article, based on anonymous sources, admitted that the “links to Baghdad . . . are not definitive.” A week later, on May 15, the *Washington Times* reported that Pentagon officials were “dubious” about the Kuwaiti claims, and the *New York Times* on May 19 wrote that “administration officials . . . expressed deep uncertainty” about Kuwait’s claims, because they could have been “based on coerced confessions or mishandled evidence.” Then, on May 27, a *Boston Globe* story, headlined “CIA Report Casts Doubt on Kuwait Assertion of Plot on Bush,” revealed that a classified CIA Counter Terrorism Center report, shown to the *Globe* reporter, said that Kuwait “has a clear incentive to play up the . . . Iraqi threat” to Western interests, and hence may have “cooked the books.” Even more important, the *Globe* wrote, “the [CIA] report says it was unable to corroborate the Kuwaiti assertion that the plot was aimed at Bush.” Around this same time, intelligence community sources told *EIR* that the plot was “concocted by Kuwaiti intelligence as an effort to prevent the sanctions against Iraq from being lifted.”

But, at the same time, press leaks continued to assert that the “CIA, Secret Service, and FBI . . . have satisfied themselves that a car-bomb seized . . . was fashioned by the Iraqi government. Forensic evidence and the bomb’s technical configuration . . . matched others known to have been fashioned by Iraqi intelligence.”

Based on these reports, Clinton administration officials were pummeled with the question, would the President “retaliate”? Simultaneously, Clinton was being criticized for not being “tough” against the Serbs in Bosnia—another British foreign policy monkey-trap. But throughout May and early June, administration officials insisted that no decision had been made because the investigations were “continuing.” In late May, to stiffen Clinton’s resolve to get tough with Iraq, Martin Indyk, the senior director for Middle East matters on Clinton’s National Security Council staff, declared at a public policy forum that Iraq would remain hostile to American in-

terests for the foreseeable future. Indyk had been an adviser to Bush on Middle East policy.

FBI explosives examiner Alan Jordan’s examination of the bombs in Kuwait was hampered and “did not meet usual FBI standards,” according to the Bromwich report, because the Kuwaitis refused to let him disassemble the components or transport the devices to the FBI lab in Washington for examination. Jordan, therefore, based on comparing the bombs to “photographs” of “known Iraqi explosive devices found in various Middle Eastern countries,” concluded “that the same person or persons manufactured the Bush device and the Middle East devices.” After a second exam, he concluded that “significant consistencies in the selection of individual components” indicated “signature characteristics.”

But, between the two Jordan exams, Whitehurst was asked to “compare explosive material in the Bush device to explosive materials and residues from Iraqi devices discovered in Southeast Asia during the 1991 Gulf War.” He found “that the explosive in the Bush device . . . was ‘very much different’ from the explosives in the Southeast Asia devices.” This fact was never told to the President.

Before a June 2 meeting between FBI Counterterrorism Section Chief Neil Gallagher and Attorney General Janet Reno, Whitehurst’s supervisor told Gallagher that “the FBI could not connect [the Bush device and other Iraqi devices] explosives chemically or say that they came from the same shipment, sources, or country.” Over the next weeks, as reflected in press leaks, a tug of war between “senior intelligence analysts,” who asserted “corroborating evidence” linking Iraqi terrorists had been found, and “administration officials,” who continued to have “doubts” about Iraq’s involvement, surfaced.

To force the “get tough” posture upon Clinton, Frank Gaffney, a senior policy strategist with the Center for Security Policy and a former Reagan administration official, penned a column entitled “‘Depersonalizing’ the Conflict with Saddam Is Wrong Policy.” Gaffney decried the administration’s failure to respond to “the Iraqi despot’s effort to blow up former President Bush.” He claimed that the “signal being sent is that the Clinton team is so determined to avoid getting bogged down in . . . Iraq that it is inclined to overlook the assassination plot.” While the administration said that the case was “less than airtight,” Gaffney wrote, “I am told . . . the evidence is compelling” against Iraq. He concluded that the “ray of hope” inside the administration is NSC staffer Indyk, whose recent speech called for “dual containment” of Iraq and Iran.

A few days later, on June 24, a report drafted by the Justice Department’s Terrorism and Violent Crime Section, headed by Mark Richard, was presented to the President. That report, which provided the “compelling evidence” the President relied upon, didn’t simply fail to include the chemical differences of the explosives in the Bush devices as compared to the “known Iraqi” devices, but also contradicted Whitehurst’s finding that they were “very much different.”