
Interview: Sergio Flamigni

The 'spider web' behind the assassination of Aldo Moro

*Sergio Flamigni started his political career as a young fighter in the Liberation war against Fascism. He served many terms in the Italian Parliament and was a member of the secretariat of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), under pro-Western leader Enrico Berlinguer (1922-84). As a collaborator of Berlinguer, Flamigni was one of the participants in the project of Christian Democracy (DC) chairman Aldo Moro for a national unity government, in 1976-78, a project which was crushed by Moro's kidnapping and murder by the terrorist Red Brigades (March 16-May 8, 1978). As a witness and protagonist during those years, Flamigni took upon himself the mission of finding the truth about those tragic events, and bringing it to the light of day. It was through his groundbreaking work *The Spider Web*, published in 1988, that the "secret government" apparatus, complicit in Moro's murder, was conclusively exposed. Among other things, Flamigni was inspired by the dossier published by the LaRouche movement in October 1978, *Who killed Aldo Moro*, which exposed the role of Henry Kissinger and pro-British networks in Italy and in the United States, in the conspiracy to kill Moro. Flamigni was interviewed by Claudio Celani on March 16; the interview was translated from Italian.*

EIR: Senator Flamigni, exactly 20 years ago, Aldo Moro was kidnapped by the Red Brigades, who killed him after 55 days' imprisonment. In these 20 years, there have been five official trials, and a sixth investigation is going on in Rome. The Red Brigades members have been arrested and sentenced. Has the full truth come to the surface?

Flamigni: Absolutely not. As an example, I will tell you that yesterday, an Italian TV broadcast released an opinion poll, according to which 98% of Italians believe that "no," the truth has not been revealed. Only 2% answered "yes," they think that everything is known.

Indeed, many aspects remain in full darkness, although discussion in all these years has never ceased. It is a fact, that those terrorist leaders who know the full truth, have consistently refused to come forward with the truth. And, especially the two Red Brigades leaders, Moretti and Gallinari, who are the only ones who had personal access to Moro during Moro's imprisonment, absolutely refuse to speak. They do not want to tell the truth.

EIR: What are the most important issues still to be clarified?

Flamigni: First of all, how could the terrorist commando know that Aldo Moro was going to drive through Via Fani, that morning? It is known that Marshal Leonardi, the head of Moro's security detail, who was killed with all members of the escort, changed the route every day. Leonardi knew that Moro was under threat. Moro himself, as is shown in an interview he gave to journalist Di Bella shortly before his kidnapping, lived in a state of anxiety because of this threat. A series of events had indicated that Moro was being followed, and this had prompted his security staff to file a request for an armored car for Moro's safety. The request was denied, under the pretext that there was no car available. This is a lie. I myself witnessed, on March 16, when I entered Parliament, a state undersecretary coming to Parliament with an armored car. And like this guy, many other politicians or government officials, who were all risking much less than Moro, received more protection than Moro.

EIR: Who was responsible for assigning armored cars?

Flamigni: Two persons, the chief of police and the Interior Minister.

EIR: Before we talk about them, what other issues have not yet been clarified in the trials?

Flamigni: Who was the sharp-shooter who, with extreme skill, fired 49 shots, the most deadly ones, that killed Moro's security team? The only security agent who even succeeds in drawing his weapon and firing two shots, is blown away by this mysterious figure. From the expert analysis of the bullets, it is clear that this figure killed Leonardi and his colleague Ricci. A witness, a gasoline dealer who watched the scene from a distance of 80 meters, saw one person firing at Moro's car from a short distance. Then, he jumps back, with extreme agility, broadens his fire and shoots at the security car. The witness is a weapons expert: He served in the military Corps of Engineers, where he was responsible for repairing weapons.

Neither this person nor the weapon used has ever been found. The Brigade members who were arrested, claimed that this person did not exist; but they were absolutely not able to act in such a professional, military way.

Furthermore, during the trial, one Brigade member, Valerio Morucci, called on a very ambiguous figure to support his version of events. Morucci called on a weapons expert, Morin, to help him try to demonstrate that the Scorpion submachine gun found in the safehouse where he was arrested, was not the same one used in the Via Fani assault. Of course, during the trial, it was demonstrated that it *was* the same weapon. But Morucci's "expert," Morin, was afterwards revealed to be a member of the clandestine NATO "Stay Behind" structure, known as "Gladio."

Another mystery is the presence, that morning in Via Fani, of Colonel Guglielmi, a member of the secret service. This fact was revealed by a witness, a secret service officer named Ravasio, who had been part of a Gladio training camp in Sardinia, in Capo Marrongiu. Ravasio furthermore revealed that the secret services had infiltrated an agent into the Red Brigades, who revealed the Brigades' plans to kidnap Moro!

Guglielmi appeared in court and explained that he was at Via Fani, because he was going to have dinner with a friend and colleague, Colonel D'Ambrosio. At 9 o'clock in the morning!

D'Ambrosio confirmed that Guglielmi appeared at his house that morning, shortly after 9:00 a.m.; but D'Ambrosio had not invited him.

EIR: What about the famous Via Gradoli story, maybe the most extraordinary sabotage of police operations to find Moro?

Flamigni: Yes, this is the most astounding case. Via Gradoli, a street in Rome, was a safehouse where Mario Moretti, a leader of the Red Brigades military command, was hiding. It was later discovered that the police had been there *several times* during that period, and had searched the building, but did not enter that apartment. All this came out later, in a sort of circus routine.

It is now confirmed that on March 18, that is, two days after Moro's kidnapping, the chief of police, Zanda Loi, was informed about a possible terrorist safehouse on the Via Gradoli. The police were sent to the place, and a report was written by Brigadier Merola, after the operation. Merola's report says that the police went to a building at 96 Via Gradoli, at 7:30 a.m. There are two buildings at that number, and the police went directly to the right one (this means that they had precise information). They were in front of the door of the flat rented by Brigade member Moretti, under the false name of Borghi. They knocked at the door. Nobody answered. The police left.

Do you understand? *A police team was in front of the flat where, according to information, Aldo Moro's kidnappers could be hiding. And they left, after knocking on the door!*

Before leaving, the police were approached by a young woman, living on the same floor as "Mr. Borghi." The woman revealed that, during the night, she heard somebody

transmitting in Morse code from the neighboring flat. The woman is the daughter of a Navy officer and has familiarity with Morse transmissions. She heard somebody transmitting and receiving from 2:30 to 3:00 a.m. She would go that day to report to the police, but since the police were there now, she begged them to file her information with Commissioner Cioppa, the head of the local police station. Brigadier Merola promised that yes, he would report to Cioppa.

The police claimed that they never received a report on the strange Morse code transmissions. Furthermore, Merola's report about the Via Gradoli search disappears.

Several days later, police authorities were again informed about Via Gradoli. This time, it is none other than Romano Prodi, currently the Italian Prime Minister. He reported to the government that, during a media briefing, the name "Gradoli" popped out. It is of course a cover, to protect the source of their information. But nevertheless, it is another indication. At that point, the police are sent to—Gradoli, which is a village outside Rome!

Despite this, Moro's wife, Eleonora, suggested to the police that it might be a street with that name. She was told that such a street does not exist. Later, in court, the police officer defended himself by saying that they looked in an old street directory and did not find it.

A few weeks ago, former state President Francesco Cossiga, who, as I said, was police minister at that time, testified before the investigating committee on terrorism of the Italian Parliament. He was confronted with this question, and he asked to be questioned in secret. I was told that he went on a rampage against Mrs. Moro, basically saying that she lied when she insists that she had indicated that "Via Gradoli" had to be searched. Cossiga has no critical words about the police operations during that 55-day period.

EIR: Luciano Violante, current chairman of the Parliament, stated in an interview a few days ago that, on this issue, he believes Mrs. Moro and not Cossiga.

Flamigni: I agree with Violante. It is not clear who was the go-between between Mrs. Moro and Cossiga (some say Tina Anselmi, who has been an influential member of Parliament); however, I believe Mrs. Moro.

When they finally "discovered" the Via Gradoli safehouse, it was April 18. The same day, there was the famous circus of the Lago della Duchessa search, which I will discuss in a second. But two days later, on April 20, the Brigades issued the death sentence against Moro. It was predictable, and there is a connection between the two facts.

The Via Gradoli flat was discovered because, after the Brigades had abandoned it, "somebody" left the shower running, and even turned it so that the water would soon drop from the ceiling of the flat beneath.

When the police opened the flat, they "discovered" that this had been Moro's safehouse. I believe that this occurred because somebody wanted to put pressure on the terrorists.

The message was: “You see, we are after you, we will get you. Now, make it short, make an end to it!” Keep in mind that the only terrorist safehouse discovered during the period of Moro’s kidnapping was exactly the one where Moretti, the head of the commando, was.

That same day, the police were sent to the Lago della Duchessa, a lake in the Appennine Mountains, because a so-called Red Brigades release announced that Moro had been killed and his body thrown in that lake. This was an incredible circus, which Cossiga set up. It was clear that the release was false. Domenico Spinella, head of the Rome investigative police, refused to act on the basis of it. Cossiga sent there Emilio Santillo, national head of the police, together with Rome state attorney De Matteo. As soon as they got to the lake, Santillo also realized that this was clearly a fake. It had been snowing for days, there were no footprints, the lake was covered with a thick layer of ice. But despite that, the circus went on for two days, with divers breaking the ice and looking for Moro’s corpse in the lake.

EIR: This brings us to Cossiga’s role in the Moro affair. Is he responsible for sabotaging police operations?

Flamigni: Cossiga was not the head of the police, he was the minister. But he appointed all the persons who were responsible for police operations, and the anti-terrorism fight in particular. Later, it was discovered that they all belonged to a secret masonic lodge, called P2 [Propaganda 2], which a parliamentary committee has found guilty of a plan to overthrow republican institutions.

Cossiga had an entire apparatus, with personnel, skills, and experience in the fight against terrorism, but he hardly used it. He created three committees to manage the crisis, and filled them with personnel from outside the administration. They were mostly members of the P2. I can name Grassini, Santovito (heads of military intelligence), and Pelosi (head of internal intelligence). In particular, he preferred Grassini, a Carabinieri general, to Emilio Santillo, who was really the only police officer with a professional anti-terrorist background. Santillo had successfully led the national police anti-terrorism squad, with brilliant results. He had practically eliminated a whole terrorist organization, the NAP. But in January 1978, two months before the Moro kidnapping, Cossiga dissolved Santillo’s team, created a new one, called UCIGOS, and appointed a provincial head of the police, Fariello, as its director. Fariello was a man whom Cossiga could totally control, who came from Sassari, Cossiga’s hometown. But Fariello was totally incompetent in terrorism matters.

Cossiga had a pretext for this reorganization: the new bill which reformed Italy’s secret services, splitting the existing SID into two branches: a military one, called SISMI, and a civilian one, called SISDE. But, while the SISMI is practically the old SID with a new name, the civilian SISDE is totally new. And, he invented UCIGOS, a section of the

police, with new personnel. This is the background to a new revelation, concerning a plan that Cossiga made in those days, and which allegedly was rejected by the government. Reportedly, Cossiga drafted a plan for establishing a special military corps on the model of the British SAS. This, he said, would be an efficient instrument to look for terrorists. It was called the Pater plan. In the polemics surrounding this newest revelation, the litany has been repeated that law enforcement agencies were unprepared for the kind of threat which unfolded with Moro’s kidnapping.

How can you say that? Terrorism had been targeting Italy for years, taking hundreds of victims: politicians, businessmen, law enforcement officers, and even trade unionists. And you, Mr. Cossiga, say that the state was unprepared? But then, it is entirely your responsibility, if you are unprepared. At least you should have had a preventive plan!

In a release issued by the “Strategic Command of the Red Brigades” in December 1977, their strategy was officially announced: They celebrated the assassination of German business leader Hanns-Martin Schleyer, and the “European role” played by the German RAF [Red Army Fraction] terrorists, and they announced that they would “hit the Christian Democratic Party, starting at its central levels.” And Moro was the most central figure of the DC!

But despite this, on March 16, when the news of Moro’s kidnapping and the assassination of his bodyguards reached the authorities, Fariello ordered the implementation of the “Zero Plan.” It really was a “zero” plan: nothing! It was a plan developed and adopted for kidnappings in Sardinia, common criminality. But nobody could find the plan. It had been left in Sardinia!

EIR: Can you tell us who Cossiga is, what his background is?

Flamigni: Cossiga was originally a political opponent of Moro within his own party, the Christian Democracy. He is a protégé of Antonio Segni, an old Notable who represents Italy’s traditional landowning class. Segni, a former Prime Minister and state President, appointed Cossiga as liaison between his office and the secret service. Cossiga kept up this liaison during a cabinet chaired by Moro in 1966. When the truth about a coup d’état plan, called “Piano Solo,” which Segni had supported, was revealed, Cossiga was the person who guaranteed the secrecy of key parts of those documents, which will never be known to Parliament.

The Solo plan was supported by Segni and then-Chief of Secret Services General Di Lorenzo. It contained a list of prominent politicians and trade unionists to be jailed in case a state of emergency were to be declared, in which key constitutional guarantees would be suspended.

EIR: Aldo Moro’s son has recently declared that his father’s name was probably on that list.

Flamigni: Yes. But the documents have disappeared. It is

thought that the list of persons to be jailed concerned not only opposition figures, but also Moro and his followers. That is Cossiga's political background.

EIR: What is the role of London in the whole story?

Flamigni: Cossiga bases himself a lot on the British. His reference point is the SAS, and the SAS praises Cossiga's plans, such as the "Pater" plan. I discern a British presence in the secret part, whose records have disappeared. But Cossiga covers also for other elements, for instance, Steve Pieczenik, a man who worked under Henry Kissinger at the State Department. He was sent to Italy at Cossiga's pressing request, to "help" in the Moro case. The Carter administration had decided that the CIA would be activated in the Moro case only if U.S. security were directly threatened. But Cossiga insisted, and the State Department sent Pieczenik, Kissinger's man (remember that Moro had been threatened by Kissinger, who did not like his policy).

Parliament learned about Pieczenik only years later, when Minister Scotti informed us about him. Cossiga says that he covered for him, because he believed this was a state secret.

As for London, again, if we consider the role of Freemasonry, then we learn a lot. As I said, the secret P2 masonic lodge had tight control on law enforcement during the Moro imprisonment. And, certain P2 members had been directly affiliated with London.

I remember that I was impressed, when I read the dossier published by the LaRouche people in 1978, *Who Killed Aldo Moro*, where Britain is indicated as responsible for Moro's murder. I picked up a sentence by Cossiga reported in that dossier: "We will have to get accustomed to living with terrorism." I traced back the original text and I saved it.

EIR: Why was Moro murdered? What was his policy?

Flamigni: The idea of "national solidarity" was the matrix of all of Moro's policy. He comes from a region, Apulia, where he witnessed the widespread poverty among peasants. His mission in politics was to put an end to that poverty. Moro represented what is otherwise called the "social doctrine of the Church." In his life and political career, his early friendship with Cardinal Montini, later Pope Paul VI, counts for a lot.

He first applied his idea of "national solidarity" in the center-left governments, in 1964. This was the government alliance between the Christian Democracy and the Socialist Party, on a clear pro-Western orientation. He was the mastermind of that project, but let somebody else, [Amintore] Fanfani, lead the government. At the same time, Moro's desire for Italy's independence showed itself in his foreign policy: During the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Moro denied Henry Kissinger the use of military bases on Italian territory. Kissinger was furious about that.

In the new phase that opened in 1976, Moro developed

his solidarity concept to include all constitutional forces for an independent policy. The new center-left would include, this time, Berlinguer's PCI. Again, he was the mastermind of the project, but had somebody else, [Giulio] Andreotti, lead the government.

EIR: Did Moro's center-left project intersect Kennedy's policy?

Flamigni: I would say, yes. In 1961-62, Kennedy sent advisers to Rome and gave the okay, on the condition that the center-left would stay clearly in the pro-Western camp. The real shift occurred after the Cuba crisis. Moro's foreign policy was a development of Kennedy's; Moro's policy is also the same as that of Enrico Mattei, the founder of Italy's national oil industry, who was murdered in 1962, shortly before he was to meet with Kennedy.

EIR: Kennedy, Mattei, and Moro were assassinated. Is there a single thread linking the murders?

Flamigni: I have examined the question. I have compared Moro's murder to the Mattei and the Kennedy cases. Why did they not do with Moro what they did with Mattei and Kennedy? I mean, a "simple" murder. No, they kidnapped him and kept him such a long time in prison, knowing well that, in the end, they would have him killed anyway. Well, with Mattei, everything went through his person. Eliminate him, and you eliminate his policy.

But had they killed Moro on the Via Fani, he would have become a martyr and his policy, his "historical compromise," would have been strengthened. But the aim was to dismantle all the work Moro had done. His work was dismantled in 55 days of national suffering. During those days, the national solidarity was broken. A split occurred among the political parties on how to deal with the terrorists, who posed unacceptable demands to the state, and promised, in exchange, to free Moro.

They would not have freed him, of course; Moro's sentence was written from the first day. But they succeeded in destroying his policy.

I think that the final aim of the forces that deployed the Red Brigades terrorism was to destroy Italian institutions. The terrorists proclaimed that they wanted to destroy the heart of the state. At that moment, the DC and the PCI were the largest forces among those that had written the Italian Constitution, at the end of the war. In the Constitutional Congress, the PCI, in particular, made fundamental choices, accepting a democratic order, something that the Red Brigades characterized as "betrayal." In writing the key passages of the Constitution, Moro had played a key role, through his direct collaboration with PCI leader Togliatti. So, I think that there is a "parallel convergence," to use an expression invented by Moro for other purposes, between terrorism and the old oligarchy that has never accepted that Constitution.