

Chancellor's Office to fall back on."¹ Events unfolded, and what happened in those days can only be called the material for a Classical tragedy. Three days later, on Dec. 1, Alfred Herrhausen was assassinated, a man in a leading position, who not only played a role in shaping Kohl's 10-point program, but also wanted to present an independent perspective for the development of Eastern Europe outside of the conditionalities of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).² With the assassination of Kohl's adviser three days after the very first sovereign baby-step of the much-touted German "solo initiative," the announcement of the 10-point program, an unmistakable signal had been delivered to the West German elite: If you dare to move outside of the Yalta framework of the postwar period, you will end up exactly like this.³

Then, only a few days after Herrhausen's assassination, Bush and Gorbachov met in Malta, and, contrary to all assurances that nobody was talking about a new version of Yalta, in this case media such as *Le Figaro* and *Libération* were not far off the mark, when they warned that in Malta, the intent was a new grand alliance of the superpowers, which would attempt to control developments in Europe. These French newspapers naturally remained silent about Mitterrand's own ambitions in this respect. But, the Anglo-American-Soviet condominium was a reality at that point in time: Henry Kissinger, co-thinker of Eagleburger and Scowcroft, warned about the "new German danger" and called for close consultations on policy toward Germany between Bush and Gorbachov. At the subsequent meeting with West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze saw Kohl's 10-point program as "fraught with dangerous consequences," and claimed that it impinged upon "the vital interests of the Soviet Union." Obviously, it was against this background of a potential external, and even personal, threat, that Kohl saw himself compelled to capitulate to Mitterrand's ultimatum, and to agree to the European monetary union, and thus the end of the deutsche-mark, already at the Strasbourg summit of the Council of Europe.

The now-released protocols report, referring to Kohl's confidential discussion with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker on Dec. 12, 1989, on joining the European economic and monetary union: "This decision he would have made contrary to German interests." According to *Der Spiegel*, Kohl admitted in early summer of 1997, to a small group of people: At that time, "I went through some of the darkest hours of my life."

1. Introduction to the *Documents*, p. 59.

2. Herrhausen, in a speech he intended to deliver in December 1989 in New York City, said that the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau of the postwar period was supposed to be the model for the development of Poland. See article, p. 37.

3. Comment by a member of the board of a large German firm at the Leipzig Fair, to a representative of the Schiller Institute.

Just as in a great historical tragedy of Shakespeare or Schiller on the stage, the circumstances here were also dramatic, even monstrous, but, just as in real life, it was the tragic flaw in the personality of the chief protagonist, which ultimately decided that the tragedy would "take its course." Of course, the circumstances were intricate, but Kohl's subjective problem and that of the inner circle of associates who conducted the negotiations in those days with the Western powers, Gorbachov or Krenz, and then Hans Modrow, consisted in the fact that they themselves thought in the same terms as the victorious powers. Although Kohl's 10-point program was a step in the right direction, even this concept was rooted in the geopolitical matrix of the victorious powers. It would have been necessary for Kohl to free himself from these mental constrictions, and, with a grand vision, to shape history on a completely different level.

The LaRouche alternative

Although there had been no preparatory plans made by the government that the Chancellor could fall back on, there was indeed a concept which would have made it possible to put the East-West relationship on a completely new basis, different from that which, with Versailles, Yalta, and finally Maastricht, had characterized the political order of the twenti-

Chancellor Kohl's program

In a speech to the West German Bundestag on Nov. 28, 1989, Chancellor Helmut Kohl laid out a 10-point program for reunification of his divided nation. He presented a cautious outline for a federated state, initiated through confederative structures that would help the two German states grow together smoothly. Kohl declared that "the special character of the relations between both German states requires an increasingly tight network of agreements in all sectors and at all levels.

"This cooperation will also increasingly require common institutions," he said. "Existing joint commissions can assume new tasks, further commissions can be created. I am thinking especially of the economy, transport, environmental protection, science and technology, health and culture. It is self-evident that Berlin will be fully included in this cooperation.

"I urge all social groups and institutions to participate in the formation of such a community.

"We are also prepared to take a further decisive step, namely, to develop confederative structures between the two states in Germany in order to create a federation. A legitimate democratic government in East Germany is a prerequisite.

eth century. This was the programmatic concept which American economist Lyndon LaRouche had developed through a series of proposals: first for the reconstruction of Poland, then for the Paris-Berlin-Vienna Productive Triangle, and finally for the Eurasian Land-Bridge.

Had Kohl moved along this path after the fall of the Berlin Wall, up to Oct. 3, 1990, and taken up these ideas and made them his own, then not only would his promises of a blossoming landscape in the new federal states of Germany have become a reality, but the hopes of the people of the countries in the former Soviet Union and the Comecon, to turn to the West and become part of the so-called First World, would have been fulfilled. Despite all of Mitterrand's, Thatcher's, and actually also Bush's geopolitical intrigues, Kohl at that time had historical momentum behind him; if, for example, he had made televised speeches to the people of Europe and especially in the East, offering the grand design of the "Productive Triangle," and thus showing a perspective for how a new economic miracle in the East could not only overcome unemployment in western Europe, but also be the beginning of the end of underdevelopment in the Southern Hemisphere, then he would have been assured of the overwhelming support of people in the East, the West, and the South. The realization of the LaRouche plan for the economic development and

modernization of the East would have created the basis for an order of peace in all of Europe, for the first time in this century.

Instead, Kohl acted *against* German interests, and, as is now a matter of published record, he knew quite well that he was doing so. The entirety of the so-called "IMF reform policy" for the republics of the former Soviet Union was willfully aimed, by the international financial oligarchy, at eliminating Russia as a potential future competitor on the world market—i.e., the policy was to deliberately deindustrialize Russia and return it to the status of a raw-materials supplier. This intent was declared in a CIA study which became public in September 1991.⁴ We see the results of this policy today: Russia is on the brink of chaos and possibly a not-so-friendly military dictatorship. Following the assassination of Detlev Rohwedder (the head of Germany's Treuhand, the agency overseeing former East Germany's state-owned enterprises), which was fed by motives similar to those in the Herrhausen assassination, supposedly by the non-existent Third Generation of the RAF, the economic hatchet descended on the head of the new federal states of Germany. The results of the election in Saxony-Anhalt in April 1998, in which Kohl's Chris-

4. Peter Schröder, *Wiesbadener Kurier*, Sept. 4, 1991, on the CIA study during the Bush administration.

"We could imagine the following institutions coming about soon after free elections [in East Germany]:

- "a common governmental committee for permanent consultation and political harmonization;
- "common technical committees;
- "a common parliamentary committee.

"Previous policy toward East Germany," the chancellor went on to say, "essentially had to concentrate on small steps that strove to alleviate the results of our division and uphold and sharpen the consciousness for the unity of the nation. If in the future a democratically legitimized, that is, a freely elected government, becomes our partner, totally new perspectives open up.

"New forms of institutional cooperation can emerge and develop in stages. Such a growing-together is part of the continuity of German history. Now we can again make use of these historical experiences.

"Nobody knows what a reunified Germany will look like. But I am sure that unity will come, if it is wanted by the German nation.

"The development of intra-German relations remains embedded in the pan-European process and in East-West relations. The future structure of Germany must fit into the whole architecture of Europe as a whole. The West has to provide peacemaking aid here with its concept for a permanent and just European order of peace."

Point two of Kohl's address dealt with the issue of East-West transportation. Here, the Chancellor significantly departed from his written text and presented a design for continental development, including high-speed rail.

The trans-European rail grid

"There are," Kohl said, "currently negotiations taking place on the modernization of the rail route leading from Hanover to Berlin. I do hold the view, however, that this is not enough, and that in the context of recent political developments we should discuss the transport and rail connections between the G.D.R. [East Germany] and the Federal Republic in a more fundamental approach.

"Forty years of being divided also mean that the transport routes have taken on, in part, a quite different structure. This is not only true for the border crossing points, but also for the traditional routing of transport connections in Central Europe, for the connections between East and West.

"Why, therefore, aren't we considering the classic route from Moscow via Warsaw and Berlin to Paris, which always ran through Cologne and had great importance at all times, to have a role in the era of high-speed trains, on the eve of the extension of the respective future trans-European transportation grid?"