

# The history of LaRouche's comprehensive SDI policy

by Michael Liebig and Jonathan Tennenbaum

Within the United States and maybe more so outside it, Lyndon LaRouche's name is being associated with SDI, the Strategic Defense Initiative. That goes for his friends, and equally so for his foes. The question of the SDI has uniquely encapsulated fundamental strategic issues not only for the United States' national security, but for global security as well.

The Soviet Union has disintegrated, and gone is the "global nuclear showdown" between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. But today's Russia faces an existential economic and political crisis, in which effective control over Russia's more than 10,000 nuclear weapons is no longer assured. The international, post-1968 nuclear non-proliferation regime is collapsing, as indicated by the recent series of nuclear tests by India and Pakistan.

Those two nations on the South Asian subcontinent do not represent a threat of nuclear aggression; they are merely asserting their sovereign right to do whatever they deem necessary for their national security and for the fullest development of advanced technologies. On what basis could one legitimately deny India, a nation of almost a billion people with a steadily advancing economy, a right that the five states of the "nuclear club"—the United States, China, Russia, France, and Britain—claim for themselves?

The nuclear non-proliferation regime—based on the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and, later, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)—is not only discriminatory, but simply does not work. In spite of the NPT, Israel does have a powerful nuclear weapons arsenal, and some 13 other states have an immediate nuclear weapons capability. While it is senseless to try to prevent the spread of nuclear weapon technologies—they simply cannot be "forbidden"—it would be equally irresponsible not to develop effective means of defense against weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. No one can rule out, that criminal regimes might one day employ nuclear weapons for blackmail and confrontation, or even use them in wars of aggression. But nuclear weapons are not "ultimate weapons"; there do exist means of effective defense against them, capable of rendering them "impotent and obsolete," as President Ronald Reagan termed it in his famous March 23, 1983 speech inaugurating the SDI. So, today, 15 years later, the strategic approach of the SDI is more "up to date," appropriate, and necessary than ever.

## The strategic background of the SDI revolution

To appreciate the strategic revolution which LaRouche aimed to bringing about with the SDI policy, it is necessary to understand the nature and origin of the opposing policies.

During the late 1970s, LaRouche had warned of a potential disastrous discrepancy between Western and Soviet military strategic doctrines. Increasingly from the 1960s on, and especially with the advent of so-called "utopian" military doctrines in the late 1960s and 1970s, the predominant current in Western strategic thinking came to regard an all-out thermonuclear war with the Soviet Union as "unthinkable"—the losses would be so gigantic as to be absolutely unacceptable to either side. Consequently, the emphasis in military doctrine should be to ensure an adequate "nuclear deterrence," while at the same time preparing to conduct armed conflicts "below the threshold" of full-scale nuclear war.

The Soviet side had a fundamentally different military doctrine, however. While seeking to achieve its strategic goals without an all-out thermonuclear war with the United States, the Soviet leadership regarded such a war as a very real possibility, and placed highest priority on exhaustive preparation and planning for that eventuality. Accordingly, Soviet military policy was to build up the industrial, technological, logistical, and global political-strategic base for fighting and *winning* an all-out nuclear war if necessary.

In few areas did the fundamental divergence between the two strategic outlooks become so extreme, as in the domain of civil defense and especially in anti-missile defense. While the Soviet military leadership regarded the need for development of anti-missile technologies as self-evident, the Western utopians were violently opposed to breakthroughs in the technology of anti-missile defense, arguing that such breakthroughs would threaten the "balance of nuclear terror" between the two sides, which the utopians claimed provided the foundation for global stability and security. Utopian policy was typified by the role of Henry Kissinger in promoting the 1972 ABM Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union, whose purpose was to prevent, or, at least greatly slow down, the development of operational anti-missile weapons. Naturally—as LaRouche and his collaborators repeatedly emphasized—given Soviet commitment to a nuclear war-winning strategy, the ABM Treaty, just like the SALT and



*Fusion Energy Foundation Executive Director Paul Gallagher briefs a CBS interviewer on the Strategic Defense Initiative, one day after President Reagan's historic March 23, 1983 announcement of the policy. Anyone who wanted to know what was going on at that time, had to turn to LaRouche and his associates.*

related “arms control” agreements which were to follow, was a wishful delusion on the Western side, fraught with the danger of a catastrophic strategic miscalculation.

As investigations by LaRouche’s collaborators revealed ever more clearly, this gross discrepancy between Eastern and Western military doctrines was ultimately the product of the same British-led geopolitical manipulations, which had promoted and shaped the postwar division of the world into adversary blocs of East and West in the first place. Above and beyond the adversary relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, there stood a “third party”—the British-centered oligarchical grouping exemplified by Bertrand Russell—which played the East-West conflict *on both sides* as a method of global geopolitical control, and a means to achieve the ultimate elimination of the nation-state and transition to some form of “world government.” The aura of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, fear of the terrifying destructive power of the nuclear bomb, as supposedly an “ultimate weapon” against which no defense would be possible, provided the means to intimidate populations and governments into acceding to the control of supranational institutions and the imposition of neo-Malthusian policies of population control and suppression of technological progress.

A key feature of this policy for a supranational world order was the massive promotion of a “cultural paradigm shift” in Western populations, beginning in the 1960s—deploying the “rock-drug-sex counterculture” and “green” anti-technology movements (starting with Russell’s own “Ban the Bomb” movement) against the traditional values of indus-

trial-oriented national economy. The very acceptance of the strategic doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), which meant living under an ever-present threat of nuclear annihilation at the push of a button, was a prime locomotive for the mass spread of cultural pessimism among the younger generation.

These brief indications make clear, that in putting forward a new strategic doctrine based on “crash program” development of strategic anti-missile defense, LaRouche was doing much more than merely remedying a crucial weakness in Western military policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. More than a mere weapons program, LaRouche’s SDI meant a return to nation-state policies of promoting rapid scientific and technological progress and industrial growth, while striking at the very heart of British geopolitical manipulation in the postwar period.

Significantly, the background for LaRouche’s elaboration of the SDI policy included an extended dialogue with high-level representatives of the Soviet government, exploring the possibilities for a way out of the increasingly unstable regime of nuclear deterrence, via joint development and deployment of anti-missile defenses based on new physical principles. LaRouche connected this with the offer, that such a joint policy for rapid technological development might provide the context for addressing long-standing problems within the Soviet economy itself. Ironically, it was the Russians’ violent rejection of this offer, following U.S. President Reagan’s announcement of the SDI policy in March 1983, which sealed the doom of the Soviet empire.

## The SDI's pre-history

As early as 1955, the United States began to develop anti-missile rockets. In the early '60s, the United States had precise plans for a nationwide ballistic missile defense (BMD) system-called Sentinel — with nuclear-tipped Spartan and Sprint anti-missile-missiles. Already in 1958, the German aerospace scientist Eugen Sänger published a study, in which he discussed the shortfalls of kinetic missile defense and advocated the development of weapons using directed-energy beams against ballistic missiles. Soviet plans to develop such directed-energy weapons were made public in Marshal V.D. Sokolovsky's book, *Soviet Military Strategy*, in 1963. The 1972 Soviet-American Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) had effectively quashed the deployment of kinetic BMD systems (i.e., interceptor missiles), but did not cover BMD systems based on "new physical principles."

Both the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in R&D work on BMD systems based on new physical principles—beam weapons or directed-energy systems. And, the Soviet efforts were especially intense. The politico-military officialdom in Washington under Kissinger-Ford and Brzezinski-Carter attempted to keep these Soviet BMD advances out of the strategic discussion in the United States and in NATO. When U.S. Air Force Maj. Gen. George Keegan publicly voiced concern over Soviet directed-energy work in 1977, he was strongly rebuffed by his military and political superiors.

## LaRouche's 'Sputnik of the Seventies' campaign

LaRouche's passionate interest in advanced physics had led him and a group of acquaintances with a background in physics to initiate the Fusion Energy Foundation (FEF) in 1974. The accumulating reports concerning Soviet advances in the field of plasma physics and directed-energy technologies were intensively discussed among LaRouche and his friends. LaRouche concluded that the scientific, technological, and military implications of these Russian advances represented such a formidable challenge to the United States, that a new "Sputnik shock" was in the making. On May 31, 1977, the U.S. Labor Party, which LaRouche had founded, drew on the foundation's research to issue a brochure, "Sputnik of the Seventies: The Science Behind the Soviets' Beam Weapon," on the Soviet breakthroughs in advanced physics. LaRouche demanded that the United States stand up to the Russian challenge and engage in a major national effort in the frontier areas of advanced physics, not the least because the *military* implications of Russia's scientific advances were enormous.

LaRouche wanted such a national effort for scientific, technological, and military reasons, but he wanted it for cultural reasons as well. He wanted to counter the cultural pessimism associated with the strategic regime of Mutually Assured Destruction and the nuclear "balance of terror." He

wanted to defeat the Malthusianism and the hysteria against nuclear energy which had become virulent in the Carter era, both in the United States, and, even more so, in Europe. That is why LaRouche did not want to merely circulate some confidential memoranda among political and military officials in Washington and elsewhere, alerting them on the Soviet challenge. LaRouche wanted the American people to know; he wanted the understanding and backing of the American people for a national effort on the frontiers of science and technology. The people must be informed and educated about the "great affairs" in national and international politics, while operational and technical specifics, of course, must remain secret. That is why tens of thousands of copies of the "Sputnik of the Seventies" brochure were circulated.

On the other side, LaRouche can be a man of great discretion. The reader would be most astounded were the names made public of all the political and military officials, internationally, with whom LaRouche met and discussed the strategic complex—known after 1983 as the Strategic Defense Initiative—during 1977-85.

Standing up to the challenge of Soviet scientific breakthroughs and their military ramifications, became a central political issue for LaRouche's 1980 Presidential campaign. His campaign program prominently featured a national program for a *beam-weapon missile defense system*. On Aug. 15, 1979, LaRouche published a Presidential campaign statement on military policy, which says, "A LaRouche administration will have two leading points in military policy: first, a commitment to the development of advanced-technology weapons able to 'kill' incoming missiles in the stratosphere." Please note, that this was stated 44 months before President Reagan's March 23, 1983 televised address on the SDI.

## LaRouche's fight against 'MAD'

In order to understand how LaRouche was able to conceptualize the SDI, it is necessary to look at his work since the mid-1970s on statecraft and military strategy. LaRouche had grasped that advances in physics and applied technologies had matured to a level which provided a solid scientific-technological foundation for BMD systems based on directed energy. But beyond the scientific-technological dimension, LaRouche had, for years, systematically and ruthlessly dissected the U.S. military strategy of Mutually Assured Destruction, or "nuclear deterrence," and its offspring, the NATO doctrine of "flexible response." The twin sister of MAD/nuclear deterrence is, of course, the political and strategic edifice of "arms control," with its various ABM, SALT, INF/Euro-missile, and START treaty complexes.

LaRouche had become the principal conceptual antipode to the "nuclear deterrence/arms control" school of McGeorge Bundy, Henry Kissinger, Robert McNamara, Zbigniew Brzezinski, James Schlesinger, or Cyrus Vance. The strategic system of nuclear deterrence intentionally made the nuclear-tipped offensive missile of whatever range into an "absolute



The LaRouche movement had been organizing support for a beam-weapon defense policy since the mid-1970s. Shown here: the U.S. Labor Party's pamphlet "Sputnik of the Seventies" (1977) and a Fusion magazine special report on beam weapons (1982).



weapon." That strategic system was technologically refined by increments (MIRVing, cruise missiles, Stealth). But, under the regime of nuclear deterrence, qualitative *technological attrition*, creating defensive or offensive weapon systems that would neutralize and supersede the offensive nuclear missile, was literally forbidden. Instead, the states with nuclear arsenals would engage in some sort of "community of fate," based on the capacity for mutual nuclear destruction. The "balance of nuclear terror" would ensure the integrity of the superpowers' sanctuaries, but not necessarily that of non-nuclear allies or other friendly third parties. The quantity of nuclear weapons may be reduced through arms control agreements, but the axiomatic quality of mutually assured nuclear destruction must be upheld. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 was designed to cement the system of nuclear deterrence against technological attrition, while the SALT I and II treaties were meant to quantitatively restructure the superpowers' nuclear offensive arsenals.

LaRouche rejected the system of nuclear deterrence by first pointing to the fact that the Soviet politico-military command had never truly subscribed to deterrence, but pursued a *war-winning* military strategy. Victory was to be achieved by nuclear means, if necessary, but preferably by non- or *post-nuclear* means. LaRouche gave much attention to Marshal Sokolovsky's book *Soviet Military Strategy* and the then-emerging, next-generation Soviet military doctrine shaped decisively by Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov. LaRouche pointed to the steadily progressing marginal superiority in Soviet offensive nuclear capabilities, the Soviet strategic defense effort, their space warfare capacity, their civil defense program,

and their ruthless "conventional" arms buildup. In the so-called "conventional" field, Ogarkov increasingly emphasized post-nuclear, advanced weaponry based on new physical principles, and corresponding post-nuclear operational concepts focussed on airborne and special forces.

Secondly, LaRouche pointed to a demotivation and demoralization trend in the American military, strongly radiating into NATO as a whole: If, under the regime of MAD, deterrence failed, the only prospect would be a suicidal, nuclear holocaust of total, global destruction. In his writings and in speeches, LaRouche explained "how 'MADness' ruined the Pentagon," as demonstrated by the sequence of political-strategic disasters, like the B-1 bomber cancellation, the neutron weapon cancellation, the bungling over the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe, Carter's Nicaragua policy, the fall of the Shah of Iran, and the hostage rescue fiasco.

LaRouche warned that *America's logistical depth*, its industrial-technological foundations, the very basis for the capability of fighting a war, were *eroding*. He denounced the reorientation of U.S. military strategy toward "limited" wars, "cabinet" wars, or "surrogate" wars in Europe and/or the Third World. The conduct of the wars in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, the Persian Gulf, and the Balkans since, has validated LaRouche's warnings.

Thirdly, LaRouche knew, and said so, that under the rigidly stagnant system of nuclear deterrence, not only the military, but also the people in the United States and, even more so, in the other NATO countries, would necessarily become increasingly demoralized. The perverse logic of threatening a nuclear holocaust as the only means of avoiding war, had to

materialize into *cultural pessimism* and a growing sentiment toward *appeasement*. “Peace movements” of all sorts flourished during the 1970s and 1980s in almost all NATO countries, attracting mass support, while being firmly controlled by Soviet and East bloc intelligence services. Their psychological warfare experts most cleverly exploited the very real dilemma posed by MAD: the prospect of a mutual nuclear holocaust, if deterrence were to fail. That made appeasement look rather acceptable and even fashionable.

LaRouche’s way out of MAD in a positive direction was a military strategy based on the military-technological revolution associated primarily with directed-energy systems. In terms of fire power (the energy density of the beam) and mobility (speed of light or approximations of that), beam weapons go orders of magnitude beyond the fastest nuclear missiles. In March 1982, LaRouche wrote a military policy paper, which was based on a lecture to an *EIR* seminar in Washington a month earlier, which bore the title, “Only Beam Weapons Could Bring to an End the Kissingerian Age of Mutual Thermonuclear Terror.”

### What is grand strategy?

A directed-energy BMD system means the strategic rehabilitation of defense. Such a system eliminates the alleged omnipotence of nuclear offense. Military strategy and genuine war avoidance are again founded on the dynamism of technological attrition and logistical depth. LaRouche’s conceptual design of a military strategy for the United States based on a directed-energy BMD system evolved out of work on the history of military science that he had pursued since the mid-1970s. There is a real wealth of lectures and essays by LaRouche on military science. LaRouche’s strategic conceptions are based on intense intellectual labor with, especially, the works of Carnot, Scharnhorst, and Schlieffen. LaRouche intensely studied the American War of Independence, the history of West Point, especially concerning the first half of the nineteenth century, and the American Civil War. He dissected the degenerated, bloody incompetence of military leadership on all sides in the conduct of World War I. And, LaRouche worked hard on Soviet Russian military thought, from Tukhachevsky, to the World War II commanders, to Sokolovsky and Ogarkov. On the American conduct of war during World War II, LaRouche’s studies focussed on Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the towering strategist and military leader of that war.

LaRouche’s military thinking is probably most strongly influenced by Lazare Carnot, about whom he wrote, “In sum, Carnot’s reforms were based on the two central republican principles: the mobilization of the citizenry to arms, and reliance on deploying the science and technology of rapid economic progress to increase mobility and firepower in warfare.”

From the vantage point of systematic study of the history of military science, LaRouche was able to conceptually rip

apart the utopian, anti-MacArthur school of Anglo-American military thinking which got codified in the system of MAD/nuclear deterrence. LaRouche traced the intellectual history of the post-World War II deterrence school back to the oligarchical “cabinet warfare.” The strategic assumptions underlying cabinet warfare are stagnation, limitations, and rigid regulations in the conduct of war, with the people and the armed forces in a state of passivity and fatalism. In other words, the exact opposite of Carnot’s way of war. While McGeorge Bundy, McNamara, or Kissinger have been more on the political “marketing” side of MAD, the originator of the deterrence school was Bertrand Russell, as mentioned above. A man of evil talents, the arch-Malthusian Russell institutionalized the deterrence school in the Pugwash Conferences. Russell and the Pugwash organization formulated, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the central features of the MAD/nuclear deterrence regime.

LaRouche’s concept of strategy is obviously not a narrow, military-technical one. Instead, for LaRouche, “war is not the sum-total of the results of individual battles; battles are but singularities of that total war which is the interdependent political, economic, cultural, and military policies and capabilities of the opposing military forces in depth.” LaRouche’s concept of strategy is one of *grand strategy*: Politics, economic performance, and culture make up “90% of strategy,” while in modern warfare no more than 10% of the total effort goes into actual fighting as such. Whether war breaks out or not, and once war has broken out, its course into victory or defeat, is fundamentally determined by politics, economic performance, and culture.

His “holistic” notion of strategy is equally important for grasping LaRouche’s unique capacity to generate innovative concepts in the fields of military strategy and intelligence affairs. Many military and intelligence experts, who respect and admire LaRouche, remain deeply puzzled about his—in their view—“improper mixing” of seemingly separate matters, such as culture and the economy with military and intelligence affairs. But they are even more puzzled about LaRouche’s ability to create new ideas on military and intelligence matters, something that “experts” with extensive, specialized professional knowledge in these areas are mostly not capable of.

In a presentation to an *EIR* seminar on “Beam Weapons: The Strategic Implications for Western Europe,” in Rome on Nov. 9, 1983, LaRouche stated that matters of strategy, warfare, statecraft, and intelligence are indeed matters of life and death. War is a brutish crime, utterly unjust, if it is not fought to defend the higher purpose of human life, the unique dignity of man as the *imago viva Dei*, the living image of God. How can there be a great strategist or a great military leader, if he or she has no morality, no soul, no higher purpose? A notion of strategy that is not anchored in morality thus defined must necessarily degenerate into crimes against humanity and ultimate defeat. World history, based on natural law, has been the judge, over and over again, on that score.

In LaRouche's notion of grand strategy, there is no place for slogans like "my country, right or wrong." Instead, for him, a nation's grand strategy must be based on a moral purpose, a mission for that nation. For LaRouche, a nation cannot just exist in and for itself, cannot be content with the material well-being of its population and otherwise stay away from internal or external trouble. A nation must not look the other way, when there is injustice within the nation, or beyond its boundaries. A nation with a moral purpose cannot but fight and overcome tyrannies, unjust wars, hunger, and the lack of culture and economic progress.

This powerful concept of moral purpose, of national mission as the basis for grand strategy, must be understood as the framework in which LaRouche has situated his military policy in general and his directed-energy BMD policy specifically. LaRouche saw in a beam defense strategy not just the undoing of nuclear deterrence and the Soviet nuclear threat. For LaRouche, a beam defense strategy meant an opening up of new scientific frontiers, especially space exploration. It meant also the undoing of Malthusian cultural pessimism, and it meant the industrial rejuvenation of the eroding physical economy of the United States, by introducing new production methods of the "Third Industrial Revolution."

Occasionally there were some echoes of LaRouche's ideas regarding the linkage of morality and strategy from official or semi-official quarters. Among interesting examples were Edward Teller's October 1982 remarks about a beam-defense strategy as a stepping stone toward realizing the "common aims of mankind."

### **LaRouche's campaign for strategic defense, 1981-83**

After Jimmy Carter was out and Ronald Reagan had become President, LaRouche intensified his political campaign for a beam-defense strategy to be adopted by the U.S. government. On July 20, 1981, LaRouche published another military policy paper, which discussed the specific requirements of a space-based beam defense system, namely the directed-energy device as such, the power source, sensors for tracking and target acquisition, battle management, and space platforms. LaRouche's political friends and his supporters from the FEF organized a growing number of public events in the United States, which featured the beam-defense system and which demanded that the Reagan administration adopt a military strategy based on such a BMD system.

The most important of these events was an *EIR* seminar in Washington, D.C. in February 1982, which was attended by a large number of political and military officials, as well as representatives of foreign embassies. LaRouche gave an outstanding lecture on a beam-weapon-centered strategy, which was published a month later, as the policy paper, "Only Beam Weapons Could Bring to an End the Kissingerian Age of Mutual Thermonuclear Terror: A Proposed Modern Military Policy of the United States."

LaRouche's beam-defense campaign coincided with the steady escalation of political tension around the stationing of NATO's intermediate nuclear forces (INF), or "Euro-missiles." The "nuclear freeze" and "no first use" campaigns in the United States and the mass activities of the Western European "peace movements" flourished. In late 1982, LaRouche travelled to Europe, where he and his associates addressed well-attended seminars on beam weapons in Bonn, Munich, Paris, Strasbourg, Milan, Brussels, Madrid, and Stockholm. Senior West European military and political figures requested briefings on beam defense by LaRouche and his associates.

When these events in the United States and Europe took place, we were still months away from March 1983. When President Reagan then made his TV address of March 23, 1983, in which he directed American scientists to develop the means to render nuclear missiles threatening the United States and its allies "impotent and obsolete," most of the political and military officialdom in Washington (just as elsewhere in the West and East) was profoundly shocked. Washington's governmental, Congressional, and military apparatus was utterly unprepared for a Presidential directive that, in effect, rendered the MAD regime of nuclear deterrence obsolete. We know now, that in the hours preceding the airing of Reagan's speech, frantic efforts were made, including by Secretary of State George Shultz, to remove the SDI section from Reagan's already-prepared TV speech.

The media, in and outside the United States, did not know where to turn on the subject of the SDI. They had to turn to the associates of LaRouche, because hardly anyone else could provide them with competent information on the subject. Specialists from *EIR* and FEF were interviewed by many TV and radio stations, written material from *EIR* and the FEF on the SDI circulated in large runs in the United States and in Europe. Between 1983 and 1985, books on the subject appeared in English, German, and Italian. Prestigious strategic journals in several NATO countries published articles on the SDI by *EIR* and FEF writers.

However, soon thereafter, the High Frontier operation of Air Force intelligence Lt. Gen. Danny Graham (ret.) was launched, in an attempt to deform and discredit the SDI approach. Graham postulated a revival of obsolete anti-missile rocket technologies, so-called "kinetic" systems, which for inherent physical-technical reasons cannot effectively defend against a massed nuclear missile attack. Years later, during the Gulf War, the miserable record of the Patriot system demonstrated that anti-missile rockets were not even effective against a small number of obsolete Iraqi Scuds. Graham denounced beam-weapon/directed-energy systems as unaffordable "music of the future."

LaRouche knew immediately that Reagan's March 23, 1983 speech had the potential of a strategic *punctum saliens*. LaRouche knew that a beam-defense system, as a comprehensive policy package with its scientific, technological, military, political, and cultural components, could signify a qualitative

phase-change in the overall national policy direction of the United States and the West as a whole.

On March 23, 1983, the American liberal foreign policy establishment had been caught off guard. Moscow was caught off guard. In confidential consultation with the U.S. government, LaRouche had been conducting private exchanges with Soviet government representatives from the winter of 1982 into spring 1983. These discussions prominently featured LaRouche's beam defense package. The Soviet side had readily conceded the strategic validity of LaRouche's beam-defense strategy, but excluded the possibility that it would ever be adopted by the U.S. government. After March 1983, the Soviets no longer regarded LaRouche as a nuisance with stimulating ideas, but a deadly enemy to be neutralized.

### **The Anglo-American establishment's and the Soviets' mobilization against the SDI**

Already on March 27, 1983, four days after Reagan's TV address, Yuri Andropov, Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), violently attacked Reagan's SDI speech as "insane." By April 1983, the Soviet politico-military command under Andropov had its response to the SDI ready: Under no circumstances would the Soviet Union accept a transition to a strategic relationship with the United States in which the SDI played any major role. American proposals in the direction of "parallel deployment" of strategic defense on both sides or even the sharing of knowledge on beam technologies between the United States and Russia were categorically rejected. The Soviets knew perfectly well, that beyond the field of military technology as such, the SDI would have a major impact in terms of U.S. politics and the U.S. economy. They knew the SDI could shatter the grip of the "liberal" establishment over U.S. foreign and security policy.

Henry Kissinger himself, at the Trilateral Commission meeting in Rome, on April 20, 1983, deplored the outflanking of the Anglo-American establishment through the SDI. He and his faction realized, that LaRouche had gained potentially decisive influence in the Reagan administration, which threatened to undo the established regime of MAD/nuclear deterrence. We now know, that Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had a wild shouting match with President Reagan some days after his TV address, accusing him of trying to destroy Britain's nuclear deterrent. Also, French President François Mitterrand violently denounced the SDI.

Senior representatives of the U.S. Department of State told inquiring foreign governments that they "should not take seriously" President Reagan's SDI speech. Vice President George Bush appeared to be loyally backing Reagan on the SDI, but we now know, that he did what he could to "whittle down" the SDI within the administration, as Kissinger had recommended.

The Russian command was determined to use every means of political and diplomatic pressure as well as military

coercion. Every Soviet intelligence asset, media contact, "useful idiot," or appeaser in the United States and the West was activated against the backers of the SDI. Even more than outside political and military pressure, the Soviet command calculated on an "inside operation," making an arrangement with their traditional partners within the Anglo-American establishment. Such an "understanding," they hoped, might strangle the SDI in the cradle and lead to a reconsolidation of the MAD/nuclear deterrence regime.

We do not know what secret encounters took place in the April-May 1983 period between the Soviets and U.S. establishment figures. What we do know is, that on April 27, 1983, Georgi Arbatov, head of the influential U.S.A.-Canada Institute in Moscow, met with then-vice chairman of Kissinger Associates, Brent Scowcroft, in Denver, Colorado. On May 26, 1983, Averell Harriman flew to Moscow to meet with Andropov. During May 24-28, a high-level Soviet-U.S. conference took place in Minnesota, where the SDI was discussed.

On April 24, 1983, Andropov had given an interview to *Der Spiegel*, in which he outlined the basic features of his proposal for an anti-SDI arrangement with the Anglo-American establishment against the SDI, which he called "dangerous adventurism." In exchange for suffocating the SDI, the Soviet Union would offer new, far-reaching nuclear arms control agreements. Soviet-American relations would be upgraded toward a new type of geopolitical condominium arrangement, including regional crisis management. After all, said Andropov, the Soviet Union was a "continental power," which had different strategic interests toward Western Europe and West Asia than the "sea power" United States. On the other side, Andropov expressed "understanding" that the United States could not be "indifferent" to the "kind of government that exists in Nicaragua." Along these lines, said Andropov, the Soviet Union was searching for a "common language with the American side."

The Anglo-American establishment went to work and delivered: The "Central American monkey trap," as LaRouche put it, was to become the crucial flanking move of the Soviet command in collusion with the Anglo-American establishment in their common war against the SDI. Nicaragua became an obsession for the Reagan administration, draining its energies. In that, Vice President Bush, with special responsibility for covert intelligence operations, played a leading role. On Oct. 13, 1983, National Security Adviser William Clark, a leading backer of the SDI in the Reagan administration, resigned. On Dec. 8, 1983, Lord Carrington was named NATO Secretary General. A senior figure in the British oligarchical establishment and a member of Kissinger Associates, he was a bitter enemy of the SDI.

The combined Soviet and Anglo-American establishment efforts to "whittle down" the SDI had surely gained momentum by late 1983. That year saw an escalation of all sorts of terrorism, destabilizations, and operations to inflame tensions and conflicts: the assassination of Palestine Liberation Orga-

nization leader Issam Sartawi; the bombing of the U.S. Embassy and the Marines barracks in Beirut; increased Soviet weapons deliveries to Nicaragua; the events in Grenada; the Soviet shoot-down of Korean Airlines Flight 007; and a North Korean commando killing of four South Korean cabinet members in Rangoon, Burma. In October 1983, the largest-ever peace demonstration against NATO's INF deployment took place in Bonn. In November, the Soviet Union broke off all arms control talks, and deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles off the U.S. coasts.

Still, in spite of the massive, concerted sabotage efforts, the enemies of SDI faced a real problem: *The SDI was a most popular policy in the U.S. population*, and LaRouche continued to play a crucial role in that. Also, all the efforts to sabotage the SDI did not succeed in preventing the creation of a basic SDI research and development infrastructure. Through Gen. James Abrahamson's Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO), significant technological breakthroughs were achieved.

### Targetting the SDI, targetting LaRouche

On Oct. 26, 1983, the Soviet weekly *Literaturnaya Gazeta* carried an article by KGB operative Fyodor Burlatsky, who wrote that the SDI—which he labelled “Star Wars”—might become a *casus belli* for the Soviet Union. Burlatsky viciously lashed out against LaRouche for propagandizing for the SDI.

In the autumn of 1983 and the spring of 1984, LaRouche addressed three important seminars on “Beam Weapons—The Strategic Implications for Western Europe” in Bonn, Rome, and Paris. The seminars had high-level attendance of senior officers and defense officials, industry representatives, political figures, and media. In all three lectures, LaRouche presented his designs for the future of the Atlantic Alliance: The offspring of NATO's MAD/nuclear deterrence, known as “flexible response,” must be replaced by a strategy, based on beam-weapon systems, that defends Western Europe—especially Germany—without defense equating self-destruction. This could only be done through a European Tactical Defense Initiative (TDI) program complementing the American SDI program.

The Soviet response to LaRouche was swift. At the Nov. 9, 1983 *EIR* conference on SDI in Rome, addressed by LaRouche, no fewer than ten Soviet intelligence operatives showed up. On Nov. 15, 1983, the Soviet government daily *Izvestia* published a lengthy, vitriolic article against LaRouche, titled “Witches' Sabbath at the Hotel Majestic.” The conference participants were described as “troglydytes,” who came to listen to LaRouche's “criminal” propaganda for “filling near-space with lasers and other types of ‘total weaponry.’” LaRouche, said *Izvestia*, was organizing “witches' sabbaths” in Rome and other Western Europe cities in order to lure the Europeans into participating in the “militarization of space.”

On March 12, 1984, *Izvestia* carried an article on the “scandalous ties of the Reagan administration with LaRouche.” When confronted by NBC-TV, “their proofs were so weighty that the White House did not even try to deny them,” exclaimed the Soviet paper. “Servant of the ruling class” and “agent of big capital” were the labels *Izvestia* chose for LaRouche.

On April 2, 1984, *Pravda* covered a conference on the SDI in Paris, addressed by LaRouche, by calling it “A Colloquium of Murderers.” Over two days, in a “business-like” atmosphere, the Paris event had discussed “what are the most effective methods of genocide.” LaRouche and his “CIA-controlled” associates debated how “at one stroke to annihilate countries, whose political systems do not please their masters, while preserving the mecca of capitalism—the United States,” shrieked the CPSU central organ.

This barrage of wild Soviet attacks against LaRouche continued into the late 1980s, and was increasingly complemented by slanders in “left” and “liberal” establishment media in both the United States and in Europe. The Soviet obsession with the SDI again became evident at the October 1986 Reykjavik summit between President Reagan and CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachov, who pushed the summit to an acrimonious conclusion, because Reagan remained unwilling to bury the SDI.

However, by that time, the Anglo-American establishment had indeed managed to “whittle down” the SDI. Funds for the program were scaled down, and the direction of the SDIO's R&D work was shifted increasingly in the direction of kinetic systems (anti-missile interceptors) and away from revolutionary laser, particle-beam, and other weapons based on new physical principles. Planning for BMD systems under development shifted increasingly from the strategic realm, to much more limited theater defense tasks. At the tenth anniversary of Reagan's March 23 speech, Adm. James Watkins, former Chief of Naval Operations and Energy Secretary, said that the SDI “faded,” because “*we never set a policy after 1985. . . . It is typical in this country of getting near the top, near the peak of Mount Everest, and then backing off.*”

Ironically, ten days later, in April 1993, the effectiveness of beam weapons as a defense from nuclear weapons—hysterically demonized in the 1980s by the Soviet leadership—and their contribution to global strategic stability, were acknowledged by Russian President Boris Yeltsin during his summit meeting with President Bill Clinton in Vancouver, Canada.

After the Iran-Contra scandal broke in October 1986, President Reagan became a “lame duck,” while the real power center within the administration shifted to Vice President Bush. Most of the responsibility for the truly criminal, murderous activities that occurred within the Iran-Contra complex, lies with George Bush, who since 1981 had supervisory control over U.S. covert intelligence operations in the White House. But Bush escaped the Iran-Contra scandal almost un-



scathed, and became President on Jan. 20, 1989. During the Bush years, the SDI was pushed to the fringe of military-strategic affairs, which centered on Bush's "new world order." And, during the Bush years, LaRouche was incarcerated as the result of one of the most outrageous political prosecutions in American legal history.

But, neither the SDI program — currently labelled the Ballistic Missile Defense program — nor LaRouche went away.

### **A new beginning?**

LaRouche has always emphasized that nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, and their delivery systems cannot be forbidden. They will not only stay around, but will inevitably proliferate. The American nuclear physicist and military expert Edward Teller, who contributed decisively to the development of the first American hydrogen bomb, and, together with LaRouche, belonged to those very few who convinced President Reagan to announce his SDI directive on March 23, 1983, said, following the recent Indian nuclear tests: "It now seems that the governments that are responsible for roughly half the population of the world already have nuclear explosives. Therefore *proliferation is an accomplished fact*. We should look for ways to live with that. We should start thinking, not in terms of what we wish, but in terms of what is reality."

The initiative for a new beginning in proliferation policy, must certainly come from the United States. Only the U.S.A. has the weight to launch a new beginning in shaping the strategic world order, as well as the new world financial system. And only the United States is economically and technologically in a position to rapidly produce effective SDI systems, in order to counter the undeniable "remaining risk" inherent in the spread of weapons of mass destruction. For example, in the United States the Airborne Laser system (ABL) is in an advanced stage of development. The ABL is a chemical laser and an adaptive optics fire control system, keeping the laser beam focussed in the atmosphere, which are installed on a Boeing 747. The ABL can destroy missiles in the boost phase at a height of 12 kilometers and a distance of 500 km or more.

The ABL is a good illustration that there are quick and effective possibilities to counter dangerous situations which can evolve from the spread of weapons of mass destruction. As said above, the United States must take the first step, although Russia, in spite of the horrendous crisis it is in, still possesses a broad array of blueprints and prototypes for beam-weapons missile defense. But, there are also other states, in various stages of economic development, that have the potential to protect themselves through beam weapons, from the dangers to national security posed by weapons of mass destruction.

SDI defense systems also offer two essential economic advantages: Not only are beam weapons technically superior on physical grounds, but they are also cheaper than the "slow"

anti-missile interceptors. Using pulses of concentrated energy, beam weapons can destroy offensive missiles with a "cost per kill" much lower than what it took to produce the missiles. Directed-energy beams represent a key technology for industry: Already today, machine tools which work with high-energy beams, are progressing very rapidly. The tremendous economic significance of high-energy-based technologies was, even in the early 1980s, a central feature of LaRouche's SDI strategy. Despite all the blather about the post-industrial "information society," in reality, more than ever, the growth of the world economy and a higher living standard for the world's population, depend on the expansion of industrial production, infrastructure, and energy production. The coming Third Industrial Revolution will encompass the full utilization of the electromagnetic spectrum—for example, laser machine tools, nuclear and fusion energy, magnetic levitation railways (as in the Eurasian Land-Bridge concept), and space travel. How often in history, have new technologies produced great changes initially in the military sector, and then dramatically changed and advanced the economy as a whole.

To sum things up: As LaRouche has stated repeatedly in recent years, more than ever, directed-energy-based defense systems against weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems are technologically feasible, strategically necessary, and morally imperative.

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e-mail: [larouche@larouchepub.com](mailto:larouche@larouchepub.com)