

mated at up to \$40 billion, the IMF is promising to send a team in September to discuss a new loan—for a miserly \$330 million.

The government now seems to be intentionally downplaying the extent of damage. It is circulating a figure of no more than \$2 billion in reconstruction costs for infrastructure, housing, and industrial enterprises. It has announced a commitment to implement a tight-money policy, as demanded by the IMF. It expects to finance the entire reconstruction cost through a special tax on mobile phones, property, real estate, and private vehicles. It also claims that production losses of no more than \$1.3-2 billion and a fall in tax revenue of \$700 million can be expected.

Under the circumstances, Ankara is whistling past the graveyard. The stock market has been closed since the earthquake, not because of physical damage, but because a massive sell-off can be expected within the first minutes of its opening. Foreign investors have been pulling hard currency out of the country. Rather than slapping on currency controls, the Central Bank has been injecting cash into the financial system, through the interbank money market, repurchase agreements, and currency intervention. Government yields on the benchmark one-year government bonds have increased by 13 percentage points to 112.7%. Crédit Suisse has released its new estimates, predicting a 2.5% negative growth rate for this year.

One ominous indication of the government response to the anticipated political backlash, is the shutdown of Channel 6, one of the national TV networks, under the excuse that its coverage of the earthquake was “provocative.” In addition, troops under orders to shoot looters are now being deployed to maintain peace—despite the fact that there has not been an atmosphere of widespread lawlessness.

### Throw out the IMF and BAC schemes

The only hope Turkey has, is to throw out the IMF and to reject the geopolitical scheming of the BAC. The earthquake has only revealed the tremendous shortcomings in the Turkish economy and economic policy. The disaster is not just the result of shoddy housing construction by dishonest contractors and corrupt officials; rather, it is, in greater part, the result of three decades of apparent rapid economic expansion, at the expense of developing infrastructure. The earthquake zone, one of Turkey’s most densely populated regions, had serious deficits in such essential infrastructure as transport, sanitation, and carefully planned housing and industrial development zones. Even before the earthquake, experts had predicted a major economic crisis because of this deficit.

If a social explosion is to be averted, the IMF conditionalities and free-market policies which have come to dominate the Turkish economy have to be thrown out. Turkey would have to join the “Survivors’ Club,” and begin implementing the dirigist policies required to rescue the country.

# Theater, national missile defense: revolution, or bluff?

by Jonathan Tennenbaum

Recent pronouncements by U.S. officials and others, in favor of a near-term introduction of Theater Missile Defenses (TMD) in the East Asia/Pacific and other regions, together with plans to build a National Missile Defense (NMD) system for the United States, have injected a dangerous destabilizing element into the world strategic situation. While repeated references to a ballistic missile threat from North Korea and other so-called “rogue states” have until recently been the main rationalization for the TMD-NMD “hype,” the real target of the campaign is, obviously, *China*.

If any doubt remained on that point, one need only juxtapose the ongoing, orchestrated anti-China hysteria in the United States to the recent chorus of demands by U.S. Congressmen and politicians for the United States to provide TMD systems to “defend Taiwan”—coming hard on the heels of Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui’s deliberately provocative statements on Taiwan independence, and in the middle of major U.S. and joint naval maneuvers around Korea and in the South China Sea.

Referring to the widely publicized calls by Rep. Benjamin Gilman (R-N.Y.) and others for the United States to deploy TMD systems “in defense of Taiwan,” Lyndon LaRouche recently remarked: “Those Congressmen have to be exposed for what they are: political *whores*, who have no concern whatsoever for defense or for protecting anybody. The purpose is only one thing: to try to provoke China into actions which would destroy any positive relation to the Clinton Presidency.”

The “logic” of the TMD provocation, if we may call it that, includes the following obvious consideration: Although Beijing is strongly committed to a peaceful process leading to reunification with Taiwan in the long term, China adamantly reserves the right to use military force, if necessary, to prevent a splitting-off of Taiwan. That military option rests in significant part, at present, on the use of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Threatening to “close the window” on such a military option, through the deployment of TMD systems a few years hence, while at the same time threatening (by the NMD) to eliminate the deterrent value of China’s tiny intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force, greatly increases the pressures in China in favor of utilizing a military option against Taiwan “before it is too late.” By simultaneously turn-

ing up the heat in other ways — egging on Lee Teng-hui, stepping up the armament of Taiwan, accelerating military cooperation with Japan, increasing the U.S. presence and the threat of direct U.S. intervention in a Taiwan or Korea conflict, and so on—the strategy is to try to push the more hot-headed factions in China over the edge into a flight-forward. In the words of China-expert Prof. Ernst Winter (see interview, p. 37): “This is really being engineered. There are interests who would like to have a condition in the Far East which would make Kosovo look like a picnic.”

But, how effective are the anti-missile defense systems really, which the U.S. Defense Department (DOD) proposes to deploy in the form of TMD and NMD, and which, years before their deployment, are being exploited in a psychological-warfare “chicken game” that could lead to World War III?

Ironically, many of the systems which are to be at the core of the near-term TMD-NMD deployment have never been tested under anything approaching realistic combat conditions. More important, however, the present near-term TMD-NMD schemes are based on kinetic interceptors technologies which are *intrinsically* incapable of shifting the advantage to the defense in any serious combat involving ballistic missiles.

Referring to the relative ease with which China could overwhelm such proposed, technologically incompetent TMD defenses by launching large numbers of dummy warheads and other countermeasures, Lyndon LaRouche recently joked, that Chinese industry can produce even more dummies than you can find in the U.S. Congress!

The cruel irony of present policy to go for near-term creation and deployment of operational TMD-NMD anti-ballistic missile systems, is that these systems may be sufficiently credible to destabilize the situation in East Asia or elsewhere, but would hardly be adequate to protect anyone from the consequences of a real, serious war fought out with ballistic missiles. They fit into the process of progressive degeneration of U.S. and Western military doctrine and capabilities, which runs from the Gulf War to the disaster in Kosovo, and which is characterized by the growing tendency to launch wars without being able to actually win them.

In this article, we shall take a closer look at the current situation of ballistic missile defense, focussing on some of the basic points which must be taken into account in any serious evaluation of the proposed TMD and NMD.

### **U.S. anti-missile defense — a big effort in the wrong direction**

At first glance the United States would appear to have a very solid base for building anti-missile systems. The U.S. Defense Department has spent roughly \$50 billion in ballistic missile defense (BMD) development over the last 15 years. The present push to build and deploy operational BMD weapons draws upon a base of knowledge and technology which was acquired, above all, during the 1980s in the period of the

famous Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

The original task of the SDI was to create a multi-layered “shield” to defend the United States against massive attack by thermonuclear-tipped strategic ballistic missiles. However, contrary to Lyndon LaRouche’s original design for the SDI, *very little* of the subsequent effort actually went toward the realization of what Edward Teller and LaRouche referred to as “new physical principles” which could revolutionize the entire technological basis of defense. With the help of sabotage and diversion from such quarters as High Frontier’s Gen. Danny Graham, the effort to achieve fundamental scientific breakthroughs was aborted, and the emphasis shifted toward mere engineering R&D. The result was essentially a painstaking elaboration, testing, and refinement of selected lines of ABM technology which *already* existed, in essence, already prior to the birth of the SDI in 1983.

In 1991, the entire focus of the BMD was changed from the original SDI defense against massive ICBM attack, to “Global Protection Against Limited Strikes” (GPALS). In 1993, the Pentagon’s SDI Organization (SDIO) was reorganized and renamed Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), with further, drastic cuts in basic technological development in favor of operational systems for theater defense. The BMDO budget for advanced technology was shrunk to a mere 7% of its total funding.

Up to 1990, investment into TMD made up less than 4% of the total BMD budget. In the years 1996-98, direct investment into TMD reached well over \$2 billion per year, making up more than 60% of the total budget. Parallel with the shift toward TMD, the role allotted to directed-energy or “beam weapons” (lasers, particle beams, etc.) was greatly scaled down. The overwhelming emphasis was shifted instead to near-term realization of conventional (“kinetic”) interceptor technology, enhanced by gradual advances in such fields as missile design, new materials, tracking (sensors, advanced radars, etc.), guidance, control, and what military professionals call “BM/C3.” On this basis it is now proposed to push, with great urgency, toward near-term deployment of operational systems based on this interceptor technology. The DOD now plans to actually *deploy* several different operational anti-ballistic missile weapons systems over the coming decade. According to official pronouncements, these are to include:

**Year 2001:** planned first deployment of upgraded Patriot PAC-3.

**Year 2003:** planned first deployment of Navy Area BMD system.

**Year 2003 or somewhat later:** projected first deployment of Navy Theater-Wide BMD system.

**Year 2003 or 2005:** projected deployment of first elements of a National Missile Defense system.

**Year 2007:** projected first deployment of Theater High-Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD).

All of these systems are based on the conventional princi-

ple of anti-missile interceptors: missiles which are launched from ground or sea, and whose homing vehicles directly intercept the target inside or outside the atmosphere in the mid- or terminal phase of its trajectory. In addition, however, operational prototypes are being built for high-power anti-missile laser weapons.

Development work is also continuing on the Space-Based Chemical Laser, a prototype of which is supposed to be put in orbit in the year 2010 or later.

*None* of these laser weapons systems are included in the present plans for near-term deployment of TMD and NMD. Although the Airborne Laser in particular could serve as a prototype and forerunner of quite effective anti-missile systems, there is no visible effort to make it or the other remaining directed-energy (“beam weapon”) technologies into the spearhead of anti-missile defense, as was envisaged by the original SDI. On the contrary, it appears that the new push toward early deployment of “kinetic” TMD-NMD systems is pushing the laser and other potentially revolutionary technology programs even more into the background.

Parallel with the push toward operational TDM systems, there has been hectic activity around the design of “architectures” for their projected deployment, especially into the East Asian region.

Notable, for example, is a “Report to Congress on Theater Missile Defense Architecture Options for the Asia-Pacific Region,” issued by the DOD “in response to the fiscal year 1999 National Defense Authorization Act which directs the Secretary of Defense to carry out a study of architecture requirements for the establishment and operation of theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD) systems for Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan that would provide for their defense against limited theater ballistic missile attacks. The report contains rather ambitious statements such as, for example: “One land-based upper-tier fire unit, with an additional THAAD-like radar would be able to cover the entire island of Taiwan. This system could intercept incoming missiles both inside the atmosphere and outside the atmosphere.” Evidently, impressionable Congressmen and public are supposed to conclude: “If defending Taiwan is so easy, why don’t we just go ahead?” But the more critically-minded would not overlook the following caveat by the authors of the report: “There was insufficient time to examine the effects of suppression of TBMD systems by a potential aggressor, robustness against maximum aggressor raid sizes, or countermeasures which could be employed on theater ballistic missiles.” Evidently, the real effectiveness of the proposed defense systems is not the matter of great interest to the DOD at this time!

### **Technological incompetence**

At first glance, the array of planned and projected dates for fielding of anti-missile systems is impressive indeed. One

must bear in mind, however, that although enormous R&D efforts have gone into ABM technology over the last two decades, virtually *none* of the extremely complex systems now projected to be deployed in the coming 10 years, have actually demonstrated their ability to reliably destroy missiles and warheads under anything close to realistic conditions.

The only ABM system ever to be used on a significant scale in actual combat, the Patriot PAC-2 interceptor system, proved to be a miserable failure against the primitive Iraqi Scud missiles in the Gulf War. Although the U.S. Army originally claimed a “success rate” of 96% against 44 Scuds that were engaged by the Patriot system, the claim was subsequently lowered to 59%, and then in a later Army study to only four “mission kills,” two deflections, and two partial hits which downgraded the destructive force of the Scud warhead. But leading Israeli experts have stated, based on Israeli studies of the 16 Patriot engagements over Israel, that only *one, or at most two* Scuds were successfully destroyed. It is generally acknowledged that much more damage occurred in Israel as a direct or indirect result of the attempted “defense” by the Patriots, than would have been inflicted if the Scuds had been allowed to pass unhindered!

The troubles with the PAC-2 do not necessarily all apply to the improved version PAC-3, which is to be the chief “terminal defense” component of the proposed layered TMD-BMD systems. One cannot overlook, however, the *huge discrepancy between actual performance of PAC-2 in combat, and what had been predicted on the basis of previous development and testing*. What about the vastly more complex and demanding interceptor systems which are supposed to form the core of the projected TMD and NMD?

Reading between the lines of official literature and publications such as *Aviation Week*, we get a picture of what is going on inside the hyped-up rush to deploy TMD/BMD, which hardly inspires confidence in the outcome. Here are a few samples from *Aviation Week’s* Aug. 16 special report on NMD technology:

“One of the biggest drawbacks of the limited advanced technology funding is that BMDO has to make investment decisions prematurely. Existing budgets force BMDO to make spending decisions based largely on paper concepts. . . .

“Having state-of-the-art components in a single-string design in a harsh environment is asking for failure. . . .

“THAAD’s six misses in a row are not that surprising, particularly if corners were being cut in ground testing and fabrication to reduce costs and meet a tight schedule.”

The crux of the matter, however, does not lie in the complexity of the systems, nor merely in the incompetent “cost-cutting” management and overall decay of U.S. in-depth science and engineering capability, which glares out between the lines of such reports. Decisive is the *elementary technological incompetence* of any interceptor-based defense—a point which has been emphasized by Lyndon LaRouche (and oth-

ers) from the very beginning of the BMD debates.

*Compared with the offensive capabilities of short-, medium-, or long-range ballistic missile technology, the technology of so-called "kinetic" interceptors—i.e., using a missile to intercept and destroy a missile or warhead—is intrinsically incapable of shifting the overall advantage from offense to defense.* The basic reasons are simple:

1. *The velocities reached by missile-launched interceptors are of the same order of magnitude as that of the objects they are intended to destroy.* This greatly reduces the time available to the defense, limits the possibility for intercept essentially to the mid- and terminal phase of the target's trajectory, and as a result generally cannot prevent the release and deployment of multiple warheads, decoys, and other countermeasures and penetration aids from the offensive launch vehicles.

2. *At least one interceptor (including a launch vehicle) is required for each target object.* Such an interceptor must be highly sophisticated and expensive, making the cost of a "kill" at the very least comparable to, and in general *very much higher* than the cost of the targetted missile. Taking into account the substantial probability of "misses" and the attrition caused by decoys and related countermeasures, the ratio of interceptors required per "kill" of a real target, and consequently the ratio of cost for interceptors as compared with the corresponding offensive systems, is shifted even much more drastically to the *disadvantage* of the defense.

The case of the National Missile Defense proposal is illustrative. According to *Aviation Week*: "An initial system is to protect against a 'C1' first level of capability threat with a limited number of warheads and the simple countermeasures expected of rogue nations. . . . NMD plans against a C1 threat of five warheads call for a 95% confidence that a 95% kill probability will be achieved. A '4-on-1 shoot-look-shoot' scheme is used to get this confidence—two interceptors are fired at a warhead, the damage is observed, and another two interceptors are fired. Twenty interceptors are needed to protect against five warheads." At the same time, however, *Aviation Week* notes: "Some members of the Rumsfeld Commission which sounded the alarm last year about the rapid pace of rogue nation missile development, said any country capable of building an ICBM could also make countermeasures that would defeat an NMD system."

The last 15 years of intensive development of interceptor technology has changed absolutely *nothing* in regard to these, and related, fundamental weaknesses of "kinetic" systems. In fact, the setbacks and embarrassments of interceptor development, including the Patriot farce, as well as the more recent debacles with Theater High-Altitude Area Defense system, only serve to underline the basic incompetence of the whole approach.

By contrast, a directed-energy weapon such as a high-power laser, for example, propagates its destructive action to the target at or near the speed of light, over 30,000 times

the speed of any missile. Even at ranges of thousands of kilometers, the beam energy arrives at its target within a small fraction of a second. The weapon must only be aimed appropriately; there is no complicated in-course guidance required as in the case of a kinetic weapon. Furthermore, the destructive action is delivered by a mere pulse of energy, rather than an expensive and complicated projectile. In contrast to the "one-on-one" requirement of interceptors, a single directed-energy weapon can in principle deliver "killing" pulses to a whole series of targets in rapid succession. Thereby, the real cost ratios are shifted decisively in favor of the defense.

These elementary considerations determined that any serious ABM defense effort must emphasize directed-energy weapons—as exemplified by high-power lasers (chemical, beam-pumped, FEL, nuclear-pumped, etc.), particle and plasma beams, high-power microwave, enhanced- and directed-radiation from nuclear devices, etc. Only these sorts of systems (or more revolutionary ones, which might be developed on the basis of new physical principles) provide the potential order-of-magnitude increase in overall "firepower" needed to give a decisive advantage to the defense in combat against ballistic missiles.

The same sorts of technologies permit methods for "active" discrimination of targets, that far more precise and reliable than the passive sensors upon which presently planned TMD-NMD systems are based.

True, to realize the intrinsic advantages of such directed-energy systems in the form of *operational* ABM weapons is technologically extremely demanding; the task goes beyond mere engineering work, and requires a process of continuous scientific and technological breakthroughs in the domain of "new physical principles." But exactly that sort of process guarantees that a large-scale effort to develop directed-energy weapons will generate enormous technological "spin-offs" whose impact on the productivity of a well-managed civilian economy will more than repay the original military investment. Exactly this "science-driver" effect was key to LaRouche's original design for the SDI, and a decisive factor in the Reagan administration's original adoption of the SDI policy. In the meantime, however, the preconditions for such a "science-driver" effect of an anti-missile program have all but vanished. Thus, in his recent article, "Congress Revisits the ABM Treaty" (*EIR*, Aug. 20, 1999), LaRouche wrote:

"Then, as now, the technological crux of this issue was, and is, that, contrary to the simplistic views of [Gen. Danny] Graham et al., the use of interceptor rockets, or other so-called 'kinetic energy' systems, does not represent an effective means of defense against a strategic thermonuclear ballistic missile attack. Today, sixteen years later, the self-bankrupted economy of the U.S.A. no longer has the scientific or economic capability, which it either had, or could have developed then, of launching the kind of strategic defense option, based on 'new physical principles,' which

could have been developed under the 1982-1983 version of my original proposal.”

### What is TMD-NMD good for?

Turning back to the question of possible military impact of the planned Theater Missile Defense systems in particular, the author submits the following theses:

1. Despite the enormous technical problems and the intrinsic “technological incompetence” of kinetic interceptor technology, the considerable resources now being devoted to near-term realization of TMD technologies, if continued, will eventually produce operational systems with a certain limited efficacy against ballistic missiles.

2. However, except for a conflict with a vastly weaker adversary (such as a NATO operation against a small developing country), these systems cannot shift the balance in favor of defense. On the contrary, a moderately capable and resourceful adversary will find ways to exploit the intrinsic weaknesses of these systems.

3. Hence, the TMD and NMD, as presently conceived, are of little or no positive value as instruments of legitimate military strategy of a nation-state. They do fit into the pattern of “utopian” globalist strategy, typified by the conduct of the Gulf War, its sequels, and the recent war in Yugoslavia, as “punitive” actions against vastly weaker adversaries—to pro-


tect forces engaged in the kind of cowardly pseudo-warfare we have seen in those conflicts.

These remarks have their direct analogue in economic policy. Some observers have been pointed to the existence of a faction in the Anglo-American “establishment,” which is aware that the financial system is going to collapse, and is planning to pour massive amounts of money into the military-industrial sector as an “anti-crisis measure.” For that purpose, a combination of regional crises and a new “arms race” (with China or a combination of China and Russia, for example) would seem to provide a welcome pretext for such an abrupt shift toward dirigistic economic policy. Indeed, the current TMD-NMD push already has something of the character of a “pork barrel,” to keep a section of aerospace and other high-tech military industrial sectors alive amidst the continuing spiral of industrial decay and down-sizing of U.S. in-depth scientific and technological capabilities. However, the policy of simply feeding money into selected military-strategic sectors, in the middle of financial breakdown and in the context of a brutal, increasingly proto-fascist austerity policy against the majority of the population, is as much doomed to failure as was the Soviet economy in 1983, when LaRouche predicted its near-term collapse as the consequence of the refusal to adopt his proposal for joint “science-driver” SDI development.

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—Former U.S. Attorney General  
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


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