

such a plot did not know the probable consequences of the assassinations. On Feb. 23, 1994, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Special Representative Michel Moussali had called for action to restore stability to Rwanda, warning of a "possible bloodbath of unparalleled proportions." According to Alison Des Forges of Human Rights Watch, who was closely involved with the Rwandan opposition to the Habyarimana government, the United States and others "ignored a CIA study at the end of January 1994 which suggested that if combat were to begin in Rwanda, that it would include violence against civilians—with a worst-case scenario of the deaths of half a million people." Although the U.S. State Department considered Habyarimana to be the major obstacle

to the implementation of the Arusha Accords, as State Department officials told regional diplomats at the time, it should have been obvious that even if that were the case, he was also the only possible force that might be able to continue to maintain a balance in the political scene that could prevent a bloodbath. With Habyarimana removed, the apocalyptic clash between the extremist wings—the Interhamwe leadership and the RPF, with the population caught in between—was inevitable.

With knowledge that the survival of Rwanda, particularly its Tutsi population, was so precarious, why would the RPF-Ugandan force contemplate such a risky option as the assassination of the President, which could only spark extreme and

## London is biggest donor to Rwandan military regime

The donor community has "ignored reports of abuses and supported the Rwandan government generously," reported the 1999 Human Rights Watch survey on Rwanda, with Britain the largest country donor. In 1999, some 45% of the Rwandan government budget was paid for by foreign aid, despite the fact that the Rwandan military is currently an aggressor country in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (D.R.C.), occupying areas of North and South Kivu provinces in eastern Congo.

To be sure, the Rwandan people, with 300,000 households headed by children, are in need of aid and a boost to begin to rebuild their lives, shattered by the catastrophes of 1994 onward. But there appear to be no conditionalities placed on the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), either in terms of accountability or the domination of its aggressor-military. "Among the largest donors was the World Bank, which gave \$75 million of unrestricted funding over a period of ten years (plus \$5 million for another specific program), and the United Kingdom which pledged \$70 million of unrestricted funding over a period of ten years. The U.S. provided \$10 million to support social justice, \$3 million of it for a public relations campaign to win support for gacaca (local reconciliation process). The Netherlands contributed \$6.7 million for education and civil service reform. In July, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, and Norway all indicated that they would increase assistance to Rwanda."

The donor money, in contrast to the siege against such countries as Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Kenya, not to mention the D.R.C., is being given despite the evidence of

continuing abuse of the Rwandan population, evidence overlooked in the donors' zeal to impose a collective guilt upon all Hutus.

### The Human Rights Watch reports

The evidence of the RPF's Nazi-like treatment of large sections of the Rwandan population is contained in the Human Rights Watch reports of 1998 and 1999, among other sources. The reports are corroborated by Rwandan sources outside the country who have fragile lines of communication with those within.

The Human Rights Watch report for 1998 states: "The Rwandan government and insurgents fought an increasingly brutal and costly war, killing probably tens of thousands of unarmed civilians during 1998. Based largely in the northwest, the insurgents also led major strikes against other regions. They attacked jails to free prisoners and they slaughtered members of the Tutsi minority, government officials, and others who refused to support the rebellion. Soldiers of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), equipped with helicopters, armored vehicles, and heavy weapons, killed unarmed civilians, sometimes in pursuit of insurgents, sometimes in places or at times where no rebels were present but where they suspected the population of supporting them. In an incident in late October that became known only near the end of 1997, RPA soldiers allegedly caused the deaths of hundreds and perhaps thousands of persons who had sought refuge in caves at Kanama [see "Kagame's Killing Fields in Rwanda," *EIR*, Dec. 12, 1997].

"Estimating the number killed in the course of the year was difficult. Investigators could not travel freely in the area and witnesses often refused to speak for fear of reprisals. Diplomats concluded that between 100,000 and 250,000 persons were unaccounted for out of a population of some 1,500,000 in the two prefectures of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri. Some 200,000 persons did not collect their

widespread violence? One clue is offered by Des Forges's 1999 case study of the Rwanda crisis published by Human Rights Watch, *Leave None To Tell the Story—Genocide in Rwanda*. Des Forges relates: "According to two highly placed RPF leaders, they anticipated that the international community would help defend civilians should killings be launched on a massive scale." This is corroborated by the introduction to *The United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996*, by former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. He reports that on April 19, 1994, during a telephone conversation with Ugandan President Museveni, Museveni "urged that UNAMIR be reinforced and retained in Rwanda. He asked me to convey his request to the Security Council which I did that

day. The President then added that he was attempting to arrange for troop contributions from countries in the region and that he personally was directing efforts to arrange a cease-fire between the RGA [Rwandan Government Forces] and the RPF. The President followed up this plea with an urgent request to the Council on April 21 that UNAMIR maintain its presence in Rwanda."

Therefore, either the Uganda-RPF grouping made a terrible miscalculation in taking the risk to proceed with the removal of Habyarimana, or they had received some form of guarantees by the relevant foreign powers—which guarantees clearly were not met. In fact, as is shown below, rejecting President Museveni's plea on April 21, under the leadership

required identity papers in Gisenyi, suggesting that they were either dead or living on the other side of the forest, or in areas controlled by rebels. Assessing responsibility for the slaughter of civilians was sometimes complicated by misinformation from witnesses or government sources. First reports said that 34 persons were slain by insurgents at Tare in July, for example, but eyewitnesses later said RPA soldiers were responsible for the crime.

"Early in 1998, the army began gathering residents of the northwest in supervised camps which by the end of October held some 480,000 persons. In some regions, soldiers ordered people to destroy banana plantations and other crops that might provide cover to the rebels, thus causing food production to fall. In addition, farmers were too afraid of attack from one side or the other to work their fields in some regions. Faced with food shortages and threats by insurgents, some persons willingly moved to the camps where they hoped to receive food and protection. Others were forced by soldiers to go there. In areas where the insurgency was strong, some residents moved close to rebel bases voluntarily and others were intimidated by the rebels into doing so."

### **People unable to return to their homes**

The 1999 Human Rights Watch report indicates that the brutal repression of the insurgency has dampened the pace of atrocities against the population. Nevertheless, people are not permitted to return to their homes and farms, but have been herded into so-called villages, where there are no services and the means of livelihood is extremely insecure.

Human Rights Watch reports: "By late 1999, the Rwandan government had largely put down an insurgency which had operated out of northwestern Rwanda and adjacent areas of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the past eighteen months. In doing so, its troops killed tens of thousands of people, many of them civilians, and

forced hundreds of thousands of Rwandans to move into government-established villages. During 1998, as part of its effort to suppress the insurgency, the government moved hundreds of thousands of people in the two northwestern prefectures into supervised camps. At the end of 1998, the government ordered the displaced to relocate once more, this time to officially designated 'villages.' Since 1995, the government had been resettling Rwandans returned from outside the country and the internally displaced in 'villages,' refusing to allow them to live in the dispersed homes customary in Rwanda. They insisted that villagization would promote economic development and improve delivery of services to the population. As applied in the northwest, however, the program appeared to be meant primarily to reduce the likelihood of a new insurgency. By late 1999, 94% of the population of Kibungo and 60% of the population of Mutara, both prefectures in the east, had been moved into villages, as had 40% of the population of the prefecture surrounding the capital of Kigali. In addition, 94% of the people of the northwest who had been in camps had been moved into villages, and others, still in their homes, had been ordered to destroy them and move to the new sites, where they were obliged to live in temporary shelters, under plastic sheeting, while building new houses. People who resisted these orders were fined or imprisoned. Despite government promises, most sites offered no services (water, schools, clinics) and residents often had to walk much farther to cultivate their fields.

"By late 1999, many land claims from the relocations remained unresolved. Farmers in the northwestern prefecture of Ruhengeri were cultivating less than 60% of available arable land. About 60% of the population of the northwestern prefectures was malnourished (compared with 40% elsewhere in the country), and more than half a million still depended on foreign food aid near the end of the year."—*Linda de Hoyos*