

## Sour Grapes

The “U.S.-China Security Review Commission” was set up to look at the “national security implications of the economic relationship between the United States and China”—an anxiety growing daily as the dollar and stock markets spiral down, and the U.S. trade deficit soars to “new historic highs” every month.

The U.S. relationship with China “can cause significant economic and security problems for our country,” the commission complains. It has especially sour grapes about the ever-soaring U.S. trade deficit with China—which results directly from the addiction of the American “consumer economy” to low-cost imports of textiles, food, and electronic items for its very survival.

There are other gripes. Under the thinking prevailing during the “roaring 1990s,” U.S. promotion of a “free-market economy” was supposed to lead to more U.S. influence on China’s political policies, the report whines. Now, it is becoming clear even to this crew, that “the burgeoning trade deficit with China will worsen despite China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO).” Now, “many leading experts” are calling the “policy of engagement . . . a mistake.” China has not been brought sufficiently to heel. The commissioners are incensed that Chinese leaders stress that they

“have no desire to repeat in China the political and economic collapse that took place in the former Soviet Union.”

This is most aggravating. The “mad eminence” of the Clash of Civilizations, former U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, wrote in his 1999 book *The Grand Chessboard*: “The defeat and collapse of the Soviet Union was the final step in the rapid ascendance of a Western Hemispheric power, the United States, as the sole and, indeed, the first truly global power. . . . For America” after the Cold War, “the chief prize is Eurasia.” China is supposed to fall next.

But the crux of the matter is U.S. economic vulnerability. “We are China’s largest export market and a key investor in its economy. . . . The U.S. trade deficit with China has grown at a furious pace—from \$11.5 billion in 1990 to \$85 billion in 2000. The U.S. trade deficit with China is not only our largest deficit in absolute terms but also the most unbalanced trading relationship the U.S. maintains,” complains the Review Commission. As if to avenge this, the Commission demands—at a time when foreign capital is fleeing the shaky U.S. markets—that Washington “implement economic and other sanctions against offending countries, including quantitative and qualitative export and import restrictions, restricting access to U.S. capital markets.”

The commissioners would seem suicidal. On July 30,

## Review Reflects Brzezinski Lunacy

The foreword to the U.S. Defense Department “Quadrennial Defense Review Report” of Sept. 30, 2001, in which Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld declared the United States at war, expressed the impact of the attacks on Sept. 11. But the policies in the Review, formulated before Sept. 11, cohere with the post-Sept. 11 actions of the U.S. government.

Rumsfeld wrote before Sept. 11, “The senior leaders of the Defense Department set out to establish a new strategy for America’s defense . . . deploying forward”—a term that goes back to the old “forward school” of the British Empire. The Quadrennial Review states that U.S. strategy must be “peacetime forward deterrence in critical areas of the world” and “enhancing the future capability of forward deployed and stationed forces,” with “information assets.” The Defense Department’s “new planning construct” calls for maintaining regionally tailored forces forward stationed and deployed in Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian littoral, and the Middle East/Southwest Asia. These forces will be “tailored increasingly to main-

tain favorable regional balances in concert with U.S. allies and friends.” The Pentagon intends to “develop a basing system that provides greater flexibility for U.S. forces in critical areas of the world . . . beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia.” This makes the bases in Central and South Asia, for example, established during the war on Afghanistan, look quite permanent.

The Review directly expressed Zbigniew Brzezinski’s “Arc of Crisis” lunacy, 25 years later: “Asia is gradually emerging as a region susceptible to large-scale military competition. Along a broad arc of instability that stretches from the Middle East to Northeast Asia, the region contains a volatile mix of rising and declining regional powers.” Coyly declining, then, to mention China, the Review’s authors still made clear who their target was: “Maintaining a stable balance in Asia will be a complex task. The possibility exists that a military competitor with a formidable resource base will emerge in the region.”

The United States was presented as a hyperpower, whose interests encompass securing not only the U.S. “homeland,” but also “precluding hostile domination of critical areas, particularly Europe, Northeast Asia, the Middle East, and the East Asian littoral” (the last modestly defined as “the region stretching from south of Japan through Australia and into the Bay of Bengal” i.e., China, all of Southeast Asia, Australia, and eastern South Asia).