

The Kennedy Assassination, Kennedy's Presidency, and Our Mission

This round-table discussion of the crucial points of history of John F. Kennedy's Presidency, took place on "The LaRouche Show" Internet radio broadcast on Nov. 22, the 40th anniversary of the fateful shock to the nation and the world, which was the killing of America's 35th President. Participants were Jeffrey and Michele Steinberg, EIR Counterintelligence Editors; EIR White House correspondent William Jones; Technology editor Marsha Freeman; and members of the LaRouche Youth Movement over the Internet. The questions and discussion are excerpted.

Michele Steinberg: We are discussing the Kennedy assassination, his Presidency, and our mission to bring this nation back to its real reason for existence—the benefit of the general welfare of all humanity, beginning with our own republic.

In a discussion this week [at a campaign meeting in St. Louis], Lyndon LaRouche, who is on the campaign trail for the Presidency, said of the Kennedy assassination: It makes very clear how important the position of the American Presidency is. In the brief time of the Kennedy Presidency, the microcosm of the very crises that we face today in the character of Vice President Dick Cheney and the resurgence of the Synarchist international—the threat to use nuclear war as an instrument of empire, and to turn the American republic into the opposite of what it represents, into an instrument of evil—likewise with the Truman Vice Presidency, the Kennedy killing underlines the importance of the American President. Harry Truman never should have been the Vice-Presidential candidate in 1944. That was an operation by powerful interests, to put in a Vice President who would, as President, do the unthinkable, use nuclear weapons against innocent civilians. And in the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Harry Truman and the people around him who made that decision set the conditions for the Cuban Missiles crisis 16 years later.

John Kennedy did not go to war over Cuba. And in that successful resolution of the Missiles Crisis, were the seeds of the assassination of JFK.

We owe an obligation to history, as LaRouche has often said, to make of our lives something that makes the past more important than it was, because of the sacrifices that were made to bring us to the position we're in—the good from them. We owe something to the future, to give them a legacy that is profound and in the image of God.

That's what the Presidency of the United States should be.

Let that introduce the inaugural speech of John F. Kennedy, January 21, 1961:

We observe today not a victory of party, but a celebration of freedom; symbolizing an end, as well as a beginning; signifying renewal, as well as change. For I have sworn before you and Almighty God the same solemn oath our forebears prescribed nearly a century and three quarters ago.

The world is very different now. For man holds in his mortal hands the power to abolish all forms of human poverty, and all forms of human life. And yet the same revolutionary beliefs for which our forebears fought are still at issue around the globe—the belief that the rights of man come not from the generosity of the state, but from the hand of God.

We dare not forget today that we are the heirs of that first revolution. Let the word go forth from this time and place, to friend and foe alike, that the torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans—born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage, and unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of those human rights to which this Nation has always been committed, and to which we are committed today at home and around the world.

Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty. This much we pledge, and more. . . .

To those old allies whose cultural and spiritual origins we share, we pledge the loyalty of faithful friends. United, there is little we cannot do in a host of cooperative ventures. Divided, there is little we can do; for we dare not meet a powerful challenge at odds and split asunder. To those new States whom we welcome to the ranks of the free, we pledge our word that one form of colonial control shall not have passed away merely to be replaced by a far more iron tyranny. . . .

To those peoples in the huts and villages across the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever period is required—not because the Communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right. If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich.

To our sister republics south of our border, we offer



“The torch is passed to a new generation of Americans. . .” President Eisenhower begins to pass the Presidency to John F. Kennedy, December 1960. Eisenhower’s military command experience helped him understand and keep down the military and Pentagon utopians, after the Truman-period disasters of the nuclear bombing of Japan, and McCarthyism. Kennedy had much less preparation for his mortal Presidential struggle against the Synarchists.

a special pledge to convert our good words into good deeds in a new alliance for progress; to assist free men and free governments in casting off the chains of poverty. But this peaceful revolution of hope cannot become the prey of hostile powers. Let all our neighbors know that we shall join with them to oppose aggression or subversion anywhere in the Americas. And let every other power know that this Hemisphere intends to remain the master of its own house.

With that, I’d like to start with Bill Jones; welcome.

The ‘Utopians’ and the Cuban Crises

Jones: Let me just tell you a little bit about the lead-up to the Cuban Missiles Crisis.

When Kennedy was elected President, he was not unaware of what we call, today, the utopian faction. He had seen some of this among some of the naval leadership in World War II, of which he was highly critical as a junior officer, as which he served. But he also knew the warnings that President Eisenhower gave, as Kennedy was about to be sworn into office, on Jan. 17, 1961, when [Eisenhower] gave a farewell speech, in which he warned about “the military-industrial complex,” and the awareness of “a disastrous rise of misplaced power.”

So Kennedy was aware that there were people within,

also, the apparatus of his own Administration, who represented this utopian view—the “war-hawks,” the ones who had been responsible for Hiroshima. And so in one sense, he was on his guard. But he didn’t realize the full nature of this group, until the Bay of Pigs—until he had been convinced, or had been misinformed, about an operation that had been set into motion under the Eisenhower Administration, to invade Cuba on the pretext that this would lead to a national uprising and the overthrow of Fidel Castro. As we know, that was a miserable failure, and was the first real blot on the Kennedy Presidency; in which he came out of it looking very, very bad, and felt, himself, that he had weakened his initial phase as President of the United States.

Shortly after that, in June 1961, Kennedy had his first meeting with [Soviet leader Nikita] Khrushchev; and there were a lot of issues to be discussed, in particular, the question of Berlin, which was already becoming a major critical area. Khrushchev

had drawn the lessons of the Bay of Pigs, and considered the young—youngest ever elected—President John Kennedy as being somewhat of a weakling; so he went into Vienna to test his mettle. And there were also stories that he actually physically assaulted the President at one point. Whatever the case may be, it was certainly a psychological assault on him; and Kennedy remarked to somebody afterwards, that that was really one of the worst times that he had ever had.

Khrushchev did not go in to talk or to negotiate; he was really going in to test. Coming out of the meeting, he obviously drew the conclusion that this fellow is really a pushover, and I can throw my weight around.

This led into a crisis over Berlin, in which Kennedy did show himself as not being a pushover; this was when the Russians built the Wall that divided the city of Berlin, but did not move into West Berlin, because Kennedy had made it clear that, according to the post-War agreements, we have a right to be there; our troops have a right to be there; we have to have access to that. Khrushchev backed down on that; he did not move any Russian troops into Berlin, but he did build the Wall. And we all know the consequences of that, until just recent history.

The second thing that Khrushchev did, was that he started to play a very provocative role in his relationship with Fidel Castro in Cuba. In April 1962, Khrushchev assured Kennedy that the Soviets were not going to build bases in Cuba. He

asked the President that U-2 flights be stopped, on this agreement. Kennedy went into that agreement. And then in August 1962, the CIA discovered that there was a lot of Soviet military equipment going into Cuba.

War Avoidance in an Existential Crisis

For a period of about a month, there was a general outcry. The Joint Chiefs of Staff; the utopians in Kennedy's own Administration—guys like Curtis LeMay, who was represented in the famous *Dr. Strangelove* as Gen. Jack Ripper; he wanted to bomb, bomb the bases, invade Cuba. There was almost a general consensus about this. And Kennedy said, "No deal. We have to find out what's going on."

U-2 flights were made over Cuba. It was confirmed by October that there were medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles being set up in Cuba. The medium-range missiles could reach through most of the Southeastern United States, including Washington, D.C. The IRBMs could reach anywhere in the United States. So this was a serious problem. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as the Congressional leaders, were calling for immediate military action. Kennedy held them off. Kennedy had to fight every step of the way, in order to gain some time to discover if Khrushchev, indeed, was really provocative enough to go to war over this issue; or if there was a way of finding a negotiable solution, a war-avoidance solution.

Khrushchev simply kept denying that any of the weapons going into Cuba were of an offensive nature. Kennedy interpreted this as Khrushchev trying to find a possible way out of the crisis, by not making it into a confrontation over the actual weapons that were going in; he was saying that they were something that they were not. As that was exposed, of course Khrushchev would have a way out. But it was very uncertain. Nobody really knew what was going on.

By Oct. 22, Kennedy had pushed through a policy of initiating a quarantine or blockade of Cuba; that the U.S. Navy would surround the island, and any Soviet ships entering into Cuban waters would be searched to see if they had any of these forbidden missiles. The warning was given to the Soviets; and on Oct. 22, Kennedy himself gave a speech to the nation. For the first time in the course of this crisis—which had been the object of press speculation for some time—he said that there were missiles there that threatened the United States; that he was initiating a quarantine; and that he called on Chairman Khrushchev to remove the missiles.

Kennedy Changes the Rules

That speech, of course, had the biggest audience that ever watched a Presidential address. You can imagine the climate in the country, as people were seeing this. They didn't know if they were going to get bombed the next day. As LaRouche has said, they were running from wherever they were, into the churches which they probably hadn't visited for a long time. It was a real existential crisis in the nation as a whole. And Kennedy was also able, in establishing this quarantine,

to bring around the Organization of American States; so it was not seen as some kind of unilateral action. When people confronted him and demanded he launch an air attack against Cuba, he said, "We're not going to do a Pearl Harbor. There's got to be a different way out." He was seeking a war-avoidance policy.

Finally, when Khrushchev realized that Kennedy was not going to back down on this, he put out the feelers saying that he wanted to talk.

In the meantime, the old utopian warriors, Bertrand Russell and Leo Szilard, had tried to contact Khrushchev to utilize this crisis in the same way that they had set up the Hiroshima bombing—to create a situation in which they could create their utopian world government, and mediate this crisis, and bring both the nation-states of Russia and the United States under some kind of international control. Khrushchev, of course, was playing this to the hilt. He was always telling Russell, "Yes, this is crazy; Kennedy's going too far, we can't allow this." Russell wrote to Kennedy that there was no conceivable justification for the quarantine. Kennedy rejected these approaches, and merely said that Russell's interests should be more directed toward the burglar rather than those who'd caught him. So he wasn't going along with this.

But he had a war-avoidance policy.

Khrushchev indicated, finally, by Oct. 26, in a letter to the President, that he was willing to come to an agreement which involved a commitment from the United States not to invade Cuba—which Kennedy, of course, had no intention of doing in the first place, after the Bay of Pigs fiasco—in return, they would dismantle the missiles, and Castro would pledge never to place offensive missiles on Cuba. There was another agreement in which the United States would also agree, over time, to get rid of the Jupiter missiles in Turkey, aimed against the Soviet Union. This was not part of the formal agreement.

That essentially ended the crisis. Kennedy faced down his military leadership, the utopians in his own Cabinet, as well as the Congressional opposition to this, in pushing forward a policy which really changed the face of politics in the United States. Kennedy emerged from this as the real hero. He had accomplished in a very difficult situation, what nobody thought could actually be done.

So he utilized this to try to change the rules governing politics, especially the politics between the United States and Russia, and the Soviet Union.

'The Best Speech Made Since Roosevelt'

Six months later, he gave the speech at the [1963] commencement of American University, in which he called for a new relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, really for the establishment of some kind of "community of principle." He was moving in this direction. He said, we have our differences, but we also have common interests. He appealed to Americans to begin to rethink many of the attitudes of the Cold War, and to try to understand the Soviet



Air Force Gen. Curtis LeMay (left) represented the utopian faction's demand to turn the 1962 Missile Crisis into war—immediate air attack on Cuba. Kennedy faced almost a military and Congressional consensus for invasion—but rejected it. Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer (right), NATO commander after Kennedy's assassination, was involved in utopian military schemes earlier in 1962—"Operation Northwoods"—to stage bombings of the United States itself (!) in order to trigger a U.S. invasion of Cuba.

Union as a nation, which was trying, in its own way, to survive and to develop—and on that basis, creating a new relationship between the two, and therefore, a new relationship in the world as a whole.

This was something that had been last done by Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Between Roosevelt, and the Kennedy speech, there may not even have been a possibility for an American President to make that kind of statement. But after the Cuban Missile Crisis, because of Kennedy's handling of it, he was able to make that, and to change the rules of the game.

Khrushchev admitted that inadvertently. Russians heard this speech as it was being broadcast. For the first time, they said VOA—Voice of America, whose broadcasts were always jammed—can broadcast this speech, and can translate it into Russian. Khrushchev said, that's the "best speech that has been made since Roosevelt."

And these same characters who had tried to create war with Cuba, and had succeeded in getting Truman to drop the bomb—this was the biggest threat that they saw, because this would really change the game entirely, making them incapable of conducting these kinds of crazy operations. And I think that also played a role in the assassination.

Michele Steinberg: Bill, thank you. I want to hear more about the policies of the Kennedy Administration from Marsha Freeman; and then ask Francisco Medina and Allyson Grimm [organizers of the LaRouche Youth Movement] to ask the questions on these issues.

Economic and War Challenges JFK Saw

Freeman: To start, as you did, with President Kennedy's inaugural address in January of 1961: He used it as an occasion to lay out what he saw as the state of the nation. He described the situation in the following way: He reported that

business bankruptcies were at the highest level since the Great Depression; that 5.5 million people were unemployed; and that the cities in the United States were becoming engulfed in squalor. He said that the classrooms in this country contained 2 million more children than they could properly have room for; and that the children were being taught by 90,000 unqualified teachers. He said that the United States lacked the qualified scientists and engineers that our world obligations require; and that all of the medical wonders that had been created were out of the reach of the poor and the aged; and that there was a terrible lack of hospital beds, nursing homes, and doctors.

But Kennedy said that all of these domestic problems paled beside the challenges of the Cold War.

Starting, really, within days of his inaugural speech, Kennedy began to move on his domestic agenda. On Feb. 9, he gave a special message to Congress on health and hospital care, laying out what needed to be upgraded in that area. Two weeks later, on Feb. 20, a special message to Congress on education; and he motivated his educational program by saying, "The human mind is our fundamental resource." On April 20, he outlined his tax incentive and tax system program; and this was the very well-known investment tax credit. President Kennedy proposed that there be an 8% investment tax credit to companies that invest in new capital equipment, machinery, expansion of existing factories and capital equipment; and said that this would be the major way to create jobs.

In the meantime, while he was moving on the fronts of this domestic agenda, as Bill was just describing, there were many crises developing in the world. In the early part of May, you had the Bay of Pigs. The President saw this as a very dramatic defeat for his Administration, and said he needed to take responsibility for that. Then something happened in the beginning of April, that was going to reshape history. That

was the flight of Yuri Gagarin, the first human being to orbit the Earth.

This was a tremendous challenge—as President Kennedy said, as significant as the 1957 challenge of Sputnik. And on May 25, he made a speech before Congress, discussing what he called “urgent national needs.” Clearly, the most famous sentence from that speech was, “I believe that this nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the Moon, and returning him safely to Earth.”

The Apollo Project

He had an inkling of what this would require. First, leadership. There was no one in the President’s Cabinet who supported this program—not in the military, not his Science Advisor. Basically no one, except his Vice President, Lyndon Johnson. This required the President taking personal leadership to push through this effort.

He knew that it would require creating a whole generation of scientists and engineers, which really did not exist at that

time. He knew that it would require the greatest peacetime mobilization of human scientific and industrial resources in this nation’s history. And he was willing to make a commitment that all of these resources would be mobilized.

What did the Apollo program create? In Lyndon LaRouche’s term, it created a “science driver” for the whole U.S. economy. It created 20 years of real economic growth for the country, and technological spinoffs into every sector of the economy—transportation, agriculture, advances in nuclear energy, medicine, machine tools; and there was one study that said that in overall terms, for every dollar invested in the space program, ten dollars came back to the economy in new goods, new industrial processing, and overall economic growth. It created this generation of scientists and engineers that the President knew was needed, and they went into every sector of the economy.

Most important, it created a cultural paradigm-shift out of the stagnation and complacency of the 1950s. This was true not only in this country; it became a program very closely watched by developing nations all over the world, many of

The American University Speech

In the June 10, 1965 mold-breaking speech in which he halted U.S. nuclear testing and offered the Soviet Union a peace based on common principles of mankind—only months after the Cuban Missiles Crisis—President Kennedy included these statements.

I have, therefore, chosen this time and this place to discuss a topic on which ignorance too often abounds and the truth is too rarely perceived—yet it is the most important topic on Earth: world peace.

What kind of peace do I mean? What kind of peace do we seek? Not a Pax Americana enforced on the world by American weapons of war. Not the peace of the grave or the security of the slave. I am talking about genuine peace, the kind of peace that makes life on Earth worth living, the kind that enables men and nations to grow and to hope and to build a better life for their children—not merely peace for Americans but peace for all men and women—not merely peace in our time but peace for all time. I speak of peace because of the new face of war. Total war makes no sense in an age when great powers can maintain large and relatively invulnerable nuclear forces and refuse to surrender without resort to those forces. . . .

I speak of peace, therefore, as the necessary rational

end of rational men. I realize that the pursuit of peace is not as dramatic as the pursuit of war—and frequently the words of the pursuer fall on deaf ears. But we have no more urgent task.

Some say that it is useless to speak of world peace or world law or world disarmament—and that it will be useless until the leaders of the Soviet Union adopt a more enlightened attitude. I hope they do. I believe we can help them do it. But I also believe that we must re-examine our own attitude—as individuals and as a nation—for our attitude is as essential as theirs. And every graduate of this school, every thoughtful citizen who despairs of war and wishes to bring peace, should begin by looking inward—by examining his own attitude toward the possibilities of peace, toward the Soviet Union, toward the course of the Cold War, and toward freedom and peace here at home.

Let us examine our attitude toward peace itself. Too many of us think it is impossible. Too many think it unreal. But that is a dangerous, defeatist belief. It leads to the conclusion that war is inevitable; that mankind is doomed; that we are gripped by forces we cannot control. We need not accept that view. Our problems are man-made—therefore, they can be solved by man. And man can be as big as he wants. No problem of human destiny is beyond human beings. Man’s reason and spirit have often solved the seemingly unsolvable—and we believe they can do it again. . . .

No government or social system is so evil that its people must be considered as lacking in virtue. As Americans, we find communism profoundly repugnant as a negation

whom started their own rocket societies and carefully followed all of the progress in the Apollo program.

The Apollo program contributed very importantly to Kennedy's strategic program, of both reaching technological parity with the Soviet Union military, and very importantly, as a war-avoidance policy, based on the idea that this program could be a basis for this community of principle of nations, working on projects that Edward Teller described later as for "the common aims of mankind."

On Sept. 20, 1963, less than a year after the Cuban Missiles Crisis, Kennedy made a very dramatic speech before the United Nations, in which he said that even though there were very serious differences between the United States and the Soviet Union, there was room for new cooperation in space. He said, "I include among these possibilities, a joint expedition to the Moon." This is really quite remarkable, when you think about what the strategic situation was.

Kennedy's vision for what the space program could promise, was cut short because his life was; and unfortunately, under Lyndon Johnson, Vietnam War spending really pre-

cluded a continuation of the visionary space program that President Kennedy started. So I think it really falls to us, as our job today, to fulfill that vision and to move forward one of the greatest of the great projects—the exploration of space.

Michele Steinberg: Marsha, thank you.

Bertrand Russell, Pre-Emptive Nuclear Warrior

Francisco Medina: Bertrand Russell's name popped in there—I wonder if Bill could discuss the tradition he was coming from, in contrast to what John F. Kennedy was doing, and the United States as a whole. He is British; recently in the LaRouche Youth Movement in Los Angeles, we have been reading a lot of H.G. Wells and Bertrand Russell.

Jones: Russell was a part of the crowd with H.G. Wells; they had their differences on some issues, but they were basically of the same faction. Their idea was—from about the 1920s—an attempt to create a world government in which nation-states would give away their own rights, and a government would be created with an elite which would steer things,



President Kennedy's June 1963 American University speech was a dramatic turn which "threatened" to end the Cold War, only months after resolving the Missiles Crisis.

of personal freedom and dignity. But we can still hail the Russian people for their many achievements—in science and space, in economic and industrial growth, in culture and in acts of courage.

Among the many traits the peoples of our two countries have in common, none is stronger than our mutual abhor-


rence of war. Almost unique, among the major world powers, we have never been at war with each other. And no nation in the history of battle ever suffered more than the Soviet Union suffered in the course of the Second World War. At least 20 million lost their lives. Countless millions of homes and farms were burned or sacked. A third of the nation's territory, including nearly two-thirds of its industrial base, was turned into a wasteland—a loss equivalent to the devastation of this country east of Chicago.

Today, should total war ever break out again—no matter how—our two countries would become the primary targets. It is an ironic but accurate fact that the two strongest powers are the two in the most danger of devastation.

...

In short, both the United States and its allies, and the Soviet Union and its allies, have a mutually deep interest in a just and genuine peace and in halting the arms race. Agreements to this end are in the interests of the Soviet Union as well as ours—and even the most hostile nations can be relied upon to accept and keep those treaty obligations, and only those treaty obligations, which are in their own interest.

So, let us not be blind to our differences—but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal.



British “peacenik” Bertrand Russell and his partner in world government, H.G. Wells, crafted the utopian war doctrine Kennedy confronted and defeated in resolving the Missiles Crisis. When only the United States had nuclear bombs, Russell had wanted them used, pre-emptively, against Japan—and then the Soviet Union.

so that you would have the utopian world that they said would be the best for everybody. But they had a problem: They had to get rid of the nation-state; and they had to establish within the population itself, some kind of willingness to give up their own rights as citizens of nation-states.

At the point that nuclear weapons were developed, the same crowd—Leo Szilard is one of the key people, and also Russell—proposed the development of these weapons in the United States during World War II. You were at the point in science where nuclear energy was going to become a force, it was within the purview of development—but they wanted to develop these weapons for a specific reason. As Wells pointed out most clearly: To the extent that there is this overall threat to mankind as a whole from these new weapons, mankind will be willing to give up rights and freedoms in order to accept a world government which would prevent these weapons from being used.

Russell made this clear in a statement in 1946, when the atomic bomb had been developed and used: He said we should begin immediately threatening a pre-emptive strike against the Soviet Union. It was clear to him, as to most people, that after the United States had developed this bomb, the Soviets also had the capabilities, and were interested in developing them for their own defensive purposes. But if two parties had these weapons, they could no longer be used in the same way, as a force controlled by one power to impose its will over the entire world.

At that point, Russell became—from a warmonger, a different kind of warmonger—he became a so-called peacenik. He was a very chameleon-like person. His attitude was: Now that two parties have these weapons, the only way we can get world government, is by using negotiations on these weapons,

to impose this world government on both. What Russell tried to do with the Russians, was to insert himself as a mediator; if it ever came to a conflict like the Cuban Missiles Crisis, he and his colleagues could then say, “You see now, we need this world government; we need this world control of nuclear weapons in order to avoid a war.” And that seemed to be exactly the way he was dealing with Khrushchev. And Kennedy really rejected that. He wasn’t going to play that game.

Michele Steinberg: Do you think that the call that Bertie Russell made for a pre-emptive strike, was to reproduce Hiroshima and Nagasaki so that it would really sink in? Or was there a military objective?

Jones: He wanted to prevent the Soviet Union from developing weapons. Russell was very anti-American,

as Wells as well. However, he swallowed the fact that, by the end of World War II, the United States was effectively the greatest power on the Earth. He swallowed his anti-Americanism, and he admitted that in the public statement he made in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, where he said that the United States could become the sole possessor of these weapons; but then the United States would have to develop a policy of really controlling the world. He said, “I’m not sure they’re willing to do it; but if they were, then I could accept that.”

So I think that what he wanted to destroy, more than anything else, was the Soviet Union from developing atomic weapons. He knew, and other people knew—his friend Niels Bohr and others, through their contacts with Russian scientists—that the Russians were also capable of doing that.

The ‘Shock Trauma’ of JFK’s Assassination

Allyson Grimm: By listening to what Kennedy seemed to have done in a short amount of time, and comparing that with FDR: They made significant steps in terms of talking to the American population and getting people to really move on this sense of *agapē*. I wanted to know if there is any correlation between Martin Luther King and JFK?—and was the assassination of Kennedy to psychologically scare the population, or was it more that he was so dangerous that [the utopians] must take him out? Or, both?

Jeffrey Steinberg: The answer is both.

Let me go back to the speech that Kennedy gave at American University on June 10, 1963. As Bill said earlier, this was about 6-7 months after the Cuban Missiles Crisis. . . . In that 6-month period—from solving the Missiles Crisis to the delivery of the American University speech—Kennedy made a

number of profound decisions. Number one: He decided, on the advice of Gen. Douglas MacArthur . . . that the U.S. would not go further with the war in Indochina, and began issuing orders for the withdrawal of American troops.

Second: He decided to end the Cold War. And in that speech at American University, he announced a unilateral U.S. ban on atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons. He announced a peace conference with Khrushchev and [Harold] Macmillan, the Prime Minister of Britain, to work on a comprehensive test ban and nuclear disarmament treaty. He said the world has reached the point of insanity, where total war will blow up the planet. In other words: Everything that Russell was using as blackmail against the nation-state system, Kennedy decided to trump.

So he made a profound decision. It was, as Allyson said, a self-conscious notion of *agapē*. I'll read you just two sentences or so from that June 10 speech: "Our problems are manmade. Therefore, they can be solved by man. And man can be as big as he wants. No problem of human destiny is beyond human beings. Man's reason and spirit have often solved the seemingly unsolvable, and we believe they can do it again." Now, in a sense, what Kennedy declared in that speech, and in his decision on stopping the war in Indochina, was that he completely rejected the "beast-man" policy of the Anglo-American oligarchy and their allies in other places around the world.

So there were two dimensions to the Kennedy assassination. He had to be stopped because what he threatened was the permanent defeat of the Bertrand Russell global tyranny notion. So one aspect of the assassination was specific to Kennedy, and to making sure that the legacy of Kennedy was not allowed to go forward. And of course, you had the assassination of Robert Kennedy just five years later, and the assassination of Martin Luther King, and that of Malcolm X. But there was another dimension, studied and written about by some of the leading British imperial psychological-warfare specialists before Kennedy was even President. Back in 1957, a British Tavistock Institute psychiatrist named William Sargent wrote a book called *Battle for the Mind*, in which he talked about how you can break the human spirit. What he said, was that particularly because of the advent of the mass media, you can have certain events occur that will affect societies as a whole. He said that the way you can destroy human beings' ability to think, is by putting people through "collective shock trauma."

The events of the 1960s were precisely that. The Cuban Missiles Crisis itself was a terrifying moment. But the fears induced by it were healed by the fact Kennedy exerted leadership, and then moved to end, permanently, the threat of thermonuclear extermination. So alone, the Cuban Missiles Crisis wasn't enough. But the Kennedy assassination; the brutal coverup; the assassination of Malcolm X; the decision by Johnson that he was a "dead man" if he didn't go forward with the Vietnam War; the riots in urban America; and

then the assassinations of Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy—within that six-year period, the Baby-Boomer generation, with no exception, were put through exactly that kind of shock trauma. So this notion of *agapē* through politics, that Kennedy personally embodied, was ripped out of all of us. It was as if you had your soul ripped out. And the alternative was readily available—drugs, rock, sex; the whole counterculture was served up through the mass media beginning in the mid-'60s, in the immediate aftermath of the Kennedy assassination.

The sense of optimism, of problem solving, that the "human spirit knew no bounds and had no problems beyond the basis for solution"—that idea was, at least, temporarily destroyed. And instead, a whole generation basically adopted irrational ideas; ideas that were provably frauds from a scientific standpoint—the biggest being the idea that human beings cannot change the world, cannot solve problems, but exist to enjoy minute-to-minute pleasures and to avoid pain. . . .

So the Baby-Boomer generation was destroyed through this process of shock trauma. These kinds of experiences are curable; but as LaRouche has been saying, it's going to take the intervention of the LaRouche Youth Movement to do that.

'Not a Pax Americana'

A final point: We're now facing, in the Bush—I should say, the Cheney—Administration, the realization of many elements of what Bertrand Russell was peddling: the idea of a global one-world tyranny, this time under the mantle of what has been referred to as "the American Empire"—using nuclear weapons at free will, through the building of mini-nuclear weapons. This was Bertrand Russell's wet dream.

Now, in that June 10 [1963] speech by Kennedy, where he announced this fundamental shift in U.S. policy, to bring the Cold War to a very rapid end, he said, "What kind of peace do I mean, and what kind of peace do we seek? Not a Pax Americana, enforced on the world by American weapons of war; nor the peace of the grave, or the security of the slave. I am talking about genuine peace; the kind of peace that makes life on Earth worth living; and the kind that enables men and nations to grow and to hope, and build a better life for their children. Not merely peace for Americans, but peace for all men and women; not merely peace in our time, but peace in all times."

So that was what was killed with the Kennedy assassination. And the wilfull intent was to defeat what Kennedy was trying to do; but also to crush the human spirit in the larger sense. And in that regard, the King assassination, Robert Kennedy, all these events of the 1960s, were part of one single strategy that, sadly, had a profound and decisively negative effect on an entire generation that is now in the leadership of world affairs today, and has to be cured of that disease.