

EIR Strategy of Tension

Strategy of Tension: The Case of Italy

by Claudio Celani

Part 2

With the exception of the 1980 Bologna train-station massacre, all major episodes of blind terrorism in Italy have remained legally unsolved, thanks to a systematic cover-up and sabotage of the investigations carried out by intelligence structures. That is why somebody like Stefano delle Chiaie, for instance, the leader of Avanguardia Nazionale and lieutenant of “Black Prince” Junio Valerio Borghese, can today walk free in Rome with no one allowed to call him a terrorist. That is why the 1994-2001 Parliament Investigating Commission was called “on the Failed Identification of the Authors of Terrorist Massacres”. Recently, a new Milan trial on the 1969 Piazza Fontana bomb had changed this pattern, but the sentence, as we have said, was overturned on appeal.

Similarly, the two major terrorist actions of 1974, the Brescia “Piazza della Loggia” massacre and the *Italicus* train bombings, have been followed by a massive coverup and destruction of evidence, which led to definitive acquittals for the indicted. However, the coverup itself could be discovered and become the evidence for a judgment on those responsible for those events.

Massacre in Piazza della Loggia

On May 28, 1974, a bomb exploded in Piazza della Loggia, Brescia, during a trade union demonstration, causing 8 dead and 103 wounded. The bomb was claimed by Ordine Nero, a neofascist organization which, a few weeks earlier, had joined three other groups—SAM, Avanguardia Nazionale, and Movimento di Azione Rivoluzionaria (MAR)—in a common action paper. Written by MAR leader Carlo Fumagalli, it had announced “war on the State” through “attacks

against the main railway lines”.

On Aug. 4 of that year, a bomb exploded on the Rome-Munich *Italicus* train, at San Benedetto Val di Sambro, causing 12 dead and 105 casualties. The massacre could have been much larger if the bomb had exploded in a tunnel the train had just gone through. Like the Piazza della Loggia bomb, the *Italicus* action was claimed by Ordine Nero.

Investigators are today convinced that those two terrorist actions were no longer part of a coup plan, and that Fumagalli’s people moved as a reaction against what they considered to be a “betrayal” by the military faction. According to Sen. Giovanni Pellegrino, chairman of the Parliament Investigating Commission, “at the beginning of the Seventies, the strategists of the Tension abandoned the military option. But their soldiers, the footsoldiers of the clandestine networks, keep waiting for a new call to arms and, while waiting, maintain their activities.”

Thus the “strategists” were forced to eliminate those sections of the terrorist apparatus which had become “uncomfortable.” Fumagalli was arrested on May 9, 1974 by a Carabinieri squad under captain Francesco Delfino. Fumagalli’s people, then, placed the bomb in Brescia. “Today we know,” Pellegrino says, “that the terrorist target was the Carabinieri, who usually, during a demonstration, would line up under the Portico of Piazza della Loggia.” By chance, that day, the rain forced the demonstrators to change their route, passing through the place where the Carabinieri were supposed to stay and where the bomb went off. Less than two hours after the explosion, the police chief ordered the fire brigades to clean up the square with hydrants and hoses, destroying any evidence. Two days later, in a mountain region around the central Italian city of Rieti, the Carabinieri assaulted a paramilitary camp and killed, in a shootout, Giancarlo Esposti, a young right-

wing extremist very close to the MAR. Esposti had called his father soon after Fumagalli's arrest on May 9, 1974 saying he was fleeing because the Carabinieri had betrayed them.

In Brescia, prosecutor Mario Arcai, investigating the May 28 massacre, found the name of his son in a list of neofascists suspected for the bombing. The list was provided by captain Delfino. This circumstance forced Arcai out of the investigation, in a move, as Arcai later denounced, to prevent his discovering the higher level behind Fumagalli's terrorist group. Nevertheless, Brescia prosecutors succeeded in nailing down some possible perpetrators of the massacre, among whom Ermanno Buzzi, a neofascist who was sentenced to life prison in 1979. Two years later, Buzzi was suddenly transferred in the Novara prison, where less than 36 hours later he was strangled by the former military leader of Ordine Nuovo, Pierluigi Concutelli, and his comrade Mario Tuti. Two more witnesses of the Brescia massacre died violently, and finally, in 1982, the Court of Appeal acquitted all culprits who were still alive. As for Fumagalli, nobody knows where he is today, nor whether he is still alive.

Coup Plotters' 'Breakaway Ally'

Even if some sections of the "Strategists of the Tension" still believed in the feasibility of a coup d'état, after the Brescia massacre such plans suffered a definitive setback. On July 17, 1974, Defense minister Giulio Andreotti announced the replacement of a dozen high military officials, in the Army and the Navy, to prevent a coup planned for Aug. 10. Andreotti put the entire Armed Forces on alert and strengthened security around the Presidential Palace. This is the famous "white coup" organized by Edgardo Sogno we have seen earlier. Andreotti had already replaced the head of the SID military intelligence service, Vito Miceli, with Admiral Casardi. Miceli was arrested in October by prosecutor Tamburino in Verona, who was investigating the Rosa dei Venti network, and incriminated also for the 1970 Borghese coup attempt. That same year, Commander Borghese himself died—through a "corrected" cup of coffee, according to his lieutenant Stefano delle Chiaie. In this context, the *Italicus* bomb, Aug. 4, would fit in the "breakaway ally" pattern. Both the Bologna trial (which incorporated the *Italicus* one) and the Parliament Investigating Commission on the secret P2 Lodge, have come to the conclusion that "the *Italicus* action can be traced back to a terrorist organization, of neofascist or neonazi



Italian Sen. Giovanni Pellegrino's (left) Commission investigated the 1970s combination of planned coups état and terrorism known as the "Strategy of Tension." It showed that the plots involved Synarchist fascist operations with Anglo-American and French links, disguised as "left-wing" anarchism; the Commission studied EIR's 1979 "Who Killed Aldo Moro" report. Henry Kissinger (right, with the later-assassinated Olof Palme) had directly threatened Moro, in person, with his fate.

character, operating in Tuscany." The first trial ended with an acquittal against three such neofascists, Mario Tuti, Luciano Franci and Piero Malentacchi. The appeal court then overturned the acquittal, sentencing the three to life in prison (Mario Tuti, we have seen, "executed" his comrade Buzzi in the Novara prison). However, the appeal sentence was invalidated by the Corte di Cassazione and the new appeal trial ended with a final acquittal.

Indicating that the neofascists had been "dumped" by their puppetmasters, the day before the bomb, MSI leader Giorgio Almirante in Rome leaked to the head of the newly formed police Antiterrorism Unit, Emilio Santillo, that he had been informed—by a source in the neofascist camp—that a terror attack on a train had been planned for the following day. However, Almirante gave—apparently due to a misunderstanding—the wrong time: the train would leave from the Rome Tiburtina station at 5.30 instead of 17.30. Similarly, Adm. Gino Birindelli, a former NATO commander and a participant in the 1971 Borghese coup attempt, as well as a member of Almirante's party, had delivered more detailed information to the Carabinieri head in Firenze, Gen. Luigi Bittoni, about the coming train bomb attack. Birindelli communicated the names of three neofascists in Arezzo, among whom Franci, who would be planning such an action. Bittoni informed the Carabinieri head in Arezzo, Col. Domenico Tuminello, who apparently did nothing.

After the explosion, when the Bologna prosecutors were looking for Augusto Cauchi, the head of the Arezzo neofascist cell, Cauchi was protected by the head of SID section in Florence, Federigo Mannucci Benincasa, who did not deliver information on Cauchi's whereabouts to the investigators. Later, in 1982, Mannucci Benincasa admitted that Cauchi was an SID collaborator.

The P2 Masonic Lodge vs. Moro

Seven years after the Brescia and *Italicus* bombings, a police unit, sent by Milan prosecutors Colombo and Turone, to a villa in Castiglion Fibocchi, near Arezzo, discovered the common house of all cover-ups, from the 1989 Piazza Fontana, to the Brescia and *Italicus* bombings, including the 1980 Bologna train-station massacre. In the residence of Arezzo businessman Licio Gelli, the police found the list of members of a secret freemasonic lodge, called Propaganda Due (P2), of which Gelli was the Grand Master.

Among the 953 names found, were: Carabinieri captain Francesco Delfino, the man whom we have seen in action in the Brescia case; Admiral Birindelli, General Bittoni and Colonel Luminello, who moved (or did not move) in the *Italicus* case; Federico Umberto d'Amato, the powerful head of the Ufficio Affari Riservati (Office of Secret Affairs) of the Interior Ministry, whence the first coverup of the Piazza Fontana bombing came; former SID head General Miceli, the man who covered up the Borghese coup attempt; Gen. Gianadelio Maletti and Captain LaBruna, two military intelligence officers who provided protection to neofascist terrorists in the aftermath of the Piazza Fontana massacre; also participants to the 1965 Istituto Pollio meeting, such as Filippo de Jorio, and to the Borghese coup attempt, such as businessman Remo Orlandini and Air Force Gen. Duilio Fanali; as well as Col. Amos Spiazzi of the Rosa dei Venti, and "white coup" organizer Edgardo Sogno.

The most important part of the list, however, included all the leaders of the Armed Forces, of the secret services, of several police branches; politicians and businessmen. The list was so hot that the two prosecutors informed the government before making it public. When the government finally decided to publish the list, public reaction was so big that Prime Minister Arnaldo Forlani had to resign; his Cabinet chief was on that list too.

The P2, according to the Parliament Investigating Committee, was an association of "mutual help," in which every member swore to "help, comfort, and defend" his "brothers even at cost of his life." The aim was to promote each member to positions of power in the society. The Parliament considered the P2 a subversive conspiracy. This does not mean, however, that all members of the P2 were plotters. Many politicians, public officials and military figures joined the pro-Atlanticist P2 because this allowed them to have a "cosmic" sort of clearance with Anglo-American institutions. Others, like current Italian Premier Silvio Berlusconi, said they joined in order to "conduct business." One thing is clear: only part of the full P2 membership was discovered, as the numbers on member cards go well beyond the 953 found in Castiglion Fibocchi. As to the role of Gelli, Pellegrino is convinced that he was not the real head of the P2, but that if P2 were a "port," Gelli would be the Port Authority.

At the beginning, the P2 itself was used as a vehicle in the coup strategy. In 1971, in fact, Gelli sent a letter to all military members of the P2, inviting them to consider the possibility

of installing a military government. In 1973, there was a meeting in Gelli's Villa Wanda in Arezzo, of all main participants in such a project. Later on, the strategy changed, as the P2 was upgraded. But from the beginning, there was deep hostility and hatred against Christian Democratic (CD) leader Aldo Moro and his policy.

The failure of the first phase of the Strategy of Tension was due to a simple fact: the open association of the project with forces too much identified with Mussolini's fascism, made it impossible to reach a broad consensus in support of an authoritarian shift. Too vivid was the memory among the Italians, of the suffering under the fascist dictatorship and in the war, into which the dictator had pulled the nation. Thus the secret Masonic lodge was formed to recruit the national anti-communist elite to a project which was presented as "pro-American" and clean of the old fascist face (which in reality was only hidden). Right-wing terrorism, put under control, was still a capability, to be run through members of the Lodge.

Licio Gelli, who was picked for the new strategy, had joined Freemasonry already in 1965—i.e., in the year of the Istituto Pollio meeting—but only in 1971 did he start to recruit to the Propaganda Due Lodge, when he was appointed its organizing secretary. The lodge was already a special one, dedicated to public figures who would not like publicity, and therefore were initiated directly by the Grand Master, without the public ceremony in front of the "brothers." But when Gelli started to stuff the P2 Lodge with military officers, Grand Orient leader Salvini became afraid and moved to publically expose Gelli. On July 10, 1971, Salvini accused Gelli of "organizing a coup d'état." A large opposition against Gelli grew inside Freemasonry. In 1973, the so-called "democratic Masons" planted a very strong denunciation of Gelli in the magazine *Panorama*. In December 1974, 600 Gran Maestri, gathered in Naples, and demanded from Salvini the ousting of Gelli. Salvini formalized the request in an act of dissolution of the P2, but before he could get that through, Gelli organized a Grand Lodge meeting and won the vote, by blackmailing Salvini with a dossier on Salvini's financial misdealings. As a result, instead of being expelled, Gelli was appointed Grand Master of the P2 Lodge. His enemies, the "democratic masons," were expelled from the Grand Orient.

Moro's 'Parallel Convergences'

On July 26, 1976, in order to stop public attention on the P2, Salvini officially dissolved it. In reality, from that moment on, the P2 became secret and totally autonomous, an instrument in the hands of "puppetmaster" Gelli's strategy to stop Aldo Moro's policy.

In 1976, the strong electoral gains of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), which was now only a couple of percentage points behind the Christian Democracy (DC), forced a shift in the political picture in favor of Aldo Moro's strategy. Moro had understood that the solution to Italy's vulnerability to external interference in its own sovereignty lay in transforming the PCI into a fully pro-West and democratic party. If that

occurred, there could be no obstacles to a normal change in political power, like in other western democracies, and no pretext for subjecting Italy to Anglo-American imperial politics under the pretext of anti-communism.

Moro developed therefore the strategy of “parallel convergences,” or the possibility of associating the PCI with government responsibilities, along with the DC, in a “national solidarity” cabinet. In 1974, after the failure of the Popular Front government in Chile and the Pinochet coup, PCI leader Enrico Berlinguer had already proposed a similar strategy of alliance with the DC, calling it “historical compromise.” In 1976, then, Berlinguer broke with Moscow by publically stating that the PCI would respect Italy’s membership in NATO.

Moro’s included aim was to defeat the right-wing forces in his own DC, those responsible for having blocked the reformist potential of the center-left governments which he had promoted since 1962. In a May 1973 interview with the weekly *Tempo*, Moro had stated: “The real Right wing is always dangerous, due to its reactionary force, for the threat it inevitably represents against the democratic order. Its influence is far greater than what it might seem from the consistency of the political and parliamentary front which refers to it. These are not words, but fundamental political data.”

This past September 2003, puppetmaster Licio Gelli “re-surfaced” in an interview in which he bluntly confessed his hostility against Moro, and recounted an episode in which the two had a confrontation (see *EIR*, March 26, 2004). Moro was not impressed by Gelli; however, he was shocked when the same hostility was expressed by U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. During a visit to the United States in 1974, Moro was brutally told by Kissinger that he should abandon his policy of dialogue with the PCI. Moro’s wife Eleonora, who testified in front of the Parliament Investigating Commission, reported Kissinger’s words as follows: “You must stop pursuing your political plan, of bringing all political forces in your country to collaborate directly. Now, either you stop doing such things, or you will pay for that. It is up to you how to interpret this.”

Moro was so shocked that he got physically ill. Upon his return to Italy, he seriously considered the idea of withdrawing from politics. The fact that he did not do so, but pushed his strategy ahead, knowing that his life was at stake, adds real greatness to his political figure. “Don’t you think I know,” he said to one of his university pupils, “that I can end up like Kennedy?”

The Career of a Synarchist

Licio Gelli started his political career as a fascist under Mussolini, participating in the Spanish Civil War on the side of the coup plotters who overthrew the republican government. After the fall of Mussolini in 1943, Gelli adhered to the “Repubblica Sociale,” the northern Italian rump state nominally led by Mussolini but totally in the hands of the Nazi SS. In Pistoia, he became an official with the local SS, at the same time developing contacts with Resistance circles. According

to the Parliamentary Investigation of the P2, “Gelli, shortly before the end of WWII, had no problems in developing contacts of collaboration and understanding with the party which inevitably was appearing as the winner. While still wearing a German uniform, or better, by using it as an asset . . . he led a difficult game, in constant and dubious balance between the two parts.”

After the war, Gelli started an official activity as a textile businessman in Arezzo, owner of the renowned Lebole firm. Unofficially, he kept playing his double game. An Italian secret service (SID) report dated September 1950, said that a source in the American Embassy characterized Gelli as an agent of an Eastern European secret service. That document, in the eyes of the Pellegrino Committee, marked the beginning of Gelli’s service under Anglo-American and Italian intelligence structures. The evidence on his past as a communist agent, in the hands of his controllers, ensured Gelli’s loyalty—and his protection—from now on.

Thus, Italian prosecutors investigating terrorist cases encountered Gelli’s name more than once, but when they requested information from the secret services, they were told the lie that there was no file on him. For instance, on July 4, 1977, SID head Admiral Casardi answered a formal request from Bologna prosecutors investigating the *Italicus* massacre: “SID does not have particular information on the P2 Lodge. . . . There is no information on Licio Gelli as concerns his membership in the P2, beyond what the press has reported.” Anti-terrorism chief Emilio Santillo, a man who made a serious effort to discover the truth about the P2, got the same “rubber wall” treatment from the secret service, and had to refer to the documents by the “democratic masons” in order to fill out his reports to investigators.

The first secret service report acknowledging the existence of the P2 was written in 1978, by the new military intelligence body, SISMI, under the direction of P2 member General Santovito. The report was an attack—not against the P2, but against an “anti-Masonic plot” allegedly carried out by some political forces: Nothing on Gelli or his connections to right-wing terrorism.

In 1981, when a Guardia di Finanza (GdF, an Army corps in charge of financial police duties) unit led by Col. Vincenzo Bianchi first searched Gelli’s Villa Wanda, and put their hands on the P2 membership list, Bianchi received a phone call from Gen. Orazio Giannini, national head of the GdF, who told him to be careful, because the list contained the names of “all the top leaders of the Corps.” Of course, including Giannini himself.

The Left-Right Red Brigades

In the early morning of March 16, 1978, Aldo Moro left his house in Via della Camilluccia, in Rome, to reach the Parliament. That day, his years-long efforts to build a “national solidarity” cabinet—i.e., a center-left government supported also by the PCI—were going to be finally rewarded. The Parliament was expected to vote confidence to such a

cabinet, led by Giulio Andreotti.

Moro never reached Parliament. In Via Fani, the two-car convoy in which Moro and his escort were riding was blocked by a terrorist commando. Under massive fire, all members of Moro's escort died and Moro himself was pulled out of the car and carried away. Soon after, the so-called Red Brigades claimed responsibility for the operation, sending a Polaroid picture of Moro prisoner, sitting with a Red Brigades symbol on the background. The kidnapping of Aldo Moro had a bloody conclusion after 55 days, on May 9, when his corpse was found in the trunk of a red Renault 4, in the central Via Caetani in Rome.

The Red Brigades were born as a leftist terrorist group, out of the violent sections of the 1968 student upsurge. A crucial moment for this development is the 1969 Piazza Fontana massacre, which was used to manipulate such radical left-wing fringes into a violent reaction. However, from the beginning, the Red Brigades included elements belonging to what Brescia prosecutor Giovanni Arcai has characterized as a "technostructure" controlling both right-wing and left-wing extremism. Interestingly, Arcai's enemy, P2 member Captain Delfino (today a general), fully agreed with him on this.

Senator Pellegrino identified such a structure in Hyperion, officially a language school based in Paris, founded by Vanni Molinaris, Corrado Simioni, and Duccio Berio, three participants in the 1969 founding of the Red Brigades. Those three formed, with Mario Moretti, a superclandestine group, called the Superclan. While Moretti stayed in Italy, and eventually became the military leader of the Red Brigades, the other three moved to Paris in 1974, where they founded Hyperion. Hyperion was highly protected: when Padua prosecutor Guido Calogero, in 1979, secretly went to Paris to investigate it, the number two of D'Amato at the Ufficio Affari Riservati, Silvano Russomanno, leaked the information to the press, and suddenly all doors for Calogero in Paris were closed. "Figures like Abbé Pierre, one of the animators of Hyperion, "Pellegrino remarked, "surely have international connections which guarantee him great protection."

According to Sergio Flamigni—a former senator who has worked on the Parliamentary Commissions on the Moro case and on the P2, and who has published several books on the Moro case—despite the fact that the Italian terrorists were wanted in Italy for "membership in a clandestine group aiming at subverting, through armed struggle, the institutions of the State, . . . the Superclan leaders received a green light from the French secret service to open the 'language school'; they enjoyed also the support of Dominican father Felix Morlion, founder of the Pro Deo intelligence service and financed by the American secret services."

Recently declassified OSS reports describe Morlion in 1945 as leader of a faction in the Vatican pushing for an authoritarian, Spanish Falange-like solution for postwar Italy. Morlion was supported by anti-Roosevelt U.S. factions, while



The number-one target of the Strategy of Tension plotters was Aldo Moro's policy in government. EIR traced his 1975 kidnapping and murder by the "leftist" Red Brigades, to orders from above, from Mussolini fascist holdovers and foreign intelligence.

his opponent in the Vatican, Monsignor Giambattista Montini (later Pope Paul VI), in agreement with Roosevelt, wanted a democratic regime in which the party of the Christian Democracy, of which he was the spiritual father, played a central role. Eventually, Montini prevailed.

Morlion kept influencing right-wing policies in Italy, through the Pro Deo University which he founded with U.S. money. In 1991, he was exposed by Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti as the recruiter of Turkish terrorist Ali Agca in the plot to assassinate Pope John Paul II.

Italy's most distinguished investigators, like prosecutors Rosario Priore or Ferdinando Imposimato, agree that the protection ensured by Francois Mitterrand's French government and security agencies, to Italian terrorist fugitives, has hindered discovering the full truth about terrorism.

And yet, in 1974, the Carabinieri under Gen. Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa succeeded in almost decapitating the Red Brigades. Thanks to the infiltration of Silvano Girotto, a former priest who had guerrilla experience in Latin America, Dalla Chiesa's men organized a trap to capture the leadership group of Mario Moretti, Renato Curcio, and Alberto Franceschini. At the last moment, Moretti was alerted and escaped the trap. However, he did not warn Curcio and Franceschini, who were captured. The leak came from inside the Dalla

Chiesa Carabinieri unit. From that moment on, there was a qualitative change in the Red Brigades, which became a highly professional group from the standpoint of military capabilities. The new leader Moretti, according to Pellegrino, was probably “the contact man with something that was above or beyond the Red Brigades.” Moretti “used to travel often to France, without anybody realizing it,” reported general Dalla Chiesa to the Parliament Committee.

Why Moro Was Not Found

Twenty-six years after Moro’s assassination and after four trials, the full truth has not yet come out. In the meantime, the Red Brigades terrorists have been captured, sentenced and today are all free. *EIR* has reported the many questions still unanswered in the Moro case. We focus here on the main elements which are central to the purpose of our reconstruction of the Strategy of Tension.

One and a half months before Moro’s kidnapping, the central anti-terrorism office of the police was dissolved. The decision was taken by Police Minister Francesco Cossiga, a personal friend of Licio Gelli, after a reform of the secret services which replaced the old SID with two agencies: SISMI (military intelligence) and SISDE (civilian intelligence), coordinated by a body under the Prime Minister, CESIS. The anti-terrorism personnel, under police chief De Francesco, was not integrated in any of the new agencies, but simply disbanded. Thus, when the Red Brigades took action on March 16, Italian anti-terrorism forces were simply blind.

Immediately after Moro’s kidnapping, Cossiga established a “technical-operational committee” to coordinate police action and to issue strategic guidelines aimed at finding Moro’s prison and liberating him. Almost all members of the committee were members of the P2 Lodge: Adm. Giovanni Torrisi, head of General Staff of the Defense; Gen. Giuseppe Santovito, head of SISMI; Gen. Giulio Grassini, head of SISDE; Walter Pelosi, head of CESIS; Gen. Raffaele Lo Giudice, head of the Guardia di Finanza; Gen. Donato Lo Prete, chief of General Staff of the Guardia di Finanza.

Cossiga then established another committee, called “Committee I” (Intelligence) formed by the heads of SISMI, SISDE, CESIS and Armed Forces Intelligence (SIOS)—all P2 members. A third body, the “Experts Committee,” included various professors, among whom Steve Pieznick, sent by the U.S. State Department, and Franco Ferracuti, a criminologist and P2 member who imposed the line that Moro, whatever he would say from his prison, had to be considered mad, a victim of the “Stockholm syndrome.”

During Moro’s captivity, Cossiga enforced a spectacular deployment of police and army forces in the streets of Rome, but in reality nothing serious was done to find the prison. One case is most striking: Two times the police received indications concerning a flat in Via Gradoli, where Red Brigadist Mario Moretti lived—once from the flat’s neighbors; the second time in an obscure circumstance involving current EU

chairman Romano Prodi. The first time, a policeman was sent to speak to the neighbors, but the flat was not searched. The second time, Prodi went personally to Cossiga to report that, during a séance with friends, the name “Gradoli” had come out. Cossiga, of course, knew that Prodi and his friends, professors at Bologna University, had probably received information from radical circles close to the Red Brigades, and that the séance story was a trick to cover the source.

Immediately, Cossiga sent hundreds of policemen—not to via Gradoli, but to a village outside Rome called Gradoli. A mistake? Not quite. Sen. Sergio Flamigni found out, years later, that SISMI owned a few flats in via Gradoli, including in the same building where the suspicious flat was. But the spectacular police deployment the other Gradoli, broadcast by radio and television, sent a warning to the terrorists to leave the Via Gradoli. On April 18, finally police entered the flat, and discovered that this, indeed, had been Moretti’s hideout; they did so, because somebody who had the flat keys, had made sure that, by leaving the water open in the bathroom, a real flood would force the neighbors to call the fire brigades.

The Trail to Palazzo Caetani

While Cossiga’s structures did nothing serious to find Moro, the political forces let themselves be captured by a division between those who proposed to negotiate with the Red Brigades to obtain Moro’s liberation (“partito della trattativa”), and those who insisted that this would have meant the capitulation of the State to terrorism (“partito della fermezza”). The Red Brigades demanded the liberation of all of their comrades in jail, a demand which could never be met and this strengthened the position of the hard-liners. However, three years later, when a Christian Democratic politician was kidnapped in Naples, the same hardliners did not hesitate to open negotiations and obtain his release.

Moro’s real prison has never been found. In September 1978, the Partito Operaio Europeo, associated with Lyndon LaRouche, published a report entitled *Who Killed Aldo Moro?* which for the first time established that the Red Brigades were the instrument of oligarchical forces who controlled both “left” and “right” terrorism, and which historically considered themselves as the enemies of the nation-state. The dossier also suggested that Moro’s prison was to be looked for, close to where his corpse was found, that is in via Caetani, and possibly in Palazzo Caetani.

Recent findings of the Parliamentary Committee chaired by Senator Pellegrino have confirmed such suggestions in an astonishing way. The Committee has found out that, shortly after Moro had been kidnapped, SISMI briefly investigated a certain “Igor Caetani,” a member of the oligarchical Caetani family. The real name of Igor Caetani was Igor Markevich, a Russian-born conductor who had married a Caetani princess. Markevich was suspected of being an intermediary between the Red Brigades and political factions who were ready to

break the “fermezza” line and negotiate a deal to obtain Moro’s freedom.

Why Markevich? Digging into his past, Committee experts have found that he was probably a double or triple intelligence agent, working for Anglo-American, Israeli, and possibly Russian intelligence circles. More important than Markevich was another inhabitant of Palazzo Caetani, Hubert Howard, who had also married a Caetani princess. Both Markevich and Howard were members of esoteric freemasonic circles. Howard had been a high British intelligence officer during the war, and had kept that function throughout the following decades. Some suspect that Howard was the real head of the secret NATO “stay-behind” network, called Gladio. According to some reconstructions, the order to kill Moro was not given by Moretti’s people, but came from above and possibly through Howard.

To be continued

Taiwan Election Shaken

Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian claimed an extremely narrow electoral victory on March 20, following a very strange shooting incident on March 19. Many questions remain as to what really happened when Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) President Chen and Vice President Annette Lu Hsiu-lien were both lightly wounded by gunshots at a campaign motorcade.

The difference between Chen and opposition candidate Lien Chan of the Kuomintang Party was less than 30,000 votes, out of about 13 million total—about 0.2%—while over 330,000 votes were invalid. Lien Chan has called for a recount, filed with the court for an annulment of the election, and has called for an investigation of the suspicious shooting, which most analysts believe turned a solid loss for the incumbent Chen into a shaky victory. “This slim gap has been achieved under clouds of suspicion. It’s not a fair election,” he said. Taiwan’s High Court ordered all ballot boxes sealed, pending a ruling on a recount.

However, voter turnout for President Chen’s highly provocative anti-Mainland referendum, which was held simultaneously with the election, was well below the required 50%, meaning that it was defeated. The referendum was considered so destabilizing that even U.S. President George Bush had called on Chen to drop it.

China has released a statement saying that the “Taiwan authorities willfully held the so-called ‘peace referendum’ in a provocative attempt to undermine cross-Straits relations and split the motherland. The referendum turned out to be invalid. . . . Any attempt to separate Taiwan from China is doomed to failure.”

With the stock market falling by 10% in the days following the election, President Chen Shui-bian agreed to a recount, proposing first passing a law mandating a recount if any vote difference is less than 1%. However, the opposition demanded that Chen use his presidential powers to mandate an immediate recount, and called for mass demonstrations on March 27.

The Court, which sealed the ballot boxes, ruled against the petition for annulment, but only on procedural grounds, ruling that the opposition must wait until Chen was sworn in on March 26, to refile the petition.

Could Plotters Cancel Philippine Elections?

The *Philippines Daily Tribune* of March 25 described a “Strategy of Tension” unfolding in Manila. The *Tribune* notes that President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has appointed her “political patron,” and master coup-instigator, former President Fidel Ramos, as chief advisor to her newly created “Anti-Terror Task Force.” The *Tribune* further notes that the make-up of the Task Force is remarkably similar to a “junta” proposed by Ramos cohort, retired Gen. Fortunato Abat, to replace the presidency. Abat, who worked closely with Ramos in overthrowing President Joseph Estrada in 2001, is openly organizing a “No-EI” (for “No-Elections”) campaign, to cancel the May 10 elections and impose the junta. Although Ramos has distanced himself from the campaign of his old cohort, no one has moved to arrest Abat for his blatantly treasonous call.

The *Tribune* writes: “Palace sources said that with Ramos in the picture, it can be deduced that this [the Anti-Terror Task Force] could very well be a political-military move, with the former President [Ramos] playing a major role. But sources in the military intimated that this could well be the start of the No-EI (No-Elections) plot, which is tied in with the ‘Oplan Bawas,’ a Palace-military plot to sow terror, violence and chaos as an excuse to set the stage for a junta government in which Mrs. Arroyo, former presidents Corazon Aquino and Ramos, along with Mrs. Arroyo’s loyal military generals, will serve in the council that will supervise the government.”

Arroyo justified the creation of the Task Force by the Madrid bombings, arguing that the Philippines, like Spain, has fully embraced and contributed to the U.S. war on Iraq. She also claimed that an unidentified group of “terrorist-politicians” within the Philippines is planning to stage violent activities to disrupt the May 10 elections—just the kind of supposed danger that could “justify” their cancellation and an emergency regime.